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Socialist market economy

2025-12-01T06:44:04Z

Sparkingcircuit: Adding "Socialist Market Economy" to "Economics".

'''Socialist market economy'''<ref group="lower-alpha">Chinese: 社会主义市场经济; Pinyin: Shèhuìzhǔyì Shìchǎng Jīngjì</ref> is the official term of the government of the [[People's Republic of China]] for the economic system implemented in the country. It was first proposed by [[Deng Xiaoping]], then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the [[Communist Party of China]], in the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978.<ref>{{Citation|author=Fan Gao|year=2022|title=Political economy in the evolution of China’s urban-rural economic relations|page=55|quote=After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, under the leadership of the CPC, China embarked on a major strategy of market-oriented reform and further opening to the outside world. Compared with the planned economy adopted in the past, this registered a widely influential and profound economic transformation. Since the inception of reform and opening up in 1978, beyond regarding socialist system as an “instrument”, China has stressed understanding socialist system as a “function” and a “value” and reiterated that the greatest ad- vantage of socialist system over capitalist system is its ability to drive the emancipation and development of productivity and to realize common prosperity on the basis of developed productivity|city=New York|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-003-18585-7|lg=http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=627E4017904A877AE5D8D6F0DF56FC48|series=China Perspectives}}</ref> It is related to the policy of [[Reform and Opening Up|Reform and opening up]], being a core part of [[Socialism with Chinese Characteristics]].<ref>[https://www.wxyjs.org.cn/dhgjzyldryj_558/201207/t20120712_17005.htm <nowiki>Jiang Zemin and the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economic System . "Party Literature" Issue 5, 2010. 2013-09-06 [ 2016-11-25 ] .</nowiki>]</ref>

The system is a market economy with the predominance of public ownership and state-owned enterprises. Originating in the Chinese economic reforms initiated in 1978 that integrated China into the global market economy, the [[Socialism|socialist]] market economy represents a preliminary or "primary stage" of developing socialism.<ref>[http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/topic/bizchina/economicsystem/200406/20040600239133.shtml "Socialist Market Economic System". Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. 25 June 2004. Retrieved 7 March 2018. <q>The development of the economic system with public ownership playing a dominant role and diverse forms of ownership developing side by side is a basic characteristic of the socialist economic system at the preliminary stage…The public economy consists not only the state-owned economy and the collective economy, but also the state-owned and collective component in the mixed-ownership economy. The dominant position of the public ownership is represented that: the public assets have a dominant proportion in the overall assets of the society; the state-owned economy controls the lifeline of the national economy and plays a leading role in the economic development, as is from the aspect of the whole country.</q>]</ref>

== History ==

=== Historical precedents ===
[[Deng Xiaoping]]'s approach to the socialist market economy, though innovative, was grounded in the historical precedents set by [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]] practices, particularly those pioneered by [[Vladimir Lenin]] with his [[New Economic Policy]] (NEP).<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1985|title=Reform is the only way for China to develop its productive forces|quote=What, after all, is socialism? The Soviet Union has been building socialism for so many years and yet is still not quite clear what it is. Perhaps Lenin had a good idea when he adopted the New Economic Policy. But as time went on, the Soviet pattern became ossified. We were victorious in the Chinese revolution precisely because we applied the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism to our own realities.}}</ref> Both leaders implemented market mechanisms within a socialist framework to address economic underdevelopment and stimulate growth, particularly in contexts where productive forces were hindered by historical exploitation or adverse conditions.<ref>{{Citation|author=Domenico Losurdo|year=2017|title=Has China turned to capitalism? — Reflections on the transition from capitalism to socialism|quote=Both the Soviet NEP and the new Chinese course were preceded by poverty and shortages acute and widespread enough to cause large-scale starvation; this situation had to be ended and a repetition had to be prevented, and this marked the turning point within Soviet Russia and China. [...]
Here is an indirect comparison between the Soviet NEP and the reform policies adopted by Deng Xiaoping in China. It is obvious what the two have in common: total political expropriation of the bourgeoisie does not equal total economic expropriation.}}</ref>

Lenin's NEP, introduced in the early 1920s, was a strategic retreat from the more rigid [[war communism]], aiming to revive the economy by allowing some degree of private enterprise and market dynamics, especially in agriculture. This policy was crucial in rebuilding Russia's economy by encouraging small-scale trade and farming, which helped stabilize the nation and modernize its agricultural sector. Lenin believed that incorporating market strategies did not compromise the socialist nature of the state but was a necessary tactic to develop the country's productive forces.<ref>{{Citation|author=Vladimir Lenin|year=1922|title=Role and functions of the trade unions under the New Economic Policy|quote=The New Economic Policy introduces a number of important changes in the position of the proletariat and, consequently, in that of the trade unions. The great bulk of the means of production in industry and the transport system remains in the hands of the proletarian state. This, together with the nationalization of the land, shows that the New Economic Policy does not change the nature of the workers’ state, although it does substantially alter the methods and forms of socialist development for it permits of economic rivalry between socialism, which is now being built, and capitalism, which is trying to revive by supplying the needs of the vast masses of the peasantry through the medium of the market.

Changes in the forms of socialist development are necessary because the Communist Party and the Soviet government are now adopting special methods to implement the general policy of transition from capitalism to socialism and in many respects are operating differently from the way they operated before [...] In particular, a free market and capitalism, both subject to state control, are now being permitted and are developing; on the other hand, the socialized state enterprises are being put on what is called a profit basis, i. e., they are being reorganized on commercial lines [...]}}</ref>

The underlying philosophy for both Lenin and Deng was based on [[Marxism|Marxist]] principles, acknowledging that socialism could incorporate elements of capitalism pragmatically during its developmental phase.<ref>{{Citation|author=Vladimir Lenin|year=1918|title="Left-wing" childishness|quote=Socialism is inconceivable without large-scale capitalist engineering based on the latest discoveries of modern science. It is inconceivable without planned state organisation, which keeps tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a unified standard in production and distribution. We Marxists have always spoken of this, and it is not worth while wasting two seconds talking to people who do not understand even this (anarchists and a good half of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries).}}</ref> [[Karl Marx|Marx]] himself noted that the lower stages of communism would necessarily carry remnants of the capitalist society from which it emerged, necessitating a period during which individual contributions and remunerations would be aligned with one's work.<ref>{{Citation|author=Karl Marx|year=1875|title=Critique of the Gotha Program|quote=What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society – after the deductions have been made – exactly what he gives to it. [...]
But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby.}}</ref> Engels further supported this view, recognizing the gradual transformation required in transitioning from capitalist to communist societies, contingent upon the maturation of productive forces.<ref>{{Citation|author=Friedrich Engels|year=1847|title=The principles of communism|quote=Will it be possible for private property to be abolished at one stroke?

No, no more than existing forces of production can at one stroke be multiplied to the extent necessary for the creation of a communal society.

In all probability, the proletarian revolution will transform existing society gradually and will be able to abolish private property only when the means of production are available in sufficient quantity.}}</ref>

=== Development in China ===
The [[New Democratic Revolution|Chinese revolution of 1949]] marked a pivotal moment in global communist history, with the [[Communist Party of China]] (CPC), led by [[Mao Zedong]], initiating widespread socialist reforms across a nation previously marred by dynastic rule and imperial subjugation from both Europe and Japan. The initial decades under communist rule saw significant strides in economic development and infrastructure, with industry growth from 1951 to 1975 averaging 82.5%, and agriculture's share in the economy dropping significantly. Life expectancy dramatically increased from 35 years in 1949 to 63 years by 1976, reflecting substantial social improvements.<ref>{{Citation|author=Mobo Gao|year=2008|title=The battle for China's past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution|page=81|quote=The Chinese people made a revolution led by the CCP, the most important leader of which was Mao, a revolution in which Chang’s parents participated, a revolution from which Chang herself benefited. It was due to this revolution that the average life expectancy of the majority Chinese rose from 35 in 1949 to 63 by 1975 (Bergaglio 2006) in a space of less than 30 years. It was a revolution that brought unity and stability to a country that had been plagued by civil wars and foreign invasions, and a revolution that laid the foundation for China to become the equal of the great global powers. It was a revolution that carried out land reform, promoted women’s status, improved popular literacy, and eventually transformed Chinese society beyond recognition (Selden et al 1991, Selden, 1971, Selden and Eggleston 1979, Selden 1988).|publisher=Pluto Press|isbn=9780745327808|lg=http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=F3B2B6834C81EF8F7315CB42A5FB7A29}}</ref>

Despite these gains, China faced critical challenges, including underdeveloped [[productive forces]] and vulnerability to natural disasters, exacerbated by the [[Sino-Soviet split]] which isolated China from much of the socialist bloc. [[Deng Xiaoping]], emerging as a key leader after Mao's death, diagnosed these issues in a 1979 speech, emphasizing China's struggle with its large population and limited arable land, which hindered sufficient production for basic needs.<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1979|title=Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles|quote=First, we are starting from a weak base. The damage inflicted over a long period by the forces of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism reduced China to a state of poverty and backwardness. However, since the founding of the People’s Republic we have achieved signal successes in economic construction, established a fairly comprehensive industrial system and trained a body of technical personnel. From Liberation to last year, the average annual rate of growth in our industry and agriculture was fairly high by world standards. Nonetheless, because of our low starting point, China is still one of the world’s poor countries. [...]

Second, we have a large population but not enough arable land. Of China’s population of more than 900 million, 80 per cent are peasants. While there are advantages to having a large population, there are disadvantages as well. When production is insufficiently developed, it poses serious problems with regard to food, education and employment. We must greatly increase our efforts in family planning; but even if the population does not grow for a number of years, we will still have a population problem for a certain period. Our vast territory and rich natural resources are big assets. But many of these resources have not yet been surveyed and exploited, so they do not constitute actual means of production. Despite China’s vast territory, the amount of arable land is limited, and neither this fact nor the fact that we have a large, mostly peasant population can be easily changed. This is a distinctive characteristic which we must take into account in carrying out our modernization programme.}}</ref>

After a party struggle against the [[Gang of Four]], the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of China]] led by Deng Xiaoping began implementing policies of [[Reform and Opening Up|opening the economy]] to foreign [[capital]], in an effort to [[Four Modernizations|modernize the Chinese economy]].<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1979|title=We can develop a market economy under socialism|title-url=https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/we-can-develop-a-market-economy-under-socialism/|quote=Modernization does represent a great new revolution. The aim of our revolution is to liberate and expand the productive forces. Without expanding the productive forces, making our country prosperous and powerful, and improving the living standards of the people, our revolution is just empty talk. We oppose the old society and the old system because they oppressed the people and fettered the productive forces. We are clear about this problem now. The Gang of Four said it was better to be poor under socialism than to be rich under capitalism. This is absurd.

Of course, we do not want capitalism, but neither do we want to be poor under socialism. What we want is socialism in which the productive forces are developed and the country is prosperous and powerful. We believe that socialism is superior to capitalism. This superiority should be demonstrated in that socialism provides more favourable conditions for expanding the productive forces than capitalism does. This superiority should have become evident, but owing to our differing understanding of it, the development of the productive forces has been delayed, especially during the past ten-year period up to 1976. In the early 1960s, China was behind the developed countries, but the gap was not as wide as it is now. Over the past 11 or 12 years, from the end of the 1960s through the 1970s, the gap has widened because other countries have been vigorously developing their economies, science and technology, with the rate of development no longer being calculated in terms of years, not even in terms of months, but in terms of days. For a fairly long period of time since the founding of the People’s Republic, we have been isolated from the rest of the world. For many years this isolation was not attributable to us; on the contrary, the international anti-Chinese and anti-socialist forces confined us to a state of isolation. However, in the 1960s when opportunities to increase contact and cooperation with other countries presented themselves to us, we isolated ourselves. At last, we have learned to make use of favourable international conditions.|series=Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping}}</ref> To achieve these goals, the Chinese government introduced market reforms through [[Special Economic Zones]] which were established in a few coastal regions that were allowed foreign investment, export-oriented industries, and decollectivized trade.<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1984|title=Make a success of Special Economic Zones and open more cities to the outside world|title-url=https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/08/make-a-success-of-special-economic-zones-and-open-more-cities-to-the-outside-world/|quote=A special economic zone is a medium for introducing technology, management and knowledge. It is also a window for our foreign policy. Through the special economic zones we can import foreign technology, obtain knowledge and learn management, which is also a kind of knowledge. As the base for our open policy, these zones will not only benefit our economy and train people but enhance our nation’s influence in the world. Public order in Shenzhen is reportedly better than before, and people who slipped off to Hong Kong have begun to return. One reason is that there are more job opportunities and people’s incomes and living standards are rising, all of which proves that, in the final analysis, ethical progress is based on material progress.|series=Deng Xiaoping Selected Works}}</ref>

While simultaneously upholding the socialist path (according to Deng Xiaoping), upholding socialist public ownership, public land ownership and rejecting economic polarization. Common prosperity and the abolition of poverty/improving material quality of life, were also the two major decisive factors in why the socialist market economy was implemented.<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1985|title=Bourgeois liberalization means taking the capitalist road|title-url=https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/bourgeois-liberalization-means-taking-the-capitalist-road/|quote=One of the features distinguishing socialism from capitalism is that socialism means common prosperity, not polarization of income. The wealth created belongs first to the state and second to the people; it is therefore impossible for a new bourgeoisie to emerge. The amount that goes to the state will be spent for the benefit of the people, a small portion being used to strengthen national defence and the rest to develop the economy, education and science and to raise the people’s living standards and cultural level.}}</ref>

== Ideological justification ==
[[Reform and Opening Up|China's economic reforms]] were ideologically justified on the basis that the main issue facing [[socialism]] in the country was the underdevelopment of [[productive forces]].<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1980|title=To build socialism we must first develop the productive forces|title-url=https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/to-build-socialism-we-must-first-develop-the-productive-forces/|quote=Revolution means carrying out class struggle, but it does not merely mean that. The development of the productive forces is also a kind of revolution — a very important one. It is the most fundamental revolution from the viewpoint of historical development. [...]

Over the past 30 years since the founding of the People’s Republic, we have laid the basic socialist foundation in agriculture, industry, and other areas. But we have a major problem, that is, we have wasted some time and our productive forces have developed too slowly. All revolution is designed to remove obstacles to the development of the productive forces.}}</ref> The reforms posited that as long as the state avoided bourgeois liberalization,<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1986|title=Take a clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalization|title-url=https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/take-a-clear-cut-stand-against-bourgeois-liberalization/|quote=The struggle against bourgeois liberalization will last for at least 20 years. Democracy can develop only gradually, and we cannot copy Western systems. If we did, that would only make a mess of everything. Our socialist construction can only be carried out under leadership, in an orderly way and in an environment of stability and unity. That’s why I place such emphasis on the need for high ideals and strict discipline. Bourgeois liberalization would plunge the country into turmoil once more. Bourgeois liberalization means rejection of the Party’s leadership; there would be no centre around which to unite our one billion people, and the Party itself would lose all power to fight. [...]

The struggle against bourgeois liberalization is indispensable. We should not be afraid that people abroad will say we are damaging our reputation. We must take our own road and build a socialism adapted to conditions in China — that is the only way China can have a future. We must show foreigners that China’s political situation is stable. If our country were plunged into disorder and our nation reduced to a heap of loose sand, how could we ever accomplish anything? The reason the imperialists were able to bully us in the past was precisely that we were a heap of loose sand.}}</ref> the [[Bourgeoisie|capitalist class]] would remain subordinate due to its own underdevelopment and the prevailing [[dictatorship of the proletariat]].<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1985|title=Reform is the only way for China to develop its productive forces|title-url=https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/reform-is-the-only-way-for-china-to-developed-its-productive-forces/|quote=In the course of reform it is very important for us to maintain our socialist orientation. We are trying to achieve modernization in industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology. [...] Socialism has two major requirements. First, its economy must be dominated by public ownership, and second, there must be no polarization.

Public ownership may consist of both ownership by the entire people and ownership by the collective. [...] At the same time, we allow a small private sector to develop, we absorb foreign capital and introduce advanced technology, we encourage Chinese and foreign enterprises to establish joint and cooperative ventures and we even encourage foreigners to set up wholly owned factories in China. [...]

As to the requirement that there must be no polarization, we have given much thought to this question in the course of formulating and implementing our policies. If there is polarization, the reform will have been a failure. Is it possible that a new bourgeoisie will emerge? A handful of bourgeois elements may appear, but they will not form a class.}}</ref> Deng Xiaoping emphasized the need to learn managerial skills and advanced technology from capitalist enterprises, which he believed would bolster the socialist economy without undermining it.<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1985|title=Reform is the only way for China to develop its productive forces|title-url=https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/reform-is-the-only-way-for-china-to-developed-its-productive-forces/|quote=From such ventures workers get wages and the state collects taxes, and part of the income of the joint and cooperative ventures goes to the socialist sector. An even more important aspect of all these ventures is that from them we can learn managerial skills and advanced technology that will help us develop our socialist economy. This cannot and will not undermine the socialist economy. [...]}}</ref> Similarly, [[Vladimir Lenin]] advocated for learning economic management from capitalists, even if it meant to coexist with [[exploitation]], as a necessary step towards building a socialist republic.<ref>{{Citation|author=Vladimir Lenin|year=1921|title=The New Economic Policy and the tasks of the political education departments|quote=Get down to business, all of you! You will have capitalists beside you, including foreign capitalists, concessionaires and leaseholders. They will squeeze profits out of you amounting to hundreds per cent; they will enrich themselves, operating alongside of you. Let them. Meanwhile you will learn from them the business of running the economy, and only when you do that will you be able to build up a communist republic. Since we must necessarily learn quickly, any slackness in this respect is a serious crime. And we must undergo this training, this severe, stern and sometimes even cruel training, because we have no other way out.

You must remember that our Soviet land is impoverished after many years of trial and suffering, and has no socialist France or socialist England as neighbours which could help us with their highly developed technology and their highly developed industry. Bear that in mind! We must remember that at present all their highly developed technology and their highly developed industry belong to the capitalists, who are fighting us.}}</ref>

[[Deng Xiaoping]] emphasized that socialism's superiority should enable [[Socialist state|socialist countries]] to outpace capitalist ones in economic growth, improving living standards and national strength.<ref>{{Citation|author=Deng Xiaoping|year=1980|title=To build socialism we must first develop the productive forces|title-url=https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/02/25/to-build-socialism-we-must-first-develop-the-productive-forces/|quote=Since socialism is superior to capitalism, socialist countries should be able to develop their economies more rapidly than capitalist countries, improving their people’s living standards gradually and becoming more powerful.}}</ref> Likewise, [[Zhou Enlai]]'s concept of the [[Four Modernizations]], proposed as early as 1963, focused on the essential modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science to build a robust socialist state.<ref>{{Citation|author=Zhou Enlai|year=1963|title=The key to building a powerful socialist country is to modernize science and technology}}</ref>

Zhou Enlai emphasized that the primary objective of socialism was to improve the material welfare and cultural life of the people, arguing that without establishing modern industries, agriculture, communications, transport, and defense, China could not overcome its economic backwardness or achieve its revolutionary goals. This focus reflects the idea that a socialist economy's fundamental aim is to fulfill the material and cultural needs of the population.<ref>{{Citation|author=Zhou Enlai|year=1954|title=Turning China into a powerful, modern, socialist, industrialized country|quote=The fundamental aim of this great people's revolution of ours is to liberate the productive forces of our country from the oppression of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism and, eventually, from the shackles of capitalism and the limitations of small-scale production. That will make it possible for the economy to advance rapidly and according to plan along the road to socialism, thus improving the people's material welfare and cultural life and strengthening the nation's independence and security. China's economy has been very backward. Unless we establish powerful, modern industry, modern agriculture, modern communications and transport, and a modern national defense, we shall neither shake off backwardness and poverty nor attain our revolutionary goals.}}</ref> [[Karl Marx]] held a similar view, arguing that real liberation requires substantial improvements in material conditions and productive forces.<ref>{{Citation|author=Karl Marx|year=1845|title=The German ideology|quote=We shall, of course, not take the trouble to enlighten our wise philosophers by explaining to them that the “liberation” of man is not advanced a single step by reducing philosophy, theology, substance and all the trash to “self-consciousness” and by liberating man from the domination of these phrases, which have never held him in thrall. Nor will we explain to them that it is only possible to achieve real liberation in the real world and by employing real means, that slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule and spinning-jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture, and that, in general, people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and clothing in adequate quality and quantity. “Liberation” is an historical and not a mental act, and it is brought about by historical conditions, the development of industry, commerce, agriculture, the conditions of intercourse}}</ref>

== Economy ==
In China, despite significant economic reforms initiated in 1976, public ownership has maintained a dominant role in shaping the economy, as outlined within the constitution of the country.<ref>{{Citation|year=2018|title=Constitution of the People's Republic of China|title-url=https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html|quote='''Article 6''' The foundation of the socialist economic system of the People’s Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, that is, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working people. The system of socialist public ownership has eradicated the system of exploitation of man by man, and practices the principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.”

In the primary stage of socialism, the state shall uphold a fundamental economic system under which public ownership is the mainstay and diverse forms of ownership develop together, and shall uphold an income distribution system under which distribution according to work is the mainstay, while multiple forms of distribution exist alongside it.

'''Article 7''' The state sector of the economy, that is, the sector of the socialist economy under ownership by the whole people, shall be the leading force in the economy. The state shall ensure the consolidation and development of the state sector of the economy.}}</ref>

=== Land ownership ===
In 1956, private property was abolished in China, and this policy has remained in effect.<ref>{{Citation|author=Chao Zhou|year=2021|title=Tracing agricultural land transfer in China: some legal and policy issues|quote=In 1956, the model regulations on the advanced Agricultural Producer Cooperatives were adopted. The policy required peasants to surrender land to collectives, and private ownership of land became “illegal”. This was the first official document stating the notion of collectively owned land. [...] By 1958, all land was either state (urban) or collectively (rural) owned. This dual type of land ownership structure remains to the present. [...]

The rural reforms that began in 1978 from bottom to top opened a new era of public ownership and private management of rural land in China. [...] Under the HRS, land ownership and use rights in land were separated: land was owned by the collective (the village), while operating rights on individual pieces of land were given to individual peasant households. [...]

The Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC was held in November 2013. At that meeting, the central government initiated the policy of “Accelerating the building of a new type of agricultural operation system.” [...] This is the first time in a central policy that farmers are encouraged to transfer their land management rights while keeping the contractual right. The collective still has the property right, farmers have the contractual right and, in addition, farmers are now allowed to transfer their land use right [...]|doi=10.3390/land10010058}}</ref> During the early 1980s, the process of de-collectivization of farmland occurred, yet the establishment of private property rights was deliberately avoided to prevent the emergence of a landlord class, with public ownership serving as a significant buffer against the social inequalities that can arise from market reforms.<ref>{{Citation|author=Peter Nolan|year=1995|title=China's rise, Russia's fall: politics, economics and planning in the transition from Stalinism|page=191|quote=Farmland was 'de-collectivised' in the early 1980s. This was not followed by the establishment of private property rights in land. Because the CCP wished to prevent the emergence of a landlord class, it did not permit the purchase and sale of farmland. Still in 1994, the Party 'adhered to the collective ownership of famland'. The village community remained the owner, controlling the terms on which land was contracted out and operated by peasant households. It endeavoured to ensure that farm households had equal access to farmland, while the village government obtained part of the Ricardian rents from the land to use for community purposes. [...] Farmland was not distributed via a free market auction, which would have helped to produce a locally unequal out- come. Rather the massively dominant form was distribution of land contracts on a locally equal per capita basis. This huge 'land reform', affecting over 800 million people, was a remarkably orderly process. It was not a disorganised land grab in which strong members of villages squeezed out the weak.|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=9780333622643|lg=http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=D7CA67989174164480DC79B03BB6C6E9}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|author=Peter Nolan|year=1995|title=China's rise, Russia's fall: politics, economics and planning in the transition from Stalinism|page=200|quote=The egalitarian land reform in the 1980s tended greatly to increase socio-economic stability. It provided equality of access to the use rights for the most important asset in China's villages. This provided security to the weakest members of the village since in the last resort land could be sublet. The relative equality in local access to farmland was a major reason for the fact that the Gini coefficient of rural household income distribution remained so low. It made public action easier to implement since villagers shared a common position in respect to the principal means of production. It provided a hugely egalitarian underpinning to rural, and indeed national, income distribution.|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=9780333622643|lg=http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=D7CA67989174164480DC79B03BB6C6E9}}</ref>

The land tenure system in China after these reforms distinctly separated individual user rights from collective ownership rights. Individual households could use the land, but the village collective retained control over significant decisions like land allocation, leasing, and selling, as well as the right to claim rent income. The village collective was responsible for managing land contracts and providing essential services to peasants, which included access to farm inputs, technology, education, and healthcare.<ref>{{Citation|author=Paul Bowles & Xiao-yuan Dong|year=1994|title=Current successes and future challenges in China’s economic reforms|page=63, 64|quote=The distinguishing feature of China’s land-tenure system in the post-reform period is the separation of individual user rights from other ownership rights which remain ‘collective’. The right to use village land is granted to individual households. However, the village collective retains other rights associated with ownership. Specifically, the village collective, as the delegated owner, has the right to allocate land among its members, the right to lease land to outsiders or sell land to the state, and the right to claim rent income from the land. This system can therefore be regarded as two-tier ownership with use rights vested in individual households and other rights vested in the village collective. [...]

Thus, under the [household responsibility system], peasant households are the basic units of farm production, while the village collective takes charge of managing land contracts, maintaining irrigation systems, and providing peasants with equitable access to farm inputs, technologies, information, credit, and the services of farm machinery, product processing, marketing, primary education and health care. The new form of village collective organization overcomes the main drawbacks of the commune system, while preserving the principal merits of economic organizations characterized by public ownership of the means of production.|pdf=https://shared.prolewiki.org/uploads/2/23/Current_Successes_and_Future_Challenges_in_China%27s_Economic_Reforms.pdf|publisher=New Left Review}}</ref>

The effectiveness of these reforms was evident in significant reductions in undernourishment in China, which saw a decrease of 96 million undernourished people from 1990-92 to 2012, contributing to 91 percent of the total reduction in undernourished people in China and Vietnam combined.<ref>{{Citation|author=FAO|year=2012|title=Framing hunger, a response to the state of food insecurity in the world|page=1|quote=In fact, advancement in reducing hunger by just two countries, China (-96 million) and Viet Nam (-24 million), amounts to 91 percent of the net numerical reduction in undernourished people since 1990-92.}}</ref> The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and other scholars have highlighted that these land reforms were critical to improving food security in China, with the equitable access to land playing a major role in mitigating hunger and enhancing socioeconomic stability.<ref>{{Citation|author=FAO|year=2012|title=Framing hunger, a response to the state of food insecurity in the world|page=14|quote=In understanding the progress of China and Viet Nam, experts cite egalitarian land reform as a key. In both countries, small holders secured access to land through state policies. SOFI12 also notes the “situation of relatively equal access to farmland and human capital” in China, and the fact that “land distribution in Viet Nam is relatively equal” as important in these two countries’ striking progress against hunger.}}</ref>

=== State planning ===
Despite predictions from Western experts in the 1990s that China was moving away from its [[Planned economy|planned economic system]],<ref>{{Citation|author=Barry Naughton|year=1996|title=Growing out of the plan: Chinese economic reform, 1978–1993|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9780511664335|lg=http://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=4CEEBFCDFF274BC0E11AD2AA804DEA7A}}</ref> centralized economic planning remains a core feature of the country's governance. The U.S. Congressional Economic and Security Review in 2015 highlighted that Soviet-style, top-down planning still defines China's economic and political strategy.<ref>{{Citation|author=U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission|year=2015|title=2015 report to congress|page=140|quote=Soviet-style, top-down planning remains a hallmark of China’s economic and political system. Five-Year Plans (FYP) continue to guide China’s economic policy by outlining the Chinese government’s priorities and signaling to central and local officials and industries the areas for future government support. The FYPs are followed by a cascade of sub-plans at the national, ministerial, provincial, and county level that attempt to translate these priorities into region or industry-specific targets, policy strategies, and evaluation mechanisms.|pdf=https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/2015-Annual-Report-to-Congress.pdf}}</ref> This is evident through the continuation of the Five-Year Plans (FYP), which set the government's priorities and guide regional and industry-specific policy strategies across all levels of government.

While there has been a transformation in the planning processes since 1993, incorporating market forces and decentralizing decision-making, the state bureaucracy still retains significant control over economic directions, ensuring that the Communist Party maintains political authority.<ref>{{Citation|author=Sebastian Heilmann & Oliver Melton|year=2013|title=The reinvention of development planning in China, 1993–2012|page=581|quote=Contrary to this widely shared focus, [...] a “demise of the plan” has not taken place in China. From 1993 on, development planning has been fundamentally transformed in terms of function, content, process, and methods. It has provided room for market forces and the decentralization of decision-making authority, while preserving the state bureaucracy’s ability to influence the economy and ensuring that the party has retained political control even as it has abandoned many of its former powers.|doi=10.1177/0097700413497551|series=Modern China|volume=39, no. 6}}</ref> China’s economic planning extends beyond mere policy outlines, involving extensive control over the allocation of resources, with a significant portion of goods and services being produced by state-owned enterprises managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) or local government equivalents.<ref>{{Citation|author=Alicia García-Herrero|year=2021|title=China’s economic planning: how does it work?|title-url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3786531|quote=In the Chinese case (even more so in the Soviet case though) , the central government goes beyond planning and allocation of credit (surely the case as the vast majority of banks are control by the central or local governments). In fact a relevant share of goods and services are produced by state-owned companies, control by the central government, namely by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) or by local government through their local SASACs. [...]

China’s economic planning originates from the former Soviet Union but has remained key for policy making until today. The key instrument for medium-term planning is the five-year plan, which started in 1953 until today. The rationale of this five-years head economic planning is to offers specific top-down targets for every actor to strive for.|publisher=Alternatives économiques|series=L'économie politique|volume=2021/1, no. 89}}</ref> These enterprises play a critical role in fulfilling the objectives set out in the Five-Year Plans.

China’s approach to planning also encompasses a wide array of specific plans under categories such as "comprehensive plans," "special plans," and "macro-regional plans."<ref>{{Citation|author=Sebastian Heilmann & Oliver Melton|year=2013|title=The reinvention of development planning in China, 1993–2012|page=586,590|quote=Beyond the most prominent five-year plan outlines for national and local governments, there are three distinct types of sub-plans that are released in successive waves throughout the planning period. This national triple structure of comprehensive plans 总体规划, special plans 专项规划 and macro-regional plans 区域规划 is then replicated in a complex, interlocking web of development programs at the provincial, municipal, and county levels.|doi=10.1177/0097700413497551|series=Modern China|volume=39, no. 6}}</ref> These cover diverse areas from regional industrialization strategies like the Western Development Program<ref>{{Citation|author=Communist Party of China|year=2006|title=Guidelines of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development|chapter=Implement the Overall Regional Development Strategy|section=Push Forward the Western Development|pdf=https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/11th%20Five-Year%20Plan%20%282006-2010%29%20for%20National%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Development%20%28EN%29.pdf}}</ref> to technological advancements in the Pearl River Delta, and sector-specific plans for industries such as pharmaceuticals, food processing, chemicals, cement and so on.

== Public and non-public ownership; the Communist Party of China's continued leadership and control of China’s economy ==
==== Role of State Owned Enterprises & the Commanding Heights ====
<blockquote>“[State Owned Enterprises] form the economic and political foundation of China’s socialist system and are a key pillar for the [Communist] Party’s rule. They must be built stronger, better and larger...[the state sector's role] cannot be negated or weakened."<ref>[https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3108288/xi-jinping-calls-chinas-state-owned-enterprises-be-stronger Xi Jinping calls for China’s state-owned enterprises to be ‘stronger and bigger’, despite US, EU opposition] - SCMP</ref></blockquote>
In the University Paper, ''Is China still Socialist'' by Khoo Heikoo, their research goes into detail of the market share of the economy. In 2010, at least 94% of all financial capital and assets is owned by SOE's out of 150 largest companies in China.<ref>[https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/136790902/2018_Khoo_Heiko_1068757_ethesis.pdf Page 86, Is China still socialist? A Marxist critique of János Kornai’s analysis of China] - Khoo, Heikoo.</ref> Compared to Capitalist nations, where privately owned firms overwhelmingly predominate, most of China’s best-performing companies are to be found in the state sector.<ref>Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Why the US Malaise over China?’, YaleGlobal Online, January 19 2006.</ref>

According to a 2011 study, it states:<ref>[https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=242115122088115083101005081082103101059076009064056023123031054019056092040015092034020082091089113117005112077081042003002101126026001120091125011031105064020025086082126093002089064004022119064&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE CAPITALIZING CHINA by Joseph Fan Randall Morck Bernard Yeung]</ref><blockquote>The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by controlling the career advancement of all senior personnel in all regulatory agencies, all state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and virtually all major financial institutions state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and senior Party positions in all but the smallest non-SOE enterprises, retains sole possession of Lenin’s Commanding Heights. </blockquote>
Martin Jacques, author of ''When China Rules The World,'' stated that:<blockquote>

"Rather than root-and-branch privatization, however, the government has sought to make the numerous state-owned enterprises that still remain as efficient and competitive as possible. As a result, the top 150 state-owned firms, far from being lame ducks, have instead become enormously profitable, the aggregate total of their profits reaching $150 billion in 2007."</blockquote>

This statement regarding state-led growth is further elaborated and expanded upon in the 2014''The Ascendency of State-owned Enterprises in China: development, controversy and problems'' by Hong Yu who states:<ref>[http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.809990 Hong Yu (2014) The Ascendency of State-owned Enterprises in China: development, controversy and problems, Journal of Contemporary China], 23:85, 161-182, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2013.809990</ref><blockquote>"In terms of total sales revenue of China’s top 100 enterprises in 2011, the SOEs accounted for around 90%. The state sector remains the driving force behind economic development in China. All the big commercial banks in China are SOEs. More importantly, given the fact that township and village enterprises (TVEs) owned by local governments belong to the state sector but are not regarded as SOEs, and a large number of entities operating inside and outside of China are actually owned or controlled indirectly via SOEs’ subsidiaries, the true size of the SOEs is unknown. Their influence is far greater than official statistics suggest. Woetzel’s study also demonstrates that many firms, which were partially privatized but with the state remaining as a majority shareholder, have not been counted in the SOE category in official statistics."</blockquote>This is further corroborated by a 2011 US study conducted for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission by the Washington consulting firm Capital Trade Inc stated that firms under various forms of Chinese state ownership control 50 percent of China’s economy, with huge impact on economic policy and trade outcomes. China’s economic policy dictates that “strategic industries” will stay wholly or largely under government control, “pillar industries” will feature the state as the major player and emerging industries will be the domain of “national champions” that are primarily state firms.

Strategic industries include defense, electric power, petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping. Pillar industries are equipment manufacturing, auto, information technology, construction, iron and steel, nonferrous metals and chemicals.

As well as stating,<blockquote>“The current economic direction of China is ‘commanding heights’ state capitalism, with the Chinese government picking the winning industries of tomorrow and developing state-owned national champions that are prominent at home and abroad...If anything, China is doubling down and giving SOEs a more prominent role in achieving the state’s most important economic goals...[Chinese State Owned Firms enjoy] preferred access to bank capital, below-market interest rates on loans from state-owned banks, favorable tax treatment, policies that create a favorable competitive environment for SOEs relative to other firms, and large capital injections when needed."<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20170417162249/http://www.reuters.com:80/article/usa-china-economy-idUSN1E79P0V220111026 US study tracks huge state role in China economy] - Reuters</ref></blockquote>This is corroborated by Margaret Pearson who states that:<ref>The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State

Margaret M. Pearson

, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jan., 2005), p 320</ref><blockquote>"State ownership of strategic firms also remains highly salient. Normatively, the leadership's metavision— which focuses on state control of key sectors, the desire to create profitable new “national champions,” and continued commitment to certain social and distributive goals—is crucial. As a result, the government's emerging vision of the market for strategic industries endorses only limited competition and restricts market entry to a few huge, market-dominating state firms." </blockquote>As of 2023, we can see this from the fact that even though there are only about 1,300 formally classified SOEs out of a total of 4,763 listed companies in Mainland China, around 27%, they are capturing 69% of the market revenue and 77% of the total profits. Most leading listed companies across key industries, including but not limited to banks, insurance, brokerage, oil & gas, chemicals, coal, power, telecom, construction, Chinese medicine and liquor, are SOEs.<ref>[https://archive.ph/mMjIq#selection-233.0-236.0 China SOEs – the journey to extract values from their re-rating and revaluation trajectory from Premia Partners]</ref>

Examples of these would be the China Baowu Steel Group Corporation Limited which is wholly owned by the SASAC, producing 80% of the auto-sheet metal (in automobile and truck (lorry) bodies, major appliances, airplane fuselages and wings, architecture, and many other application) and 60% of the silicon steel (used in generators, motors, and transformers). In both sectors, being the largest producer.<ref>[https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/china-baowu-steel-group-corporation-limited-09-03-2022 China Baowu Steel Group Corporation Limited] - FitchRatings</ref> The third largest global steelmaker, Ansteel, is likewise majority-owned by the SASAC.<ref>[http://en.ansteel.cn/about/company_profile/ Ansteel brief introduction]</ref> And China Minmetals Corporation, making up 90% of the market share<ref>[https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2021/0421/2021042100263.pdf METALLURGICAL CORPORATION OF CHINA LTD.*] - Page 14</ref> and contract value of domestic metallurgical engineering and construction, which is the construction of industrial metal production engineering machines and items, as of 2021.<ref>[https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/china-minmetals-corporation-16-08-2021 China Minmetals Corporation -] Fitchratings</ref> It is also one of the top producers of tungsten, crystalline graphite, bismuth in the world. And ranks first in copper, zinc and lead extraction worldwide as of 2023.<ref>[https://download.yingjiesheng.com/dlb2023/wukuang.pdf Minmetals Corporation 2023 Campus Recruitment Brochure, page 4]</ref> The construction industry is dominated by large CSOEs and SOEs. Out of the top 10 consultants and contractors, all of which are state owned.<ref>[https://archive.ph/ZfpVf#selection-901.0-908.0 China Construction Market Size, Trend Analysis by Sector, Competitive Landscape and Forecast to 2027] - May 24, 2023</ref> Civil Aviation is also dominated by 3 SOEs, namely Air China, China Southern Airlines and China Eastern Airlines.<ref>[https://archive.ph/4FeBe#selection-337.0-342.0 China Fortifies State Businesses to Fuel Growth] - NYT</ref>

In the top 50 nonferrous metal enterprises. In terms of operating income, state owned enterprises held 60% of the total operating incomes of the 50 enterprises. And in terms of asset ownership, state owned enterprises held around 67.5%.<ref>[https://www.sohu.com/a/573011500_121123683 The list of the top 50 non-ferrous metal companies by operating income and the top 20 overseas assets in 2021 is released] - Sohu</ref>Xiamen Tungsten owns 60% of the domestic market share for tungsten molybdenum wire materials. And its output capacity of tungsten smelting products ranking the world No.1, with it being China’s largest producer and exporter of tungsten powder and tungsten carbide powder, it is the largest tungsten and molybdenum production enterprise in China.<ref>[https://www.emis.com/php/company-profile/CN/Xiamen_Tungsten_Co_Ltd__%E5%8E%A6%E9%97%A8%E9%92%A8%E4%B8%9A%E8%82%A1%E4%BB%BD%E6%9C%89%E9%99%90%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8__en_1733239.html XIAMEN TUNGSTEN CO., LTD. (CHINA)] - Emis.Com</ref> Zijin mining which is a majority state owned company holds 92% of all domestic copper reserves. And holds 40% of all domestic gold reserves.<ref>[https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2023/0326/2023032600155.pdf ZIJIN MININGANNUAL RESULTS ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2022 - page 33]</ref> Another 30% of the gold reserves is held by China National Gold.<ref>[https://www.chinagoldgroup.com/en/1593.html China Gold Group, import and export]</ref> In the top 10 automobile companies, 73% of sales come from SOEs.<ref>[https://www.statista.com/statistics/244353/automobile-manufacturers-in-china-by-number-of-cars-sold/ Leading ten domestic automobile manufacturers in China in 2021, based on sales volume - Statista]</ref>

The power-generating industry in China is dominated by five SOE power-generating company groups: China Huaneng Power Group, China Datang Corporation, China Huadian Corporation, China Guodian Corporation, and China Power Investment Corporation. And the public utilities sector is dominated by the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) and China Southern Power Grid Corporation<ref>Lewis, Joanna I. (2023). ''Cooperating for the Climate: Learning from International Partnerships in China's Clean Energy Sector''.</ref> 70% of all power is generated by the state sector with 95% of the distribution of all power is done by the state sector.<ref>[http://ccnews.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2019/1111/c141677-31447999.html Deepen understanding of the development of state-owned enterprises] - Renmin Ribao</ref> The telecommunications industry in China is dominated by three SOE telecommunications carriers: China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile.<ref>[https://www.statista.com/topics/6577/telecommunications-industry-in-china/#topicOverview Telecommunications industry in China - statistics & facts] - Statista</ref> The oil and gas industry is dominated by four SOE company groups: China National Petroleum Corporation, Sinopec, Sinochem and China National Offshore Oil Corporation.<ref>[https://archive.ph/3POHm The 5 Biggest Chinese Oil Companies - Investopedia.]</ref> The total revenue gained by the state sector in oil in 2019 was 89.4% in the oil and gas extraction industry.<ref>NBS “Yearly Data” available at <nowiki>https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01</nowiki> 2020. Indicators of “规模以上工业企业主营业务收入(亿元)” and “国有控股工业企业主营业务收入(亿元)”. Retrieved January 11, 2022.</ref> Coal is also dominated by state industry, SOEs have 75% share of the total revenue from said industry.<ref>NBS “Yearly Data” available at <nowiki>https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01</nowiki> 2020. Indicators of “规模以上工业企业主营业务收入(亿元)” and “国有控股工业企业主营业务收入(亿元)”. Retrieved January 11, 2022.</ref>

The banking industry in China is dominated by four state-owned banks: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Bank of China.<ref>CHEN MENG, MULTINATIONAL BANKING IN CHINA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 28 (2009).</ref> The China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation which is the world's largest producer of rolling stock and locomotive is under state ownership and controls 90% of their respective markets domestically.<ref>[https://www.railwaygazette.com/business/chinese-rolling-stock-manufacturers-merge-to-form-crrc-corp/40956.article Chinese rolling stock manufacturers merge to form CRRC Corp] - Railway Gazette International, 2 june 2015</ref> Chinacol which is the world's largest producer of aluminium is under state ownership.<ref>[https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/fitch-affirms-chinalco-ratings-at-a-outlook-stable-18-09-2023 Fitch Affirms Chinalco's Ratings at 'A-'; Outlook Stable] - Fitchratings</ref> China Rare Earth Group holds around 70% of the production quota of heavy and medium rare earths in China.<ref>[https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Commodities/China-consolidates-3-rare-earth-miners-into-aircraft-carrier China consolidates 3 rare earth miners into 'aircraft carrier'] - Nikkei.Asia</ref> The Chinese State Shipbuilding Corporation builds 48% of all ships in the world, being the largest producer of ships worldwide.<ref>[https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3225973/china-becoming-worlds-go-shipbuilding-after-boom-overseas-orders-global-de-risking-threatens-rock China becoming world’s go-to for shipbuilding after ‘boom of overseas orders’, but global de-risking threatens to rock the boat] - SCMP</ref> China National Building Material Company produces the most cement, commerical concrete, gypsum board, glass fibre, wind power blade, light steel stud and cement technical engineering equipment in the world.<ref>[https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2022/0831/2022083100818.pdf China National Building Material Company Limited, 2022 Interim report]</ref> It's parent company is China National Building Material Group Co., Ltd. (CNBM), a state-owned enterprise administrated by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, thus determining it as state owned.<ref>[https://www.cnbm.com.cn/EN/000000160001/38221.html China National Building Material Group Corporation Ltd. Founded] - Aug 28, 2016</ref>

According to the book, ''The Logic of Economic Reform in China'' the following states that (units in Yuan/RMB):<blockquote>For the perspective of overall development of the state-owned enterprises, operating income of state-owned and state-held enterprises (excluding financial enterprises) increased from 10.73 trillion to 39.25 trillion with the annual increase of 17.6% from 2003 to 2011; total assets and owner’s equity were 85.37 trillion and 29.17 trillion, respectively 4.3 times and 3.5 times compared with those in 2003.<ref name=":21">[https://books.google.com.hk/books?id=rnT_CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA196&lpg=PA196&dq=Huang+Qunhui+(2013)+How+to+actively+develop+mixed-ownership+economy+in+New+Era.+Administration+Reform,+Dec+2013&source=bl&ots=WbA8hJmYTr&sig=ACfU3U34LWt5hyrz8GqLl5U5tcvwdrodpA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj35dS5q6CAAxWIAt4KHRhHBTIQ6AF6BAgcEAM#v=onepage&q=Huang%20Qunhui%20(2013)%20How%20to%20actively%20develop%20mixed-ownership%20economy%20in%20New%20Era.%20Administration%20Reform%2C%20Dec%202013&f=false The Logic of Economic reform in China - Xiaojing Zhang, Xin Chang] - Page 177</ref></blockquote>As of 2019 (latest data), the public capital stock of the PRC was roughly around 167.47% of GDP. The USA had 59.49%. India had 59.44%, Russia had 63.31% and the Nordic countries only had an average of 64.85%. Taiwan has 66.27%, France 68.53% and Germany has 44.33%. The country in the global north with the highest public capital stock second only to the PRC was Japan at 120.54%. The average for countries in the OECD (excluding Japan as it is nearly triple the average and is a outlier), 57.92% of GDP.<ref>[https://data.imf.org/?sk=1ce8a55f-cfa7-4bc0-bce2-256ee65ac0e4 IMF, Investment and Capital Stock (Dataset) Indicator, General Government Capital Stock.]</ref>

As of 2019, the ratio of public capital stock to private capital stock (measured in% of GDP is as follows), 0.87:1, 1 being private stock, 0.87 as public stock for China. For the USA it was 0.34:1, India had 0.40:1, Russia had 0.35:1, Nordic countries had an average of 0.31:1. Taiwan had 0.45:1, France had 0.31:1 and Germany had 0.20:1. For Japan, it was 0.50. The average for countries in the OECD (excluding Japan) is, 0.30:1.<ref>[https://data.imf.org/?sk=1ce8a55f-cfa7-4bc0-bce2-256ee65ac0e4 IMF Data, Investment and Capital Stock Dataset. Indicator (private capital stock)]</ref>

We can see that in terms of capital stock value, the state plays a far larger role in China compared to the OECD and large developing economies.

A 2022 study found that from 2000 to 2019, Chinese SOEs have a positive influence on value-enhancing upgrading, while the effects on resource-saving and environment-friendly upgrading are inverted U-shaped. These results indicate that innovation partially mediates the relationship between SOEs and the three types of industrial upgrading. Chinese SOEs are able also to promote industrial transformation and upgrading with strong and far-reaching spillovers.<ref>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959652622000580?via%3Dihub Does China's state-owned sector lead industrial transformation and upgrading?] - Mingshan Li & Shu Guan</ref>

From 2002 - 2011, total SOE assets started at roughly 550% of GDP, declining to an all time low of 410% of GDP in 2008, before reaching a general equilibrium from 2008 to 2011 of 450% of GDP.<ref>Wang, Y. (2015). ''The rise of the “shareholding state”: financialization of economic management in China -'' Page 7</ref>

In 2006, The report revealed that 349 enterprises in the list were state owned, accounting for nearly 70 percent of the total. Their combined assets reached 39 trillion yuan (4.87 trillion US dollars) at the end of 2005, accounting for 95 percent of the total out of the 500. It showed that state-owned economy remained dominant and controls the leading industries in the national economy.<ref name=":13">[https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-09/03/content_680098_2.htm Top 500 account for 78% of China's GDP] - Biz.China, Xinhua.net</ref>

A 2008 article stated that , total assets of Non-financial SOEs in China were $6 trillion, or 133% of Chinese GDP, whereas the corresponding numbers for France, a developed country known for its outsized state control in the economy, were $686 billion and 28%, respectively.<ref>China's 'State Capitalism' Sparks a Global Backlash by

Jason Dean, Andrew Browne And Shai Oster</ref>

In 2012, the total assets held by the State sector in China amounted to 55.78% or 53% depending on the estimate used.<ref>The Basic Economic System of China by Changhong Pei, Chunxu Yang and Xinming Yang, page 24-25</ref> However, in comparison with European nations during the same time period, the total assets of eastern European nations held by the state sector were around 13%. For the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium and Portugal, it was around 4.60%. For Ireland and the UK, even less than that number. For Austria and Germany, around 10.79%. For Scandinavia, it was 6.02%<ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344833099_State-Owned_Enterprises_Across_Europe_Stylized_Facts_from_a_Large_Firm-Level_Dataset State-Owned Enterprises Across Europe: Stylized Facts from a Large Firm-Level Dataset], by Bram De Lange and Bruno Merlevede, p 17</ref>

In 2013, a study found that out of the revenue of the top 500 firms, only 19% was held by private firms, 12% were held by firms classified as others (which included cooperatives and most likely firms of mixed ownership), the other 69% were held by various SOEs.<ref>Paul Hubbard "Where Have China's state monopolies gone?" China Economic Journal, Volume 9, Issue 1, January 2016</ref>

Another 2013 study found that, in the largest developing economies, total assets held by the state sector as a% of GDP, China had by far the largest. With Non financial state assets being 176% of GDP, for Brazil it was 51%, India it was 75%, Indonesia it was 19%, Russia it was 64% and South Africa it was 3%.<ref>[https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781513539942/ch11.xml Modernizing China, Investing in Soft Infrastructure. Chapter 11 - IMF]</ref>In comparison, in 2015, Italian, Korean, Saudi Arabian and Norway's state owned assets did not reach more than 25% of GDP.<ref>[https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2021/012/article-A002-en.xml People’s Republic of China: Selected Issues, Volume 2021, issue 12] - IMF</ref> In 2016, for SOEs in developing European economies, the number did not exceed 100% of GDP, the median being around roughly 40%.<ref>[https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/cse-economists/economic-performance-soes-in-emerging-economies.html Economic performance of state-owned enterprises in emerging economies, A cross country study] - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</ref>

In 2014, China's top 500 companies, 300 are SOEs, accounting for 60 percent. The operating revenues of these SOEs account for 79.9 percent of the total 56.68 trillion yuan, while total assets account for 91.2 percent, out of the total 176.4 trillion yuan in the top 500 enterprises. The total profit of these SOEs account for 83.9 percent out of the total 2.4 trillion yuan<ref name=":12">[http://www.china.org.cn/business/2014-09/03/content_33419397.htm China reveals new top 500 enterprises list] - Wang Zhiyong, China.org.cn</ref>

In 2019 in listed companies (3,777), to be a listed company in China you have to have operating income/revenue of 100 million RMB per year, accumulative over the course of 3 years of 300 million. SOEs held 98% in the Telecom sector. SOEs held 95% in the airline sector. SOEs held 94% in the infrastructure sector. And SOEs held more than 93% in the utilities and energy sector. In the industry sector, SOEs held more than 74% of assets. In the material sector, SOEs held more than 63% of assets. In automobiles, SOEs held more than 62% of assets. <ref>[https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PC-05-2021.pdf China’s state-owned enterprises and competitive neutrality by Alicia García-Herrero and Gary Ng]</ref> SOEs accounted for 29 percent of listed firms and 57 percent of listed firm value-added, capturing around 63% of the revenue. SOE revenues were on average 4.7 times larger than POEs, value added was 3.6 times larger and fixed assets were 6.9 times larger. <ref>Resource Misallocation Among Listed Firms in China: The Evolving Role of State-Owned Enterprises by Emilia Jurzyk and Cian Ruane</ref>

And in 2021, out of total asset ownership, 60% are held by SOEs. And in terms of SOE revenue accounts for 70% of GDP. In foundational and security-related sectors such as energy, infrastructure, public utilities and finance, SOEs enjoy a market share of a combined total of over 70 percent.<ref>[https://archive.ph/44ZmP#selection-403.68-403.79 '''SOE reforms key to smooth recovery''' - 2023-04-10] by ChinaDaily</ref> In 2022, The largest 500 private enterprises held 41.64 trillion yuan worth of assets (34.40% of GDP)<ref>[https://www.xinhuanet.com/energy/20220907/79f0e58b387f4e7c903a51be2a8fc3b6/c.html The top 500 Chinese private enterprises in 2022 released a total operating income of 38.32 trillion yuan] - Xinhua.net</ref> In 2022, the total assets of CSOEs amounted to 109.4 trillion yuan which is 90.4% of GDP. Total non financial SOEs had assets of 339.5 trillion yuan, which amounts to 280.5% of GDP. Total assets of SOEs amounted to 608% of GDP.<ref>[https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/nvBGqtx7MuPB8RTC9XT6jA State Council Comprehensive Report on State-owned Asset Management in 2022] - SASAC</ref>

China has also maintained commitment to growing and strengthening the SOE's, directly countering the demands of the USA in the Trade War against China, which is to shrink the size of SOEs.<ref name=":14">[https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3038993/china-wont-give-its-state-led-economic-model-top-trade?fbclid=IwAR2ys8_Y_6Nxq2x__BM4SoKdR63it7X_JRy1XJdkLw4QrK0VQ77mXYyrcks China will make state economy ‘stronger, better and bigger’, top trade negotiator Liu He says]</ref> There were 116,499 local SOEs at the end of 2016, up from 103,608 at the end of 2013.<ref>Ministry of Finance (2017)</ref> The role of SOE's are also used to help invest and improve the material standard of unequally developed interior provinces in China, about 60% of fixed-asset investment by SOEs goes to inland provinces, mostly in the form of infrastructure. Since these provinces account for less than half of national GDP, SOE investment is clearly part of a strategy to redistribute income and support poorer provinces. <ref>[https://www.cebc.org.br/sites/default/files/the_state_of_the_state_sector.pdf The State Of The State Sector] - Gavelkand Dragonomics</ref>

During the "13th Five-Year Plan" period, a total of 85 local state-owned enterprises were listed on A-shares, more than double that during the "12th Five-Year Plan" period, and the financing amount reached 130.8 billion yuan, a 62% increase over the "12th Five-Year Plan" period, indicating that China's commitment is not just lip service. Within the Five Year Plan period, the CPC has also committed to realizing operating income of Central SOE's to have 36.3 trillion yuan by 2021, a year-on-year increase of 19.5%, and an average increase of 8.2% in two years; total profits of 2.4 trillion yuan and net profits of 1.8 trillion yuan, respectively, a year-on-year increase of 30.3% and 29.8%, the two-year average growth rate was 14.5% and 15.3%, far exceeding the economic growth rate in the same period. Most of the subsequent investments will be in key strategic sectors, though this varies across provinces, but the majority of which are in the energy generation, heavy and light manufacturing, as well as other industrial clusters.<ref name=":17">[https://www.pwccn.com/zh/blog/state-owned-enterprise-soe/analysis-on-the-14th-five-year-plan-of-local-soe-feb2022.html <nowiki>[Observatory of State-owned Enterprise Reform] Analysis of the "14th Five-Year Plan" of some local state-owned enterprises</nowiki>]</ref>

73% of the Chinese companies listed on the Fortune 500 (500 companies with the greatest revenue in the world) are listed as SOE's. [[Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.|Huawei]] is also listed on there, but it cannot be deemed private due to the nature of its ownership leaning more towards a cooperative. <ref name=":15">[https://chinapower.csis.org/chinese-companies-global-500/ How Dominant are Chinese Companies Globally?] - Chinapower</ref>

The capitalist Australia-based Center for Independent Studies (CIS) published a July 2008 article that says that those who think that China is becoming a capitalist country “misunderstand the structure of the Chinese economy, which largely remains a state-dominated system rather than a free-market one.” The article elaborates:<blockquote>"By strategically controlling economic resources and remaining the primary dispenser of economic opportunity and success in Chinese society, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is building institutions and supporters that seem to be entrenching the Party’s monopoly on power. Indeed, in many ways, reforms and the country’s economic growth have actually ''enhanced'' the CCP’s ability to remain in power. Rather than being swept away by change, the CCP is in many ways its agent and beneficiary."<ref>[https://www.cis.org.au/commentary/media/putting-democracy-in-china-on-hold/ John Lee, “Putting Democracy in China on Hold,” May 28, 2008], Published by The Center for Independent Studies</ref></blockquote>There is also a great deal of political control within the State Owned Enterprises, Article 33 of the People's Republic of China's Constitution states:<ref>[http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/10195159.html Article 33 - Constitution of the PRC]</ref><blockquote>"The leading Party members groups or Party committees of state-owned enterprises shall play a leadership role, set the right direction, keep in mind the big picture, ensure the implementation of Party policies and principles, and discuss and decide on major issues of their enterprise in accordance with regulations. Primary-level Party organizations in state-owned or collective enterprises should focus their work on the operations of their enterprise. Primary-level Party organizations shall guarantee and oversee the implementation of the principles and policies of the Party a

nd the state within their own enterprise and shall support the board of shareholders, board of directors, board of supervisors, and manager (or factory director) in exercising their functions and powers in accordance with the law. They shall wholeheartedly rely on the workers and office staff and support the work of workers' representative congresses; and they shall participate in making decisions on major issues in the enterprise. They shall strengthen their own organizational development and lead work on political thinking, efforts toward cultural-ethical progress, work related to the united front, and work on trade unions, Communist Youth League organizations, women's organizations, and other people's group organizations"</blockquote>Party cadre management is an essential mechanism through which the Party leads SOEs in China. SOE executives are both managers and quasi-officials with political ranks, similar to the USSR's "Nomenklatura"<ref>K.E. Brødsgaard, Politics and business group formation in China: The Party in control?</ref> As members of the Party’s personnel system, they are selected, trained, appointed, and disciplined by the Party’s OD departments.<ref>Y. Zheng, L.L.P. Gore (Eds.), The Chinese Communist Party in Action: Consolidating Party Rule, Routledge, London (2019), pp. 220-239</ref> A 2015 study found that, to improve their political performance and advance their careers, they are motivated to actively implement the Party’s principles, policies, and resolutions in SOEs. This political personnel management system makes SOE executives in China different from their Capitalist counterparts. <ref>[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21697213.2015.1045401 S. Liang, Z. Li, D. Chen, S. Chen, Political ranks, incentives and firm performance]</ref>

According to a study released, detailing information from 2000 to 2004 regarding political control within SOE's, they found that:<ref name=":18">[https://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/storage/1281_382-397-yu.pdf Party Control in China’s Listed Firms* Wei YU—Finance School, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics]</ref> <blockquote>"Chinese SOEs come under the dual leadership of the state and the CCP. On the state side, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) plays an active, although by no means exclusive, role as ultimate owner. On the party side, the Organization Department selects and appoints firms’ top executives, evaluates their performance, gives them incentives, and oversees their work. This constellation of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms dominated by the CCP ensures that managers at every level pay close attention to policy signals emanating from the highest reaches of the CCP.

The CCP remains the political center of SOEs and, as such, handles all political affairs, including applying party lines and policies, enforcing commitment to ideological principles, and ensuring that corporate decisions take national policies into account. It plays a pivotal role in key decisions, for example, the nomination of top executives, executive evaluation and compensation, asset acquisitions and disposals, and annual budgets. The board of directors often seems to have no more than the ability to rubber stamp big decisions"</blockquote>SOE's since 2003 have been governed by the SASAC, The SASAC is charged with the supervision and management of personnel, corporate affairs, and state assets. This centralized ownership arrangement has lead to an increase in SOEs’ performance.<ref>D. Sheng, C. Liu, Can external regulation improve the performance of state-owned enterprises? Econ. Res. J., 10 (2016), pp. 97-111</ref> Party organizations are embedded in the governance structure of each tier. Their role is to push SOEs to better serve national strategies while preserving and increasing the value of state assets. Furthermore, Party organizations also assume a coordinating role. Their involvement in all levels of SOE governance enables the entire governance system to operate more smoothly. For example, communication between the tiers of Party organizations helps reduce the information asymmetry caused by the government structure.<ref>J. Liu, B. Liu, L. Hu, Chinese state-owned assets reform: Controversies, mistakes and innovation mode Manage. World, 1 (2020), pp. 60-69</ref>

The CSIS also states that SOE's account for 71% of total Chinese firms on the list by numbers (Out of 136) but represent 78% of total revenue and 84% of all assets from Chinese entrants to the list. They claim that these SOE's have a low return on assets and lower profitability margins compared to non-Chinese companies on the list. They state that Chinese SOEs primarily pursue the logic of asset maximization. This is typical of SOEs in general, as pretty much SOEs are designed for social value and public services, instead of profit maximization. But this demonstrates that the largest companies in China in terms of revenue are SOEs instead of private companies in contrast to capitalist economies <ref>[https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/fortune-favors-state-owned-three-years-chinese-dominance-global-500-list Fortune Favors the State-Owned: Three Years of Chinese Dominance on the Global 500 List - CSIS]</ref>

Indicating that the commanding heights of the economy, otherwise known as SOE's are still very much operating off of "Socialist logic" and not "Capitalist logic" when it comes to running the business.

==== Role of State Guinded Investment Funds ====
To understand the role of the state sector of the economy it is not enough to just look at what proportion they have of GDP, nor their degree of concentration. It is also important, if not more so, to look at what proportion of investments are channelled through the state sector, because investments are the driving force of the economy. And under capitalism, through the mechanism of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, the cause of the boom-slump cycle. Fortunately, statistics about fixed-asset investments (investments in buildings and machinery) are also much more accurate and uncontested compared to GDP statistics.

A casual analysis from the New York Times states the following, <blockquote>Most economies can pull two levers to bolster growth: fiscal and monetary. China has a third option. The National Development and Reform Commission can accelerate the flow of investment projects.<ref>[https://archive.ph/SeHVw Show Me The China Stimulus Money] - New York Times</ref></blockquote>The role of the NDRC is further elaborated upon by Margaret Pearson, who says

"The National Development and Reform Commission (or NDRC, which is the reformulated State Development and Planning Commission, or SDPC) makes basic decisions as to which industries should receive major government investment. The NDRC is deeply involved in key regulatory decisions and even carries out some of the "classic" regulatory functions of price setting and licensing. It also has been deeplyinvolved in the numerous restructurings of strategic industries, and in 2003, the State Council assigned it responsibility for formulation and oversight of industrial policy."<ref>The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State

Margaret M. Pearson

, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jan., 2005), p305</ref>

There is a great deal of evidence that governmental control of investment remains substantial, that governemnt guided investment mechanisms, state controlled banking system and dominant state owned enterprises are still a 'holdover' from the "Mao era economic system". The way these investments are conducted almost perfectly match investments conducted under the "Mao era economic system".<ref>China's Great Economic Transformation, by Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, p353</ref>

In the University paper, ''The Rise of the Investor State: State Capital in the Chinese Economy'' by Hao Chen and Meg Rithmere discusses how state shareholders can influence the private sector. With the overall ownership of assets within investment firms in 2017 being 80.9% central state owned, 13.7% local state owned and only 4.67% being truly private. The top 20 shareholders within investment firms also finds that shareholders of a private origin are the lowest percentage of roughly around 500 or so registed private investment shareholders. With more than 2,000 central SOE shareholders, more than 1,000 big 4 bank shareholders, roughly 500 for both local SOE and "Other" shareholders respectively and around 700 pension funds. So roughly around 10.8% of all shareholders of investment firms are of a private orientation

The paper also goes on to state:<ref>[https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12116-020-09308-3 The Rise of the Investor State: State Capital in the Chinese Economy] - Hao Chen and Meg Rithmire</ref><blockquote>"The state’s role as owner of firms has narrowed to include a set of large, national champion firms at the central level, but the deployment of state capital has morphed form rather than abated. As we have shown, the state invests broadly in the private sector in a number of forms, a fact that complicates the “state versus private” dichotomy that has dominated the study of China’s political economy during the reform era. Further, the deployment of state capital into the wider economy has accompanied a change in the structure of the state; hundreds of shareholding firms, large and small and owned by local and central levels of the state, now interface extensively with private firms, can intervene with ease in stock markets, and appear to constitute new agents in the execution of the CCP’s overall economic policy."</blockquote>The study goes onto mention Minsheng group which is on paper the largest "private" investment fund but while being of a hybrid ownership (being legally classified as a joint stock limited company). The largest controlling ownership is held by Dajia Life Insurance which is on paper a joint-stock limited company, holding 17.84% of the total shares (the second largest share is less than 5%)<ref>[https://ir.cmbc.com.cn/media/cftelmok/2021-annual-report-en.pdf China Minsheng Bank Annual Report, 2021], page 403</ref> Reports from China Minsheng itself states that Dajia Life Insurance is 98.23% owned by a Chinese SOE (China Insurance Security Fund), thus despite it being the "largest private equity investment company", the controlling shareholder remains squarely in the hands of a SOE.<ref>[https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2023/0131/2023013101076.pdf CONTINUING CONNECTED TRANSACTIONS BUSINESS COOPERATION FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY SALES OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS WITH DAJIA LIFE INSURANCE CO., LTD. - China Minsheng Bank 2023]</ref>

The sentiment of Chinese firm control through investment funds is elaborated in an article by the Economist, which states:<ref>[https://archive.ph/mcIQv#selection-601.0-604.0 The rise of China’s VC-industrial complex] - The Economist</ref><blockquote>"Between 2015 and 2021 around 2,000 so-called “government guidance funds” collectively raised almost $1trn. Although the pace of fundraising has slowed since its peak in 2016, not least to allow the vehicles to deploy their copious dry powder, the government’s role has been entrenched. Last year the state (including local governments) accounted for one-third of all capital raised in Chinese limited partnerships, making it by far the country’s biggest source of venture capital (vc) and private equity...

...According to Bain, a consultancy, most big Chinese funds that completed fundraising rounds in 2021 were government-led. The Enterprises Reform Fund raised nearly $11bn; the National Green Development Fund brought in $14bn. Provinces set up 20 such vehicles last year, marshalling about 136bn yuan all told, four and a half times as much as they raised in 2020, according to Zero2ipo, a research firm. Cities and other local governments chipped in more."</blockquote>Another study published in 2013 shows similar findings, that investment by non-SOEs is crowded out by investment by SOEs, which is backed by a stimulus package from the CPC from 2003 onward.<ref name=":16">[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378426616300541 To what extent did the economic stimulus package influence bank lending and corporate investment decisions? Evidence from China]</ref>

Firms and investments are clearly hinged upon China and the use of State owned capital to accelerate reform. In many cases, it is also noted that state investment crowds out private investment, in turn making the state the primary investor, with private capital getting less and less oppurtunities to invest.

State guidelines for recognising investment losses are often stricter than venture capitalists or private-equity managers would like, and less patient towards failing firms. This means if that private firms end up failing or defaulting, the CPC simply lets them fall to the wayside, and take their place using an SOE. If a guidance fund with a small stake in a sub-fund decides to pull out, its preferential terms will cause the dissolution of the entire vehicle, leaving both the portfolio firms and private investors out to dry.

The same economist article also finds that in 2018 Shandong set up the New Growth Drivers Fund. Since then the vehicle has launched more than 270 sub-funds and its cash has found its way into at least 1,000 provincial companies. An analysis on 50 of these sub-funds reveals that about half are dominated by state capital with little private-sector co-investment. Many of the remaining limited partners are other guidance funds, state-run firms or various government-linked entities.

Another university paper states the exact same findings, stating in their conclusion regarding Government Guided Investment Funds in China that,<ref>[https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10099247/1/State-led%20financialization-20200524%20-%20submission.pdf State-led financialisation: the case of the government-guided investment fund]</ref><blockquote>"Drawing on the case of the GGIF, this paper explores how state-led financialisation has taken place in the Chinese context. This study shows the crucial roles of the central government, local governments and state-owned enterprises in the spread of this financialised policy. Despite market-oriented reform, the use of the GGIF “is not for the market but for using market means to solve problems in development. State-led financialisation in China has not resulted in the decreasing role of the state as what happened in many Western economies...

...Financialisation can be ‘a state-driven process’ in a liberal market economy such as the US, but the role of the state in the financialisation of development policies in China is different as the policies seem to internalise finance in state management by using state capital directly or indirectly. This study shows that the central government has played a key role in designing and promoting financialised policy...

...The central government of China has promoted new policy tools that are ‘proactive towards its growth agenda’ In the case of GGIFs established by governments in China, the key funders are state-owned firms controlled by the local or central government. Thus, the approach again reinforces the role of the state in urban development...Since the GGIF has largely failed to attract capital from the private sector, the central role of the state in this new approach has blurred the distinction between GGIFs and traditional state investments to some extent despite the market-oriented design of this policy tool..."</blockquote>We can clearly see that the CPC is in charge of the private sector using their investments, crowding out private investments ad once private investments have been used up, simply kick them out or leave them out to dry, filling their role with state investments instead, in an article published by John Ross, Former Director of the London Economic and Business Policy Agency, Senior Researcher at Renmin University Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies explains the mechanisms of how Chinese state investment is actually more efficient than the private investment system of capitalist nations.<ref>[https://www.guancha.cn/LuoSiYi/2023_04_17_688675_1.shtml John Ross: Why is it more efficient to invest in China? This is really a "systemic problem"!]</ref>

He finds that Chinese Incremental Capital Output Ratio in relation to developing nations is lower in relation to other developing nations (the lower the ICOR, provided it is a positive number, representing economic expansion and not contraction, the more efficient investment is in generating growth) Taking the latest available data, for 2021, the average ICOR of developing countries is 8.2 and for China 7.1. As China is by now one of the most highly developed of developing countries, and will in only a few years become a high income economy by World Bank standards, this shows the strong efficiency of China’s investment. China’s efficiency of investment in generating growth was ranked second out the world’s 20 largest economies.

The overwhelming reason for China’s very high efficiency of investment is due to the socialist character of its economy. In particular, it results from China’s extremely strong anti-crisis macro-economic strength which flows from possessing a socialist economy compared to capitalist one. Crisis's in capitalist economies and fall of investment within capitalist economies is because the economy is dominated by private capitalists. If these capitalists decide not to invest the economy goes into recession, which causes an increase in ICOR. There is no large enough or powerful enough state sector sufficient to offset this. Private ownership of all the main means of production therefore produces weakness in Western macro-economic crisis mechanisms.

China’s large state sector, means it is possible to stabilize China’s investment level with much lower increases in state investment. In short, China’s large state sector is an extremely powerful anti-crisis mechanism. This, in turn, because it sustains economic growth, prevents the type of severe crisis increases in ICOR seen in capitalist economies such as the U.S.. China’s large state sector, therefore, has a powerful effect in keeping China’s ICOR down and maintaining a high level of investment efficiency.

We can ignore the claims that the "Government guided funds using state capital, nationalized banks and nationalized companies will bring systematic financial risk to the economy..." The point is that the vast majority of government guided funds have increased, and the state's role in funding is deeply entrenched. The CPC continues to play a significant role in the growth of the Chinese economy and the allocation of funds to certain key sectors to stimulate state-led growth in certain economic sectors. Additionally, the movement of capital and investment itself is highly regulated, and it is complicated for wealthy entrepreneurs and corrupt government members to transfer money across borders. <ref name=":9">[https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3012312/chinas-capital-outflow-controls-have-gone-extreme-former China’s capital outflow controls have gone to the ‘extreme’, former central bank adviser says - SCMP]</ref>
==== Role of Cooperatives ====
The TVE's (Township and Village Enterprises), which are in actuality a cooperative sector of the Chinese economy have been described as "private". This collectively owned sector grew rapidly - in 1978 there were 1.5 million such enterprises, by 1995 there were 22 million. In 1978 they employed 28 million people, by 1995 128 million. While they have been claimed to be private, in reality, the CPC legally defines TVE's as<ref>Hongyi Chen - [https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781315211305/institutional-transition-china-township-village-enterprises-hongyi-chen The Institutional Transition of China’s Township Village Enterprises.] p5 DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315211305</ref>

"The term "township enterprises" as mentioned in this Law refers to all kinds of enterprises established in townships (including villages under their jurisdiction) that are mainly invested by rural collective economic organizations or farmers and undertake the obligation to support agriculture.

'''The term "investment-based" mentioned in the preceding paragraph refers to rural collective economic organizations or farmers investing more than 50 percent, or less than 50 percent, but can play a controlling or actual dominating role.'''

A township enterprise that meets the conditions for an enterprise legal person shall obtain the qualification of an enterprise legal person according to law."<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20200717181302/http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-06/01/content_3432.htm "Township Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China"]</ref>

In 2008, China’s poorest and most backward agricultural areas, such as Guizhou, Henan,and Guangxi,TVEs have an important share of the economy (50-60 percent of gross output value, but in the richindustrial areas, such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, they are insignificant (6-12 percent).<ref>Yasheng Huang: Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics , 2008</ref>

In 2012, it was found that in terms of farming assets, cooperatives/collectives held 4.26 trillion RMB of collective assets and the 28 trillion RMB worth of cultivated land, for a total of 32.26 trillion RMB. Since the total assets of rural households amount to 5.01 trillion RMB, the ratio between rural collectives and private household farms is 86.56:13.44.<ref>The Basic Economic System of China - page 27</ref>

In 2016, 163,081,417 people were working in Co-Ops. China's employed working force is 762,450,000. 21% of China's total employed population is in the cooperative sector in 2016.<ref>[https://www.ica.coop/sites/default/files/2021-11/Cooperatives%20and%20Employment%20Second%20Global%20Report.pdf '''COOPERATIVES AND EMPLOYMENT, second global report''' - 2019 By Hyung-Sik Eum]</ref>

==== Role of State Ownership and it's role in control over "Private" Firms ====

One way the CPC maintains ownership over the market sector is through the use of the CPC being the majority shareholder. This is elborated on in the following article. In a May 2009, Derrick Scissors of the Heritage Foundation explains this issue rest in an article called “Liberalization in Reverse.” He writes:<blockquote>"Examining what companies are truly private is important because privatization is often confused with the spreading out of shareholding and the sale of minority stakes. In China, 100 percent state ownership is often diluted by the division of ownership into shares, some of which are made available to nonstate actors, such as foreign companies or other private investors. Nearly two-thirds of the state-owned enterprises and subsidiaries in China have undertaken such changes, leading some foreign observers to relabel these firms as “nonstate” or even “private.” But this reclassification is incorrect. The sale of stock does nothing by itself to alter state control: dozens of enterprises are no less state controlled simply because they are listed on foreign stock exchanges. As a practical matter, three-quarters of the roughly 1,500 companies listed as domestic stocks are still state owned. "<ref name=":4">[https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/liberalization-reverse Derek Scissors, Ph.D. “Liberalization in Reverse,” May 4, 2009, Published by The Heritage Foundation]</ref></blockquote>The same thing can be found in the text, ''The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State'', where Margaret Pearson finds that China continues to comit to state ownership, with of course, the listings on stock exchnges still retains a large scale of public ownership. The present focus is to improve state owned assets, not to denationalize them.<ref>The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State

Margaret M. Pearson

, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jan., 2005), p304</ref>

In the book, ''China's Great Economic Transformation'' by Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski found that between 1990 to 2003, only 6.97% could be considered "private", while the rest were very clearly in state hands. These companies are allowed to have acces to private revenue, but their control rights are strongly within the hands of the state and should therefore be considered state firms.<ref>''China's Great Economic Transformation'' by Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, p355</ref>

In 2003, it was found that domestic shareholding firms accounted for 70.1% of the domestic fixed asset investment, while foreign joint-ventures accounted for around 27%, the majority of domestic shareholding firms being state owned.<ref>Yasheng Huang: Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics</ref> A lot of these shareholding firms are also ran as cooperatives, where it was majority owned by employees, but were counted as private, being around 11.7% of the market sector.<ref>National Bureau of Statistics (2003b)</ref>

A study spanning from 1998 to 2007 found that 78% of the 11,780 sample firms on the stock market could be classified as state owned enterprises or state controlled enterprises, despite a decent sum being formally named "private enterprises". These State controlled enterprises hired more workers and were primarily concentrated in industrial ventures. 95% of firms whose primarily business was mining and the utilities industries were made up of these state controlled enterprises. 90% of transporting, warehousing and social service industries were made up of these state controlled enterprises. The average ownership stake in the hand of the state was 40%, the largest shareholder (in this case the state) tends to hold substantially larger proportion of shares than other shareholders.<ref>[https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=036104118122118094068066017122071091118034032080036086072002119090126064118102016095039031120001116015022104018071105124004027061050017010060100002096072119127105089076055024114115094099001012126119007070002125122027127108097108093110099066015002008&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE Political and economic incentives of government in partial privatization], Page 19 - 21, by Zhaohua Li and Takeshi Yamada</ref>

In 2004, it was found that 70% of all non-financial firms had SOEs as the largest shareholder. In 2010, data according to the Chinese Statistical Yearbook found that out of 52,425 domestic industrial firms, 42,474 of those firms had the state as either a sole or controlling/dominant role, 300 were Joint-ventures (169 were joint-ventures with collectives/cooperatives) and 9,651 were privately owned. Meaning that around 81% of all 52,425 industrial firms are under the state's direct control, of which there are 42,474. In 2011, it was found that to ensure state control, the government limits individual shares to less than one‐ third of the total. In other words, the state still controls more than two‐thirds of shares within listed companies, either through the holding of state shares by {government agencies} and SOEs, or indirectly through legal‐person shares, using CPC memebers to hold onto these shares.<ref>[https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/10_26_11_CapitalTradeSOEStudy.pdf An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China By Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle] - pp 8-10</ref>

In 2012, 50% of State Controlled Firms (More than, or exactly 50% state ownership) are registered as "Private firms", this includes foreign firms where the classification as 30% of the shares by a foreign entity makes it foreign funded. For example, the joint ventures of the SAIC with Volkswagen, SAIC-Volkswagen are registered as foreign firms, even though 50% of ownership is held by the SAIC. Roughly 2/3 of all firms were directly or indirectly owned by the SASAC<ref>[https://www.nber.org/papers/w21006 '''Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small: The Transformation of the State Sector in China''' By CHANG-TAI HSIEH and ZHENG (MICHAEL) SONG, Page 7-8]</ref>

In 2019, it was found that out of the top 300 listed companies in China, 61% of those could be classified as state controlled enterprises, despite being on paper being "public listed enterprises" or not officially designated as SOEs.<ref>[https://archive.ph/PAlRB INVESTING IN CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES - Factset]</ref>

In 2001, a study was done compiling the composition of listed companies by nature of dominant shareholder, it found that out of the 1,050 listed companies, 80.5% of the dominant shareholder were SOE's or CPC organizations.<ref>Zhang et. al [2002]</ref> Another study was conducted in 2002, out of all publically quoted shareholder companies, which there are 1,105, the state is in the ultimate and absolute control of 84% them.<ref>[https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/917/1/02-19.pdf The Class of Shareholdings and its Impacts on Corporate Performance – A Case of State Shareholding Composition in Chinese Publicly Listed Companies], June 2002</ref>

A 1997 study found that, although individual shareholding constituted 30 percent of the outstanding shares, on average individual shareholders occupied less than 0.3 percent of the seats on the boards of 154 companies, whereas on average the state was overrepresented on the boards. On average, the state retained 50 percent of the seats even though its equity shares amounted to 30 percent.<ref>Xu, Xiaonian, and Yan Wang. 1997. “Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance.”</ref> It is also worth noting that Chinese shares are peculiar animals quite different from those in the capitalist world. Chinese shares do not entitle the owner to a share of a company’s assets.<ref>Will Hutton: The writing on the Wall , 2007</ref> Thus, even if 100 percent of the shares in a Chinese company were privately owned, the share owners could not move the machines out of the factories and sell them, as they still belong to the state. No wonder Stephen Green of the Royal Institute of International affairs comments:<blockquote>“The stock market has been used to support national industrial policy, to subsidise SOE restructuring, not to allow private companies to raise capital."<ref>[https://archive.ph/B5kSb#selection-863.68-863.133 Economist: 18 March, 2004]</ref></blockquote>While the so-called ‘privatization’ process of allows some private ownership, whether domestic or foreign, Scissors makes clear that this is a far cry from real privatization, as occurs in the United States and other capitalist countries. The state, headed by the CPC, retains a majority stake in the company and guides the company’s path. More striking are the industries that remain firmly under state control, which are those industries most essential to the welfare of the Chinese masses. Scissors continues:<blockquote>"No matter their shareholding structure, all national corporations in the sectors that make up the core of the Chinese economy are required by law to be owned or controlled by the state. These sectors include power generation and distribution; oil, coal, petrochemicals, and natural gas; telecommunications; armaments; Aviation and shipping; machinery and automobile production; information technologies; construction; and the production of iron, steel, and nonferrous metals. The railroads, grain distribution, and insurance are also dominated by the state, even if no official edict says so."<ref name=":4" /></blockquote>The same sentiment is echoed in a study, which finds that out of the 1,381 listed companies, 65.9% of their shares are non-tradeable. Over half of the shares are owned by the government, with the remainder owned by SOEs or State Investment funds. This means that despite on the surface being private entities, the majority of the listed companies are state owned. With little influence from the private shareholders who may be sitting on the board. Listed firms also do not pay dividends on state owned shares.:<ref name=":10">[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5223340_Perspectives_on_China's_outward_foreign_direct_investment Perspectives on China's outward foreign direct investment] - Journal of International Business Studies (2008) 39, 337–350. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400366</ref>

Interestingly enough, another study also finds that the "privatization" doesn't tend to cause lay offs and still maintains high levels of job preservation, contrary to popular belief that "privatization" always leads to a loss of jobs and decline in employment, with mass lay offs.<blockquote>"Both anecdotal evidence and our statistical analysis show that the Chinese government has made job preservation an important pre-condition for privatization. As a result, there was no accelerated layoff of surplus labor after privatization, even though the surplus labor problem was severe in both pre-privatization SOEs and post-privatization SOEs."<ref>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0147596708000723 How does privatization work in China?] - Chong-En Bai, Jiangyong Lu, Zhigang Tao</ref></blockquote>A research report published in 2009 stated that,<ref>[https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1156&context=clpe Non-Tradable Share Reform in China: Marching Towards the Berle and Means Corporation?] - Horace W. H. Yeung</ref><blockquote>The privatization campaign in China is clearly one with “Chinese characteristics”. In contrast to those in Russia and Eastern Europe, there has not been any transfer of control from the state to the private hands. The Chinese government has introduced a special mechanism to prevent the loss of state control when companies go public. A distinct feature that separates China’s stock market from those in other countries is the creation of state shares and legal person shares, which both carry significant constraints on tradability. These shares are generally state-owned or state controlled. On the other hand, tradable shares are composed of A, B and H shares... A typical public company has about one-third of its shares in each category of state, legal person and tradable shares. By holding two-thirds of most companies’ shares, the state can ensure that it still has the power to direct and influence the activities of the companies...

The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is the socialist public ownership of the means of production. It appears that even if the shares owned by the state can now be traded on the market, these shares will still be tightly hold by the state for an indefinite period. Indeed, only 10 per cent of these shares have actually gone to the hands of private investors so far</blockquote>In a statement made by the ''Business insider'' it also found that truly private or free floating shares in the stock market was the lowest in Asia, accounting for 30% in 2010. Meaning the other 70% of shares are held up to the discretion of the state or in the hand of the state itself. Which matches previous findings that state that around 2/3 of shares either directly through state ownership or indirectly through legal person shares.<ref>[https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-chinese-stocks-are-a-state-controlled-facade-2010-6 Here's Why Chinese Stock Markets Remain A State-Controlled Facade]</ref>The view that the stock market in China is state dominated is echoed in a 2014 research paper which the abstract states the following:<ref>[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jacf.12075 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Volume 26, Issue 3, Was Deng Xiaoping Right? An Overview of China's Equity Markets, Carl .E Walter, 21st of October 2014]</ref><blockquote>The combination of state monopolies with Wall Street expertise and international capital has led to the creation of national companies that represent little more than the incorporation of China's old Soviet-style industrial ministries. As for the markets, the government's determination to prevent real privatization has produced separate classes of shares that are defined almost entirely by one thing: the shareholder's relationship to the government.</blockquote>And in the conclusion of the research paper, it states the following: <ref>Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Volume 26, Issue 3, page 18, Was Deng Xiaoping Right? An Overview of China's Equity Markets, Carl .E Walter, 21st of October 2014</ref><blockquote>China’s domestic market is rife with moral hazard. Beijing plays every role from issuer, to underwriter, to regulator, to controlling investor and manager of the exchanges. Efforts to simplify domestic arrangements—the old share classes have been eliminated—have served only to conceal the fact that the state in its many guises still owns nearly two-thirds of domestically listed company shares. </blockquote>A comment by a Chinese Law scholar in an article published in 2017 came to the same conclusions. He noted that despite so called "privatization" of former SOE's, the Party state remains dedicated to ensuring control over these supposedly "privatize" entities:<ref>[https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3021&context=articles China 's 'Corporatization without Privatization' and the Late 19th Century Roots of a Stubborn Path Dependency] - Nicholas Howson, page 11</ref><blockquote>To the present day, the PRC Party State remains absolutely committed to retaining control over converted enterprises in the broadest range of sectors-not just the usual suspects for state control (e.g., defense and national security, power generation, extractive industries, and key infrastructure), but also non-national security and non-key infrastructure sectors that are extremely profitable for central or local Party State insiders, especially when financed by largely passive and information-deprived public investors, Chinese and foreign

The core holding company, managed by Party State nomeklatura appointees who rotate between central and local official posts and enterprise executive offices or directorships (and even between allegedly competing enterprise groups in a single monopoly or duopoly sector), coordinates the entire group's business activities. They do this in the interest, above all, of state industrial policy, and certainly with a preference for such national policy over what might be in the interest of shareholder wealth maximization for the nongroup, minority shareholders invested in the individual legal person subsidiaries often through the public capital markets

...State nomenklatura insider appointees working at the core holding company level, and as directors and officers of the subsidiary entities controlled by the core holding company. As Party State bureaucratic political actors seeking advancement in the Party system, these individuals are perfectly responsive to Party State policy (which necessarily includes national industrial policy), while at the same time they are content to ignore the interests of external minority shareholders in the listed subsidiaries they formally manage</blockquote>The same article goes onto give a concrete example of how one CSOE (Central SOE) can functionally corner and control the entire market through this shareholding system. The example given is the China National Petroleum and Chemical Group, known as Sinopec:<ref>[https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3021&context=articles China 's 'Corporatization without Privatization' and the Late 19th Century Roots of a Stubborn Path Dependency] - Nicholas Howson, page 11 - 12</ref><blockquote>Sinopec has a monopoly on all downstream hydrocarbons businesses in China, thus gas stations, refining, petrochemicals, etc everything separate from exploration, development and production, and energy transportation businesses, all of which are the province of other enterprise groups. There is a Sinopec core holding company at the center of these enter prise groups, the "Sinopec Group Holding Company", which is 100 percent "owned" by a State Council department now called SASAC.

A majority-controlled subsidiary, department, or affiliated entity would function as a dedicated "finance holding company" necessary for the allocation of funds and finance to and among operations and entities included in the Sinopec Group. Sinopec Group Holding Company, explicitly permitted in its business license to invest in other entities, in turn owns a vast number of only Sinopec business-related subsidiaries, each with a business scope allowing it to operate in a defined sector within the group's larger monopoly or defined geographical areas.

Those subsidiaries will always show majority equity ownership in the hands of the Sinopec Group Holding Company or one of its controlled subsidiaries, but they can be financed directly by bank loans, minority non-public investment, or the public capital markets, domestic or foreign. This Sinopec Group can seek to reorganize a traditional SOE grouping of productive and social assets conducting a petrochemicals business, like in the Shanghai suburbs of Jinshan District into a Sinopec Group Holding Company-controlled company called "Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited," which could complete an IPO on the PRC domestic or foreign capital markets.

After the IPO, issuer Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited would still be dominated absolutely by the core holding company (which is the Party-State Ran State Owned Enterprise of Sinopec) via an 80 percent equity stake and its power to appoint all directors and officers of the listed subsidiary.

Moreover, Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Company Limited would benefit from well advertised preferences critical to its commercial success, preferences relating to regulatory breaks, supply or other inputs, availability or pricing, or exclusive access to certain markets at preferred (higher) prices, importantly preferences delivered not just by other Sinopec Group affiliates but even by other Party State-controlled competitors...</blockquote>No capitalist country in the history of the world has ever had state control over all of these industries. In countries like the United States or France, certain industries like railroads and health insurance may have state ownership, but it falls drastically short of dominating the industry. In essence, we can see that there is no "true privatization" in a sense of the word and there remains a state control pervasive through the overwhelming majority of firms.

==== Role of CPC ran banks and CPC ran bond markets ====
The importance of this widespread state ownership is that the essential aspects of the Chinese economy are run by the state headed by a party whose orientation is towards the working class and peasantry. Particularly damaging to the China-as-state-capitalist argument is the status of banks and the Chinese financial system. Scissors elaborates:<blockquote>"the state exercises control over most of the rest of the economy through the financial system, especially the banks. By the end of 2008, outstanding loans amounted to almost $5 trillion, and annual loan growth was almost 19 percent and accelerating; lending, in other words, is probably China’s principal economic force. The Chinese state owns all the large financial institutions, the People’s Bank of China assigns them loan quotas every year, and lending is directed according to the state’s priorities."<ref name=":4" /></blockquote>The People’s Bank of China (PBC) highlights one of the most important ways in which the CPC uses the market system to control private capital and subordinate it to socialism. Far from functioning as a capitalist national bank, which prioritizes facilitating the accumulation of capital by the bourgeoisie, “this system frustrates private borrowers.”<ref name=":4" />

Control is maintained not just through economic coercion, but by having direct party members on the ground regulating the banks, imbedded within them occur as well. A book published on China's economic structure found that,<ref>''Capitalizing China'' by Joseph PH Fan and Randall Morck, page 12</ref><blockquote>While individual banks, business enterprises, and regulatory agencies appear distinct on paper, they are actually highly integrated because the CCP OD handles human resource management (HRM) decisions throughout all of them (Macgregor 2010). The future careers of top bankers and bank regulators thus depend on how cadres in the CCP OD assess their performance.</blockquote>As of the end of 2017, there are only 17 private-owned banks among 4,532 financial institutions classified as the banking industry. The number of people employed by these 17 private-owned banks only accounts for 0.1% of all banking staff.<ref>The Rise and Fall of China’s Private Sector: Determinants and Policy Implications - Kerry Liu, Page 6</ref>

China’s specialized policy banks were designed to help the government achieve its long-term goals in areas where profit-driven banks might be reluctant to lend. Beijing can also draw on them when there’s a pressing short-term need to boost the economy. China’s policy banks are of a much larger scale and play a bigger role in the country’s state-directed economy in comparison to Capitalist nations who may have similar policy banks.<ref>[https://archive.ph/DrsYd#selection-3365.0-3372.0 What Are the Policy Banks China Uses to Spur Economy? - Bloomberg]</ref>

Firms in China are also incredibly bank dependent, because there are no real means of securing external finances, banks are the only way to actually secure financial funding. Thus, firms in China are more bank-dependent, which makes them much more sensitive to changes in bank loan supply, State ran banks also control 98% of all banking assets within China itself.<ref>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0929119908000722 Leverage and investment under a state-owned bank lending environment: Evidence from China]</ref> Interestingly enough, State owned banks within capitalist societies tend to favour merely large firms, while State owned banks in China lend primarily to SOE's and is unresponsive to firm profitability. Indicating that SOE's received more bank loans and invested more than non-SOEs.<ref name=":16" /> Similarly as a side note, the stock market has not played a role as prominent as the banking sector in financing firms and economic growth for most of the past two decades. Stock market returns in both developed economies, such as the US, UK, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and large emerging economies, such as South Africa and Brazil, are strong predictors of GDP growth in the following year. The correlation between market returns and future GDP growth for China, however, is much lower and statistically insignificant.<ref>'''[https://www.cicfconf.org/sites/default/files/paper_736.pdf Explaining the Disconnection between China’s Economic Growth and Stock Market Performance]''' - January 31, 2015 By Franklin Allen, Jun “QJ” Qian, Susan Chenyu Shan, Julie Lei Zhu</ref>

This belief is corroborated in a 2019 study that found that,<ref>[https://www.nber.org/digest/mar19/favoritism-toward-chinas-former-state-owned-enterprises Favoritism toward China's Former State-Owned Enterprises]</ref><blockquote>“Currently state-owned firms receive more subsidies and lower interest rates than formerly state-owned firms, which in turn are favored relative to always-private firms... former SOEs still benefit from some forms of state support. These firms receive low-interest loans and subsidies more frequently, and in greater quantity, than other enterprises.”</blockquote>The same belief is echoed in the book, ''Capitalizing China'' by Joseph PH Fan and Randall Morck who argue that China continues to remain a broadly socialist nation, stating the following regarding CPC ran banks:<ref>''Capitalizing China'' by Joseph PH Fan and Randall Morck, page 11</ref><blockquote>Allen et al. show most bank lending flowing to SOEs, rather than the hybrid sector they find better equipped to generate wealth-despite SOES' ongoing accumulation of nonperforming loans. Their findings suggest that politics and connections dominate financial viability in bank loan alloca- tion decisions, sheltering banks from market forces as well. Unsurprisingly, simultaneous capital shortages and surpluses ensue-excess capital being wasted in some sectors and firms while, simultaneously, chronic capital shortages blocks needed growth in other sectors and firms. The capital shortage in the hybrid sector is due to the lending bias of state-controlled banks, which prefer to lend to large state-controlled enterprises; frequent government intervention in the financial system merely reinforces this bias.</blockquote>The hybrid sector in this context refers to local government controlled enterprises through a shareholding scheme or Township and Village Enterprises.

There is a definite bias towards State Owned Enterprises and former SOE's which have been turned into private companies, but functionally speaking they would still be underneath the control of the state, former SOE's are not "root and branch privatized" as, previously discused through the stock ownership model and how stock ownership manifests, these former SOE's are still managed and controlled through majority CPC stockholder ownership.

The CPC floods the market with public bonds, which has a crowding-out effect on private corporate bonds that firms use to raise independent capital. Another example of this would be how there is a strong price cap on how much money you can move out of the country, with a cap on outflow of wealth to external bank accounts or bringing money into China being around 20,000 - 50,000 USD, making the control of investment in and out of the country, subordinate to the CPC's goals.<ref name=":9" />

This also renders state bonds far more valuable than private bonds and the credit deterioration of non-state bonds is worse than state bonds. State Owned Enterprises receive much more preferential treatment from the government due to this model of flooding state bonds and far more valuable bonds into the market, with comparable private bonds declining in terms of value and being unable to compete.

In 2018, this is clearly demonstrated after the implementation of more regulations on the shadow banking market, leading to investors flocking towards much more valuable State bonds over private ones. This inevitably creates a feed back look where State bonds have a "premium" and are objectively more valuable than private ones.<ref>[https://en.saif.sjtu.edu.cn/junpan/Credit.pdf The SOE Premium and Government Support in China’s Credit Market] - Zhe Geng and Jun Pan - November 29, 2022</ref>

This is corroborated by a 2016 study which found that,

"Whereas the governments of Japan and Korea worked hand in glove with private institutions that had close relationships with financial regulators and line ministries, the Chinese approach has been to pervade the entire corporate bond market with state-owned and state-linked actors. The principal role for private actors in this market is as passive suppliers of capital to SOEs and LGFVs (local government financing vehichles)...the Chinese government’s approach has been to prioritize SOE interests over non-SOE interests in a tightly managed market that is simultaneously massive in scale and seriously underdeveloped institutionally."<ref>[https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1206&context=fac_pubs Bonded to the State: A Network Perspectiv on China e on China's Corporate Debt Market -] Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J Milhaupt</ref>

By harnessing supply and demand in the bond market, the PBC prevents private firms, domestic or foreign, from accumulating capital independently of socialist management.

==== Role of Party Committee's ====
In one defining way that the CPC maintains control over the "private" sector is through the use of party committees and party units. A survey conducted in 2006, investigated 400 private enterprises in 26 provinces. Only 9% of all respondents believed party committees held no or a weak sway over decision making.<ref>Contemporary Manager Journal, 2006</ref>

Another study conducted in 2008 states that:<ref name=":10" /><blockquote>"State-appointed independent directors often see the world much as do state-appointed CEOs. Moreover, every listed firm’s board has a parallel authority structure, the firm’s Party Committee, headed by its Party Secretary. Reforms to the board leave this hidden – or not-so- hidden – real power structure untouched. The Party Secretary may or may not chair the board, and Party Committee members may or may not serve as directors. Where the two structures do not overlap, real power flows through the Party channels, leaving the board and formal corporate top executives with scant real authority. In the large SOEs, the Party Secretary appoints the top executives and directors, often simply relaying orders from the Communist Party of China’s Organizational Department, and exercises a leading role in the company.

The ultimate function of the Party Committee and Party Secretary may change as corporate governance reforms occur, but this remains unresolved. For example, whether listed companies’ managers might someday report to shareholders, rather than the Party, is debated. At present, the Party Committee monitors and evaluates corporate executives, determining their prospects for career advancement. The CEOs of the largest 53 national SOEs are appointed directly by the Communist Party of China’s Organizational Department. The other senior management positions are mostly appointed by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which is directed by the State Council. Similar patterns hold for the local SOEs.

In November 2004, the top managers of the three largest telecommunication companies in China – China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom – exchanged positions almost overnight without prior notice to public shareholders. In short, executive positions in listed firms are filled by State and Party bureaucrats and are seen as steps in the career of a successful civil servant. "</blockquote>A similar statement provided in the book, ''Capitalizing China'' finds that:<ref>''Capitalizing China'' by Joseph PH Fan and Randall Morck, page 8</ref><blockquote>Parallel this corporate governance system, each enterprise also has a Communist Party Committee, headed by a Communist Party Secretary. These advise the CEO on critical decisions, and are kept informed by party cells throughout the enterprise that also monitor the implementation of party policies. Indeed, the party secretary plays a leading role in major decisions, and can overrule or bypass the CEO and board if necessary (Deng et al. 2011). For example, foreign independent directors on the board of CNOOC reportedly first learned of that enterprise's takeover bid for Unocal, an American oil company, from news broadcasts (Macgregor 2010). Directors often also learn of such major strategic moves, and of equally major personnel moves such as the rotation of oil company top managers described earlier after the fact. Despite their formal powers, CEOs and boards are thought to welcome party advice, and any directors likely to have reservations are kept out of the loop to preserve harmony-especially if issues the CCP views as strategically important are involved. </blockquote>According to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, the party commitee's role within the non-public sector are to:<blockquote>Primary-level Party organizations in non-public sector entities shall implement the Party's principles and policies, guide and oversee their enterprises' observance of state laws and regulations, exercise leadership over trade unions, Communist Youth League organizations, and other people's group organizations, promote unity and cohesion among workers and office staff, safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all parties, and promote the healthy development of their enterprises.<ref>[http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/10195159.html Article 33 - Constitution of the PRC]</ref></blockquote>The independence of private companies is limited, as many are to a certain extent dependent on the state for supplies, distribution and even customers. Symptomatic of this is that in a survey in 1995 of 154 private firms where the state had a minority stake of an average of 30 percent it still had an average of 50 percent of the seats on the boards of these companies. Unlike in the west, proxyvoting is not permitted at shareholders meetings. This favours those that own many shares. In China, that is often the state.<ref>Yasheng Huang: Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics , 2008</ref> In 2018, the Organization Department reported that 73.1 percent of private companies had established a Party organization, up from 58.4 percent in 2013. With the number predicted to continue to increase.<ref>“2017 Statistical Communique of the Chinese Communist Party,” CPC Member Web [2017年中国共产党党内统计公报] via www.12371.CN, October 1, 2017, <nowiki>http://www.12371.cn/2018/08/27/</nowiki></ref>

Most of listed shareholder firms have a party secretary. Data was collected on 4,104 firm-years between 2000 and 2004, which represents 68% of the total firms with A-shares in China during that period. Only 11% of the firms said that they did not have a party secretary. In those firms with party secretaries, many of the secretaries hold other management positions as well: 5% also serve as both the chairman and the CEO; 18% also serve as the chairman; 6% also serve as the CEO; and 26% also serve as a supervisor, director, or executive. Thus, many party secretaries have a significant affect on firm management.<ref name=":18" />

According to Scholar Nicholas Howson,<blockquote>PRC corporate groups, and by extension their subsidiaries and divisions, are therefore actually controlled by Party State nomenklatura insider appointees working at the core holding company level, and as directors and officers of the subsidiary entities controlled *by the core holding company. As Party State bureaucratic political actors seeking advancement in the Party system, these individuals are perfectly responsive to Party State policy (which necessarily includes national industrial policy), while at the same time they are content to ignore the interests of external minority shareholders in the listed subsidiaries they formally manage<ref>[https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3021&context=articles China 's 'Corporatization without Privatization' and the Late 19th Century Roots of a Stubborn Path Dependency] - Nicholas Howson, page 11</ref></blockquote>So quite simply, even if the company is listed on the public shareholder market, the ultimate decision making power at the highest level comes from the CPC. This is how the CPC exerts power and influence over the "Private" sector, even though the sell of stock and the sell of shares into the "private market" is permitted.

And as explained in previous arguments, the vast majority of shares all end up in the hands of the CPC anyway, considering that more often than not the CPC maintains largest equity shareholder. Even if it doesn't, the use of the CPC party committees and cells ensure compliance and control over these private companies.

The role of the party commitee's are further elaborated upon by Trey McArver, co-founder of consultancy Trivium/China, which advises companies working in China, who states:<blockquote>“No company, private or state-owned, gets ahead in China without aligning itself with the party's larger goals and strategies. That is more the case than ever in Xi’s China...Xi [Jinping] has reasserted the centrality of the party in all facets of society, including within the economy.” </blockquote>Fraser Howie, a long-time follower of China’s markets and author of ''Red Capitalism'' also states:<blockquote>"Being non-state does not mean you are private... it was always a blurred line and it's become ever more so."</blockquote>Although modern China has an expansive market system, the CPC uses the market to both secure and advance socialism. Rather than privatizing major industries, as is often alleged by detractors, the state maintains a vibrant system of socialist public ownership that prevents the rise of an independent bourgeoisie. Deng talked specifically about this very deliberate system in the same interview with Fallaci:<blockquote>"No matter to what degree we open up to the outside world and admit foreign capital, its relative magnitude will be small and it can’t affect our system of socialist public ownership of the means of production. Absorbing foreign capital and technology and even allowing foreigners to construct plants in China can only play a complementary role to our effort to develop the productive forces in a socialist society."<ref name=":32">Deng Xiaoping, “Answers to the Italian Journalist Orianna Fallaci,” August 21 and 23, 1980</ref></blockquote>

==== Extra-Legal Control Rights ====
The Chinese state also exercises significant extra-legal control rights over private firms. State encroachment into private ownership of enterprise is particularly acute, however, when the state does not scrupulously follow clearly delineated and neutrally enforced legal rules in exercising its control rights over private firms.

The Chinese state relies on several means to exercise extra-legal influence over private firms. One mechanism is the socalled industrial association. Established in industries where the former line ministry has been disbanded, these nominally private organizations are designed to coordinate activities within an industry. Yet the industrial associations are staffed by former government officials from the defunct ministries and retain basically the same organizational structures and functions as those ministries.<ref>Zheng, Wentong, “Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, and State Control,” 32 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law. 643, 669-70 (2010)</ref> The industrial associations actively supervise the operations of firms in their respective industries and have retained much, if not all, of the power exercised by their state predecessors.<ref>On the official functions of such industrial associations, a US court noted:

The [industrial associations] were given both governmental functions, which had previously been performed by the [ministries], and private functions. The governmental functions included, inter alia, responding to foreign anti-dumping charges and industry “coordination.” The private functions of the Chambers included organizing trade fairs, conducting market research and “mediating” trade disputes.

In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 810 F.Supp.2d 522, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).</ref>

For example, in 2010, China’s main cooking oil producers raised or were planning to increase prices due to cost pressures. Concerned about the impact of these price hikes on food price inflation, the NDRC interviewed executives of the cooking oil producers three times to urge them not to increase prices. During one of the interviews, the NDRC flatly ordered the producers to freeze prices for four months, and the producers complied.<ref>See “Cooking Oil Companies ‘Interviewed’ Three Times in Recent Years; Downstream Restaurants Temporarily Halting Price Hikes,” Xinhua, July 30, 2012, <nowiki>http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-07/30/c_123494170</nowiki>. htm.</ref>

Yet another means by which the state exercises extra-legal control over private firms is through the practice of prodding or even forcing private firms to participate in state-led industrial restructuring efforts. The right of corporate ownership implies the right to sell control and to refuse offers to purchase control. But in China, this right must yield to the state’s plans for restructuring an industry. In 2009, for example, Shandong Steel Group, a major SOE in Shandong Province, acquired a 67 percent stake in Shandong Rizhao Steel, an emerging private steel producer, under the auspices of a restructuring plan for the industry previously adopted by the Shandong provincial government.<ref>See “Shandong Steel Clinches Deal to Acquire 67% of Rizhao Steel,” Sina, September 7, 2009, <nowiki>http://finance</nowiki>. sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20090907/04566714022.shtml.</ref>

The government routinely enforces its policies by extra-legal means, the added degree of autonomy that ordinarily flows from private, as compared to government, the so called "private ownership" of a company may be illusory.

==== The Role of Social Credit Score and Anti Monopoly Laws in regulating the Market Sector ====

Of course, there is also an additional way that the CPC maintains control of the private sector. It is through the use of it's social credit score and social credit system. How the social credit system does this according to the The “Planning Outline for the Establishment of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)” issued by the CPC states that:<blockquote>"must have advancing the establishment of creditworthiness in government affairs, commerce and society and establishment of judicial credibility as its primary content; must have advancing the establishment of a culture of creditworthiness and establishing mechanisms to encourage trustworthiness and punish untrustworthiness as key points; must by supported by advancing the establishment of industry and region specific credit, and developing credit services markets; must have raising the entire society’s awareness and levels of creditworthiness, and improving the economic and social operating environment as its goals; and must put people first, to form an environment across all society in which trustworthiness is honored and untrustworthiness is shameful, and make honesty and trustworthiness the entire populations' conscientious behavioral norm."<ref>[https://archive.ph/Z0H0W#selection-851.0-851.124 State Council Notice concerning Issuance of the Planning Outline for the Establishment of a Social Credit System (2014-2020)] - Translated by ChinaLawBlog</ref> </blockquote>What is credit worthiness?It is being able to comply on financial agreements and willingness to pay debts. And to ensure that in the context of the social credit score, to ensure companies enact on their promises. The score is used to regulate the private sector and continue to clamp down on potential exploitative behaviour that may be undergone. The score is given to private firms and there are real punishments and draw backs for those who do not comply or fail to achieve a high score<blockquote>"The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is pushing ahead with social credit-based supervision of all commercial entities from large firms to small, independently owned and operated business, prompting complaints over corporate privacy and heavy handed government intervention. The social credit rating will include court rulings, tax records, environmental protection issues, government licensing, product quality, work safety and administrative punishments by market regulators.

'All the existing credit incentive and punishment measures listed in the memorandums are based on laws and regulations... For severe violations, especially those endangering life and property, harsh punishment will be adopted, such as a temporary or even permanent ban on market entry - Lian Weiliang, deputy chairman of the NDRC"<ref>[https://archive.ph/sqFN6#selection-803.13-803.110 China pushing ahead with controversial corporate social credit rating system for 33 million firms] - SCMP</ref></blockquote>And in a horizons article which goes over how corporate social credit works, <blockquote>"While the China Blacklisting system is still in its early stages, it is already the most prominent system of its kind worldwide. China has already put this system into action, and has barred thousands of Chinese residents’ rights to buy plane tickets and travel either domestically or abroad. However, most of the blacklisting that has occurred to date has been as a result of violations or misbehavior of companies and the individuals working for them."<ref name=":11">[https://nhglobalpartners.com/china-social-credit-system-explained/#:~:text=The%20China%20social%20credit%20system%20is%20a%20broad%20regulatory%20framework,and%20governmental%20entities%20across%20China. China Social Credit System Explained – What is it & How Does it Work?] - Horizons</ref></blockquote>Individuals who end up on a black list due to mistreatment of workers or violating the laws around workers rights are given penalties and can be as severe as having their business license revoked or barring them from using social amenities and public services until they fix their social credit score. There are real consequences for breaking the PRC's laws regarding worker rights and treatment of workers.

How the social credit score is measured according to CreditChina, the website responsible for openly publishing corporate social credit data lists the following reasons for a low social credit score:<blockquote>”Basic identifying information for the company, including the company’s Unified Social Credit Code and permits held； Any applicable administrative penalties; Any payment defaults recognized by the Courts; Any instances of tax evasion and fraud; Instances of illegal importing or exporting; Unpaid wages”<ref name=":11" /></blockquote>The Social Credit System is meant to serve as a market regulation mechanism. The goal is to establish a self-enforcing regulatory regime fueled by big data in which businesses exercise "self-restraint". The basic idea is that with a functional credit system in place, companies will comply with government policies and regulations to avoid having their scores lowered by disgruntled employees, customers or clients. Companies with bad credit scores will potentially face unfavorable conditions for new loans, higher tax rates, investment restrictions and lower chances to participate in publicly funded projects.<ref>Meissner, Mirjam (24 May 2017). [https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/China%20Monitor_39_SOCS_EN.pdf "China's Social Credit System: A big-data enabled approach to market regulation with broad implications for doing business in China"]

</ref>

And for those wondering about State Owned Enterprises or other government institutions, a similar method is also employed to ensure citizens have faith in SOE's and the government. The social credit system targets government agencies, assesses local governments' performance and focuses on financial problems such as local governments' debts and contract defaults<ref>[https://merics.org/en/report/chinas-social-credit-system-2021-fragmentation-towards-integration "China's Social Credit System in 2021: From fragmentation towards integration".] ''Mercator Institute for China Studies''. 3 March 2021.</ref> In this way, local governments and SOE's are regulated and encouraged to increase trustworthiness among the chinese masses, as well as putting a form of "government self-discipline" upon the companies.

The way the discipline of the social credit score system and the effects are primarily undertaken by the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Administration for Market Regulation. This tends to lead to large fines being enacted on both domestic and foreign companies that breach the laws and regulations set out by the social credit system. An example of this would be Meituan, which was fined US$530 million for monopolistic behaviour. Meituan was also ordered to refund exclusive cooperation deposits paid by merchants, totalling 1.29 billion yuan.Alibaba Group Holding was fined 18.2 billion yuan after the conclusion of its own antitrust investigation, in 2019.<ref>[https://archive.ph/s5Had#selection-759.13-770.0 China fines Meituan less-than-expected US$530 million for monopolistic behaviour, ending five-month antitrust probe] - SCMP</ref>

China also expanded Anti-Monopoly Bureau as more crackdowns occur on companies that appear to breach anti monopoly trust laws. This included hefty fines, as afformentioned. But also blocking mergers and preventing private companies from merging together, decreasing the potential influence and impact that large private companies could already have on the pre-existing private sector.<ref>[https://archive.ph/gy8IW#selection-3013.0-3020.0 China to Expand Anti-Monopoly Bureau as Crackdown Widens, Sources Say] - Bloomberg</ref> The revised anti monopoly law in 2022 strenghtened the party's role over controlling the aspects of large private sectors, wanting to avoid monopolistic behaviour in all sectors dominated by large private companies. The CPC will continue to maintain a close eye on the activity of large companies. The new law prohibites the use of technology to engage in monopolistic behavior suggests that the authorities will be looking closer at platform companies’ rules of engagement, M&A deals, and contracts with partners and third parties. Meanwhile, the draft provisions governing consolidation indicate that more large companies will be required to undergo antitrust reviews when they engage in M&A or other consolidation.<ref>[https://www.china-briefing.com/news/what-has-changed-in-chinas-amended-anti-monopoly-law/ What Has Changed in China’s Amended Anti-Monopoly Law? - China-briefing.com]</ref>

While the CIS and other bourgeoisie economist thinktanks goes on to discuss about the lack of economic and political freedoms in China, Marxist-Leninists should read between the lines and know the truth: China isn’t capitalist, the CPC isn’t pursuing capitalist development, and the Socialist Market Economy has succeeded in laying the material foundation for ‘higher socialism’. We can clearly see that with the commanding heights of the Chinese economy that China remains socialist and a Marxist-Leninist nation. The claims that China has restored the capitalist road is fundamentally untrue.

== True Size and Nature of the State and Market sector ==
<blockquote>“All enterprises must persevere in putting proletarian politics in command and ideological and political work first.”<ref>Document of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, September 2, 1975</ref></blockquote>The nature of the market under the Socialist Market Economy is one designed to adhere to public good and social welfare, as well as subservience to Public Ownership and the State Owned Economy. Therefore, the true nature of the market and how the state - market intersect must be examined. The fact that prior listed mechanisms such as banks lending almost exclusively to SOE's and financialization and investment funds in every sector of the economy is dominated by state funds, it would seem to indicate that the nature of the market economy is very different than one of Capitalism.

The CPC uses the market to both secure and advance socialism. Rather than privatizing major industries, as is often alleged by detractors, the state maintains a vibrant system of socialist public ownership that prevents the rise of an independent bourgeoisie. Deng talked specifically about this very deliberate system in the same interview with Fallaci:<blockquote>"No matter to what degree we open up to the outside world and admit foreign capital, its relative magnitude will be small and it can’t affect our system of socialist public ownership of the means of production. Absorbing foreign capital and technology and even allowing foreigners to construct plants in China can only play a complementary role to our effort to develop the productive forces in a socialist society."<ref name=":322">Deng Xiaoping, “Answers to the Italian Journalist Orianna Fallaci,” August 21 and 23, 1980</ref></blockquote>

==== Renationalization: the state sector advances, the private sector retreats ====
There is a famous saying in China, the state sector advances and the private sector retreats.<ref>https://www.forbes.com/sites/china/2010/08/31/guo-jin-min-tui/</ref> The role that Xi is playing exposes the nature of the State and the market economy, that the market is subservient to the state and the state advances, while the private sectore retreats. Many private firms have been forced to default and ended up being renationalized as Xi Jinping cracks down much harder on the private sector. This phenomenon will be further elaborated upon in how the CPC remains comitted to building higher socialism.

Private companies are forced to comply to developmental goals set out by the CPC, with the rise of Xi Jinping as General Secetary, bourgeoisie thinktanks interept Xi's actions as returning to "Mao era China".<ref>[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Xi-Jinpings-politics-in-command-economy.pdf Xi Jinping’s Politics in Command Economy] - Atlantic Council</ref> The Regulation of the market sector has taken a much deeper step, afformentioned with how social credit is used to punish companies.

The acquisition of A-share private enterprises by local state-owned enterprises has also become an important point of view in the capital market. From 2019 to 2021, more than 110 A-share listed private enterprises were acquired by local state-owned system enterprises, with a total market value of more than 600 billion yuan. There is a greater degree of re-nationalization within China.<ref name=":17" /> The goal of which appears to be acquiring key technology and assets, promote local industrial upgrades and to obtain listed company shells for back-door listing. This has been a growing trend since 2020. The most common target industries appear to be building renovation and furnishing, pharmaceutical and biotechnology, and environmental protection; hi-tech manufacturing companies are the most popular strategic investment targets.<ref>[https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/chinese-soes-increasing-investments-in-poes-03-07-2022 China’s State-Owned Entities Boost Investments in Private Companies] - Fitchratings</ref>

Similary, there is a great deal of bias and red tape surrounding these private enterprises. In Zhanjiang prefecture, Guangdong province, a private mining enterprise went bankrupt in 2003, allegedly because of the excessive fees and “penalties” extorted from it by the Municipal Land and Resources Bureau.<ref>Nanfang Daily online edition, January 10, 2005</ref> As another example, the owner of a private firm that produces wrapping paper claimed that the taxes and fees levied upon it were so hefty they had put a severe dent (of more than 50%) in his profits.<ref>Peoples’ Daily online edition, November 14, 2011)</ref> In Shijiazhuang prefecture, the capital of Hebei province, a private enterprise spent nearly three years collecting a total of 166 departmental approvals in order to develop a real estate project but missed the opportunity to do so by the time the project was given the green light.<ref>(Xinhua News, February 21, 2009).</ref> Consistent with these findings, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences found in a survey in 2003 that 70% of the profits of private enterprises went to fees imposed on them by the local authorities—not to mention the high transaction costs arising from “red tapes” or over-regulations in dealing with local governments.

In 2011, China’s central government picked 750 champion firms, and plans to provide them with the support needed to make theirs a self-fulfilling prophesy. And China selected 426 firms to essentially die off. or "losers'. National champions which are overwhelmingly SOE's get free land, cut-rate financing, instant approvals, guaranteed domestic markets and expedited stock-market listings. The losers, consisting of companies in disposable foam plastic dinnerware, vertical gas water heaters and cardboard detonators, get nothing but a date by which they must terminate operations. China’s losers also have a third category, industries not set for termination but will be terminated at a later date.<ref>[https://financialpost.com/opinion/nationalizing-china/wcm/a04c963d-06da-4763-b06a-4881dfde010f Nationalizing China - Patricia Adams]</ref>

These are industries that will be tolerated for a while. These include villa-type real estate developments, golf courses, artificial leather, certain types of toothpaste and small versions of the winners, like small coal mines, for example. These tolerated sectors, recieve no governemnt favours and will disappear over time, either being consolidated into the State Sector or simply left to die off.

==== True Size of the Market Sector ====
Even after the economic reforms, China's public ownership sector remained great, according to the paper ''"China’s Collective and Private Enterprises: Growth and Its Financing"'' by Shahid Yusuf, during 1985-1991, on average only around 7.1% of the Industrial Sector was actually private (started by entrepreneurs and foreign businesses), when it came down to measuring the raw output of resources. <ref>[https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781557753809/ch012.xml#Rch12tab02 China’s Collective and Private Enterprises: Growth and Its Financing, Table 2 by Shahid Yusuf]</ref> And during 1991, the national industrial sector only had around 11.41% being truly private.<ref>[https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781557753809/ch012.xml#Rch12tab15 China’s Collective and Private Enterprises: Growth and Its Financing, Table 15 by Shahid Yusuf]</ref>

The true nature of the private sector is actually quite small once you take into account it's breaking down. In 2005, the private sector is dominated by small sized enterprises, only 5 per cent of private enterprises employ more than 500 and only 2% more than 1000 workers. The number of private industrial firm ownership appears to have peaked in 2013 at around 23% of asset ownership but the number has never risen above 23%.<ref>The Rise and Fall of China’s Private Sector: Determinants and Policy Implications - Kerry Liu, page 8</ref>

Contrast this with the state sector where 80% of workers work in companies employing over 500 workers. The number of private companies rose from 90,000 in 1989 employing 1.4 million workers, to 3.6 million companies in 2004 employing 40 million workers. 74% of private companies originated as new start ups, 7% are privatized state owned companies, 8% are privatized rural collectives and 11% are privatized urban collectives. The average income of an entrepreneur is $6600 US per year (2002 figures) this gives an idea of the small scale of the overwhelming majority of private sector enterprises in China.<ref>OECD Economic Survey China Sept. 2005 p83-95</ref>

In some areas the contribution of private companies can appear to be impressive. 70 percent of theworld lighters are made by private Chinese companies in the city of Wenzhou. However, these lighters are produced by 3,000 small firms, some specialising in components, some in final assembly.<ref>Economist , 18 March, 2004</ref> Their specific weight in the Chinese economy does not amount to much. 90 percent of private companies employless than eight people. Companies like that cannot compete for influence with the giant SOEs.

==== Regulation of Special Economic Zones ====
Shanghai is often presented as the shop window of capitalism in China. But this is nothing more than a successful advertising campaign on the part of the bureaucracy to attract large foreign multinationals for joint-ventures. Although Shanghai is the richest area of China, the indigenous private-sector is among the smallest. Wage income is high in Shanghai, but asset income (income from shares, property, land, bank accounts) is the lowest in the country. Fixed asset investment by the indigenous private sector peaked in 1985 in Shanghai and has declined every year since then. By 2004, it was back to the same level as it was in 1978, in absolute terms.

This is not surprising if one knows that there are many political, regulatory, and financial restrictions on private enterprise. A few examples: Professors, civil servants, SOE managers, and workers for non-profit organisations were not allowed to start businesses on the side; the Shanghai government rigorously enforced zoning arrangements about what areas are allowed to be used for businesses and tightly controls land transactions; in critical infrastructure projects private companies are forbidden.<ref>Yasheng Huang: Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics , 2008</ref>

It is because of this, not despite it, that Shanghai with its 17 million people has managed to reach a GDP per capita similar to Portugal. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets have exploded (and then declined), but this does not either represent a transition to capitalism. An overwhelming proportion of companies traded there are SOEs.

==How the CPC manages foreign capital==
<blockquote>No better proof of the Russian Soviet Republic’s material and moral victory over the capitalists of the whole world can be found than the fact that the powers that took up arms against us because of our terror and our entire system have been compelled, against their will, to enter into trade relations with us in the knowledge that by so doing they are strengthening us. This might have been advanced as proof of the collapse of communism only if we had promised, with the forces of Russia alone, to transform the whole world, or had dreamed of doing so. However, we have never harboured such crazy ideas and have always said that our revolution will be victorious when it is supported by the workers of all lands. In fact, they went half-way in their support, for they weakened the hand raised against us, yet in doing so they were helping us.<ref>[https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/nov/21.htm Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks] - November 21, 1920, Vladimir Lenin</ref></blockquote>China’s opening up to foreign investment and its integration into global markets is often presented as primary evidence of its having become a capitalist country, that China has "sold itself" to foreign capital or allowed foreign capital to dictate China's actions. China’s joining of the World Trade Organisation in 2001 was seen as the final death blow to Socialism in China. However, based on the following pieces of evidence I will present to you, this is not the case.

Jenny Clegg explains that WTO membership had nothing to do with capitalist restoration, and everything to do with developing China’s productive forces, strengthening its geopolitical position, and thereby building a better life for its people. China joined the WTO in order to able to<blockquote>"insert itself into the global production chains linking East Asia to the US and other markets, thus making itself indispensable as a production base for the world economy. This would make it far more difficult for the United States to impose a new Cold War isolation.”</blockquote>And that it allows China to undergo<blockquote>“the unprecedented global technological revolution, offering a short cut for the country to accelerate its industrial transformation and upgrade its economic structure.”<ref>Jenny Clegg, ''China’s Global Strategy: Toward a Multipolar World'', Pluto Press, 2009</ref></blockquote>The opportunity to rapidly learn from the advanced capitalist countries’ developments in science and technology was the principal reason for ‘opening up’, based off of Mao Zedong's principle of the Four Modernizations. To use their science and technology to rapidly strenghten Socialist modernisation. Blockaded by the western countries after the revolution, and then cut off from Soviet support as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, China in 1978 was objectively technologically backwards, despite it having made some great advances and having developed a standard of living for its people that was far ahead of other countries at a similar level of development. According to Edward M. Graham and Erika Wada,<blockquote>“Currently, the central government of China, as well as provincial governments, do regulate entry of FDI closely or at least attempt to do so. Entry of foreign firms is often conditioned on the achievement of industrial policy goals aslaid out by the state. Foreign firms are most welcome when these goals cannot be fulfilled bydomestic firms. The entry of a foreign firm can be subject to numerous conditions, for example,such performance requirements as having to use local suppliers, often designated by thegovernment, or locating in certain areas, or setting up the local operation as a joint venture."<ref>Edward M. Graham and Erika Wada: Foreign Direct Investment in China: Effects on Growth and Economic Performance, 2001</ref></blockquote>
===Restrictions on Foreign Investment===
There are real administrative measures to restrict foreign investments or to keep a strong leash on foreign investment in regions where the CPC deems of critical importance, and certain actions are prohibited among foreign companies which the CPC deems undesirable. One example of which would be as of 2021, foreign shares in any given company cannot exceed 30% of the total number of shares.<ref>[https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/clp-jan-2022-impact-of-chinas-2021-new-negative-lists/ China Law & Policy (Spring 2022) — Impact of China’s 2021 New Negative Lists on Overseas Listing]</ref> In the book, ''China's superbank: debt, oil and influence: how China Development Bank is rewriting the rules of finance''<ref>[https://archive.org/details/chinassuperbankd0000sand/page/169/mode/1up China's superbank : debt, oil and influence : how China Development Bank is rewriting the rules of finance] pp 169 to 170</ref> it found that the expansion of state capital into private equity in China has coincided with a drop in investments by foreign firms, who face growing amounts of red tape. Investments by Chinese firms rose to $7.8 billion in 2011, exceeding for the first time the $7.4 billion put in by US and other foreign funds, according to the Asian Venture Capital Journal, which tracks the industry. While the number of foreign-currency funds in China fell to 25 in 2011 from 44 in 2008, domestic ones increased to 129 from 70. Any local RMB funds that also contained foreign source investment, were deemed as foreign as well, restricting foreign investment in media, educations, telecommunications, internet and technology.

Contrary to popular belief, foreign direct investment into China does not make a large portion of GDP, with it consistently falling all the way to 0.98% of GDP as of 2021. Foreign inflow of direct investment peaked at 6.19% in 1993, with it gradually going down ever since.<ref>[https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/foreign-direct-investment China Foreign Direct Investment 1979-2023 - Macrotrends]</ref>

Similarly, Western capitalist shills lament the way China constructs and uses foreign investment. China uses something called vaariable-interest entity, or VIE. Many big-name Chinese companies that have sold shares in foreign markets (including Hong Kong) over the past two decades have done so only quasi-legally at best. Beijing prohibits foreign ownership of large sections of the Chinese economy, and especially the most profitable parts involving digital technology and data. The workaround was to create an offshore holding company or VIE. The Chinese operating company would bind itself contractually to remit its profits to the offshore entity, which could then sell shares to foreign investors.

The Western investor doesn’t own anything, since ownership of the VIE does not translate into a claim on the assets of the operating Chinese company. The Western investor can make no demands on the management of the Chinese company because absent an equity stake there is no mechanism by which to influence or change management. In the event of a dispute, no one can guarantee a Chinese court would enforce the contracts binding the operating Chinese company to the VIE that Western shareholders do own. Beijing has played foreign investors like a fiddle. It induced them to finance the expansion of the riskiest parts of its economy while distracting them from asking why China couldn’t use its enormous financial resources to back unicorn tech companies itself. This funded national champions to compete with the Western giants, while insulating domestic middle-class investors—a politically sensitive cohort if ever there was one—from the risks.<ref>[https://archive.ph/bgN3b#selection-133.5-133.40 How China Played American Investors - WSJ]</ref>

===Forced Technology and IP transfer===
Deals with foreign investors were drawn up such that foreign companies trying to expand their capital in China were compelled to share skills and technology, and operate under Chinese regulation. According to David Rosnick, Mark Weisbrot, and Jacob Wilson, ''The Scorecard on Development, 1960–2016: China and the Global Economic Rebound, 2017''<ref>[https://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/scorecard-2017-10.pdf David Rosnick, Mark Weisbrot, and Jacob Wilson, The Scorecard on Development, 1960–2016: China and the Global Economic Rebound, 2017]</ref>

''"Foreign investment was regulated to make it compatible with state development planning. Technology transfer and other performance requirements ― conditions attached to foreign investment to make sure that the host country gets some benefit from foreign investment, such as the use of locally produced inputs, or the hiring of local managers ― were common and are still an issue of contention with the United States today.”''

Even though these investors may have wanted to keep their technologies a secret, they had no choice.

Martin Jacques, ''When China Rules The World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World'', Penguin, 2012 states <ref>Martin Jacques, ''When China Rules The World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World'', Penguin, 2012</ref>

"''As China has grown more powerful, the demand for technology transfer has become ever more insistent, with foreign companies, complain though they may, generally conceding.”''

And Peter Nolan states,<ref>Peter Nolan, China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall, Palgrave Macmillan, 1995</ref><blockquote>" ''in order to gain access to the vast and rapidly growing China market, Boeing was required to assist the main Chinese aircraft manufacturer in Xian to successively establish a capacity to produce spare parts and then manufacture whole sections of aircraft, and finally to assist in the development of a capacity to produce complete aircraft within China. In order to gain the right to invest in car production in China, Ford Motor Company was required to first invest for several years in upgrading the technical capacity of the Chinese automobile spare parts industry through a sequence of joint ventures.”''</blockquote>Ever since 2006, the CPC has been implementing new policies that seek to appropriate technology from foreign multinationals in several technology-based industries, such as air transportation, power generation, high-speed rail, information technology, and now possibly electric automobiles. These rules limit investment by foreign companies as well as their access to China’s markets, stipulate a high degree of local content in equipment produced in the country, and force the transfer of proprietary technologies from foreign companies to their joint ventures with China’s state-owned enterprises. The new regulations are complex and ever changing. They reverse decades of granting foreign companies increasing access to Chinese markets and put CEOs in a terrible bind: They can either comply with the rules and share their technologies with Chinese competitors, or refuse and miss out on the world’s fastest-growing market.
===Heavy bias towards domestic companies===
In late 2009, China’s Ministry of Science and Technology demanded that all the technologies used in products sold to the government be developed in China, which would have forced multinational companies to locate many more of their R&D activities in a country where intellectual property is notoriously unsafe.

A few examples of how China has coerced foreign capital is outlined by the Harvard Business Review:<ref>[https://hbr.org/2010/12/china-vs-the-world-whose-technology-is-it China vs the World: Whose Technology Is It? - Harvard Business Review]</ref><blockquote>...from 1996 to 2005 foreign companies held a 75% share of the Chinese market for wind energy projects. Then the government decided to grow the market dramatically, offering buyers large new subsidies and other incentives. At the same time, it quietly increased the local-content requirement on wind turbines from 40% to 70% and substantially hiked the tariffs on imported components. As the market exploded, foreign manufacturers were unable to expand their supply chains quickly and meet the increased demand. Their Chinese competitors, who had been licensing technology mainly from small European turbine producers, took up the slack rapidly and cost-effectively. By 2009 Chinese companies, led by Sinovel and Goldwind, controlled more than two-thirds of the market. In fact, foreign companies haven’t won a single central government–funded wind energy project since 2005.

In the early 2000s the superior equipment of multinational corporations such as Alstom, which built France’s TGV train system; Kawasaki, which helped develop Japan’s bullet trains; and Siemens, the German engineering conglomerate, gave foreign companies control of about two-thirds of the Chinese market. The multinationals subcontracted the manufacture of simple components to state-owned companies and delivered end-to-end systems to China’s railway operators. In early 2009 the government began requiring foreign companies wanting to bid on high-speed railway projects to form joint ventures with the state-owned equipment producers CSR and CNR. Multinational companies could hold only a 49% equity stake in the new companies, they had to offer their latest designs, and 70% of each system had to be made locally. Most companies had no choice but to go along with these diktats, even though they realized that their joint-venture partners would soon become their rivals outside China.

Owing to hypercompetition between Chinese companies, which spilled into overseas markets, the prices of solar panels fell worldwide by about 50% in 2009 and 2010, driving higher-cost Western producers into the red. Germany’s Q-Cells, an industry pioneer, slid from an operating profit of 16% of sales in 2008 to an operating loss of 60% of sales the following year. China now exports 95% of its solar panels, and Chinese companies such as Suntech, Yingli, and JA Solar control half of the German market and a third of the U.S. market.</blockquote>What is worse for many foreign companies is that they are being out-competed in China by Chinese state companies. As independent private companies, present day state companies might not stand achance, but as part of a planned economy and with the backing of cheap credit from the state banks, they are doing well. Ningbo Bird and TCL, two state-owned mobile phone producers, have overtaken both Motorola and Nokia in China, despite China being Motorola’s second largest market(and Motorola being the biggest foreign company in China). Procter & Gamble had a good start totheir shampoo sales, but were soon undercut by Chinese rivals. P & G’s market share dropped from over 50 percent in 1998 to 30 percent in 2002. Whirlpools’ Chinese adventure ended up with the mending production of their own brands in China, instead a Chinese state-owned company, Kelon,outsourced to them.

In regards to Sinovel and Goldwind who control the majority of the market, Sinovel and Goldwind are both subsidiaries of the CPC's state owned enterprises, giving the CPC main controlling rights over these companies. Western pundits have directly named and consider these companies officially "state owned" despite their legal classification as a limited company, with stte related organs holding the majoirty share.<ref>[https://archive.ph/dYxXt Wind Power for Boston, Made in China] - NYT</ref> <ref>[https://www.goldwind.com/home/goldwind/uploads/bdc_content/2022/1665270518844470272.pdf NOTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY GENERAL MEETING - XINJIANG GOLDWIND SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.]</ref>

===Forced cooperation with the CPC subsidiaries and directives===
China also bars many foreign companies from participating in the Chinese market. As a result, companies need to enter the market through other means, such as setting up a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) or forming a joint venture with a Chinese business partner. It is also alleged that Chinese Joint-Ventures and Chinese companies tend to steal IP and technologies from these foreign companies, as demonstrated in the above quotes. And many foreign investors have also stated that there are no legal protections for these foreign companies and Chinese attorneys will lobby in favour of the state, this indicates that foreign companies clearly do not run amuck in China. Many foreign investors have complained about the lack of freedom of voice in the Chinese market, with the state being the ultimate deciding factor in many cases.<ref>[https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f5481934-6949-4666-bfb9-08976db73831#:~:text=China%20bars%20many%20foreign%20companies,with%20a%20Chinese%20business%20partner. China Joint Ventures: Everything You Should Know] - China Law Blog, Harris Bricken</ref> The international monopolies have to accept a rate of profit in China that is lower than anywhere else.<blockquote>"A study of American Commerce Department data conducted by a research publication, China Economic Quarterly. showed that direct and indirect profits made by American affiliates in China mounted to $2.8 billion in 2001—less than the $4.4 billion made in Mexico, with a population of just 100 million. Although profitability has undoubtedly improved, many companies are not even covering their cost of capital, much less getting a proper return on their investment. Norman Villamin at Morgan Stanley says that some multinationals deliberately lower the required rates of return for their China operations to wave through projects that would not usually qualify, and charge costs to head office to make the China arm seem more profitable than it is.... ... A few large multinationals, notably General Electric, are planning to go much further, moving advanced production lines and research facilities there in order to transform their entire corporate cost base. But many of those lured to China for the domestic market will struggle to generate sustainable profits. And all foreign companies have to face the fact that China is still not a rational place to do business."<ref>[https://archive.ph/YAGfs Bulls in a China shop] - Economist</ref></blockquote>Working conditions are generally quite good and wages relatively high for employees of the bigmultinationals in China. The Communist Party exercises a great deal of control over foreigncompanies that are considered decisive for the development of China. Take the example of the gian tAmerican computer processor producer Intel’s experience. In a book by Harvard professor Tarun Khanna the work of an American employed at Intel’s lab in Shanghai in 2002 is described:<blockquote>“Work in the lab was rigorous, requiring continual interface with the government. The Shanghai government was not the slow bureaucracy he associated with federal jobs. In China, the governmentdemanded performance and held to aggressive time lines. His boss said, ‘The head members of thelocal branch of the Communist Party set the deadline and they are reviewing the finished product. You won’t feel so good saying no to a Communist Party member.'<ref>Tarun Khanna: Billions of Entrepreneurs: How China and India are reshaping their futures and yours ,2007</ref></blockquote>
=== Use of Social Credit===
Similarly to the afformentioned social credit system, foreign companies are equally subject to the social credit system in China. According to the president of the EU chamber of commerce, he states:

“The corporate social credit system could mean life or death for individual companies...The overwhelming absence of preparation by the European business community is deeply concerning.”<ref>[https://archive.ph/K27if#selection-1765.0-1765.59 China to impose ‘social credit’ system on foreign companies - Financial Times]</ref>

The foreign sector is still cowed into submission, the previously discussed ways the social credit system influences the private sector still apply to the foreign sector.

After many decades since China first opened up up, China is has became one of the world’s leading innovators in science and technology; it has caught up, through strategically and methodically integrating itself into a globalized value chain. While continuing to promote the Socialist principle of focusing on the needs of the masses.

=== Use of Party Commitee's ===
Foreign Companies have yet to be spared from the existence of party commitee's as well, the same afformentioned party commitee system is used to regulate the foreign companies as well. The same logic applies. In Joint Ventures such as Nissan-Dongfeng, it is found that their Party organization has been written into the enterprise charter, with members of the Party organization playing a role in human resources decisions.<ref>Wang Yi, “Leading the Party Building to Create a New Realm of Development; Looking Back on the Party Building Work of Dongfeng Co., Ltd.,” Dongfeng Auto News [党建领航开创发展新境界: 东风有限党建工作回眸], September 7, 2018, <nowiki>http://epaper.dongfeng.net/</nowiki> html/2018-09/07/content_71334.htm.</ref>

This clearly indicates that these party commitee's within the company are extolling or fighting for "Pro worker rights" considering they deliberately have a role to play in human resources. Statistics show that by the end of 2016, a total of 75,000 foreign-funded enterprises across the country had established party organizations, accounting for 70.8% of the total number of foreign-funded enterprises. <ref>Ye Xiaonan and Guo Chaokai, “‘Party building’ + ‘Foreign Enterprises’ releases ‘red productivity,’” People’s Daily Overseas Edition, [“‘党建’ + ‘ 外企’ 释放 ‘红色生产力’”], January 18, 2018, <nowiki>http://dangjian.people</nowiki>. com.cn/n1/2018/0118/c117092-29772309.html.</ref>

== The Socialist Market Economy and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics has allowed China to rise to unprecedented economic heights ==
(See: [[Reform and Opening Up#The Achievements'/Successes of Reform and Opening Up]] for more information)

While the Great Leap Forward was an ambitious attempt at laying the industrial foundation necessary to build socialism, the facts are in: China’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 1960, after the GLF, was $59.72 billion. <ref name=":5">[https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/gdp-gross-domestic-product China's GDP 1960-2023, Macrotrends]</ref> In 2009, China’s GDP sits at 5,101 billion, making it the second largest economy in the world.<ref name=":5" /> In other words, the modern Chinese economy is about 89 times the size of its economy following the [[Great Leap Forward]], which was previously the largest socialist economic overhaul in Chinese history.

Ironically, Capitalists admire yet despise the success of the Socialist Market Economy. They hate China's commitment to socialism but cannot deny its success. Scissors admits in the same Heritage foundation article that "between June 2002 and June 2008, China's GDP more than tripled and it's exports more than quadrupled"<ref name=":43">[https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/liberalization-reverse Derek Scissors, Ph.D. “Liberalization in Reverse,” May 4, 2009, Published by The Heritage Foundation]</ref> He also states<blockquote>"This rapid GDP growth has created jobs: by the end of June 2008, the unemployment rate among registered urban voters was a mere four percent — even lower than the government’s ambitious target of 4.5 percent. That figure may understate true joblessness by ignoring rural and unregistered urban employment, but it accurately reflects trends in the broader job situation. So many migrant workers from rural areas were absorbed into the urban labor force that the 20 million such workers reported to have lost their jobs in late 2008 still left well over 100 million rural migrants with jobs in cities."<ref name=":43" /></blockquote>China is able to dynamically handle unemployment through smart distribution of labor and the creation of jobs through development unseen in capitalist countries, “Urban wages have climbed significantly, by 18 percent between 2007 and 2008,” representing serious material gains for the Chinese working class.<ref name=":43" /> This also leads into my point that China is not Capitalist, because it doesn't demonstrate the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall.

Interestingly enough, a paper published in 2019 states that:<ref>[https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=646117100022000067127127105121107104118081007014064089086094009069118095081025098108050122101118013124055089098123072099087109023074053015000069110070021100100016076058082010064110000127019097094105068097069081075099075010104107000094023015107022120082&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE The Myth of Worker Exploitation in the Chinese Manufacturing Sector] - Linan Peng , Joshua Ingber</ref><blockquote>"This paper follows the monopsony research tradition and examines the Chinese manufacturing sector along several likely indicators of monopsony power. These include the turnover rate in the manufacturing sector, the relation between marginal factor cost and average factor cost, the relation between average real labor productivity and real wage in the manufacturing sector, and the comparison of labor costs between China and other countries. This study found that worker exploitation/monopsony in the manufacturing sector is not as severe as previously reported."</blockquote>To take the modern example, the Capitalist class will choose less labor intensive and cheaper methods to try and maximize profits, causing a decrease in wages. This causes overall wages and disposable income to decrease, causing workers being unable to pay for more goods and services. This leads to Capitalists to end up not being able to profit, due to the lack of workers being able to afford their products. This is the inevitable nature of Capitalism. Except, this doesn't happen in China. As demonstrated previously, job rates and wages have continued to increase.

Richard D. Wolff in his video, ''Economic Update: China's Economic Record and Strategy'' <ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cw8SvK0E5dI&ab_channel=DemocracyAtWork Economic Update: China's Economic Record and Strategy]</ref> from 8:38 to 12:51 demonstrates that The real wage in China (IE the wage adjusted for the prices you pay) has gone up 4x in the past 25 years, more than any other country. This is staggering considering it's the most populous country on the planet. The US real wage by comparison is lower in 2019 than it was in 1973. In advanced G20 economies, real wage growth fluctuated between 0.4 and 0.9 per cent, while rising more rapidly – between 3.5 and 4.5 per cent annually – in emerging G20 countries. Between 2008 and 2019, real wages more than doubled in China (Around 9 per cent annual increase)<ref>[https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_762302.pdf 2020-2021 Global Wage Report, Page 2]</ref>. This means Once you account for disposable income, it has increased 1,000% within 2002 and 2022.<ref>[https://www.statista.com/statistics/278698/annual-per-capita-income-of-households-in-china/ Average annual per capita disposable income of households in China from 1990 to 2022 -] Statista</ref>

Between 1988 and 2008, in adjusted 2005 PPP prices, the average per capita income in China grew by 229 percent – ten times the global average of 24 percent, and far ahead of the rates for India (34 percent), as well as other Asian economies (68 percent)<ref>[https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/ed8d4ff4-8768-5c79-8266-1d151eff85b9/content Global Income Distribution, From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession - Christoph Lanker, Branko Milanovic, p27]</ref> Per capita income in China doubled in the decade from 1980, whereas it took Britain six decades to achieve the same after the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century and America five decades after the Civil War.<ref>Jude Woodward. The US vs China: Asia’s New Cold War? Geopolitical Economy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017, p42</ref>

As of 2011, Chinese labor cost's were higher than every single developing asian country with the exception of Thailand and Malaysia.<ref>'''[https://archive.ph/u2IuX China Now Has Third Highest Labor Costs in Emerging Asia]''' by Chris Devonshire Ellis</ref> By 2015, the average monthly wage of manufacturing workers reached 4126 yuan (US$635) by the end of 2015 which is far below the US (US$3099 per month) but is nearly the same as in Brazil and significantly greater than in other emerging markets (Malaysia, Thailand, Mexico, Vietnam and India).<ref>'''[https://iems.ust.hk/publications/thought-leadership-briefs/can-chinese-manufacturing-firms-cope-with-rising-labor-costs-albert-park Can Chinese Manufacturing Firms Cope with Rising Labor Costs?]''' by Cheng Hong, Albert Park</ref>Chinese labor is no longer "cheap", between 2013 and 2022 manufacturing wages doubled, to an average of $8.27 per hour. Malaysian, Filipino, Vietnamese, Indian and Thai wages do not exceed $3 per hour.<ref>'''[https://archive.ph/Gz5o1 Global firms are eyeing Asian alternatives to Chinese manufacturing]''' - Economist</ref>

Continuing to steadily climb, showing that the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall is not demonstrated in China, as China has continued to industrialize and increase roboticization.

== The successful elevation of China as a modern industrial economy has laid the basis for ‘higher’ forms of socialist economic organization. ==

The market is not a mode of production; rather, the market is a form of economic organization. Deng explains this distinction well in a lecture series he gave in 1992. He states:<blockquote>"The proportion of planning to market forces is not the essential difference between socialism and capitalism. A planned economy is not equivalent to socialism, because there is planning under capitalism too; a market economy is not capitalism, because there are markets under socialism too. Planning and market forces are both means of controlling economic activity." <ref>Deng Xiaoping, “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai,” January 18 – February 21, 1992</ref></blockquote>Markets are neither capitalist nor socialist, just as economic planning is neither capitalist nor socialist. Both of these forms of economic organization are just tools in the toolbox, and in some situations, markets are a useful tool for socialist construction. For 30 years, the CPC has successfully used markets as a tool for revolutionizing the country’s productive forces. Precisely because of this success, the state is rapidly moving towards more advanced forms of socialist industrial organization to replace the market mechanism. Markets under socialism was first implemented in the agricultural industry with the same aim as Lenin’s NEP: to aggressively expand and modernize food production. However, the CPC introduced markets as a tool to build socialism, rather than as a permanent functioning mode of economic organization. This is a very important distinction because it means that Deng and the CPC viewed market reforms as a transient form of ‘lower socialism’, to borrow a term from Marx, that they would replace with collectivized agriculture after the material conditions changed. Deng explains this in a talk delivered to the Central Committee in May 1980. Entitled “On Questions of Rural Policy,” Deng addresses concerns about contemporary market reforms to the agricultural sector:<blockquote>"It is certain that as long as production expands, division of labour increases and the commodity economy develops, lower forms of collectivization in the countryside will develop into higher forms and the collective economy will acquire a firmer basis. The key task is to expand the productive forces and thereby create conditions for the further development of collectivization."<ref>Deng Xiaoping, “On Questions of Rural Policy,” May 31, 1980</ref></blockquote>Deng understood that building a socialist agricultural economy capable of meeting the needs of China’s enormous population required developing the productive forces in the countryside, which markets could accomplish. Only after revolutionizing the productive forces of the entire country could the material basis for a full-scale collective economy–‘higher socialism’–exist.

Mao said that “Practice is the criterion of truth,” and after 30 years of practice, Deng’s statements have come true. In 2006, the CPC announced a revolutionary overhaul of the Chinese countryside and pledged to use China’s newly acquired wealth to transform rural areas into what President [[Hu Jintao]] calls a “new socialist countryside.” <ref name=":6">[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/22/china.jonathanwatts Jonathan Watts, “China vows to create a ‘new socialist countryside’ for millions of farmers,”] February 22, 2006, Published in ''The Guardian''</ref>
==== Addressing Unequal Development ====
The late Egyptian political scientist Samir Amin, who was by no means uncritical of Chinese socialism, pointed out that “the growth of income has been a reality for almost all the population even if that growth has been much higher for some than it has been for the others.” Therefore in China, “growing inequality has been accompanied by reduction of poverty”, unlike in the vast majority of countries of the Global South, where “growth – and in some cases significant high growth – has benefited only a minority.” He also makes a point about gini coefficient and how it's not a holistic metric, because "China and India may have the same Gini coefficient, and yet the social meaning of the same apparent phenomenon (growing inequality) is very different<ref>[https://archive.ph/mcssk Samir Amin 2018, Interview: ‘There is a structural crisis of capitalism’, Frontline]</ref>

Arthur Kroeber notes that:<blockquote>A host of policies specifically designed to reduce urban-rural inequality and inequalities between poor and rich regions. Programs to boost rural incomes have included: a relaxation of rules requiring farmers to grow grain, enabling them to increase production of more profitable cash crops; the easing and finally abolition of taxes and fees on agricultural production; a major push to build farm-to-market roads, helping farmers gain access to richer urban consumers; and stepped-up investments in food processing industries.<ref>Kroeber, China's economy : what everyone needs to know, p199</ref></blockquote>Even today, most of China’s population remains in rural sections of the country, but the application of modern farming techniques and mechanized agricultural practices have generated a net surplus of grain production in China. Among this new policy’s many provisions, China’s 2006 rural policy promises “sustained increases in farmers’ incomes, more industrial support for agriculture and faster development of public services.” Additional provisions allow peasant students to “receive free textbooks and boarding subsidies,” and the state will “increase subsidies for rural health cooperatives.” <ref name=":62">[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/22/china.jonathanwatts Jonathan Watts, “China vows to create a ‘new socialist countryside’ for millions of farmers,”] February 22, 2006, Published in ''The Guardian''</ref>

Massive state investment in agricultural infrastructure is “a significant shift away from the previous focus on economic development.” Because of the success of modernization, “greater weight will be given to the redistribution of resources and a rebalancing of income.”<ref name=":62" /> Instead of viewing market socialism as an end in itself, the CPC has harnessed the market as a means to generating an industrial base sufficient to build ‘higher socialism’. China’s extraordinary GDP growth and technological development via market socialism makes it possible to implement these sweeping revolutionary changes.

[[Xi Jinping]] has also pushed for wealth redistribution, forcing private companies to donate large sums of their profits, around 76% into rejuvenating the unequally developed interior regions and area's still stricken with poverty.<ref>[https://i.imgur.com/KztMXf6.png Tencent donates 76% of profits]</ref> <ref>[https://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2021/08/26/chinas-tech-giants-are-giving-away-their-money-to-avoid-beijings-wrath/?sh=798b86883485 China’s Tech Giants Are Giving Away Their Money To Avoid Beijing’s Wrath] - Forbes</ref> Xi has promised to tackle income inequality, which is a 'warning signal for the wealthy'<ref>[https://archive.ph/HukD4#selection-833.13-844.0 China’s Xi Jinping sends ‘warning signal’ to the wealthy as he opens new front in ‘common prosperity’ push] - SCMP</ref>

Turning to the macroeconomic situation, China’s application of the socialist market economy has led to serious disparities in income. While undoubtedly a defect of ‘lower socialism’, the Chinese state takes this contradiction very seriously and announced an unprecedented government spending campaign in March 2011 aimed at closing the income gap.<ref name=":82">[https://archive.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2011/03/06/china_will_boost_spending_try_to_close_income_gap/ Charles Hutzler, “China will boost spending, try to close income gap,” March 6, 2011], ''Associated Press'', Published on boston.com</ref> By increasing public spending by 12.5% in 2012, the CPC will allocate enormous government resources “for education, job creation, low-income housing, health care, and pensions and other social insurance.”<ref name=":82" />

As part of the poverty alleviation programme, many industries have been transferred from the urban coastal areas to the rural inland zones, with more than 300,000 industrial bases having been built in the last decade. The government “has facilitated the transfer of food processing, clothes manufacturing, and other labour-intensive industries from the east to the west. With the growth of such specialty industries, poor areas have gained economic momentum.”<ref>[http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2021-04/06/content_77380652_5.htm Poverty Alleviation: China’s Experience and Contribution (2021), The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 14 February 2023,]</ref>

Thus while working to eliminate poverty, China is also making progress towards the vision outlined by Marx and Engels 150 years ago of “abolishing the antithesis between town and country”<ref>[https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/hist-mat/hous-qst/ch03b.htm Friedrich Engels 1873, The Housing Question]</ref>

==== Growth of Cooperatives and Rural reforms ====
Thanks to a 2007 law strengthening rural cooperatives<ref>[http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2017-12/27/content_2035707.htm Law of the People's Republic of China on Farmers' Professional Cooperatives - National People's Congress of China.cn]</ref> This has lead to roughly 48% of all rural households by 2018 as apart of a cooperative. And as a way to increase agricultural efficiency through integration both horizontal — by combining small farms into larger, more efficient entities — and vertical — by bringing together the production, processing, storage, transportation, and sales into one industrial chain. In the process, agricultural officials hope to transform the country’s scattered landholders into large-scale farms, realize economies of scale, and improve farmer bargaining power. In 2017, there were 30,281 primary (village-level) supply and marketing cooperatives (SMCs), 2,402 country-level federations of SMCs, 342 city-level federations of SMCs, 32 provincial-level federations of SMCs, 21,852 cooperative enterprises and 280 cooperative institutes represented by ACFSMC (All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives). There were 3.4 million employees in all SMCs represented by ACFSMC.<ref>[https://coops4dev.coop/en/4devasia/china China, #CoopsForDev]</ref> And under Xi Jinping's administration, About 95% of towns and villages have a SMC as of 2019, compared to 50% a mere 6 years prior.<ref>[https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2184810/can-china-get-its-farmers-back-track-us400-million-fund-state Xi Jinping turns to Mao Zedong era system to get rid of poverty] - SCMP</ref>

Under the Xi Jinping administration, the Zhejiang economic model is spear headed by cooperatives and cooperative growth. The cooperative sector continues to grow, China's supply and marketing system will realize sales of agricultural products of 2.7591 trillion yuan and daily necessities of 1.4925 trillion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 24.3% and 17.1% respectively. A recruitment notice stated that in 2023, the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives plans to take the examination and recruit staff from the agency. Outstanding young people who are interested in joining the supply and marketing cooperatives are welcome to apply for the examination.<ref>[https://www.zaobao.com.sg/realtime/china/story20221102-1329090 Afternoon inspection: Supply and marketing cooperatives come back?] - Zaobao.sg</ref>

==== Healthcare Reforms ====
The New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) was rolled out in China from 2003-2008 which provided insurance to 800 million rural Chinese. A study found that there was a significant decline in aggregate mortality, with the program saving more than one million lives per year at its peak, and explaining 78% of the entire increase in life expectancy in China over this period.<ref>[https://www.nber.org/papers/w31423 The Largest Insurance Expansion in History: Saving One Million Lives Per Year in China - Jonathan Gruber, Mengyun Lin & Junjian Yi]</ref>

On health care, Austin Ramzy of TIME Magazine reported in April 2009 that “China is laying out plans to dramatically reform its health care system by expanding coverage for hundreds of millions of farmers, migrant workers and city residents.”<ref name=":72">Austin Ramzy, “China’s New Healthcare Could Cover Millions More,” April 9, 2009, Published in ''TIME Magazine''</ref> These plans consist of spending “$125 billion over the next three years building thousands of clinics and hospitals and expanding basic health care coverage to 90% of the population.”<ref name=":72" /> Rather than a reversal of the Deng-era reforms, China’s move back towards public health care is the logical progression of the more modernized and expansive health care system achieved through the Socialist Market Economy.

China’s round of health system reform in 2009 has made good progress. Almost everyone is covered by the social health insurance system and basic public health service package, and unmet health needs and inequities have decreased. In 2003, 29.6% was the proportion of patients who were advised by doctors that they needed treatment in hospital but did not use inpatient care. By 2013, that number dropped to 7.4% In 2000, 50% of health expenditures were out of pocket, this has decreased to 28% in 2017. In 2000, infant mortality was 25.2%, this decreased to 3.8% by 2017.<ref>[https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/365/bmj.l2349.full.pdf '''What can we learn from China’s health system reform?''' - 2019 By Qingyue Meng]</ref>

Fiscal investment in healthcare in the PRC have more than tripled over the course of 2010 to 2018. In new drugs, pharmaceuticals from Pfizer to Roche have agreed to cuts of as much as 70%. For generic drugs, prices have dropped an average of 52% so far through a government bulk-buying program. Funding for Chinese biotech firms has more than quadrupled within the span of 2017 to 2019.<ref>[https://archive.ph/zUTJS#selection-1381.0-1381.59 China Is Striving for the World’s Best, Cheapest Healthcare] - Bloomberg</ref>

In 2018, 85.2 percent of the hospital visits come from state owned hospitals, even though 46% of hospitals in China are state owned.<ref>Data from National Statistic Yearbook and Statistics Report of the National Healthcare Development (卫生健康事业发展统计公报)</ref> The number of public hospitals was 12,032 with an average of 399.1 beds per hospital, while the number of private hospitals was 20,977 with 8.5 beds per hospital; utilization rate was 91.3 percent in public hospitals and 63.4 percent in private hospitals.<ref>Data from National Health Commission</ref> 85.2 percent of the treatments were carried out by public hospitals and the remaining 14.8 percent by private ones.<ref>Data from National Health Commission, treatment = hospital visit</ref>So despite common belief that healthcare is actually dominated by private hospitals, state owned hospitals are far larger and service more people.

China is also curing cancer much faster and cheaper than any developed nation, with 55% of all CAR-T research being conducted in China. Of course, the reasoning is because of State directives and economic planning, for the "Healthy China 2030" plan to spearhead cancer reduction and is currently spearheading effective cancer cure research out of all the world's nations.<ref>[https://archive.ph/tlE5a China dominates CAR-T therapies - Clinical Trials Arena]</ref>

==== Improved Working Conditions ====
As foreign capital entered China, the corporations of imperialist countries–attracted by China’s vast labor pool–exploited some Chinese workers through capitalist relations of production. The exploitative behavior of foreign corporations constitutes a major contradiction in the Chinese economy that the CPC has taken concerted steps towards resolving. While all people in China retain access to essential goods and services like food and health care, the CPC places restrictions on foreign corporations’ ability to operate in China that severely curtail their politico-economic power in China.

The CPC has therefore made tremendous efforts to meet the demands of local protests and strikes as well as hold local governments accountable for causing or mishandling protests that spin out of control. Chinese workers have successfully organized collective action to get local governments, and the courts as mentioned above, to help accommodate their claims, most notably getting payment for wage arrears.<ref>Su and He, “Street as Courtroom: State Accommodation of Labor Protests in South China.”</ref>

Far from abandoning Chinese workers in the pursuit of modernization, the CPC announced the Draft Labor Contract Law in 2006 to protect the rights of workers employed by foreign corporations by ensuring severance pay and outlawing the non-contract labor that makes sweatshops possible. Viciously opposed by Wal-Mart and other Western companies, “foreign corporations are attacking the legislation not because it provides workers too little protection but because it provides them too much.” <ref>[https://fpif.org/labor_rights_in_china/ Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello, Brendan Smith, “Labor Rights in China,”] December 19, 2006, Published by Foreign Policy in Focus</ref> Nevertheless, the Draft Labor Contract Law, which “required employers to contribute to their employees’ social security accounts and set wage standards for workers on probation and overtime,” was enacted in January 2008. <ref>''Xinhua,'' “New labor contract law changes employment landscape,” January 2, 2008, Published in ''People’s Daily Online''</ref> In 2008, the number of migrant workers suffering from wage arrears was roughly 4%<ref>'''[https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-12/15/content_5461359.htm A multi-pronged approach to eliminate the “stubborn problem” of wage arrears for migrant workers] - Xinhua.net'''</ref>

Similarly, a study in 2009 found that more often than not, the arbitration tribunals in mainland China are biased in favor of employees suing their employers. Because arbitration tribunals are sympathetic towards employees-who are traditionally seen as the weaker party-they will sometimes overlook acontract violation by the employee. In addition, sometimes tribunals assume that companies can bear the financial losses more readily than employees. Therefore, more often than not, employees win in arbitration or in court based on prejudice in their favor.<ref>Joanna Law, Employers, Prepare for Tribunal Trouble, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Feb. 2009</ref> In 2008, the number of labor-related cases doubled to over six hundred thousand, and that number has stayed relatively steady since then. In 2011, workers won almost two hundred thousand of the cases they brought, whereas employers won less than seventy-five thousand.<ref>Zhongguo Laodong Tongji Nianjian 2012 [China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2012] 368, tbl. 9–1.</ref>

Since 2009, China's worker fatality per 100,000 workers was the same as Australia's. By the end of 2010, China's worker fatality rate per 100,000 workers was lower than Australia's and the gap continues to widen.<ref>[https://www.trotskyistplatform.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/China-Aus-Death-Rate-Workers-e1492003570262.png Annual Work-Related Deaths per 100,000 workers China vs Australia, 2001 - 2015]</ref> The fatality rate per 100,000 workers in Australia is 1.6% in 2015.<ref>[https://archive.ph/WvnHH#selection-1427.0-1438.0 Work-Related Traumatic Injury Fatalities Australia 2015 - Monash University]</ref> The fatality rate per 100,000 workers in China is 1.07% in 2015.<ref>[https://archive.ph/mqNdd#selection-209.1-209.110 Statistical Communiqué of the People's Republic of China on the 2015 National Economic and Social Development] - NBS</ref>

Another study in 2013 found that younger generations of migrant workers experienced far greater job satisfaction than older generations, as well as more likely to rely on governemnt channels to help solve disputes in the work place compared to older generations. While also having increased wages, insurance and a slight decrease in work hour.<ref>[https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/80714/1/747237409.pdf Wang, Huashu; Lei Pan; Heerink, Nico (2013) : Working Conditions and Job Satisfaction of China's New Generation of Migrant Workers: Evidence from an Inland City, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7405, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn]</ref> This indicates the state apparatus for solving work related disputes have increased in efficacy and conditions on the whole are rising. A similar 2013 survey found that out of 43 nations surveyed in the OECD, China had the most protective legislation for employed permanent workers against individual and collectivie dismissal.<ref>[https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/Employment-Outlook-2013-chap2.pdf Protecting jobs, enhancing flexibility: A new look at employment protection legislation] - OECD Employment outlook, page 24</ref>

Among migrant construction workers in 2013, 1.8 per cent suffered from wage arrears compared to 0.9 per cent in the manufacturing sector. In 2014, it fell to 1.4 per cent in construction and 0.6 per cent in manufacturing. While wage arrears remains an issue, it is a gradually declining and miniscule issue that affects less than 2% of the total rural migrant working population in those industries, therefore the issue of underpaying or refusing to pay migrant workers at all is an overexaggerated issue that is blown out of proportion.<ref>[https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/6279F3FC81641FBBB45AFD9A415B8591/S0305741022000807a.pdf/div-class-title-working-without-wages-network-structure-and-migrant-construction-workers-protests-in-china-div.pdf Working without Wages: Network Structure and Migrant Construction Workers’ Protests in China] - By Haitao Wei and Cheris Shun-Ching Chan</ref>

The recent series of labor disputes between Chinese workers and foreign corporations testify to the working class orientation of the Chinese state. In response to widespread strikes at Western factories and manufacturing plants, the CPC undertook an aggressive policy of empowering Chinese workers and backing their demands for higher wages. Beijing’s regional government raised the minimum wage twice in six months, including a 21% increase in late 2010.<ref>[https://www.ft.com/content/30f7f9e0-1277-11e0-b4c8-00144feabdc0 Jamil Anderlini, Rahul Jacob, “Beijing city to raise minimum wage 21%,”] December 28, 2010, Published by ''Financial Times''</ref> In April of 2011, the CPC announced annualized 15% wage increases with “promises to double workers’ wages during the 12th five-year plan that lasts from 2011 to 2015.”<ref>''Caijing,'' “China Targets at Annualized Wage Rise of 15Pct,” April 19, 2011</ref>

Dramatic increases in wages and benefits for Chinese workers, particularly migrant workers, is a serious blow to foreign corporations and makes China a decisively less attractive hub of cheap labor for foreign investors. <ref>Zheng Caixiong, “Wage hike to benefit migrant laborers,” March 3, 2011, Published on ''China Daily''</ref>Contrary to the actions of a capitalist state in the face of labor unrest, which generally consists of petty reforms or brutal repression, China’s response is to launch an offensive against the hoarding of wealth by foreign corporations by forcing them to pay substantially higher wages.

In the book, A New Deal for China's workers (released in 2016) states that,<ref>[https://dokumen.pub/qdownload/a-new-deal-for-chinas-workers-2016017881-9780674971394.html Conclusion, Page 220 - A New Deal for China’s Workers? 2016017881, 9780674971394]</ref><blockquote>"In enacting the LCL, and in doubling down on its employment protections by restricting the use of labor dispatch, China is swimming against both a modest liberalizing current in parts of the developed world and deeper trends toward declining job tenure, splintering of work organizations, outsourcing of production, and contingent work arrangements. The continuing slide from long-term employment within integrated firms toward a “gig” economy, though celebrated by some, has potentially dire consequences for workers who risk losing the entire panoply of rights, protections, and benefits that twentieth-century reforms had attached to the employment relationship. But China is seeking to defy that trend, and to shore up job security and stability."</blockquote>Since 2013, the total proportion of migrant workers who are owed wages has been below 1%, but there are fluctuations from year to year. From 2013 to 2015, the proportions of migrant workers who were owed wages were 1%, 0.76% and 0.99% respectively. The number of migrant workers in 2016 who were owed wages was 2,369,000 out of 281,710,000, which is 0.84% of the total rural migrant population. In 2016 in the manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail, transportation, warehousing and postal industries were 0.6%, 1.8%, 0.2% and 0.4% respectively.<ref>'''[http://cn.chinagate.cn/news/2017-04/30/content_40721463_5.htm 2016 Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report - NBS]'''</ref>

In 2018, there were a total of 1,110,175 people involved in labor disputes. The number 1 cause being labor renumeration/wage arrears. Number 1 reason for case settlement was agreed upon increase in wage, and the number 1 way this was administered was legal order to make required adjustment. Out of 894,053 cases of labor issues, 93,823 were won by employers.<ref>Zhongguo Laodong Tongji Nianjian 2019 [China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2019] p 343 - 344</ref>

From a period of 2008 to 2019, the average late wage payment/wage arrears rate is 1.29%, with the highest of 4% in 2008 and the lowest rate of 0.5% in 2012.<ref>[https://www.statista.com/statistics/235248/proportion-of-late-wage-payments-to-migrant-workers-in-china/ Proportion of late wage payments to migrant workers in China from 2008 to 2018 -] NBS</ref> In 2020, there were a total of 1,283,491 people involved in labor disputes, which is around 0.16% of the entire employed population of China . The number 1 cause being labor renumeration/wage arrears. Out of 1,100,681 cases, 112,053 were won by employers. The number 1 way this was enforced was legal order to make required adjustment.<ref>Zhongguo Laodong Tongji Nianjian 2021 [China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2021] p 362 - 364</ref>

A 2020 study goes over the dramatic rise in worker's safety in the Coal mining industry in China, paired with state intervention and the reduction of private enterprise within the sector. The study states that:

Coal mine safety management is undoubtedly one of the most successful public governance practice cases in China in recent 20 years. The death toll from accidents decreased from 7625 in the peak year of 1989 to 225 in 2020.<ref>[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301420722002252 Reform and development of coal mine safety in China: An analysis from government supervision, technical equipment, and miner education]</ref>

Though trying to portray the CPC in a negative light here, it still admits that the CPC opposes and seeks to ensure better job security and stability compared to the Capitalist nations of the West. Defying a gig economy and seeking to double down on employment protection has done far more than the rest of the "developed world" in securing and defending the rights of the working class.

==== Strenghtened Unions/Worker's Congresses ====
A 2003 study found that input of the trade union and SWRC does have a significant positive impact on the protection of the workers’ occupational health and safety.<ref>[https://psc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/IPS/PSC/CCC/publications/papers/AC_employee_and_union_inputs.pdf Employee and union inputs into occupational health and safety measures in Chinese factories] - Meei Shia Chen, Anita Chan</ref>

A 2004 study found that these Worker's Congresses were able to dismiss managers when they failed to get more than 60% votes of confidence, and that it was possible for these unions to significantly improve health and safety conditions, or to fairly distribute new housing benefits.<ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269496596_The_Internal_Politics_of_an_Urban_Chinese_Work_Community_A_Case_Study_of_Employee_Influence_on_Decision-Making_at_a_State-Owned_Factory The Internal Politics of an Urban Chinese Work Community: A Case Study of Employee Influence on Decision-Making at a State-Owned Factory]</ref>

In 2005, a study released regarding the influence of Worker Congresses and Chinese unions analyzed the effects of companies that had unions or no unions. When surveyed, the worker satisfaction along the metrics of greater worker rights, greater wages and greater abilities to settle conflcits in favour of workers. It was found that generally speaking, worker satisfaction was higher than in companies without them. And in the same study, claims around 80% of all companies have some form of workers union on board. Worker's participation however, is not mandatory in these Unions and those who do not wish to unionize are not required to have a union.<ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265966556_Zhu_Xiaoyang_and_Anita_Chan_Staff_and_Workers'_Representative_Congress_An_Institutionalized_Channel_for_Expression_of_Employees'_Interests_Chinese_Sociology_and_Anthropology_Vol_37_No_4_Summer_2005_pp ZHU XIAOYANG AND ANITA CHAN - Staff and Workers’ Representative Congress An Institutionalized Channel for Expression of Employees’ Interests?]</ref>

A study analyzing data in a 2006 survey of 1,268 firms in 12 cities found that unionization is significantly associated with higher hourly wages and larger pension coverage and weakly associated with lower monthly working hours. Further econometric analysis finds that unions promote individual and collective contracts. The effect of collective contracts vanishes when unions are present, whereas individual contracts have independent and positive effects. In addition, unions have effects on workers’ welfare independent of collective and individual contracts.<ref>Yao, Y., & Zhong, N. (2013). Unions and Workers’ Welfare in Chinese Firms. ''Journal of Labor Economics'', ''31''(3), 633–667. <nowiki>https://doi.org/10.1086/669819</nowiki></ref>

In 2012, the number of unions in SOE's were 88.1% and in non-SOE's to be around 85.5%. It also states that within Chinese companies 32.7% of employee representatives at the company and plant level are nominated and elected directly from employees, while 61% of them are nominated by the Party committees and elected by employees. The same study finds that worker congresses are positively associated with better health and safety, and more likely to report issues or flaws within company structure, as well as a useful consultation method that better leveraged worker voices towards the higher ups.<ref>[https://fbr.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s11782-018-0033-y#Sec8 The perceived effectiveness of democratic management, job performance, and citizenship behavior: evidence from a large Chinese state-owned petrochemical company]- Fuxi Wang</ref>

In 2021, Several laws and regulations to protect the rights of workers in the “gig economy”. Tech companies “must now sign labour contracts with their gig workers, and provide them with the insurance coverage of state-run insurers”<ref>[https://archive.ph/TrtK7 Masha Borak 2021, Can China’s drive to protect gig economy workers work by pressing Big Tech to give more?, SCMP,]</ref>; furthermore,in 2022, China’s Trade Union Law has been revised to enable and encourage unionisation of gig economy workers.<ref>[https://archive.ph/X9Igb Ding Xiangyu 2022, China Revises Trade Union Law to Protect Gig Workers, China Justice Observer]</ref>

== See Also ==

* [[Deng Xiaoping]]
* [[Socialism with Chinese Characteristics]]
* [[People's Republic of China]]
* [[Reform and Opening Up]]
* [[Essay:Why China is not Capitalist|''Why China is not Capitalist'']], essay by [[ProleWiki]] editor [[Comrade:GojiraTheWumao|GojiraTheWumao]]

== References ==
<references group="lower-alpha" />
<references />
[[Category:Pages needing references]]
[[Category:Economics]]

Market socialism

2023-06-05T03:22:43Z

Sparkingcircuit: Correcting Market Socialism page to include more variations.

'''Market Socialism''', is the concept of a market based economy within a socialist mode of production. Key examples of this include [[Socialism with Chinese Characteristics|China's Socialism with Chinese Characteristics]], [[Socialist-oriented market economy|Vietnam's Socialist-oriented Market Economy]], [[Republic of Cuba|Cuba's recent market reforms]], and [[New Economic Mechanism|Laos's New Economic Mechanism]].

Market socialism

2023-06-05T03:13:54Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created simple redirect page.

#REDIRECT [[Socialist-oriented market economy]]

Apple Inc.

2023-04-27T23:15:11Z

Sparkingcircuit: Added Infobox, and some basic information/formatting.

{{stub}}{{Infobox company|name=Apple Inc.|image=Apple logo black.svg|founding_name=Apple Computer Company (1976-1977)|founding_date=April 1, 1976|founding_place=Los Altos, California|founder=Steve Jobs
Steve Wozniak
Ronald Wayne
Mike Markkula|industry=Computers, Consumer Electronics, Mobile Phones, Music Appliances|headquarters=1 Apple Park Way, Cupertino, California|key_people=Tim Cook (CEO)|employee_number=164,000 (2022)|revenue=$394.33 billion (2022)|net_income=$99.80 billion (2022)|total_assets=$352.76 billion (2022)}}

[[Apple Inc.]] is a capitalist corporation, known for the sale of luxury consumer electronics (primarily) in the western hemisphere.

=== History ===

=== Controversies ===
Apple's locked down ecosystem, and proprietary hardware/software is known for trapping people into using their products, due to increased difficulty transitioning to other systems.
[[Category:Big tech]]
[[Category:Stubs]]
[[Category:Companies based in the United States]]
[[Category:Computing]]
[[Category:Companies]]

File:Apple logo black.svg

2023-04-27T23:04:41Z

Sparkingcircuit: Logo of Apple Inc. (Black version)

== Summary ==
Logo of Apple Inc. (Black version)

Achievements of socialism

2023-03-16T06:05:46Z

Sparkingcircuit: Minor grammar correction.

The [[Bourgeoisie|ruling class]] which owns the [[corporate media]] regularly demonizes the notions of [[socialism]] and [[communism]] to serve their own profit-seeking interests. They promote the idea that "socialism has failed everywhere it's been tried." (without mentioning the fact that these failures are oftentimes brought about through [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] coups)

In addition to raising the basic living conditions of citizens,<ref>{{News citation|journalist=Marcida Dodson|date=1986-06-07|title=Quality of Life Higher in Socialist Nations, Study Says|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-06-07-me-10010-story.html|newspaper=Los Angeles Times}}</ref><ref>{{News citation|journalist=[[Hakim]]|date=2021-09-22|title=Socialism is just better, scientifically|url=https://youtu.be/FEHYeeRCtVI}}</ref> [[Socialist state|socialist states]] have also produced valuable advances in the fields of science and technology, debunking the false claims that socialism cannot produce innovation.

== USSR ==
The broad masses of pre-revolutionary [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Russia]] were deeply poor and lacked basic necessities, while only the upper class had access to education and healthcare.<ref>{{News citation|journalist=Commiedad|date=2016-11-25|title=The Successes of Socialism in the USSR|url=https://writetorebel.com/2016/11/25/the-successes-of-socialism-in-the-ussr/|newspaper=Write to Rebel|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://writetorebel.com/2016/11/25/the-successes-of-socialism-in-the-ussr/|archive-date=|retrieved=}}</ref> Under the rule of the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|CPSU]], the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|USSR]] increased living standards faster than any previous country in history and worked relentlessly to combat [[racism]], [[sexism]], and national oppression.<ref name=":3">{{Web citation|author=J. Sykes|newspaper=[[Fight Back! News]]|title=Red Theory: The achievements of socialism in the Soviet Union|date=2022-12-11|url=https://www.fightbacknews.org/2022/12/11/red-theory-achievements-socialism-soviet-union|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221226140813/https://www.fightbacknews.org/2022/12/11/red-theory-achievements-socialism-soviet-union|archive-date=2022-12-26|retrieved=2023-02-05}}</ref>

Following the establishment of the USSR, the following rights were introduced to all citizens:

* The right to eight-hour work day.
* The right to annual paid leave.
* The right to three-year maternity leave.
* The right to free general and professional education, including higher education.
* The right to [[Universal healthcare|free health care]].
* The right to use nurseries, kindergartens, summer camps — free of charge.
* The right to free sanatorium-and-spa treatment.
* The right to free housing.
* Equal rights for women.

Many of these rights forced Western bourgeois countries to [[Social democracy|adopt similar policies]] to stave off the risk of a [[proletarian revolution]].

=== Living standards ===
Housing and basic food were subsidized in the USSR. Rent took up only 2–3% of a family's income and utilities only 4–5%. All citizens had the right to free education in arts and sciences.<ref name=":3" /> Life expectancy increased from 30 years in 1900 to 62 in 1953. By 1975, Soviet life expectancy reached 71 years, within a year of the [[United States of America|United States]], and was more than two years longer than the non-white life expectancy in the U.S.<ref name=":022">{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=Economic Rights|page=136–137|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd.|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}</ref>

=== Economic development ===
Industrial production in [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1917–1991)|Russia]] increased 151 times from 1913 to 1984 and 17 times from 1940 to 1984. It increased by more than 200 times in [[Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (1936–1991)|Kazakhstan]] and over 300 times in [[Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic (1936–1991)|Kyrgyzstan]] since the [[First World War]].<ref name=":02">{{Citation|author=Albert Szymanski|year=1984|title=Human Rights in the Soviet Union|chapter=The Asian Nationalities in the USSR|page=39|pdf=https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceazdmtb2y3qq27fve5ib3gk7uv2unt6ae2xss74xmfpur7k5uhl5m?filename=Albert%20Szymanski%20-%20Human%20Rights%20in%20the%20Soviet%20Union_%20Including%20Comparisons%20with%20the%20U.S.A.-Zed%20Books%20Ltd.%20%281984%29.pdf|city=London|publisher=Zed Books Ltd.|isbn=0862320186|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=C597B1232D9EA6B0F3DCB438D7E15A81}}</ref> In 50 years, industrial production rose from 12% to 80% of the U.S. amount and agricultural production rose to 85% of the U.S. level. The wealthiest people in the USSR earned only 10 times as much as the poorest, while corporate executives in the U.S. made hundreds of times more than their employees.<ref name=":3" />

=== Space Race ===
[[File:Space Race Meme.png|thumb|355x355px|Chart of "firsts" achieved by the participants in the space race, illustrating the US propaganda's attempt to paint the US as the winner of the space race. ]]
During the Space Race between the two cold war superpowers, the USSR and the USA, the USSR achieved many great leaps before the US did.

* First artificial satellite - [[Sputnik 1]]
* First animal in space - [[Laika]]
* First photographs of the far side of the moon - [[Luna 3]]
* First person in space - [[Yuri Gagarin]]
* First woman in space - [[Valentina Tereshkova]]
* First spacewalk - [[Alexei Leonov]]
* First spacecraft landing on the moon - [[Luna 9]]
* First spacecraft landing on another planet (Venus) - [[Venera 7]]
* First space station - [[Salyut 1]]
* First spacecraft landing on Mars - [[Mars 3]]

=== Notable technologies invented ===
The following are technologies not already listed in the space race section above

* Life support machine called the Autojektor, invented in 1926.<ref name=":0">[https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/10-greastest-inventions-made-by-the-soviet-union.html 10 Greastest Inventions Made By The Soviet Union]</ref>
* Human anthrax vaccine in 1930, predated by a French invention of an anthrax vaccine for animals.<ref name=":0" />
* Artificial heart in 1937<ref name=":0" />
* Mobile phone in 1957 (20 years before Motorola, the first non-Soviet mobile phone producer)<ref name=":0" />

== China ==
At the beginning of the 20th century, [[Qing dynasty (1636–1912)|China]] was deeply impoverished due to external [[Colonialism|colonization]] and internal [[Feudalism|feudal]] relations which held back economic development. During this period, China was referred to as the "sick man of Asia."

When the [[Communist Party of China]] came to power in 1949, its leaders' fundamental long-range goals were to transform [[People's Republic of China|China]] into a modern, powerful, socialist nation. In economic terms these objectives meant [[industrialization]], improvement of [[Living standard|living standards]], narrowing of [[Income inequality metrics|income differences]], and production of modern [[military equipment]]. The immense economic rise of China in the 21st century is, according to the Communist Party of China, the result of the application of Marxist theory to the material conditions of China.

At the time of the [[Chinese Revolution|Chinese revolution]], a fifth of land was devoted to opium production. The CPC eliminated drug addiction within two years of coming to power.<ref name=":1">{{Web citation|author=[[Harpal Brar]]|newspaper=[[Proletarian (newspaper)|Proletarian]]|title=Greetings to the Communist Party of China on its 100th anniversary|date=2021-06-30|url=https://thecommunists.org/2021/06/30/news/harpal-brar-communist-party-china-100th-anniversary/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220529123605/https://thecommunists.org/2021/06/30/news/harpal-brar-communist-party-china-100th-anniversary/|archive-date=2022-05-29|retrieved=2022-12-04}}</ref>

=== End of warlordism ===
By 1952, the CPC cleared mainland China of bandits and warlords.<ref name=":1" />

=== Economic development ===
Between 1950 and 1952, agricultural production increased by 15% and the economy grew by an average of 25% every year. Heavy industry increased by 30 times between 1952 and 1979. Rural consumption of electricity increased by 71 times up to 1965. Since 1978, the Chinese economy has grown an additional 37 times<ref name=":1" /> with an average growth rate of 9.5%.<ref name=":2">{{Web citation|author=J. Sykes|newspaper=[[Fight Back! News]]|title=Red Theory: The achievements of socialism in China|date=2022-12-24|url=https://www.fightbacknews.org/2022/12/24/red-theory-achievements-socialism-china|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230123044644/https://www.fightbacknews.org/2022/12/24/red-theory-achievements-socialism-china|archive-date=2023-01-23|retrieved=2023-02-05}}</ref>

=== Living standards ===
Under the leadership of [[Mao Zedong|Chairman Mao]], China's life expectancy rose from 38 to 68 years. It continued to increase after Mao's death and surpassed the U.S. to reach 78.2 years by 2022.<ref name=":2" />

In 1949, less than 20% of China's population was literate. Adult literacy rose to 57% by 1959 and now stands at 99.8% while the U.S. only has a literacy rate of 79%.<ref name=":2" />

==== Poverty alleviation ====
In the past 40 years, China has lifted 800 million people out of extreme poverty, accounting for three-quarters of global poverty reduction.<ref name=":2" />

== Korea ==
Following the division of [[Korea]], northern authorities shortened the work day to eight hours (seven for dangerous jobs), banned [[child labor]], and established social security, paid vacations of two weeks to a month, and gender equality. Before the rise of socialism, workers worked 15-hour days with no paid vacations.<ref name=":12">{{Citation|author=Stephen Gowans|year=2018|title=Patriots, Traitors and Empires: The Story of Korea’s Struggle for Freedom|chapter=The Patriot State|page=88–93|pdf=https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafykbzaced4iiga4ngtxusr2civjxewbili5jne2sbpefbx2s3im2kphattzc?filename=Stephen%20Gowans%20-%20Patriots%2C%20Traitors%20and%20Empires_%20The%20Story%20of%20Korea%E2%80%99s%20Struggle%20for%20Freedom-Baraka%20Books%20%282018%29.pdf|city=Montreal|publisher=Baraka Books|isbn=9781771861427|lg=https://libgen.rs/book/index.php?md5=8435F6FF91279531705764823FDC2A7F}}</ref> Despite abolishing [[Tax|taxes]] in 1974 and suffering severe [[Economic sanctions|sanctions]] from the [[Imperial core|West]], the [[Democratic People's Republic of Korea|DPRK]] continues to provide [[Universal healthcare|free healthcare]] and [[education]] to its citizens, and housing and food are very cheap.<ref>{{Web citation|author=Zak Brown|newspaper=Anti-Imperialism.org|title=Towards a concrete analysis of the DPRK|date=2023-11-18|url=https://anti-imperialism.org/2013/11/18/towards-a-concrete-analysis-of-the-dprk/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200118135119/https://anti-imperialism.org/2013/11/18/towards-a-concrete-analysis-of-the-dprk/|archive-date=2020-01-18|retrieved=2023-03-12}}</ref>

== Germany ==
The [[German Democratic Republic (1949–1990)|German Democratic Republic]] had 100% employment and very cheap higher education.<ref name=":03">{{Citation|author=Austin Murphy|year=2000|title=The Triumph of Evil|chapter=A Post-Mortem Comparison of Communist and Capitalist Societies Using the German Case as an Illustration|page=94–102|pdf=https://mltheory.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil.pdf|city=Fucecchio|publisher=European Press Academic Publishing|isbn=8883980026}}</ref> Rent took up less than 10% of total income and evictions were illegal.<ref name=":32">{{Web citation|author=Victor Grossman|newspaper=[[Monthly Review]]|title=My seventy years and the departed GDR|date=2022-08-24|url=https://mronline.org/2022/08/24/my-seventy-years-and-the-departed-gdr/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220825143732/https://mronline.org/2022/08/24/my-seventy-years-and-the-departed-gdr/|archive-date=2022-08-25|retrieved=2022-08-26}}</ref> Between 1951 and 1989, its economy grew slightly faster than [[Federal Republic of Germany|West Germany]]'s with an annual growth rate of 4.5% to 4.3%.<ref>{{Citation|author=Karl Mai|year=2009|title=GDR - FRG in an economic-statistical comparison 1950 to 1989 - On new results by Prof. Gerhard Heske|pdf=https://web.archive.org/web/20200613132353/http://www.memo.uni-bremen.de/docs/m3309.pdf|trans-title=DDR – BRD im ökonomisch-statistischen Vergleich 1950 bis 1989 - Zu neuen Ergebnissen von Prof. Gerhard Heske|trans-lang=German}}</ref> The GDR had 24 doctors per 10,000 people by 1989, higher than the USA or [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|UK]].<ref>{{Web citation|newspaper=[[Tricontinental]]|title=‘Socialism Is the Best Prophylaxis’: The German Democratic Republic’s Health Care System|date=2023-02-14|url=https://thetricontinental.org/studies-2-ddr-health-care-2/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230214134923/https://thetricontinental.org/studies-2-ddr-health-care-2/#_Toc113466469|archive-date=2023-02-14|retrieved=2023-02-26}}</ref>

== Latin America ==

=== Nicaragua ===

* [[Nicaragua]], under the socialist [[Sandinista National Liberation Front|Sandinista]] government, has diversified away from colonial-era cash crops and monocultures, delivered sustained economic growth, and alleviated poverty.<ref>[https://www.telesurenglish.net/opinion/Nicaraguan-Sandinista-Economic-Model-Consolidates-Its-Success-20160130-0005.html Nicaraguan Sandinista Economic Model Consolidates Its Success] by [[TeleSur]]</ref>

=== Cuba ===

* Despite the [[United States embargo against Cuba|US blockade]], [[Republic of Cuba|Cuba]] is still able to boast having the highest quality healthcare system for its national income range.<ref>Mostly Anti-Cuba article that is forced to report cold hard facts: [https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/11/cuba-health/508859/ How Cubans Live as Long as Americans at a Tenth of the Cost] by [[The Atlantic]]</ref>
* Cuba has a far higher standard of living than most of its neighbors, according to the very CIA which has plotted to destroy the communist Cuban government countless times.<ref>{{News citation|journalist=Ben Cohen|date=2018-10-09|title=Cuba and the Success of Socialism|url=https://thedailybanter.com/2010/10/01/cuba-and-the-success-of-socialism/|newspaper=The Daily Banter|archive-url=|archive-date=|retrieved=}}</ref>

== See also ==

* [[Failures of capitalism]]

== References ==

Library:Simple Sabotage Field Manual

2023-03-03T06:30:14Z

Sparkingcircuit: /* (1) Personal Motives */ Correcting typo.

{{changetitle|''Simple Sabotage Field Manual'', by Department of Strategic Services (Provisional)}}
{{Library work
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| written by = [[Department of Strategic Services (Provisional)]]
| written in = 1963
| published = 1963
| type = Book
| source = [https://archive.org/details/SimpleSabotageFieldManualStrategicServicesProvisional/page/n21/mode/2up Archive.org]
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== SIMPLE SABOTAGE FIELD MANUAL ==

Strategic Services (Provisional)

17 January 1944

Prepared under direction of The Director of Strategic Services

STRATEGIC SERVICES FIELD MANUAL No. 3

DSS REPRODUCTION BRANCH
----This Simple Sabotage Field Manual — Strategic Services (Provisional) — is published for the information and guidance of all concerned and will be used as the basic doctrine for Strategic Services training for this subject.

The contents of this Manual should be carefully controlled and should not be allowed to come into unauthorized hands.

The instructions may be placed in separate pamphlets or leaflets according to categories of operations but should be distributed with care and not broadly. They should be used as a basis of radio broadcasts only for local and special cases and as directed by the theater commander.

AR 380-5, pertaining to handling of secret documents, will be complied with in the handling of this Manual.

''William J. Donovan''
----

== CONTENTS ==

# INTRODUCTION
# POSSIBLE EFFECTS
# MOTIVATING THE SABOTEUR
# TOOLS, TARGETS, AND TIMING
# SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR SIMPLE SABOTAGE

----SIMPLE SABOTAGE

== 1. INTRODUCTION ==
a. The purpose of this paper is to characterize simple sabotage, to outline its possible effects, and to present suggestions for inciting and executing it.

b. Sabotage varies from highly technical coup to main acts that require detailed planning and the use of specially trained operatives, to innumerable simple acts which the ordinary individual citizen-saboteur can perform. This paper is primarily concerned with the latter type. Simple sabotage does not require specially prepared tools or equipment; it is executed by an ordinary citizen who may or may not act individually and without the necessity for active connection with an organized group; and it is carried out in such a way as to involve a minimum danger of injury, detection, and reprisal.

c. Where destruction is involved, the weapons of the citizen-saboteur are salt, nails, candles, pebbles, thread, or any other materials he might normally be expected to possess as a householder or as a worker in his particular occupation. His arsenal is the kitchen shelf, the trash pile, his own usual kit of tools and supplies. The targets of his sabotage are usually objects to which he has normal and inconspicuous access in everyday life.

d. A second type of simple sabotage requires no destructive tools whatsoever and produces physical damage, if any, by highly indirect means. It is based on universal opportunities to make faulty decisions, to adopt a non- cooperative attitude, and to induce others to follow suit. Making a faulty decision may be simply a matter of placing tools in one spot instead of another. A non-cooperative attitude may involve nothing more than creating an unpleasant situation among one’s fellow workers, engaging in bickering, or displaying surliness and stupidity.

e. This type of activity, sometimes referred to as the “human element,” is frequently responsible for accidents, delays, and general obstruction even under normal conditions. The potential saboteur should discover what types of faulty decisions and non-cooperation are ''normally'' found in this kind of work and should then devise his sabotage so as to enlarge that “margin for error.”

== 2. POSSIBLE EFFECTS ==
a. Acts of simple sabotage are occurring throughout Europe. An effort should be made to add to their efficiency, lessen their detectability, and increase their number. Acts of simple sabotage, multiplied by thousands of citizen- saboteurs, can be an effective weapon against the enemy. Slashing tires, draining fuel tanks, starting fires, starting arguments, acting stupidly, short-circuiting electric systems, abrading machine parts will waste materials, man-power, and time. Occurring on a wide scale, simple sabotage will be a constant and tangible drag on the war effort of the enemy.

b. Simple sabotage may also have secondary results of more or less value. Widespread practice of simple sabotage will harass and demoralize enemy administrators and police. Further, success may embolden the citizen-saboteur eventually to find colleagues who can assist him in sabotage of greater dimensions. Finally, the very practice of simple sabotage by natives in enemy or occupied territory may make these individuals identify themselves actively with the United Nations war effort, and encourage them to assist openly in periods of Allied invasion and occupation.

== 3. MOTIVATING THE SABOTEUR ==
a. To incite the citizen to the active practice of simple sabotage and to keep him practicing that sabotage over sustained periods is a special problem.

b. Simple sabotage is often an act which the citizen performs according to his own initiative and inclination. Acts of destruction do not bring him any personal gain and may be completely foreign to his habitually conservationist attitude toward materials and tools. Purposeful stupidity is contrary to human nature. He frequently needs pressure, stimulation or assurance, and information and suggestions regarding feasible methods of simple sabotage.

=== (1) Personal Motives ===
(a) The ordinary citizen very probably has no immediate personal motive for committing simple sabotage. Instead, he must be made to anticipate indirect personal gain, such as might come with enemy evacuation or destruction of the ruling government group. Gains should be stated as specifically as possible for the area addressed: simple sabotage will hasten the day when Commissioner X and his deputies Y and Z will be thrown out, when particularly obnoxious decrees and restrictions will be abolished, when food will arrive, and so on. Abstract verbalization about personal liberty, freedom of the press, and so on, will not be convincing in most parts of the world. In many areas they will not even be comprehensible.

(b) Since the effect of his own acts is limited, the saboteur may become discouraged unless he feels that he is a member of a large, though unseen, group of saboteurs operating against the enemy or the government of his own country and elsewhere. This can be conveyed indirectly: suggestions which he reads and hears can include observations that a particular technique has been successful in this or that district. Even if the technique is not applicable to his surroundings, another’s success will encourage him to attempt similar acts. It also can be conveyed directly: statements praising the effectiveness of simple sabotage can be contrived which will be published by white radio, freedom stations, and the subversive press. Estimates of the proportion of the population engaged in sabotage can be disseminated. Instances of successful sabotage already are being broadcast by white radio and freedom stations, and this should be continued and expanded where compatible with security.

(c) More important than (a) or (b) would be to create a situation in which the citizen-saboteur acquires a sense of responsibility and begins to educate others in simple sabotage.

=== (2) Encouraging Destructiveness ===
It should be pointed out to the saboteur where the circumstances are suitable, that he is acting in self-defense against the enemy, or retaliating against the enemy for other acts of destruction. A reasonable amount of humor in the presentation of suggestions for simple sabotage will relax tensions of fear.

(a) The saboteur may have to reverse his thinking, and he should be told this in so many words. Where he formerly thought of keeping his tools sharp, he should now let them grow dull; surfaces that formerly were lubricated now should be sanded; normally diligent, he should now be lazy and care-less; and so on. Once he is encouraged to think backwards about himself and the objects of his everyday life, the saboteur will see many opportunities in his immediate environment which cannot possibly be seen from a distance. A state of mind should be encouraged that anything can be sabotaged.

(b) Among the potential citizen-saboteurs who are to engage in physical destruction, two extreme types may be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the man who is not technically trained and employed. This man needs specific suggestions as to what he can and should destroy as well as details regarding the tools by means of which destruction is accomplished.

(c) At the other extreme is the man who is a technician, such as a lathe operator or an automobile mechanic. Presumably this man would be able to devise methods of simple sabotage which would be appropriate to his own facilities. However, this man needs to be stimulated to re-orient his thinking in the direction of destruction. Specific examples, which need not be from his own field, should accomplish this.

(d) Various media may be used to disseminate suggestions and information regarding simple sabotage. Among the media which may be used, as the immediate situation dictates, are: freedom stations or radio, false or official leaflets may be directed toward specific geographic or occupational areas, or they may be general in scope. Finally, agents may be trained in the art of simple sabotage, in anticipation of a time when they may be able to communicate this information directly.

=== (3) Safety Measures ===
(a) The amount of activity carried on by the saboteur will be governed not only by the number of opportunities he sees, but also by the amount of danger he feels. Bad news travels fast, and simple sabotage will be discouraged if too many simple saboteurs are arrested.

(b) It should not be difficult to prepare leaflets and other media for the saboteur about the choice of weapons, time, and targets which will insure the saboteur against detection and retaliation. Among such suggestions might be the following:

(1) Use materials which appear to be innocent. A knife or a nail file can be carried normally on your person; either is a multi-purpose instrument for creating damage. Matches, pebbles, hair, salt, nails, and dozens of other destructive agents can be carried or kept in your living quarters without exciting any suspicion what- ever. If you are a worker in a particular trade or industry you can easily carry and keep such things as wrenches, hammers, emery paper, and the like.

(2) Try to commit acts for which large numbers of people could be responsible. For instance, if you blow out the wiring in a factory at a central fire box, almost anyone could have done it. On-the-street sabotage after dark, such as you might be able to carry out against a military car or truck, is another example of an act for which it would be impossible to blame you.

(3) Do not be afraid to commit acts for which you might be blamed directly, so long as you do so rarely, and as long as you have a plausible excuse: you dropped your wrench across an electric circuit because an air raid had kept you up the night before and you were half-dozing at work. Always be profuse in your apologies. Frequently you can “get away” with such acts under the cover of pretending stupidity, ignorance, over-caution, fear of being suspected of sabotage, or weakness and dullness due to undernourishment.

(4) After you have committed an act of easy sabotage, resist any temptation to wait around and see what happens. Loiterers arouse suspicion. Of course, there are circumstances when it would be suspicious for you to leave. If you commit sabotage on your job, you should naturally stay at your work.

== 4. TOOLS, TARGETS, AND TIMING ==
a. The citizen-saboteur cannot be closely controlled. Nor is it reasonable to expect that simple sabotage can be precisely concentrated on specific types of target according to the requirements of a concrete military situation. Attempts to control simple sabotage according to developing military factors, moreover, might provide the enemy with intelligence of more or less value in anticipating the date and area of notably intensified or notably slackened military activity.

b. Sabotage suggestions, of course, should be adapted to fit the area where they are to be practiced. Target priorities for general types of situations likewise can be specified, for emphasis at the proper time by the underground press, freedom stations, and cooperating propaganda.

=== (1) Under General Conditions ===
(a) Simple sabotage is more than malicious mischief, and it should always consist of acts whose results will be detrimental to the materials and man-power of the enemy.

(b) The saboteur should be ingenious in using his every-day equipment. All sorts of weapons will present themselves if he looks at his surroundings in a different light. For example, emery dust a powerful weapon may at first seem unobtainable, but if the saboteur were to pulverize’ an emery knife sharpener or emery wheel with a hammer, he would find himself with a plentiful supply.

(c) The saboteur should never attack targets beyond his capacity or the capacity of his instruments. An inexperienced person should not, for ex- ample, attempt to use explosives, but should confine himself to the use of matches or other familiar weapons.

(d) The saboteur should try to damage only objects and materials known to be in use by the enemy or to be destined for early use by the enemy. It will be safe for him to assume that almost any product of heavy industry is destined for enemy use, and that the most efficient fuels and lubricants also are destined for enemy use. Without special knowledge, however, it would be undesirable for him to attempt destruction of food crops or food products.

(e) Although the citizen-saboteur may rarely have access to military objects, he should give these preference above all others.

=== (2) Prior to a Military Offensive ===
During periods which are quiescent in a military sense, such emphasis as can be given to simple sabotage might well center on industrial production, to lessen the flow of materials and equipment to the enemy. Slashing a rubber tire on an Army truck may be an act of value; spoiling a batch of rubber in the production plant is an act of still more value.

=== (3) During a Military Offensive ===
(a) Most significant sabotage for an area which is, or is soon destined to be, a theater of combat operations is that whose effects will be direct and immediate. Even if the effects are relatively minor and localized, this type of sabotage is to be preferred to activities whose effects, while widespread, are in-direct and delayed.

(1) The saboteur should be encouraged to attack transportation facilities of all kinds. Among such facilities are roads, railroads, auto- mobiles, trucks, motor-cycles, bicycles, trains, and trams.

(2) Any communications facilities which can be used by the authorities to transmit instructions or morale material should be the objects of simple sabotage. These include telephone, telegraph and power systems, radio, newspapers, placards, and public notices.

(3) Critical materials, valuable in themselves or necessary to the efficient functioning of transportation and communication, also should become targets for the citizen-saboteur. These may include oil, gasoline, tires, food, and water.

== 5. SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR SIMPLE SABOTAGE ==
a. It will not be possible to evaluate the desirability of simple sabotage in an area without having in mind rather specifically what individual acts and results are embraced by the definition of simple sabotage.

b. A listing of specific acts follows, classified according to types of target. This list is presented as a growing rather than a complete outline of the methods of simple sabotage. As new techniques are developed, or new fields explored, it will be elaborated and expanded.

=== (1) Buildings ===
Warehouses, barracks, offices, hotels, and factory buildings are outstanding targets for simple sabotage. They are extremely susceptible to damage, especially by fire; they offer opportunities to such untrained people as janitors, charwomen, and casual visitors; and, when damaged, they present a relatively large handicap to the enemy.

==== (a) Fires ====
Fires can be started wherever there is an accumulation of inflammable material. Warehouses are obviously the most promising targets but incendiary sabotage need not be confined to them alone.

(1) Whenever possible, arrange to have the fire start after you have gone away. Use a candle and paper combination; setting it as close as possible to the inflammable material you want to burn: From a sheet of paper, tear a strip three or four centimeters wide and wrap it around the base of the candle two or three times. Twist more sheets of paper into loose ropes and place them around the base of the candle. When the candle flame reaches the encircling strip, it will be ignited and in turn will ignite the surrounding paper. The size, heat, and duration of the resulting flame will depend on how much paper you use and how much of it you can cramp in a small space.

(2) With a flame of this kind, do not attempt to ignite any but rather inflammable materials, such as cotton sacking. To light more resistant materials, use a candle plus tightly rolled or twisted paper which has been soaked in gasoline. To create a briefer but even hotter flame, put celluloid such as you might find in an old comb, into a nest of plain or saturated paper which is to be fired by a candle.

(3) To make another type of simple fuse, soak one end of a piece of string in grease. Rub a generous pinch of gunpowder over the inch of string where greasy string meets clean string. Then ignite the clean end of the string. It will burn slowly without a flame (in much the same way that a cigarette burns) until it reaches the grease and gunpowder; it will then flare up suddenly. The grease-treated string will then burn with a flame. The same effect may be achieved by using matches instead of the grease and gunpowder. Run the string over the match heads, taking care that the string is not pressed or knotted. They too will produce a sudden flame. The advantage of this type of fuse is that string burns at a set speed. You can time your fire by the length and thickness of the string you chose.

(4) Use a fuse such as! the ones suggested above to start a fire in an office after hours. The destruction of records and other types of documents would be a serious handicap to the enemy.

(5) In basements where waste is kept, janitors should accumulate oily and greasy waste. Such waste sometimes ignites spontaneously, but it can easily be lit with a cigarette or match. If you are a janitor on night duty, you can be the first to report the fire, but don’t report it too soon.

(6) A clean factory is not susceptible to fire, but a dirty one is. Workers should be careless with refuse and janitors should be inefficient in cleaning. If enough dirt and trash can be accumulated an otherwise fireproof building will become inflammable.

(7) Where illuminating gas is used in a room which is vacant at night, shut the windows tightly, turn on the gas, and leave a candle burning in the room, closing the door tightly behind you. After a time, the gas will explode, and a fire may or may not follow.

==== (b) Water and miscellaneous ====
(1) Ruin warehouse stock by setting the automatic sprinkler system to work. You can do this by tapping the sprinkler heads sharply with a hammer or by holding a match under them.

(2) Forget to provide paper in toilets; put tightly rolled paper, hair, and other obstructions in the W. C. Saturate a sponge with a thick starch or sugar solution. Squeeze it tightly into a ball, wrap it with string, and dry. Remove the string when fully dried. The sponge will be in the form of a tight hard ball. Flush down a W. C. or otherwise introduce into a sewer line. The sponge will gradually expand to its normal size and plug the sewage system.

(3) Put a coin beneath a bulb in a public building during the daytime, so that fuses will blow out when lights are turned on at night. The fuses themselves may be rendered ineffective by putting a coin behind them or loading them with heavy wire. Then a short-circuit may either start a fire, damage transformers, or blow out a central fuse which will interrupt distribution of electricity to a large area.

(4) Jam paper, bits of wood, hairpins, and anything else that will fit, into the locks of all unguarded entrances to public buildings.

=== (2) Industrial Production: Manufacturing ===

==== (a) Tools ====
(1) Let cutting tools grow dull. They will be inefficient, will slow down production, and may damage the materials and parts you use them on.

(2) Leave saws slightly twisted when you are not using them. After a while, they will break when used.

(3) Using a very rapid stroke will wear out a file before its time. So will dragging a file in slow strokes under heavy pressure. Exert pres- sure on the backward stroke as well as the for- ward stroke.

(4) Clean files by knocking them against the vise or the workplace; they are easily broken this way.

(5) Bits and drills will snap under heavy pressure.

(6) You can put a press punch out of order by putting in it more material than it is adjusted for — two blanks instead of one, for example.

(7) Power-driven tools like pneumatic drills, riveters, and so on, are never efficient when dirty. Lubrication points and electric contacts can easily be fouled by normal accumulations of dirt or the insertion of foreign matter.

==== (b) Oil and lubrication systems ====
Oil and lubrication systems are not only vulnerable to easy sabotage, but are critical in every machine with moving parts. Sabotage of oil and lubrication will slow production or stop work entirely at strategic points in industrial processes.

(1) Put metal dust or filings, fine sand, ground glass, emery dust (get it by pounding up an emery knife sharpener) and similar hard, gritty substances directly into lubrication systems. They will scour smooth surfaces, ruining pistons, cylinder walls, shafts, and bearings. They will overheat and stop motors which will need overhauling, new parts, and extensive re- pairs. Such materials, if they are used, should be introduced into lubrication systems past any filters which otherwise would strain them out.

(2) You can cause wear on any machine by uncovering a filter system, poking a pencil or any other sharp object through the filter mesh, then covering it up again. Or, if you can dispose of it quickly, simply remove the filter.

(3) If you cannot get at the lubrication system or filter directly, you may be able to lessen the effectiveness of oil by diluting it in storage. In this case, almost any liquid will do which will thin the oil. A small amount of sulfuric acid, varnish, water-glass, or linseed oil will be especially effective.

(4) Using a thin oil where a heavy oil is prescribed will break down a machine or heat up a moving shaft so that it will “freeze” and stop.

(5) Put any clogging substance into lubrication systems or, if it will float, into stored oil. Twisted combings of human hair, pieces of string, dead insects, and many other common objects will be effective in stopping or hindering the flow of oil through feed lines and filters.

(6) Under some circumstances, you may be able to destroy oil outright rather than interfere with its effectiveness, by removing stop-plugs from lubricating systems or by puncturing the drums and cans in which it is stored.

==== (c) Cooling Systems ====
(1) A water cooling system can be put out of commission in a fairly short time, with considerable damage to an engine or motor, if you put into it several pinches of hard grain, such as rice or wheat. They will swell up and choke the circulation of water, and the cooling system will have to be torn down to remove the obstruction. Sawdust or hair may also be used to clog a water cooling system.

(2) If very cold water is quickly introduced into the cooling system of an overheated motor, contraction and considerable strain on the engine housing will result. If you can repeat the treatment a few times, cracking and serious damage will result.

(3) You can ruin the effectiveness of an air cooling system by plugging dirt and waste into intake or exhaust valves. If a belt-run fan is used in the system, make a jagged cut at least half way through the belt; it will slip and finally part under strain and the motor will overheat.

==== (d) Gasoline and Oil Fuel ====
Tanks and fueling engines usually are accessible and easy to open. They afford a very vulnerable target for simple sabotage activities.

(1) Put several pinches of sawdust or hard grain, such as rice or wheat, into the fuel tank of a gasoline engine. The particles will choke a feed line so that the engine will stop. Some time will be required to discover the source of the trouble. Although they will be hard to get, crumbs of natural rubber, such as you might find in old rubber bands and pencil erasers, are also effective.

(2) If you can accumulate sugar, put it in the fuel tank of a gasoline engine. As it burns together with the gasoline, it will turn into a sticky mess which will completely mire the engine and necessitate extensive cleaning and repair. Honey and molasses are as good as sugar. Try to use about 75-100 grams for each 10 gallons of gasoline.

(3) Other impurities which you can introduce into gasoline will cause rapid engine wear and eventual breakdown. Fine particles of pumice, sand, ground glass, and metal dust can easily be introduced into a gasoline tank. Be sure that the particles are very fine, so that they will be able to pass through the carburetor jet.

(4) Water, urine, wine, or any other simple liquid you can get in reasonably large quantities Will dilute gasoline fuel to a point where no combustion will occur in the cylinder and the engine will not move. One pint to 20 gallons of gasoline is sufficient. If salt water is used, it will cause corrosion and permanent motor damage.

(5) In the case of Diesel engines, put low flash-point oil into the fuel tank; the engine will not move. If there already is proper oil in the tank when the wrong kind is added, the engine will only limp and sputter along.

(6) Fuel lines to gasoline and oil engines frequently pass over the exhaust pipe. When the machine is at rest, you can stab a small hole in the fuel line and plug the hole with wax. As the engine runs and the exhaust tube becomes hot, the wax will be melted; fuel will drip onto the exhaust and a blaze will start.

(7) If you have access to a room where gasoline is stored, remember that gas vapor accumulating in a closed room will explode after a time if you leave a candle burning in the room. A good deal of evaporation, however, must occur from the gasoline tins into the air of the room. If removal of the tops of the tins does not expose enough gasoline to the air to ensure copious evaporation, you can open lightly constructed tins further with a knife, ice pick or sharpened nail file. Or puncture a tiny hole in the tank which will permit gasoline to leak out on the floor. This will greatly increase the rate of evaporation. Before you light your candle, be sure that windows are closed and the room is as air-tight as you can make it. If you can see that windows in a neighboring room are opened wide, you have a chance of setting a large fire which will not only destroy the gasoline but anything else nearby; when the gasoline explodes, the doors of the storage room will be blown open, a draft to the neighboring windows will be created which will whip up a fine conflagration.

==== (e) Electric Motors ====
Electric motors (including dynamos) are more restricted than the targets so far discussed. They cannot be sabotaged easily or without risk of injury by unskilled persons who may otherwise have good opportunities for destruction.

(1) Set the rheostat to a high point of resistance in all types of electric motors. They will overheat and catch fire.

(2) Adjust the overload relay to a very high value beyond the capacity of the motor. Then overload the motor to a point where it will over-heat and break down.

(3) Remember that dust, dirt, and moisture are enemies of electrical equipment. Spill dust and dirt onto the points where the wires in electric motors connect with terminals, and onto insulating parts. Inefficient transmission of cur- rent and, in some cases, short circuits will result. Wet generator motors to produce short circuits.

(4) “Accidentally” bruise the insulation on wire, loosen nuts on connections, make faulty splices and faulty connections in wiring, to waste electric current and reduce the power of electric motors.

(5) “Damage to commutator and reduce” the power output or cause short circuiting in direct-current motors: Loosen or remove commutator holding rings. Sprinkle carbon, graphite, or metal dust on commutators. Put a little grease or oil at the contact points of commutators. Where commutator bars are close together bridge the gaps between them with metal dust, or sawtooth their edges with a chisel so that the teeth on adjoining bars meet or nearly meet and current can pass from one to the other.

(6) Put a piece of finely grained emery paper half the size of a postage stamp in a place where it will wear away rotating brushes. The emery paper — and the motor — will be destroyed in the resulting fire.

(7) Sprinkle carbon, graphite or metal dust on slip-rings so that the current will leak or short circuits will occur. When a motor is idle, nick the slip-rings with a chisel.

(8) Cause motor stoppage or inefficiency by applying dust mixed with grease to the face of the armature so that it will not make proper contact.

(9) To overheat electric motors, mix sand with heavy grease and smear it between the stater and rotor, or wedge thin metal pieces between them. To prevent the efficient generation of current, put floor sweepings, oil, tar, or paint between them.

(10) In motors using three-phase current, deeply nick one of the lead-in wires with a knife or file when the machine is at rest, or replace one of the three fuses with a blown-out fuse. In the first case, the motor will stop after running awhile, and in the second, it will not start.

==== (f) Transformers ====
(1) Transformers of the oil-filled type can be put out of commission if you pour water, salt-water, coolant, or kerosene, into the oil tank.

(2) In air-cooled transformers, block the ventilation by piling debris around the transformer.

(3) In all types of transformers, throw carbon, graphite or metal dust over the outside bushings and other exposed electrical parts.

==== (g) Turbines ====
Turbines for the most part are heavily built, stoutly housed, and difficult of access. Their vulnerability to simple sabotage is very low.

(1) After inspecting or repairing a hydro turbine, fasten the cover insecurely so that it will blow off and flood the plant with water. A loose cover on a steam turbine will cause it to leak and slow down.

(2) In water turbines, insert a large piece of scrap iron in the head of the penstock, just beyond the screening, so that water will carry the damaging material down to the plant equipment.

(3) When the steam line to a turbine is opened for repair, put pieces of scrap iron into it, to be blasted into the turbine machinery when steam is up again.

(4) Create a leak in the line feeding oil to the turbine, so that oil will fall on the hot steam pipe and cause a fire.

==== (h) Boilers ====
(1) Reduce the efficiency of steam boilers any way you can. Put too much water in them to make them slow-starting, or keep the fire under them low to keep them inefficient. Let them dry and turn the fire up; they will crack and be ruined. An especially good trick is to keep put- ting limestone or water containing lime in the boiler; it will deposit lime on the bottom and sides. This deposit will provide very good insulation against heat; after enough of it has collected, the boiler will be completely worthless.

=== (3) Production: Metals ===

==== (a) Iron and Steel ====
(1) Keep blast furnaces in a condition where they must be frequently shut down for repair. In making fire-proof bricks for the inner lining of blast furnaces, put in an extra proportion of tar so that they will wear out quickly and necessitate constant re-lining.

(2) Make cores for casting so that they are filled with air bubbles and an imperfect cast results.

(3) See that the core in a mold is not properly supported, so that the core gives way or the casting is spoiled because of the incorrect position of the core.

(4) In tempering steel or iron, apply too much heat, so that the resulting bars and ingots are of poor quality.

==== (b) Other Metals ====
No suggestions available.

=== (4) Production: Mining and Mineral Extraction ===

==== (a) Coal ====
(1) A slight blow against your Davy oil lamp will extinguish it, and to light it again you will have to find a place where there is no fire damp. Take a long time looking for the place. (2) Blacksmiths who make pneumatic picks should not harden them properly, so that they will quickly grow dull.

(3) You can easily put your pneumatic pick out of order. Pour a small amount of water through the oil lever and your pick will stop working. Coal dust and improper lubrication will also put it out of order.

(4) Weaken the chain that pulls the bucket conveyors carrying coal. A deep dent in the chain made with blows of a pick or shovel will cause it to part under normal strain. Once a chain breaks, normally or otherwise take your time about reporting the damage; be slow about taking the chain up for repairs and bringing it back down after repairs.

(5) Derail mine cars by putting obstructions on the rails and in switch points. If possible, pick a gallery where coal cars have to pass each other, so that traffic will be snarled up.

(6) Send up quantities of rock and other useless material with the coal.

=== (5) Production: Agriculture ===

==== (a) Machinery ====
(1) See par. 5 b. (2) (c), (d), (e).

==== (b) Crops and livestock ====
Crops and livestock probably will be destroyed only in areas where there are large food surpluses or where the enemy (regime) is known to be requisitioning food. (1) Feed crops to livestock. Let crops harvest too early or too late. Spoil stores of grain, fruit and vegetables by soaking them in water so that they will rot. Spoil fruit and vegetables by leaving them in the sun.

=== (6) Transportation: Railways ===

==== (a) Passengers ====
(1) Make train travel as inconvenient as possible for enemy personnel. Make mistakes in issuing train tickets, leaving portions of the journey uncovered by the ticket book; issue two tickets for the same seat in the train, so that an interesting argument will result; near train time, instead of issuing printed tickets write them out slowly by hand, prolonging the process until the train is nearly ready to leave or has left the station. On station bulletin boards announcing train arrivals and departures, see that false and misleading information is given about trains bound for enemy destinations.

(2) In trains bound for enemy destinations, attendants should make life as uncomfortable as possible for passengers. See that the food is especially bad, take up tickets after midnight, call all station stops very loudly during the night, handle baggage as noisily as possible during the night, and so on.

(3) See that the luggage of enemy personnel is mislaid or unloaded at the wrong stations. Switch address labels on enemy baggage.

(4) Engineers should see that trains run slow or make unscheduled stops for plausible reasons.

==== (b) Switches, Signals and Routing ====
(1) Exchange wires in switchboards containing signals and switches, so that they connect to the wrong terminals.

(2) Loosen push-rods so that signal arms do not work; break signal lights; exchange the colored lenses on red and green lights.

(3) Spread and spike switch points in the track so that they will not move, or place rocks or close-packed dirt between the switch points.

(4) Sprinkle rock salt or ordinary salt profusely over the electrical connections of switch points and on the ground nearby. When it rains, the switch will be short-circuited.

(5) See that cars are put on the wrong trains. Remove the labels from cars needing repair and put them on cars in good order. Leave couplings between cars as loose as possible.

==== (c) Road-beds and Open Track ====
(1) On a curve, take the bolts out of the tie-plates connecting to sections of the outside rail, and scoop away the gravel, cinders, or dirt for a few feet on each side of the connecting joint.

(2) If by disconnecting the tie-plate at a joint and loosening sleeper nails on each side of the joint, it becomes possible to move a section of “rail, spread to sections of rail and drive a spike vertically between” them.

==== (d) Oil and Lubrication ====
(1) See 5 b. (2) (b).

(2) Squeeze lubricating pipes with pincers or dent them with hammers, so that the flow of oil is obstructed.

==== (e) Cooling Systems ====
(1) See 5 b (2) (c).

==== (f) Gasoline and Oil Fuel ====
(1) See 5 b (2) (d).

==== (g) Electric Motors ====
(1) See 5 b (2) (e) and (f).

==== (h) Boilers ====
(1) See 5 b (2) (h).

(2) After inspection put heavy oil or tar in the engines’ boilers, or put half a kilogram of soft soap into the water in the tender.

==== (i) Brakes and Miscellaneous ====
(1) Engines should run at high speeds and use brakes excessively at curves and on down-hill grades.

(2) Punch holes in air-brake valves or water supply pipes.

(3) In the last car of a passenger train or or a front car of a freight, remove the wadding from a journal box and replace it with oily rags.

=== (7) Transportation: Automotive ===

==== (a) Roads ====
Damage to roads [(3) below] is slow, and therefore impractical as a D-day or near D-day activity.

(1) Change sign posts at intersections and forks; the enemy will go the wrong way and it may be miles before he discovers his mistakes. In areas where traffic is composed primarily of enemy autos, trucks, and motor convoys of various kinds, remove danger signals from curves and intersections.

(2) When the enemy asks for directions, give him wrong information. Especially when enemy convoys are in the neighborhood, truck drivers can spread rumors and give false information about bridges being out, ferries closed, and detours lying ahead.

(3) If you can start damage to a heavily traveled road, passing traffic and the elements will do the rest. Construction gangs can see that too much sand or water is put in concrete or that the road foundation has soft spots. Any- one can scoop ruts in asphalt and macadam roads which turn soft in hot weather; passing trucks will accentuate the ruts to a point where substantial repair will be needed. Dirt roads also can be scooped out. If you are a road laborer, it will be only a few minutes work to divert a small stream from a sluice so that it runs over and eats away the road.

(4) Distribute broken glass, nails, and sharp rocks on roads to puncture tires.

==== (b) Passengers ====
(1) Bus-driver can go past the stop where the enemy wants to get off. Taxi drivers can waste the enemy’s time and make extra money by driving the longest possible route to his destination.

==== (c) Oil and Lubrication ====
(1) See 5 b. (2) (b).

(2) Disconnect the oil pump; this will burn out the main bearings in less than 50 miles of normal driving.

==== (d) Radiator ====
(1) See 5 b. (2) (c).

==== (e) Fuel ====
(1) See 5 b. (2) (d).

==== (f) Battery and Ignition ====
(1) Jam bits of wood into the ignition lock; loosen or exchange connections behind the switchboard; put dirt in spark plugs; damage distributor points.

(2) Turn on the lights in parked cars so that the battery will run down.

(3) Mechanics can ruin batteries in a number of undetectable ways: Take the valve cap off a cell, and drive a screw driver slantwise into the exposed water vent, shattering the plates of the cell; no damage will show when you put the cap back on. Iron or copper filings put into the cells i.e., dropped into the acid, will greatly shorten its life. Copper coins or a few pieces of iron will accomplish the same and more slowly. One hundred to 150 cubic centimeters of vinegar in each cell greatly reduces the life of the battery, but the odor of the vinegar may reveal what has happened.

==== (g) Gears ====
(1) Remove the lubricant from or put, too light a lubricant in the transmission and other gears.

(2) In trucks, tractors, and other machines with heavy gears, fix the gear case insecurely, putting bolts in only half the bolt holes. The gears will be badly jolted in use and will soon need repairs.

==== (h) Tires ====
(1) Slash or puncture tires of unguarded vehicles. Put a nail inside a match box or other small box, and set it vertically in front of the back tire of a stationary car; when the car starts off, the nail will go neatly through the tire.

(2) It is easy to damage a tire in a tire repair shop: In fixing flats, spill glass, benzine, caustic soda, or other material inside the casing which will puncture or corrode the tube. If you put a gummy substance inside the tube, the next flat will stick the tube to the casing and make it unusable. Or, when you fix a flat tire, you can simply leave between the tube and the casing the object which caused the flat in the first place.

(3) In assembling a tire after repair, pump the tube up as fast as you can. Instead of filling out smoothly, it may crease, in which case it will wear out quickly. Or, as you put a tire together, see if you can pinch the tube between the rim of the tire and the rim of the wheel, so that a blow-out will result.

(4) In putting air into tires, see that they are kept below normal pressure, so that more than an ordinary amount of wear will result. In filling tires on double wheels, inflate the inner tire to a much higher pressure than the outer one; both will wear out more quickly this way. Badly aligned wheels also wear tires out quickly; you can leave wheels out of alignment when they come in for adjustment, or you can spring them out of true with a strong kick, or by driving the car slowly and diagonally into a curb.

(5) If you have access to stocks of tires, you can rot them by spilling oil, gasoline, caustic acid, or benzine on them. Synthetic rubber, however, is less susceptible to these chemicals.

=== (8) Transportation: Water ===

==== (a) Navigation ====
(1) Barge and river boat personnel should spread false rumors about the navigability and conditions of the waterways they travel. Tell other barge and boat captains to follow channels that will take extra time, or cause them to make canal detours.

(2) Barge and river boat captains should navigate with exceeding caution near locks and bridges, to waste their time and to waste the time of other craft which may have to wait on them. If you don’t pump the bilges of ships and barges often enough, they will be slower and harder to navigate. Barges “accidentally” run aground are an efficient time waster too.

(3) Attendants on swing, draw, or bascule bridges can delay traffic over the bridge or in the waterway underneath by being slow. Boat captains can leave unattended draw bridges open in order to hold up road traffic.

(4) Add or subtract compensating magnets to the compass on cargo ships. Demagnetize the compass or maladjust it by concealing a large bar of steel or iron near to it.

==== (b) Cargo ====
(1) While loading or unloading, handle cargo carelessly in order to cause damage. Arrange the cargo so that the weakest and lightest crates and boxes will be at the bottom of the hold, while the heaviest ones are on top of them. Put hatch covers and tarpaulins on sloppily, so that rain and deck wash will injure the cargo. Tie float valves open so that storage tanks will overflow on perishable goods.

=== (9) Communications ===

==== (a) Telephone ====
(1) At office, hotel and exchange switch-boards delay putting enemy calls through, give them wrong numbers, cut them off “accident- ally,” or forget to disconnect them so that the line cannot be used again.

(2) Hamper official and especially military business by making at least one telephone call a day to an enemy headquarters; when you get them, tell them you have the wrong number. Call military or police offices and make anonymous false reports of fires, air raids, bombs.

(3) In offices and buildings used by the enemy, unscrew the earphone of telephone receivers and remove the diaphragm. Electricians and telephone repair men can make poor connections and damage insulation so that cross-talk and other kinds of electrical interference will make conversations hard or impossible to understand.

(4) Put the batteries under automatic switchboards out of commission by dropping nails, metal filings, or coins into the cells. If you can treat half the batteries in this way, the switchboard will stop working. A whole telephone system can be disrupted if you can put 10 percent of the cells in half the batteries of the central battery room out of order.

==== (b) Telegraph ====
(1) Delay the transmission and delivery of telegrams to enemy destinations.

(2) Garble telegrams to enemy destinations so that another telegram will have to be sent or a long distance call will have to be made. Some- times it will be possible to do this by changing a single letter in a word — for example, changing “minimum” to “miximum,” so that the person receiving the telegram will not know whether “minimum” or “maximum” is meant.

==== (c) Transportation Lines ====
(1) Cut telephone and telegraph transmission lines. Damage insulation on power lines to cause interference.

==== (d) Mail ====
(1) Post office employees can see to it that enemy mail is always delayed by one day or more, that it is put in wrong sacks, and so on.

==== (e) Motion Pictures ====
(1) Projector operators can ruin newsreels and other enemy propaganda films by bad focusing, speeding up or slowing down the film and by causing frequent breakage in the film.

(2) Audiences can ruin enemy propaganda films by applauding to drown the words of the speaker, by coughing loudly, and by talking.

(3) Anyone can break up a showing of an enemy propaganda film by putting two or three dozen large moths in a paper bag. Take the bag to the movies with you, put it on the floor in an empty section of the theater as you go in and leave it open. The moths will fly out and climb into the projector beam, so that the film will be obscured by fluttering shadows.

==== (f) Radio ====
(1) Station engineers will find it quite easy to over-modulate transmissions of talks by persons giving enemy propaganda or instructions, so that they will sound as if they were talking through a heavy cotton blanket with a mouth full of marbles.

(2) In your own apartment building, you can interfere with radio reception at times when the enemy wants everybody to listen. Take an electric light plug off the end of an electric light cord; take some wire out of the cord and tie it across two terminals of a two-prong plug or three terminals of a four-prong plug. Then take it around and put it into as many wall and floor outlets as you can find. Each time you insert the plug into a new circuit, you will blow out a fuse and silence all radios running on power from that circuit until a new fuse is put in.

(3) Damaging insulation on any electrical equipment tends to create radio interference in the immediate neighborhood, particularly on large generators, neon signs, fluorescent lighting, X-ray machines, and power lines. If workmen can damage insulation on a high tension line near an enemy airfield, they will make ground- to-plane radio communications difficult and perhaps impossible during long periods of the day.

=== (10) Electric Power ===

==== (a) Turbines, Electric Motors, Transformers ====
(1) See 5 b. (2) (e), (f),and (g).

==== (b) Transmission Lines ====
(1) Linesmen can loosen and dirty insulators to cause power leakage. It will be quite easy, too, for them to tie a piece of very heavy string several times back and forth between two parallel transmission lines, winding it several turns around the wire each time. Beforehand, the string should be heavily saturated with salt and then dried. When it rains, the string becomes a conductor, and a short-circuit will result.

=== (11) General Interference with Organizations and Production ===

==== (a) Organizations and Conferences ====
(1) Insist on doing everything through “channels.” Never permit short-cuts to be taken in order to expedite decisions.

(2) Make “speeches.” Talk as frequently as possible and at great length. Illustrate your “points” by long anecdotes and accounts of personal experiences. Never hesitate to make a few appropriate “patriotic” comments.

(3) When possible, refer all matters to committees, for “further study and consideration.” Attempt to make the committees as large as possible — never less than five.

(4) Bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible.

(5) Haggle over precise wordings of communications, minutes, resolutions.

(6) Refer back to matters decided upon at the last meeting and attempt to re-open the question of the advisability of that decision.

(7) Advocate “caution.” Be “reasonable” and urge your fellow-conferees to be “reasonable” and avoid haste which might result in embarrassments or difficulties later on.

(8) Be worried about the propriety of any decision — raise the question of whether such action as is contemplated lies within the jurisdiction of the group or whether it might conflict with the policy of some higher echelon.

==== (b) Managers and Supervisors ====
(1) Demand written orders.

(2) “Misunderstand” orders. Ask endless questions or engage in long correspondence about such orders. Quibble over them when you can.

(3) Do everything possible to delay the delivery of orders. Even though parts of an order may be ready beforehand, don’t deliver it until it is completely ready.

(4) Don’t order new working materials until your current stocks have been virtually exhausted, so that the slightest delay in filling your order will mean a shutdown.

(5) Order high-quality materials which are hard to get. If you don’t get them argue about it. Warn that inferior materials will mean inferior work.

(6) In making work assignments, always sign out the unimportant jobs first. See that the important jobs are assigned to inefficient workers of poor machines.

(7) Insist on perfect work in relatively unimportant products; send back for refinishing those which have the least flaw. Approve other defective parts whose flaws are not visible to the naked eye.

(8) Make mistakes in routing so that parts and materials will be sent to the wrong place in the plant.

(9) When training new workers, give incomplete or misleading instructions.

(10) To lower morale and with it, production, be pleasant to inefficient workers; give them undeserved promotions. Discriminate against efficient workers; complain unjustly about their work.

(11) Hold conferences when there is more critical work to be done.

(12) Multiply paper work in plausible ways. Start duplicate files.

(13) Multiply the procedures and clearances involved in issuing instructions, pay checks, and so on. See that three people have to approve everything where one would do.

(14) Apply all regulations to the last letter.

==== (c) Office Workers ====
(1) Make mistakes in quantities of material when you are copying orders. Confuse similar names. Use wrong addresses.

(2) Prolong correspondence with government bureaus.

(3) Misfile essential documents.

(4) In making carbon copies, make one too few, so that an extra copying job will have to be done.

(5) Tell important callers the boss is busy or talking on another telephone.

(6) Hold up mail until the next collection.

(7) Spread disturbing rumors that sound like inside dope.

==== (d) Employees ====
(1) Work slowly. Think out ways to increase the number of movements necessary on your job: use a light hammer instead of a heavy one, try to make a small wrench do when a big one is necessary, use little force where considerable force is needed, and so on.

(2) Contrive as many interruptions to your work as you can: when changing the material on which you are working, as you would on a lathe or punch, take needless time to do it. If you are cutting, shaping or doing other measured work, measure dimensions twice as often as you need to. When you go to the lavatory, spend a longer time there than is necessary. Forget tools so that you will have to go back after them.

(3) Even if you understand the language, pretend not to understand instructions in a foreign tongue.

(4) Pretend that instructions are hard to understand, and ask to have them repeated more than once. Or pretend that you are particularly anxious to do your work, and pester the foreman with unnecessary questions.

(5) Do your work poorly and blame it on bad tools, machinery, or equipment. Complain that these things are preventing you from doing your job right.

(6) Never pass on your skill and experience to a new or less skillful worker.

(7) Snarl up administration in every possible way. Fill out forms illegibly so that they will have to be done over; make mistakes or omit requested information in forms.

(8) If possible, join or help organize a group for presenting employee problems to the management. See that the procedures adopted are as inconvenient as possible for the management, involving the presence of a large number of employees at each presentation, entailing more than one meeting for each grievance, bringing up problems which are largely imaginary, and so on.

(9) Misroute materials.

(10) Mix good parts with unusable scrap and rejected parts.

(12) General Devices for Lowering Morale and Creating Confusion

(a) Give lengthy and incomprehensible explanations when questioned.

(b) Report imaginary spies or danger to the Gestapo or police.

(c) Act stupid.

(d) Be as irritable and quarrelsome as possible without getting yourself into trouble.

(e) Misunderstand all sorts of regulations as concerning such matters as rationing, transportation, and traffic regulations.

(f) Complain against ersatz materials.

(g) In public treat axis nationals or quislings coldly.

(h) Stop all conversation when axis nationals or quislings enter a cafe.

(i) Cry and sob hysterically at every occasion, especially when confronted by government clerks.

(j) Boycott all movies, entertainments, concerts, newspapers which are in any way connected with the quisling authorities.

(k) Do not cooperate in salvage schemes.
[[Category:Library works by Department for Strategic Services (Provisionsal)]]
[[Category:Anti-communism]]

COINTELPRO

2023-01-30T03:16:31Z

Sparkingcircuit: Reformatting and minor grammar corrections.

{{Message box/Stub}}

'''COINTELPRO''' (syllabic abbreviation derived from COunter INTELligence PROgram) (1956 - present) was a series of [[Covert operation|covert]] and illegal<ref name="church-final-report">{{Cite book|title=Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans – Church Committee final report|title-link=Church Committee|date=1976-04-26|publisher=United States Senate|series=II|page=10|chapter=I. Introduction and Summary|access-date=2014-07-15|chapter-url=https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_III.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140418092233/http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94th/94755_II.pdf|archive-date=2014-04-18|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|access-date=14 February 2018|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160309125741/https://archive.org/details/CointelproTheUntoldAmericanStory|title=COINTELPRO: The Untold American Story}}</ref> projects conducted by the [[United States of America|United States]] [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] (FBI). Aimed at surveilling, infiltrating, discrediting, and disrupting domestic American political organizations.<ref name="Citizens">{{Cite news|url=https://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/08/opinion/oe-jalon8|title=A break-in to end all break-ins|last=Jalon|first=Allan M.|date=8 March 2006|work=Los Angeles Times|access-date=2014-07-15|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203035850/http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/08/opinion/oe-jalon8|archive-date=2013-12-03}}</ref><ref name="The-Dangers-of-Domestic-Spying-by-Federal-Law-Enforcement">{{Cite report|url=https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/mlkreport.pdf|title=The Dangers of Domestic Spying by Federal Law Enforcement|date=2002|publisher=[[American Civil Liberties Union]]|access-date=2017-11-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180205173958/https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/mlkreport.pdf|archive-date=2018-02-05|url-status=live}}</ref> FBI records show COINTELPRO resources targeted groups and individuals the FBI deemed subversive,<ref name="Jeffreys-Jones">{{Cite book|title=The FBI: A History|last=Jeffreys-Jones|first=Rhodri|date=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn=978-0-300-14284-6|location=New Haven, CT|page=189|author-link=Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones|orig-year=2007}}</ref> including [[feminist]] organizations,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.freedomarchives.org/Documents/Curr%20C101/Cointelpro%20and%20Women's%20Liberation.pdf|title=The Women's Liberation Movement and COINTELPRO|website=www.freedomarchives.org|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150724013050/http://www.freedomarchives.org/Documents/Curr%20C101/Cointelpro%20and%20Women's%20Liberation.pdf|archive-date=2015-07-24}}</ref> the [[Communist Party USA]], [[Opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War|anti–Vietnam War]] organizers, activists of the [[civil rights movement]] or [[Black Power movement]] (e.g. [[Martin Luther King Jr.]], the [[Nation of Islam]], and the [[Black Panther Party]]), [[environmentalist]] and [[animal rights]] organizations, the [[American Indian Movement|American Indian Movement (AIM)]], independence movements (such as [[Puerto Rican independence]] groups like the [[Young Lords]]), and a variety of organizations that were part of the broader [[New Left]], in combination with unrelated groups such as the [[Ku Klux Klan]] (KKK).<ref>{{Cite book|title=White Robes and Burning Crosses: A History of the Ku Klux Klan from 1866|last=Newton|first=Michael|publisher=McFarland|year=2014|isbn=978-0-7864-7774-6|location=Jefferson, North Carolina|pages=146}}</ref>

==References==

<references />
[[Category:Intelligence Operations]]
[[Category:FBI]]

Communist Party of Cuba

2023-01-30T03:08:41Z

Sparkingcircuit: Reformatting to better fit ProleWiki guidelines.

{{Infobox political party
| name = Communist Party of Cuba
| native_name = Partido Comunista de Cuba
| logo = [[File:Logo del Partido Comunista de Cuba.svg|frameless|175px]]
| colorcode = red
| founder = [[Fidel Castro]]
| leader1_title = First Secretary
| leader1_name = Raúl Castro
| foundation = 3 October 1965
| newspaper = ''Granma''
| political_orientation = [[Marxism-Leninism]]
| website = [http://www.pcc.cu/ www.pcc.cu]
| international = [[International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties]]
| youth_wing = Young Communist League
| country = Cuba
}}
{{Communist parties}}
The '''Communist Party of Cuba''' ('''PCC''') is a [[Marxism-leninism|Marxist-Leninist]], organized vanguard of the [[Republic of Cuba]], and is the political leading force of the Cuban state and society.<ref>''2019 Constitution of Republic of Cuba''. Article 5. [http://www.cubadebate.cu/cuba/constitucion-republica-cuba/ Link (Spanish)]</ref> It's the sole political party in Cuba.

The PCC is a [[communist party]] organically structured under [[democratic centralism]] and holds as its main objective the building of [[socialism]].<ref>''Statute of the Communist Party of Cuba''. [https://www.pcc.cu/sites/default/files/documentos/2020-07/estatutos-pcc.pdf Link (Spanish)]</ref>

The highest body within the PCC is the Party Congress, which convenes every five years. When the Congress is not in session, the Central Committee becomes the highest body. Due to the Central Committee meeting twice a year, most day-to-day duties and responsibilities are vested in the Politburo. As of April 2021, the First Secretary of the Central Committee is [[Miguel Díaz-Canel]].<ref>{{Web citation|url=https://www.granma.cu/octavo-congreso-pcc/2021-04-19/elegido-miguel-diaz-canel-bermudez-como-primer-secretario-del-comite-central-del-partido-comunista-de-cuba-19-04-2021-10-04-18|title=Elegido Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez como Primer Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba|newspaper=Granma|date=2021-04-19|retrieval-date=23 April 2021}}</ref>

==History==
Cuba had a number of [[Communism|communist]] and [[Anarchism|anarchist]] organizations from the early period of the [[Republic of Cuba (1902–1959)|Republic]] (founded in 1902). The original "[[Comintern|internationalised]]" Communist Party of Cuba formed in the 1920s. In 1944, it renamed itself as the [[Popular Socialist Party (Cuba)|Popular Socialist Party]] for electoral reasons. In July 1961, two years after the successful overthrow of [[Fulgencio Batista]] and the creation of a revolutionary government, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) was formed from the merger of:

* Fidel Castro's [[26th of July Movement]]
* The [[Popular Socialist Party (Cuba)|Popular Socialist Party]] led by [[Blas Roca]]
*Parts of the student-based [[Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil|Revolutionary Directory]] led by [[Faure Chomón]]

On 26 March 1962, the ORI became the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution (PURSC), which in turn became the Communist Party of Cuba on 3 October 1965. In Article 5 of the Cuban constitution of 1976, the Communist Party is recognized as "the superior guiding force of society and of the State, that organizes and orients common efforts toward the high goals of the construction of socialism and the advancement toward communist society".<ref>{{Web citation|url=http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Cuba/vigente.html#mozTocId561012|title=Cuba: Constitución|website=pdba.georgetown.edu|access-date=14 October 2017}}</ref> All parties, including the Communist Party, are prohibited from publicly advertising their organizations.

For the first fifteen years of its formal existence, the Communist Party was almost completely inactive outside of the Politburo. The 100 person Central Committee rarely met and it was ten years after its founding that the first regular [[Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba|party Congress]] was held. In 1969, membership of the party was only 55,000 or 0.7% of the population, making the PCC the smallest ruling communist party in the world. In the 1970s, the party's apparatus began to develop. By the time of the first party Congress in 1975, the party had grown to just over two hundred thousand members, the Central Committee was meeting regularly and provided the organizational apparatus giving the party the leading role in society that ruling Communist parties generally hold. By 1980, the party had grown to over 430,000 members and it grew further to 520,000 by 1985. Apparatuses of the party had grown to ensure that its leading cadres were appointed to key government positions.

==Ideology ==
Compared with other ruling Communist Parties, such as in [[Communist Party of Vietnam|Vietnam]], [[Communist Party of China|China]], and [[Lao People's Revolutionary Party|Laos]], the Communist Party of Cuba retains a stricter adherence to the tradition of [[Marxism–Leninism]] and the traditional [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet model]]. The party has been more reluctant in engaging in market reforms, though it has been forced to accept some market measures in its economy due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the resultant loss of economic subsidies. The Communist Party of Cuba has often pursued an [[Interventionism (politics)|interventionist]] foreign policy, actively assisting left-wing revolutionary movements and governments abroad, including the [[National Liberation Army (Colombia)|ELN]] in [[Colombia]], the [[Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front|FMLN]] in [[El Salvador]], the [[Sandinista National Liberation Front|Sandinistas]] in [[Nicaragua]], and [[Maurice Bishop]]'s [[New Jewel Movement]] in [[Grenada]].{{citation needed|date=February 2007}} The party's most significant international role was in the [[Angolan Civil War|civil war]] in [[Angola]], where Cuba directed a joint Angolan/Soviet/Cuban force in the [[Battle of Cuito Cuanavale]].<ref>{{Web citation|author=Michael Evans|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/|title=Secret Cuban Documents on History of Africa Involvement|publisher=Gwu.edu|access-date=13 January 2010}}</ref><ref>{{Web citation|url=http://www.ipsterraviva.net/Africa/viewstory.asp?idnews=452|title=Cuba: Angolan War Memories Live On|date=16 June 2007|access-date=23 April 2018|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://archive.today/20070616124846/http://www.ipsterraviva.net/Africa/viewstory.asp?idnews=452|archive-date=16 June 2007}}</ref>More recently, the party has sought to support [[Pink Tide]] leaders across Latin America, such as [[Hugo Chávez]] and later [[Nicolás Maduro]] in [[Venezuela]] and [[Evo Morales]] in [[Bolivia]].

[[Medical diplomacy]] has also been a prominent feature of the Party's foreign policy. The party [[Cuban medical internationalism|maintains a policy]] of sending thousands of Cuban doctors, agricultural technicians, and other professionals to other countries throughout the developing world.

Since becoming the leader of the party, Raúl Castro has campaigned to "renew" Cuba's socialist economy through incorporating new exchange and distribution systems that have been seen traditionally, as "market oriented". This has led to some speculation that Cuba may transition towards a model [[Socialist-oriented market economy|similar]] to that of [[People's Republic of China|China]] and [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam|Vietnam]].<ref>{{Web citation|url=http://insight.inewsweek.cn/topic.php?tid=626|title=古巴改革："社会主义更新"未完待续|access-date=22 April 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140429205524/http://insight.inewsweek.cn/topic.php?tid=626|archive-date=29 April 2014}}</ref>

== Mass organizations related to the PCC==

* [[Young Communist League (Cuba)|Young Communist League]], (UJC founded in 1962 by [[Fidel Castro]]), youth group of future militants of the PCC
* [[Workers' Central Union of Cuba]], (CTC, founded in 1939 by Blas Roca and Lázaro Peña), a Cuban trade union center.
* [[Federation of Cuban Women]], (FMC, founded in 1960 by Fidel Castro and Vilma Espín), a centralized women's organization.
* [[National Association of Small Farmers]], (ANAP, founded in 1961 by Fidel Castro), a peasant organization.
* [[José Martí Pioneer Organization]], (OPJM, founded in 1977 by Fidel Castro), student organization (pioneers).
* Student Federation of Secondary Education,(FEEM, founded in 1970 by Fidel Castro), student organization (pre).
* University Student Federation, (FEU, founded in 1922 by [[Julio Antonio Mella]]), student organization (university).
* [[Committees for the Defense of the Revolution]], (CDR, founded in 1960 by Fidel Castro), community work organization.
* Association of Combatants of the Cuban Revolution, (ACRC, founded in 1993 by Fidel Castro), organization of active and retired military personnel.
* [[Union of Journalists of Cuba|Union of Journalists of Cuba, (UPEC, founded in 1963 by Fidel Castro), a centralized organization of journalists.]]

==Youth==
The Communist Party of Cuba has a youth wing, the [[Young Communist League (Cuba)|Young Communist League]] (''Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas'', UJC) which is a member organization of the [[World Federation of Democratic Youth]]. It also has a children's group, the [[José Martí Pioneer Organization]].

==References==
<references />
[[Category:Communist parties]]

Food loss and waste

2023-01-29T19:53:01Z

Sparkingcircuit: Replaced Infobox and corrected spelling.

{{Message box/Stub}}

'''Food loss and waste''' is food that is not eaten. The causes of food waste or loss are numerous and occur throughout the food system, during production, processing, distribution, retail and consumption. Overall, about one third of the world's food is thrown away.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-10-04|title=UN Calls for Action to End Food Waste Culture - October 4, 2021|url=https://dailynewsbrief.com/2021/10/04/un-calls-for-action-to-end-food-waste-culture/|access-date=2021-10-04|website=Daily News Brief|language=en-US}}</ref>

In [[People's Republic of China|China]], the [[Socialism|socialist]] [[Communist Party of China|government]] has instituted legislation to combat food waste<ref>[https://www.ifad.org/en/web/latest/-/blog/fighting-food-waste-in-china-local-efforts-global-effects Fighting food waste in China: Local efforts, global effects]</ref><ref>[https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-01-16/Fighting-food-waste-Serving-up-just-right-portions-at-open-buffets--X48mcDBYkM/index.html Fighting food waste: Serving up 'just right' portions at all-you-can-eat buffets]</ref> to "foster a resource-conserving and environmentally-friendly society."<ref>[https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202104/1222490.shtml China adopts law against food waste; binge eating, excessive leftovers to face fines]</ref>

In the [[Capitalism|capitalist]] [[United States of America|United States]], 30-40% of food is wasted, yet laws prohibit the donation of food to those in need.<ref>[https://universe.byu.edu/2017/11/27/some-americans-go-hungry-while-others-waste-food/ Some Americans go hungry while others waste food]</ref><ref>[https://www.reddit.com/r/WorkersStrikeBack/comments/qhoqad/why/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3 "Portland Police are guarding a dumpster full of food. The grocery store threw it away because the power was out for too long, and police are threatening to arrest anyone who tries to take it."] screenshot of anonymous [[Facebook, Inc.|Facebook]] status, posted to [[WorkersStrikeBack (subreddit)|/r/WorkersStrikeBack]] on Oct 28, 2021</ref>

== References ==
<references />
[[Category:Social issues]]
[[Category:Stubs]]

United States Department of Defense

2023-01-28T21:35:13Z

Sparkingcircuit: Added Infobox

{{Message box/Stub}}
{{Infobox government agency
| agency_name = United States Department of Defense
| seal = Seal of United States Department of Defense.svg
| seal_width = 200
| seal_caption = Seal
| formed = 1947-9-18th
| jurisdiction = [[Government_of_the_United_States_of_America]]
| headquarters = [[The Pentagon]] Arlington County, Virginia, [[United States|United States]]
| budget = 721.5$ billion
| chief1_name = Lloyd J. Austin
| chief1_position = Secretary
| chief2_name = Kathleen Hicks
| chief2_position = Deputy Secretary
| chief3_name = Mark A. Milley
| chief3_position = Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
| chief4_name = Christopher W. Grady
| chief4_position = Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
| child1_agency = [[United States Department of the Army|Department of the Army]]
| child2_agency = [[United States Department of the Navy|Department of the Navy]]
| child3_agency = [[United States Department of the Air Force|Department of the Air Force]]
| child4_agency = [[National Security Agency]]
| child5_agency = [[Defense Intelligence Agency]]
| child6_agency = [[National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency]]
| child7_agency = [[National Reconnaissance Office]]
| website = https://www.defense.gov/[https://www.defense.gov/]
}}
The '''United States Department of Defense''' ('''DOD'''), previously known as the '''United States Department of War''' is a [[reactionary]] and [[anti-communist]] government organization responsible for the military overthrow of various governments around the world, most notably those of [[socialist]] and indigenous control.
[[Category:Stubs]]
[[Category:Imperialist organizations]]
[[Category:United States of America]]

File:Seal of United States Department of Defense.svg

2023-01-28T21:15:25Z

Sparkingcircuit: The seal of the DOD.

== Summary ==
The seal of the DOD.

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2023-01-28T21:08:14Z

Sparkingcircuit: A template for the displaying of information regarding governmental agencies.

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Luna Oi

2023-01-28T20:24:47Z

Sparkingcircuit: Added a person infobox.

{{Infobox person|name=Luna Oi|image=LunaOi.png|nationality=Vietnam|field=Youtuber}}

'''Luna Oi''' is a [[Socialist Republic of Vietnam|Vietnamese]] [[Nationalism|nationalist]] and [[Marxism-Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]] content creator who is prominent on [[YouTube]]. She promotes [[Socialism|socialist]] education from a Vietnamese perspective in the English language.

She's covered the [[COVID-19 pandemic]] in Vietnam,<ref>{{YouTube citation|title=Vietnam is Defeating COVID, why can't the West? {{!}} MOONCAST|url=https://youtu.be/SIxD0gJfCAo|channel=[https://www.youtube.com/@Lunaoi Luna Oi]}}</ref> the [[Republic of India|Indian]] farmers' protest movement,<ref>{{News citation|title=Here's how Farmers DEFEATED Neoliberalism in India!|url=https://youtu.be/0FOv9Q3x9KI}}</ref> among many other topics. She has also appeared on the [[The Deprogram|Deprogram]] podcast.<ref>{{News citation|author=The Deprogram|newspaper=Patreon|title=The Deprogram Episode 25:Viet Minh? More like Viet Win (Vietnamese Socialism Ft. Luna Oi)|date=2022-04-22|url=https://www.patreon.com/TheDeprogram|retrieved=2022-05-01}}</ref>

== Controversies ==

=== Anarchist positions ===

In 2019, Luna Oi claimed that what she really wanted was [[anarchism]], with "[Marxism-Leninism] during the revolution time".<ref>{{Web citation|url=https://twitter.com/LunaOi_VN/status/1162553955039137793|title=Luna Oi claiming that she wants Anarchism|author=@LunaOi_VN (Luna Oi)|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20211009222319/https://twitter.com/LunaOi_VN/status/1162553955039137793|archive-date=2021-10-09T22:23:19}}</ref>

=== Vietnamese nationalism ===

Luna Oi has frequently denounced accusations against Vietnam. This includes defending the Vietnamese occupation of [[Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)|Cambodia]] and calling it necessary.<ref>{{Web citation|url=https://twitter.com/LunaOi_VN/status/1613661614816772097|title=Luna Oi defending the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.|author=Luna Oi|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20230113003848/https://twitter.com/LunaOi_VN/status/1613661614816772097|archive-date=2023-01-13T00:38:48}}</ref> Luna Oi also called [[Deng Xiaoping]] a monster after repeating Western propaganda surrounding the [[1989 Tian'anmen Square riots]].<ref>{{Web citation|url=https://twitter.com/LunaOi_VN/status/1187774578921070592|title=Luna Oi calling Deng a monster|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20191025225705/https://twitter.com/LunaOi_VN/status/1187774578921070592|archive-date=2019-10-25T22:57:05|author=Luna Oi|quote=My high school history teacher told us about Tiananmen. We're shocked and shivered listening to what actually happened.
All the "justification" for it is just quibble. I hope everyone, even the Dengists, have to admit that. Deng was monster and he knew it, he chose to do it.}}</ref>
== External links ==

* [https://www.youtube.com/lunaoi YouTube]
* [https://twitter.com/LunaOi_VN Twitter]

== References ==
[[Category:Communist YouTube channels]]

File:LunaOi.png

2023-01-28T20:19:46Z

Sparkingcircuit: Image of the ML Youtuber "Luna Oi".

== Summary ==
Image of the ML Youtuber "Luna Oi".

Nuclear weapon

2023-01-28T01:42:38Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created "Nuclear Weapon" page.

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A '''Nuclear weapon''', is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either [[Nuclear fission|fission]] (fission bomb) or a combination of fission and [[Nuclear fusion|fusion]] reactions (thermonuclear bomb), producing a [[nuclear explosion]]. Both bomb types release large quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter.

The first test of a fission (atomic) bomb released an amount of energy approximately equal to 20 kilo-tons of TNT. The first thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb test released energy approximately equal to 10 mega-tons of TNT. Nuclear bombs have had yields between 10 tons TNT and 50 megatons for the [[Tsar Bomba]]. A thermonuclear weapon weighing as little as 600 pounds (270 kg) can release energy equal to more than 1.2 mega-tonnes of TNT.

A nuclear device no larger than a conventional bomb can devastate an entire city by blast, fire, and radiation. Since they are [[Weapons of Mass Destruction|weapons of mass destruction]], the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a focus of international relations policy. Nuclear weapons have been deployed twice in war, by the [[United States of America|United States]] against the [[Empire of Japan (1868–1947)|Japanese]] cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 during [[Second World War|World War II]].

== Testing and deployment ==
Nuclear weapons have only twice been used in war, both times by the United States against Japan near the end of World War II. On August 6, 1945, the [[United States Armed Forces|U.S. Army Air Forces]] detonated a uranium fission bomb nicknamed "Little Boy" over the Japanese city of Hiroshima; three days later, on August 9, the U.S. Army Air Forces detonated a plutonium fission bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" over the Japanese city of Nagasaki. These bombings caused injuries that resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 civilians and military personnel.

Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have been detonated over 2,000 times for testing and demonstration. Only a few nations possess such weapons or are suspected of seeking them. The only countries known to have detonated nuclear weapons—and acknowledge possessing them—are (chronologically) the United States, the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]] (succeeded by [[Russian Federation|Russia]]), the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|United Kingdom]], [[French Republic|France]], [[People's Republic of China|China]], [[Republic of India|India]], [[Islamic Republic of Pakistan|Pakistan]], and the [[Democratic People's Republic of Korea|DPRK]]. [[State of Israel|Israel]] is believed to possess nuclear weapons, though, in a policy of deliberate ambiguity, it does not acknowledge having them. [[Federal Republic of Germany|Germany]], [[Italian Republic|Italy]], [[Republic of Turkey|Turkey]], [[Kingdom of Belgium|Belgium]] and the [[Kingdom of the Netherlands|Netherlands]] are nuclear weapons sharing states. [[Republic of South Africa|South Africa]] is the only country to have independently developed and then renounced and dismantled its nuclear weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons aims to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons, but its effectiveness has been questioned. Modernisation of weapons continues to this day.

== Types ==
The [[Trinity (Nuclear Test)|Trinity test]] of the [[Manhattan Project]] was the first detonation of a nuclear weapon, which led [[Robert Oppenheimer]] to recall verses from the Hindu scripture ''[[Bhagavad Gita]]'': "If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be like the splendor of the mighty one "... "I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds".

Robert Oppenheimer, principal leader of the Manhattan Project, often referred to as the "father of the atomic bomb".

There are two basic types of nuclear weapons: those that derive the majority of their energy from nuclear fission reactions alone, and those that use fission reactions to begin nuclear fusion reactions that produce a large amount of the total energy output.

=== Fission weapons ===
All existing nuclear weapons derive some of their explosive energy from nuclear fission reactions. Weapons whose explosive output is exclusively from fission reactions are commonly referred to as '''atomic bombs''' or '''atom bombs''' (abbreviated as '''A-bombs''').

In fission weapons, a mass of fissile material (enriched uranium or plutonium) is forced into supercriticality—allowing an exponential growth of nuclear chain reactions—either by shooting one piece of sub-critical material into another (the "gun" method) or by compression of a sub-critical sphere or cylinder of fissile material using chemically fueled explosive lenses. The latter approach, the "implosion" method, is more sophisticated and more efficient (smaller, less massive, and requiring less of the expensive fissile fuel) than the former.

All fission reactions generate fission products, the remains of the split atomic nuclei. Many fission products are either highly radioactive (but short-lived) or moderately radioactive (but long-lived), and as such, they are a serious form of [[Nuclear waste|radioactive contamination]]. Fission products are the principal radioactive component of nuclear fallout. Another source of radioactivity is the burst of free neutrons produced by the weapon. When they collide with other nuclei in the surrounding material, the neutrons transmute those nuclei into other isotopes, altering their stability and making them radioactive.

The most commonly used fissile materials for nuclear weapons applications have been uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Less commonly used has been uranium-233. Neptunium-237 and some isotopes of americium may be usable for nuclear explosives as well, but it is not clear that this has ever been implemented, and their plausible use in nuclear weapons is a matter of dispute.

=== Fusion weapons ===
The other basic type of nuclear weapon produces a large proportion of its energy in nuclear fusion reactions. Such fusion weapons are generally referred to as '''thermonuclear weapons''' or more colloquially as '''hydrogen bombs''' (abbreviated as '''H-bombs'''), as they rely on fusion reactions between isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and tritium). All such weapons derive a significant portion of their energy from fission reactions used to "trigger" fusion reactions, and fusion reactions can themselves trigger additional fission reactions.

Only six countries—United States, Russia (Formally the USSR), United Kingdom, China, France, India and the DPRK—have conducted thermonuclear weapon tests. Whether India has detonated a "true" multi-staged thermonuclear weapon is controversial. Thermonuclear weapons are considered much more difficult to successfully design and execute than comparatively primitive fission weapons. Almost all of the nuclear weapons deployed today use the thermonuclear design because it is more efficient.

Thermonuclear bombs work by using the energy of a fission bomb to compress and heat fusion fuel. In the Teller-Ulam design, which accounts for all multi-megaton yield hydrogen bombs, this is accomplished by placing a fission bomb and fusion fuel (tritium, deuterium, or lithium deuteride) in proximity within a special, radiation-reflecting container. When the fission bomb is detonated, gamma rays and X-rays emitted first compress the fusion fuel, then heat it to thermonuclear temperatures. The ensuing fusion reaction creates enormous numbers of high-speed neutrons, which can then induce fission in materials not normally prone to it, such as depleted uranium. Each of these components is known as a "stage", with the fission bomb as the "primary" and the fusion capsule as the "secondary". In large, megaton-range hydrogen bombs, about half of the yield comes from the final fissioning of depleted uranium.

Virtually all thermonuclear weapons deployed today use the "two-stage" design described above, but it is possible to add additional fusion stages—each stage igniting a larger amount of fusion fuel in the next stage. This technique can be used to construct thermonuclear weapons of arbitrarily large yield. This is in contrast to fission bombs, which are limited in their explosive power due to criticality danger (premature nuclear chain reaction caused by too-large amounts of pre-assembled fissile fuel). The largest nuclear weapon ever detonated, the Tsar Bomba of the USSR, which released an energy equivalent of over 50 megatons of TNT, was a three-stage weapon. Most thermonuclear weapons are considerably smaller than this, due to practical constraints from missile warhead space, weight requirements, and technical complications.

Fusion reactions do not create fission products, and thus contribute far less to the creation of nuclear fallout than fission reactions, but because all thermonuclear weapons contain at least one fission stage, and many high-yield thermonuclear devices have a final fission stage, thermonuclear weapons can generate at least as much nuclear fallout as fission-only weapons. Furthermore, high yield thermonuclear explosions (most dangerously ground bursts) have the force to lift radioactive debris upwards into the stratosphere, where the calm non-turbulent winds permit the debris to travel great distances from the burst, eventually settling and unpredictably contaminating areas far removed from the target of the explosion.

== Weapons delivery ==
The first nuclear weapons were gravity bombs, such as the Statesian "Fat Man" weapon dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. They were large and could only be delivered by heavy bomber aircraft

The system used to deliver a nuclear weapon to its target is an important factor affecting both nuclear weapon design and nuclear strategy. The design, development, and maintenance of delivery systems are among the most expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program; they account, for example, for 57% of the financial resources spent by the United States on nuclear weapons projects since 1940.

The simplest method for delivering a nuclear weapon is a gravity bomb dropped from aircraft; this was the method used by the United States against Japan. This method places few restrictions on the size of the weapon. It does, however, limit attack range, response time to an impending attack, and the number of weapons that a country can field at the same time. With miniaturization, nuclear bombs can be delivered by both strategic bombers and tactical fighter-bombers. This method is the primary means of nuclear weapons delivery; the majority of U.S. nuclear warheads, for example, are free-fall gravity bombs.

Preferable from a strategic point of view is a nuclear weapon mounted on a missile, which can use a ballistic trajectory to deliver the warhead over the horizon. Although even short-range missiles allow for a faster and less vulnerable attack, the development of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) has given some nations the ability to plausibly deliver missiles anywhere on the globe with an exceedingly high likelihood of success.

More advanced systems, such as multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), can launch multiple warheads at different targets from one missile, reducing the chance of a successful missile defense. Today, missiles are most common among systems designed for delivery of nuclear weapons. Making a warhead small enough to fit onto a missile, though, is quite difficult.

Tactical weapons have involved the most variety of delivery types, including not only gravity bombs and missiles but also artillery shells, land mines, and nuclear depth charges and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. An atomic mortar has been tested by the United States. Small, two-man portable tactical weapons (somewhat misleadingly referred to as suitcase bombs), such as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, have been developed, although the difficulty of combining sufficient yield with portability limits their military utility.

== Governance, control, and law ==
The International Atomic Energy Agency was created in 1957 to encourage peaceful development of nuclear technology while providing international safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

Because they are weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation and possible use of nuclear weapons are important issues in international relations and diplomacy. In most countries, the use of nuclear force can only be authorized by the head of government or head of state. Despite controls and regulations governing nuclear weapons, there is an inherent danger of accidents, mistakes, false alarms, blackmail, theft, and sabotage.

In the late 1940s, lack of trust and stubbornness from the United States, prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from making progress on arms control agreements. The Russell–Einstein Manifesto was issued in London on July 9, 1955, by Bertrand Russell in the midst of the [[Cold War]]. It highlighted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and called for world leaders to seek peaceful resolutions to international conflict. The signatories included eleven pre-eminent intellectuals and scientists, including Albert Einstein, who signed it just days before his death on April 18, 1955. A few days after the release, Cyrus S. Eaton offered to sponsor a conference—called for in the manifesto—in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Eaton's birthplace. This conference was to be the first of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, held in July 1957.

By the 1960s, steps were taken to limit both the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and the environmental effects of nuclear testing. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricted all nuclear testing to underground nuclear testing, to prevent contamination from nuclear fallout, whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) attempted to place restrictions on the types of activities signatories could participate in, with the goal of allowing the transference of non-military nuclear technology to member countries without fear of proliferation.

In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United Nations to encourage development of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against its misuse, and facilitate the application of safety measures in its use. In 1996, many nations signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which prohibits all testing of nuclear weapons. A testing ban imposes a significant hindrance to nuclear arms development by any complying country. The Treaty requires the ratification by 44 specific states before it can go into force; as of 2012, the ratification of eight of these states is still required.

Additional treaties and agreements have governed nuclear weapons stockpiles between the countries with the two largest stockpiles, the United States and the Soviet Union, later between the United States and Russia. These include treaties such as SALT II (never ratified), START I (expired), INF, START II (never in effect), SORT, and New START, as well as non-binding agreements such as SALT I and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991. Even when they did not enter into force, these agreements helped limit and later reduce the numbers and types of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia.

Nuclear weapons have also been opposed by agreements between countries. Many nations have been declared Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, areas where nuclear weapons production and deployment are prohibited, through the use of treaties. The Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) prohibited any production or deployment of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Treaty of Pelindaba (1964) prohibits nuclear weapons in many African countries. As recently as 2006 a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was established among the former Soviet republics of Central Asia prohibiting nuclear weapons.

In 1996, the International Court of Justice, the highest court of the United Nations, issued an Advisory Opinion concerned with the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". The court ruled that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate various articles of international law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Given the unique, destructive characteristics of nuclear weapons, the International Committee of the Red Cross calls on States to ensure that these weapons are never used, irrespective of whether they consider them lawful or not.

Additionally, there have been other, specific actions meant to discourage countries from developing nuclear arms. In the wake of the tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, economic sanctions were (temporarily) levied against both countries, though neither were signatories with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the stated ''casus belli'' for the initiation of the 2003 [[Iraq War]] was an accusation by the United States that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear arms (though this was soon discovered not to be the case). In 1981, Israel had bombed a nuclear reactor being constructed in Osirak, Iraq, in what it called an attempt to halt Iraq's previous nuclear arms ambitions; in 2007, Israel bombed another reactor being constructed in Syria.

In 2013, Mark Diesendorf said that governments of France, India, People's Korea, Pakistan, UK, and South Africa have used nuclear power and/or research reactors to assist nuclear weapons development or to contribute to their supplies of nuclear explosives from military reactors.

The two tied-for-lowest points for the Doomsday Clock have been in 1953, when the Clock was set to two minutes until midnight after the U.S. and the Soviet Union began testing hydrogen bombs, and in 2018, following the failure of world leaders to address tensions relating to nuclear weapons and climate change issues.

=== Disarmament ===
The USSR and United States nuclear weapon stockpiles throughout the Cold War until 2015, with a precipitous drop in total numbers following the end of the Cold War in 1991.

Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are eliminated.

Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has as one of its explicit conditions that all signatories must "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards the long-term goal of "complete disarmament". The nuclear-weapon states have largely treated that aspect of the agreement as "decorative" and without force.

Only one country—South Africa—has ever fully renounced nuclear weapons they had independently developed. The former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned Soviet nuclear arms stationed in their countries to Russia after the collapse of the USSR.

In January 1986, Soviet leader [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] publicly proposed a three-stage program for abolishing the world's nuclear weapons by the end of the 20th century. The soviets actively asked the United States to stop developing, and dismantle already existing nuclear weapons they possessed, as to allow for global denuclearization prior to this. In the years after the end of the Cold War, there have been numerous campaigns to urge the abolition of nuclear weapons, such as that organized by the Global Zero movement.

=== United Nations ===
''Main article: [[United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs]]''

The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) is a department of the United Nations Secretariat established in January 1998 as part of the [[United Nations]] Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plan to reform the UN as presented in his report to the General Assembly in July 1997.

Its goal is to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the strengthening of the disarmament regimes in respect to other weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. It also promotes disarmament efforts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms, which are often the weapons of choice in contemporary conflicts.

== Controversy ==

=== Ethics ===
Even before the first nuclear weapons had been developed, scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were divided over the use of the weapon. The role of the two atomic bombings of the country in Japan's surrender and the U.S.'s ethical justification for them has been the subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades, with most socialists believing the United States to be morally wrong in their decision. The question of whether nations should have nuclear weapons, or test them, has been continually and nearly universally controversial.

=== Notable nuclear weapons accidents ===
''Main article: [[List of nuclear accidents]]''

''See also: [[List of nuclear close calls]]''

* August 21, 1945: While conducting experiments on a plutonium-gallium core at Los Alamos National Laboratory, physicist Harry Daghlian received a lethal dose of radiation when an error caused it to enter prompt criticality. He died 25 days later, on September 15, 1945, from radiation poisoning.
* May 21, 1946: While conducting further experiments on the same core at Los Alamos National Laboratory, physicist Louis Slotin accidentally caused the core to become briefly supercritical. He received a lethal dose of gamma and neutron radiation, and died nine days later on May 30, 1946. After the death of Daghlian and Slotin, the mass became known as the "demon core." It was ultimately used to construct a bomb for use on the Nevada Test Range.
* February 13, 1950: a Convair B-36B crashed in northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark IV atomic bomb. This was the first such nuclear weapon loss in history. The accident was designated a "Broken Arrow"—an accident involving a nuclear weapon but which does not present a risk of war. Experts believe that up to 50 nuclear weapons were lost during the Cold War.
* May 22, 1957: a 42,000-pound (19,000 kg) Mark-17 hydrogen bomb accidentally fell from a bomber near Albuquerque, New Mexico. The detonation of the device's conventional explosives destroyed it on impact and formed a crater 25 feet (7.6 m) in diameter on land owned by the University of New Mexico. According to a researcher at the Natural Resources Defense Council, it was one of the most powerful bombs made to date.
* June 7, 1960: the 1960 Fort Dix IM-99 accident destroyed a Boeing CIM-10 Bomarc nuclear missile and shelter and contaminated the BOMARC Missile Accident Site in New Jersey.
* January 24, 1961: the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. A Boeing B-52 Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in the process.
* 1965 Philippine Sea A-4 crash, where a Skyhawk attack aircraft with a nuclear weapon fell into the sea. The pilot, the aircraft, and the B43 nuclear bomb were never recovered. It was not until 1989 that the Pentagon revealed the loss of the one-megaton bomb.
* January 17, 1966: the 1966 Palomares B-52 crash occurred when a B-52G bomber of the USAF collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refuelling off the coast of Spain. The KC-135 was completely destroyed when its fuel load ignited, killing all four crew members. The B-52G broke apart, killing three of the seven crew members aboard. Of the four Mk28 type hydrogen bombs the B-52G carried, three were found on land near Almería, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the weapons detonated upon impact with the ground, resulting in the contamination of a 2-square-kilometer (490-acre) (0.78 square mile) area by radioactive plutonium. The fourth, which fell into the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a 21⁄2-month-long search.
* January 21, 1968: the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash involved a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in Greenland, causing the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in widespread radioactive contamination. One of the bombs remains lost.
* September 18–19, 1980: the Damascus Accident, occurred in Damascus, Arkansas, where a Titan missile equipped with a nuclear warhead exploded. The accident was caused by a maintenance man who dropped a socket from a socket wrench down an 80-foot (24 m) shaft, puncturing a fuel tank on the rocket. Leaking fuel resulted in a hypergolic fuel explosion, jettisoning the W-53 warhead beyond the launch site.

=== Nuclear testing and fallout ===
Over 500 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests were conducted at various sites around the world from 1945 to 1980. Radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing was first drawn to public attention in 1954 when the Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at the Pacific Proving Grounds contaminated the crew and catch of the Japanese fishing boat ''Lucky Dragon''. One of the fishermen died in Japan seven months later, and the fear of contaminated tuna led to a temporary boycotting of the popular staple in Japan. The incident caused widespread concern around the world, especially regarding the effects of nuclear fallout and atmospheric nuclear testing, and "provided a decisive impetus for the emergence of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in many countries".

As public awareness and concern mounted over the possible health hazards associated with exposure to the nuclear fallout, various studies were done to assess the extent of the hazard. A [[Center for Disease Control|Centers for Disease Control]] and Prevention/ National Cancer Institute study claims that fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests would lead to an estimated 11,000 excess deaths among people alive during atmospheric testing in the United States from all forms of cancer, including leukemia, from 1951 to well into the 21st century.

In addition, leakage of byproducts of nuclear weapon production into groundwater has been an ongoing issue, particularly in regards to the Hanford site.

== Effects of nuclear explosions ==

=== Effects of nuclear explosions on human health ===
Some scientists estimate that a nuclear war with 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear explosions on cities could cost the lives of tens of millions of people from long-term climatic effects alone. The climatology hypothesis is that ''if'' each city firestorms, a great deal of soot could be thrown up into the atmosphere which could blanket the earth, cutting out sunlight for years on end, causing the disruption of food chains, in what is termed a nuclear winter.

People near the Hiroshima explosion and who managed to survive the explosion subsequently suffered a variety of medical effects:

* Initial stage—the first 1–9 weeks, in which are the greatest number of deaths, with 90% due to thermal injury and/or blast effects and 10% due to super-lethal radiation exposure.
* Intermediate stage—from 10 to 12 weeks. The deaths in this period are from ionizing radiation in the median lethal range – LD50
* Late period—lasting from 13 to 20 weeks. This period has some improvement in survivors' condition.
* Delayed period—from 20+ weeks. Characterized by numerous complications, mostly related to healing of thermal and mechanical injuries, and if the individual was exposed to a few hundred to a thousand millisieverts of radiation, it is coupled with infertility, sub-fertility and blood disorders. Furthermore, ionizing radiation above a dose of around 50–100 millisievert exposure has been shown to statistically begin increasing one's chance of dying of cancer sometime in their lifetime over the normal unexposed rate of ~25%, in the long term, a heightened rate of cancer, proportional to the dose received, would begin to be observed after ~5+ years, with lesser problems such as eye cataracts and other more minor effects in other organs and tissue also being observed over the long term.

Fallout exposure—depending on if further afield individuals shelter in place or evacuate perpendicular to the direction of the wind, and therefore avoid contact with the fallout plume, and stay there for the days and weeks after the nuclear explosion, their exposure to fallout, and therefore their total dose, will vary. With those who do shelter in place, and or evacuate, experiencing a total dose that would be negligible in comparison to someone who just went about their life as normal.

Staying indoors until after the most hazardous fallout isotope, I-131 decays away to 0.1% of its initial quantity after ten half-lifes—which is represented by 80 days in I-131s case, would make the difference between likely contracting Thyroid cancer or escaping completely from this substance depending on the actions of the individual.

=== Effects of nuclear war ===
''See also: [[Doomsday Clock]], and [[Nuclear famine]]''

Nuclear war could yield unprecedented human death tolls and habitat destruction. Detonating large numbers of nuclear weapons would have an immediate, short term and long-term effects on the climate, potentially causing a weather condition known as a "nuclear winter". In 1982, Brian Martin estimated that a US–Soviet nuclear exchange might kill 400–450 million directly, mostly in the United States, Europe and Russia, and maybe several hundred million more through follow-up consequences in those same areas. Many scholars have posited that a global thermonuclear war with Cold War-era stockpiles, or even with the current smaller stockpiles, may lead to the extinction of the human race. It is believed that nuclear war could indirectly contribute to human extinction via secondary effects, including environmental consequences and agricultural collapse.

According to a peer-reviewed study published in the journal ''Nature Food'' in August 2022, a full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia would directly kill 360 million people and more than 5 billion people would die from starvation. More than 2 billion people could die from a smaller-scale nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

=== Public opposition ===
In the United Kingdom, the first Aldermaston March organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament(CND) took place at Easter 1958, when, according to the CND, several thousand people marched for four days from Trafalgar Square, London, to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment close to Aldermaston in Berkshire, England, to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear weapons. The Aldermaston marches continued into the late 1960s when tens of thousands of people took part in the four-day marches.

In 1959, a letter in the ''[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]'' was the start of a successful campaign to stop the Atomic Energy Commission dumping radioactive waste in the sea 19 kilometres from Boston. In 1962, Linus Pauling won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work to stop the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and the "Ban the Bomb" movement spread.

== Costs and technology spin-offs ==
According to an audit by the Brookings Institution, between 1940 and 1996, the U.S. spent $10.1 trillion in present-day terms on nuclear weapons programs. 57% of which was spent on building nuclear weapons delivery systems. 6.3% of the total, $631 billion in present-day terms, was spent on environmental remediation and nuclear waste management, for example cleaning up the Hanford site, and 7% of the total, $707 billion was spent on making nuclear weapons themselves.

== History of development ==
''See also: [[Soviet atomic bomb project]]''

This section is an excerpt from History of nuclear weapons § Physics and politics in the 1930s and 1940s.

In nuclear fission, the nucleus of a fissile atom (in this case, enriched uranium) absorbs a thermal neutron, becomes unstable and splits into two new atoms, releasing some energy and between one and three new neutrons, which can perpetuate the process.

In the first decades of the 20th century, physics was revolutionized with developments in the understanding of the nature of atoms including the discoveries in atomic theory by John Dalton. In 1898, Pierre and Marie Curie discovered that pitchblende, an ore of uranium, contained a substance—which they named radium—that emitted large amounts of radioactivity. Ernest Rutherford and Frederick Soddy identified that atoms were breaking down and turning into different elements. Hopes were raised among scientists and laymen that the elements around us could contain tremendous amounts of unseen energy, waiting to be harnessed.

In Paris in 1934, Irène and Frédéric Joliot-Curie discovered that artificial radioactivity could be induced in stable elements by bombarding them with alpha particles; in Italy Enrico Fermi reported similar results when bombarding uranium with neutrons.

In December 1938, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann reported that they had detected the element barium after bombarding uranium with neutrons. Lise Meitner and Otto Robert Frisch correctly interpreted these results as being due to the splitting of the uranium atom. Frisch confirmed this experimentally on January 13, 1939. They gave the process the name "fission" because of its similarity to the splitting of a cell into two new cells. Even before it was published, news of Meitner's and Frisch's interpretation crossed the Atlantic.

Between 1939 and 1940, Joliot-Curie's team applied for a patent family covering different use cases of atomic energy, one (case III, in patent FR 971,324 - ''Perfectionnements aux charges explosives'', meaning ''Improvements in Explosive Charges'') being the first official document explicitly mentioning a nuclear explosion as a purpose, including for war. This patent was applied for on May 4, 1939, but only granted in 1950, being withheld by French authorities in the meantime.

Uranium appears in nature primarily in two isotopes: uranium-238 and uranium-235. When the nucleus of uranium-235 absorbs a neutron, it undergoes nuclear fission, releasing energy and, on average, 2.5 neutrons. Because uranium-235 releases more neutrons than it absorbs, it can support a chain reaction and so is described as fissile. Uranium-238, on the other hand, is not fissile as it does not normally undergo fission when it absorbs a neutron.

By the start of the war in September 1939, many scientists likely to be persecuted by the Nazis had already escaped. Physicists on both sides were well aware of the possibility of utilizing nuclear fission as a weapon, but no one was quite sure how it could be engineered. In August 1939, concerned that Germany might have its own project to develop fission-based weapons, Albert Einstein signed a letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt warning him of the threat.

Roosevelt responded by setting up the Uranium Committee under Lyman James Briggs but, with little initial funding ($6,000), progress was slow. It was not until the U.S. entered the war in December 1941 that Washington decided to commit the necessary resources to a top-secret high priority bomb project.

Organized research first began in Britain and Canada as part of the Tube Alloys project: the world's first nuclear weapons project. The Maud Committee was set up following the work of Frisch and Rudolf Peierls who calculated uranium-235's critical mass and found it to be much smaller than previously thought which meant that a deliverable bomb should be possible. In the February 1940 Frisch–Peierls memorandum they stated that: "The energy liberated in the explosion of such a super-bomb...will, for an instant, produce a temperature comparable to that of the interior of the sun. The blast from such an explosion would destroy life in a wide area. The size of this area is difficult to estimate, but it will probably cover the centre of a big city."

Leo Szilard, invented the electron microscope, linear accelerator, cyclotron, nuclear chain reaction and patented the nuclear reactor in London in 1934.

== See also ==

* [[Cobalt bomb]]
* [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]
* [[Dirty bomb]]
* [[List of states with nuclear weapons]]
* [[List of nuclear close calls]]

[[Category:Weaponry]]
[[Category:WMD]]
[[Category:Military Hardware]]

Topic:X9ysrw1qe6y4sgf7

2023-01-03T00:52:55Z

Sparkingcircuit (talk | contribs) commented on "Popular Unity for Socialism Party page is now available" (Popular Unity Party page now exists. I figured you might want to know seeing as you follow their party line.)

PU

2023-01-02T23:55:06Z

Sparkingcircuit: Corrected redirect.

#REDIRECT [[Popular Unity for Socialism]]

Template:Communist parties

2023-01-02T23:54:18Z

Sparkingcircuit: Added Popular Unity for Socialism"

{{Sidebar with collapsible lists
|name = Communist parties
|listtitlestyle = border-bottom:1px solid #c20000; background:transparent; text-align:center;
|pretitle = Part of a [[:Category:Communist parties|series]] on
|title = [[Communist party|Communist parties]]
|imagestyle = padding:0.4em 0 0.4em;
|titlestyle = font-size:200%;font-weight:normal;
|expanded = {{{expanded|{{{1|}}}}}}

|list1name = Africa
|list1title = Africa
|list1class = hlist
|list1 =
* [[Algerian Party for Democracy and Socialism|Algeria]]
* [[Communist Party of Benin|Benin]]
* [[Voltaic Revolutionary Communist Party|Burkina Faso]]
* [[Egyptian Communist Party|Egypt]]
* [[Communist Party of Lesotho|Lesotho]]
* [[Libyan Communist Party|Libya]]
* [[Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar|Madagascar]]
* [[Communist Party of Namibia (2009)|Namibia]]
* [[Democratic Way|Morocco]]
* ''[[Communist Party of Réunion|Réunion]]''
* [[Party of Independence and Labour|Senegal]]
* South Africa
** [[Economic Freedom Fighters|EFF]]
** [[South African Communist Party|SACP]]
* [[Communist Party of South Sudan|South Sudan]]
* [[Sudanese Communist Party|Sudan]]
* [[Swaziland Communist Party|Swaziland]]
* [[Workers' Party (Tunisia)|Tunisia]]
* [[Revolutionary Communist Party of Ivory Coast|Ivory Coast]]


|list2name = Americas
|list2title = Americas
|list2class = hlist
|list2 =
* Argentina
** [[Communist Party of Argentina|PCA]]
** [[Communist Party of Argentina (Extraordinary Congress)|PCCE]]
** [[Revolutionary Communist Party of Argentina|PCRA]]
* [[Communist Party of Bolivia|Bolivia]]
* Brazil
** [[Brazilian Communist Party|PCB]]
** [[Revolutionary_Communist_Party_(Brazil)|PCR]]
** [[Popular_Unity_for_Socialism | PU]]
* [[Socialism in Canada|Canada]]
** [[Communist Party of Canada|CPC]]
** [[Communist Party of Canada (Marxist–Leninist)|CPC-ML]]
** [[Revolutionary Communist Party of Canada |PCR-RCP]]
* Chile
** [[Communist Party of Chile|PCCh]]
** [[Chilean Communist Party (Proletarian Action)|PC(AP)]]
* Colombia
** [[Colombian Communist Party|PCC]]
** [[Communist Party of Colombia (Marxist–Leninist)|PC de C (M–L)]]
* [[Communist Party of Cuba|Cuba]]
* [[Communist Party of Labour|Dominican Republic]]
* Ecuador
**[[Communist Party of Ecuador|PCE]]
**[[Marxist–Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador|PCMLE]]
* Mexico
** [[Communist Party of Mexico (2011)|PC]]
** [[Popular Socialist Party (Mexico)|PPS]]
** [[Popular Socialist Party of Mexico|PPSM]]
** [[Communist Party of Mexico (Marxist–Leninist)|PCMML]]
* Panama
** [[People's Party of Panama|PPP]]
** [[Communist Party (Marxist–Leninist) of Panama|PC(ml)P]]
* [[Paraguayan Communist Party|Paraguay]]
* Peru
** [[Peruvian Communist Party|PCP]]
** [[Communist Party of Peru – Red Fatherland|PCdelP–PR]]
* [[Communist Party of Uruguay|Uruguay]]
* United States
** [[Communist Party USA|CPUSA]]
** [[Workers World Party|WWP]]
** [[Party for Socialism and Liberation|PSL]]
** [[Revolutionary Communist Party, USA|RCPUSA]]
** [[American Party of Labor|APL]]
** [[Progressive Labor Party (United States)|PLP]]
** [[Party of Communists USA|PCUSA]]
** [[People's Revolutionary Party|PRP]]
* Venezuela
** [[Communist Party of Venezuela|PCV]]
** [[Marxist–Leninist_Communist_Party_of_Venezuela|PCMLV]]


|list3name = Asia
|list3title = Asia
|list3class = hlist
|list3 =
* [[Communist (Maoist) Party of Afghanistan|Afghanistan]]
* [[National Liberation Front – Bahrain|Bahrain]]
* Bangladesh
** [[Communist Party of Bangladesh|CPB]]
** [[Workers Party of Bangladesh|WPB]]
* [[Communist Party of Burma|Burma]]
* [[Communist Party of China|China (PRC)]]
* India
** [[Communist Party of India|CPI]]
** [[Communist Party of India (Marxist)|CPI(M)]]
** [[Communist Party of India (Maoist)|CPI(Mst)]]
** [[Maoist Communist Party of Manipur|MCPM]]
* Iran
** [[Communist Party of Iran|CPI]]
** [[Tudeh Party of Iran|Tudeh]]
** [[Labour Party of Iran|Toufan]]
* [[Iraqi Communist Party|Iraq]]
* [[Maki (political party)|Israel]]
* [[Japanese Communist Party|Japan]]
* [[Jordanian Communist Party|Jordan]]
* Kazakhstan
** [[Communist Party of Kazakhstan|CPK]]
** [[Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan|CPPK]]
* [[Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan|Kyrgyzstan]]
* [[Lao People's Revolutionary Party|Laos]]
* [[Lebanese Communist Party|Lebanon]]
* Nepal
** [[Nepal Communist Party|NCP]]
** [[Nepal Workers Peasants Party|NWPP]]
** [[Rastriya Janamorcha|RaJaMo]]
** [[Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist–Leninist) (2002)|CPN(M-L)]]
** [[Communist Party of Nepal (2013)|CPN]]
** [[Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) (2006)|CPN (Marxist)]]
* [[Communist Party of Pakistan|Pakistan]]
* [[Palestinian People's Party|Palestine]]
* Philippines
** [[Communist Party of the Philippines|CPP]]
** [[Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas-1930|PKP-1930]]
* [[Communist Party of Sri Lanka|Sri Lanka]]
* Syria
** [[Syrian Communist Party (Bakdash)|SCP (Bakdash)]]
** [[Syrian Communist Party (Unified)|SCP (Unified)]]
* [[Communist Party of Tajikistan|Tajikistan]]
* [[Communist Party of Vietnam|Vietnam]]
'''Former parties'''
* Cambodia
** [[Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party|KPRP]]
** [[Communist Party of Kampuchea|CPK]]
* [[Communist Party of Indonesia|Indonesia]]
* [[Communist Party of Korea|Korea]]
* [[Malayan Communist Party|Malaya and Singapore]]
**[[Communist Party of Malaya/Marxist–Leninist|Marxist–Leninist]]
**[[Communist Party of Malaya/Revolutionary Faction|Revolutionary Faction]]
* [[Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas-1930|Philippines]]
* [[Communist Party in Saudi Arabia|Saudi Arabia]]
* ''[[North Kalimantan Communist Party|Sarawak]]''
* ''[[Taiwanese Communist Party|Taiwan]]''
* [[Communist Party of Thailand|Thailand]]


|list4name = Europe
|list4title = Europe
|list4class = hlist
|list4 =
* [[Communist Party of Albania (1991)|Albania]]
* [[Armenian Communist Party|Armenia]]
* Austria
** [[Communist Party of Austria|KPÖ]]
** [[Party of Labour of Austria|PdA]]
** [[Communist Initiative|KI]]
* [[Azerbaijan Communist Party (1993)|Azerbaijan]]
* [[Communist Party of Belarus|Belarus]]
* Belgium
** [[Workers' Party of Belgium|PvdA/PTB]]
** [[Communist Party (Flanders)|KP]]
** [[Communist Party (Wallonia)|PC]]
* [[Workers' Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia and Herzegovina]]
* Bulgaria
** [[Communist Party of Bulgaria|KPB]]
** [[Union of Communists in Bulgaria|SKB]]
* [[Socialist Labour Party of Croatia|Croatia]]
* [[Progressive Party of Working People|Cyprus]]
* [[Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia|Czech Republic]]
* Denmark
** [[Communist Party of Denmark|DKP]]
** [[Communist Party in Denmark|KPiD]]
** [[Workers' Communist Party (Denmark)|APK]]
* [[Communist Party of Estonia (1990)|Estonia]]
* [[Communist Party of Finland (1994)|Finland]]
* France
** [[French Communist Party|PCF]]
** [[Workers' Communist Party of France|PCOF]]
** [[Pole of Communist Revival in France|PRCF]]
** [[Communist Revolutionary Party of France|PCRF]]
* [[Unified Communist Party of Georgia|Georgia]]
* Germany
** [[Communist Party of Germany (1990)|KPD]]
** [[German Communist Party|DKP]]
** [[Marxist–Leninist Party of Germany|MLPD]]
* Greece
** [[Communist Party of Greece|ΚΚΕ]]
** [[Communist Organization of Greece|ΚΟΕ]]
** [[Movement for the Reorganization of the Communist Party of Greece 1918–55|Anasintaxi]]
* Hungary
** [[Hungarian Workers' Party|Munkáspárt]]
** [[Workers' Party of Hungary 2006|Munkáspárt 2006]]
* Ireland
** [[Communist Party of Ireland|CPI]]
** [[Workers' Party of Ireland|WPI]]
* Italy
** [[Communist Party (Italy)|PC]]
** [[Communist Refoundation Party|PRC]]
* [[Socialist Party of Latvia|Latvia]]
* [[Socialist People's Front|Lithuania]]
* [[Communist Party of Luxembourg|Luxembourg]]
* [[Communist Party of Malta|Malta]]
* [[Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova|Moldova]]
* [[New Communist Party of the Netherlands|Netherlands]]
* Norway
** [[Communist Party of Norway|NKP]]
** [[Marxist–Leninist Group Revolution |MLGR]]
** [[Red Party (Norway)|R]]
* [[Polish Communist Party (2002)|Poland]]
* Portugal
** [[Portuguese Communist Party|PCP]]
** [[Portuguese Workers' Communist Party|PCTP]]
* [[Communist Party (Nepeceriști)|Romania]]
* Russia
** [[Communists of Russia|KR]]
** [[Communist Party of the Russian Federation|CPRF]]
** [[Communist Party of Social Justice|CPSJ]]
** [[Party of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat|PDP]]
** [[Russian Communist Workers' Party of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|RCWP-CPSU]]
** [[Russian Maoist Party|RMP]]
** [[Russian United Labour Front|RULF]]
* [[Sammarinese Communist Refoundation|San Marino]]
* [[New Communist Party of Yugoslavia|Serbia]]
* [[Communist Party of Slovakia|Slovakia]]
* Spain
** [[Communist Party of Spain|PCE]]
** [[Communists of Catalonia|CC]]
** [[Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain|PCPE]]
** [[Communist Party of Spain (Marxist–Leninist) |PCE (M–L)]]
** [[Communist Party of the Workers of Spain|PCTE]]
* Sweden
** [[Communist Party (Sweden)|KP]]
** [[Communist Party of Sweden (1995)|SKP]]
* Switzerland
** [[Communist Party (Switzerland)|Communist Party (Switzerland)]]
** [[Swiss Party of Labour|PdA]]
* Turkey
** [[Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front|DHKP/C]]
** [[Labour Party (Turkey)|EMEP]]
** [[People's Communist Party of Turkey|HTKP]]
** [[Communist Revolution Movement/Leninist (Turkey)|KDH/L]]
** [[Communist Party of Kurdistan|KKP]]
** [[Communist Party (Turkey, 2014)|TKP]]
** [[Maoist Communist Party (Turkey)|MKP]]
** [[Marxist–Leninist Communist Party (Turkey)|MLKP]]
** [[Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey|TDKP]]
** [[Communist Labour Party of Turkey|TKEP]]
** [[Communist Labour Party of Turkey/Leninist|TKEP/L]]
** [[Communist Workers Party of Turkey|TKIP]]
** [[Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist–Leninist|TKP/ML]]
* Ukraine
** [[Communist Party of Ukraine|KPU]]
** [[Union of Communists of Ukraine|SKU]]
* United Kingdom
** [[Communist Party of Britain|CPB]]
** [[Communist Party of Britain (Marxist–Leninist)|CPB-ML]]
** [[Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist–Leninist)|CPGB-ML]]
** [[Communist Party of Great Britain (Provisional Central Committee)|CPGB-PCC]]
** [[Communist Party of Scotland|CPS]]
** [[New Communist Party of Britain|NCPB]]
** [[Revolutionary Communist Group (UK)|RCG]]
** [[Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain (Marxist–Leninist)|RCPB-ML]]
'''Former parties'''
* [[Party of Labour of Albania|Albania]]
* [[Communist Party of Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovakia]]
* [[Socialist Unity Party of Germany|East Germany]]
* Italy
** [[Italian Communist Party|PCI]]
** [[Party of Italian Communists|PdCI]]
* [[Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization|Macedonia]]
* [[Communist Party of the Netherlands|Netherlands]]
* [[Polish United Workers' Party|Poland]]
* [[Romanian Communist Party|Romania]]
* [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet Union]]
* [[Communist Party of Turkey (historical)|Turkey]]
* [[Communist Party of Great Britain|United Kingdom]]
* [[Communist Party of Germany|West Germany]]
* [[League of Communists of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]]


|list5name = Oceania
|list5title = Oceania
|list5class = hlist
|list5 =
* Australia
** [[Communist Party of Australia (current)|CPA]]
** [[Communist Party of Australia (Marxist–Leninist)|CPA(ML)]]
** [[Australian Communist Party (2019)|ACP]]
** [[Socialist Alliance (Australia)|Socialist Alliance]]
** [[Socialist Alternative (Australia)|Socialist Alternative]]
** [[Victorian Socialists]]
* New Zealand
** [[Communist League (New Zealand)|CL]]
** [[Organisation for Marxist Unity – New Zealand|OMU]]
** [[Socialist Party of Aotearoa|SPA]]
'''Former parties'''
* Australia
** [[Communist Alliance]]
** [[Communist Party of Australia|CPA]]
** [[Democratic Socialist Perspective|DSP]]
** [[Revolutionary Socialist Party (Australia)|RSP]]
** [[Victorian Socialist Party]]
* New Zealand
** [[Communist Party of New Zealand|CPNZ]]
** [[Socialist Unity Party of New Zealand|SUP]]
** [[Communist League (New Zealand)|CL]]


|list6name = related
|list6title = Related topics
|list6class = hlist
|list6 =
* [[Communism]] ([[History of communism|history]])
* [[Democratic centralism]]
* [[Marxism–Leninism]]

}}
[[Category:Communist parties]]

PU

2023-01-02T23:49:17Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created a redirect page from "PU" to "Popular Unity Party"

#REDIRECT [[Popular Unity Party]]

Popular Unity for Socialism

2023-01-02T23:48:00Z

Sparkingcircuit: Added acronym.

{{Message box/Stub}}{{Infobox political party|name=Popular Unity Party|native_name=Unidade Popular|logo=PopularUnityPartyLogo.svg|founded=June 16, 2016|position=Revolutionary Socialism
Marxism
Marxism-Leninism|colours=Black, White|website=https://www.unidadepopular.org.br/|country=Brazil}}

The '''Popular Unity Party''' ('''PU'''), is a [[Marxism|Marxist]] [[political party]] based in [[Federative Republic of Brazil|Brazil]]. They support the [[nationalization]] of industry and a [[planned economy]]. They are [[Anti-imperialism|anti-imperialist]].

{{Communist parties}}

=== Party Program (Roughly Translated) ===

# Social control of all monopolies and capitalist consortia and of the means of production in the strategic sectors of the economy; economic planning to meet the needs of the population and eliminate regional and social inequalities.
# Nationalization of the banking system and popular control of the financial system.
# End of imperialist plunder of the national economy; stagnation of the bleeding of our resources abroad, putting an end to remittances of profits, dividends, payment of royalties and payments of the external debt; annulment of the State's agreements and debts with foreign capitalists, which were contracted against the sovereignty and interests of the workers; guarantee of Brazil's total economic independence from imperialist countries, in particular US imperialism; transfer of foreign trade to state bodies.
# Re-nationalization of privatized state-owned companies; end of oil auctions; review of concessions for Brazilian ports, airports and roads handed over to private companies.
# Compulsory employment and work guarantee for all adult persons able to work; prohibition of exploitation of child labor;
# Popular agrarian reform; nationalization of land and end of private land monopoly.
# Annulment of extortionate taxes levied on the people; tax on large fortunes and progressive. Those who earn more pay more.
# Nationalization of all means of public transport.
# Public and free education for all and at all levels; end of profit in education. Guarantee of free access of the people to the university and/or professional technical courses; end of the entrance exam, vestibulinho or any selection
# Democratization of the media, with the socialization of all major television channels, newspapers and radio stations; guaranteed access to the means of communication to all citizens;
# Broad freedom of expression and organization for workers and the people; end of capitalist donations to electoral campaigns;
# Justice: judges and courts elected by the people;
# End discrimination against women; equal rights; an end to racism and discrimination against blacks; firm fight against the sexual exploitation of women and children; for the decriminalization and legalization of abortion; fight against all LGBT-phobic manifestations; firm punishment of offenders.
# End of any religious, racial or gender discrimination; full guarantee of religious freedom;
# Defense and protection of the environment and nature; prohibition of forest destruction; establishment of popular control over the Amazon and expulsion of all foreign monopolies from the region;
# Demarcation and immediate possession of all indigenous lands; guarantee of differentiated schools for indigenous people and encouragement and support for indigenous languages; defense of the culture and rights of indigenous peoples;
# Guarantee of free and public health for all; end of exploitation of private health plans;
# Defense and encouragement of national and popular culture; nationalization of all music recording companies and film production companies;
# Working hours: reduction to six hours for all workers and general increase in wages;
# Establishment of law guaranteeing rest on festive days, Sundays and holidays for workers, except for essential sectors;
# Guarantee of dignified housing, sanitation and garbage collection for all Brazilian families; allocate abandoned properties to solve the housing deficit; carrying out a profound urban reform;
# Trial, imprisonment, and confiscation of the property of all the corrupt;
# Support for the struggle of all peoples and countries for liberation from capitalist domination and imperialist dispossession; defense of sovereignty, independence and self-determination of peoples.
# For the end of the military police; end any repression of social movements;
# Exemplary punishment for the dictatorship's torturers and murderers, immediate revision of the Amnesty Law; all support to the struggle for Memory, Truth and Justice.

[[Category:Stubs]]
[[Category:Political parties]]
[[Category:Communist parties]]
[[Category:Anti-imperialism]]

Popular Unity for Socialism

2023-01-02T23:46:38Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created basic page for the "Popular Unity Party" of Brazil.

{{Message box/Stub}}{{Infobox political party|name=Popular Unity Party|native_name=Unidade Popular|logo=PopularUnityPartyLogo.svg|founded=June 16, 2016|position=Revolutionary Socialism
Marxism
Marxism-Leninism|colours=Black, White|website=https://www.unidadepopular.org.br/|country=Brazil}}

The '''Popular Unity Party''', is a [[Marxism|Marxist]] [[political party]] based in [[Federative Republic of Brazil|Brazil]]. They support the [[nationalization]] of industry and a [[planned economy]]. They are [[Anti-imperialism|anti-imperialist]].

{{Communist parties}}

=== Party Program (Roughly Translated) ===

# Social control of all monopolies and capitalist consortia and of the means of production in the strategic sectors of the economy; economic planning to meet the needs of the population and eliminate regional and social inequalities.
# Nationalization of the banking system and popular control of the financial system.
# End of imperialist plunder of the national economy; stagnation of the bleeding of our resources abroad, putting an end to remittances of profits, dividends, payment of royalties and payments of the external debt; annulment of the State's agreements and debts with foreign capitalists, which were contracted against the sovereignty and interests of the workers; guarantee of Brazil's total economic independence from imperialist countries, in particular US imperialism; transfer of foreign trade to state bodies.
# Re-nationalization of privatized state-owned companies; end of oil auctions; review of concessions for Brazilian ports, airports and roads handed over to private companies.
# Compulsory employment and work guarantee for all adult persons able to work; prohibition of exploitation of child labor;
# Popular agrarian reform; nationalization of land and end of private land monopoly.
# Annulment of extortionate taxes levied on the people; tax on large fortunes and progressive. Those who earn more pay more.
# Nationalization of all means of public transport.
# Public and free education for all and at all levels; end of profit in education. Guarantee of free access of the people to the university and/or professional technical courses; end of the entrance exam, vestibulinho or any selection
# Democratization of the media, with the socialization of all major television channels, newspapers and radio stations; guaranteed access to the means of communication to all citizens;
# Broad freedom of expression and organization for workers and the people; end of capitalist donations to electoral campaigns;
# Justice: judges and courts elected by the people;
# End discrimination against women; equal rights; an end to racism and discrimination against blacks; firm fight against the sexual exploitation of women and children; for the decriminalization and legalization of abortion; fight against all LGBT-phobic manifestations; firm punishment of offenders.
# End of any religious, racial or gender discrimination; full guarantee of religious freedom;
# Defense and protection of the environment and nature; prohibition of forest destruction; establishment of popular control over the Amazon and expulsion of all foreign monopolies from the region;
# Demarcation and immediate possession of all indigenous lands; guarantee of differentiated schools for indigenous people and encouragement and support for indigenous languages; defense of the culture and rights of indigenous peoples;
# Guarantee of free and public health for all; end of exploitation of private health plans;
# Defense and encouragement of national and popular culture; nationalization of all music recording companies and film production companies;
# Working hours: reduction to six hours for all workers and general increase in wages;
# Establishment of law guaranteeing rest on festive days, Sundays and holidays for workers, except for essential sectors;
# Guarantee of dignified housing, sanitation and garbage collection for all Brazilian families; allocate abandoned properties to solve the housing deficit; carrying out a profound urban reform;
# Trial, imprisonment, and confiscation of the property of all the corrupt;
# Support for the struggle of all peoples and countries for liberation from capitalist domination and imperialist dispossession; defense of sovereignty, independence and self-determination of peoples.
# For the end of the military police; end any repression of social movements;
# Exemplary punishment for the dictatorship's torturers and murderers, immediate revision of the Amnesty Law; all support to the struggle for Memory, Truth and Justice.

[[Category:Stubs]]
[[Category:Political parties]]
[[Category:Communist parties]]
[[Category:Anti-imperialism]]

File:PopularUnityPartyLogo.svg

2023-01-02T23:32:00Z

Sparkingcircuit: The logo of the Brazilian "Popular Unity Party"

== Summary ==
The logo of the Brazilian "Popular Unity Party"

White supremacy

2022-12-28T05:52:51Z

Sparkingcircuit: Minor grammar correction.

{{Message box/Stub}}

'''White supremacy''' is the [[Racism|racist]] belief and or practice of the idea that white people are superior or more legitimate as a person than those of other skin tones. For example, a white supremacist might believe that white individuals are more intelligent than Black or Asian individuals based purely off of their skin color.
[[Category:Stubs]]
[[Category:Racism]]
[[Category:Race]]
[[Category:White supremacist]]

Party for Reclamation and Survival

2022-12-22T17:36:41Z

Sparkingcircuit: Minor grammar correction.

{{Infobox political party|name=The Party for Reclamation and Survival|logo=RAS_logo.jpg|political_orientation=[[Anti-imperialism]] [[Eco-Socialist]] [[Marxist]] [[Marxist-Leninist]] Placeholder|international=Placeholder}}{{Message box/Stub}}
The '''Party for Reclamation and Survival''' ('''RAS''') is a revolutionary Marxist political party in the [[United States of America|United States]]. They are semi-underground, Material Feminists, and pro de-colonization<ref>{{Web citation|author=The Party for Reclamation and Survival|newspaper=Twitter|title=What makes the RAS different from other Communist organizations in the United States empire?|date=2021-06-05|url=https://twitter.com/Reclaim_Survive/status/1401316373242859522?cxt=HHwWhMCi0aT0vPImAAAA}}</ref>. They are pro [[Actually Existing Socialism|actually existing socialisms]]<ref>{{Web citation|author=The Party for Reclamation and Survival|newspaper=Twitter|date=2022-08-02|url=https://twitter.com/Reclaim_Survive/status/1554478098845949956?cxt=HHwWiICzzYnmzpIrAAAA|quote=}}</ref>.

== Links ==

* [https://twitter.com/Reclaim_Survive Twitter]
* [https://linktr.ee/Reclaim_Survive Linktree]

== References ==
[[Category:Statesian communist parties]]
<references />
[[Category:Communist parties]]
[[Category:Stubs]]

Soviet space program

2022-12-18T21:31:30Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created page for the Soviet Space Program.

The '''Soviet space program''' (Russian: '''Космическая программа СССР''', Romanized: '''Kosmicheskaya programma SSSR'''), was the space program of the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]] (USSR). The Soviet space program was active 1955, until the [[Overthrow of the Soviet Union|Dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in 1991.

Soviet investigations in rocketry began with the formation of a research laboratory in 1921, but these efforts were hampered by the [[Second World War|devastating war]] with [[German Reich (1933–1945)|Germany]]. The Soviet program was notable in setting many records in space exploration, including the first intercontinental missile that launched the [[Sputnik (Satellite)|first satellite.]] Furthermore, The Soviet space program sent the [[Laika|first animal]] into Earth orbit in 1957, placed the [[Yuri Gagarin|first human]] in space in 1961, brought the [[Valentina Tereshkova|first woman]] in space in 1963, the [[List of spacewalks and moonwalks|first spacewalk]] in 1965. Other milestones included computerized [[Luna programme|robotic missions exploring the Moon]] starting in 1959, with the second mission being the first to [[Luna 3|reach the surface of the Moon]], recording the first image of the far side of the Moon, and achieving the [[Luna 9|first soft landing]] on the Moon. The Soviet program also achieved the [[Lunokhod 1|first space rover]] deployment in 1966 and sent the first robotic probe that automatically [[Luna 16|extracted a sample of lunar regolith]] and brought it to Earth in 1970. The Soviet program was also responsible for leading the first interplanetary probes to [[Venera|Venus]] and [[Mars Program|Mars]] and made successful soft landings on these planets in the 1960s and 1970s. It put the [[Salyut 1|first space station]] into low Earth orbit in 1971 and the [[Mir|first modular space station]] in 1986. Its [[Interkosmos]] program was also notable for sending the first citizen of a country other than the [[United States of America|United States]] or Soviet Union into space.

After the [[Second World War|Great Patriotic War]], the Soviet and [[NASA|US space programs]] utilized German technology. Eventually, the program was managed under [[Sergei Korolev]], who led the program based on unique ideas derived by [[Konstantin Tsiolkovsky]], sometimes known as the father of theoretical astronautics. Contrary to its American, [[European Space Agency|European]], and [[Ministry of Aerospace Industry|Chinese]] competitors, who had their programs run under a single coordinating agency, the Soviet space program was divided and split among several internally competing design bureaus led by [[Sergei Korolev|Korolev]], [[Suleymen Kerimov|Kerimov]], [[Mstislav Keldysh|Keldysh]], [[Michail Yangel|Yangel]], [[Valentin Glushko|Glushko]], [[Vladimir Chelomey|Chelomey]], [[Viktor Makeyev|Makeyev]], [[Boris Chertok|Chertok]] and [[Mikhail Reshetnev|Reshetnev]].

== Origins ==

=== Early Russian-Soviet efforts ===
The theory of space exploration had a solid basis in the [[Russian Empire (1721–1917)|Russian Empire]] before the [[First World War]] with the writings of the Russian and Soviet rocket scientist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857–1935), who published pioneering papers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries on astronautic theory, including calculating the Rocket equation and in 1929 introduced the concept of the multi-staged rocket. Additional astronautic and spaceflight theory was also provided by the Ukrainian and Soviet engineer and mathematician [[Yuri Kondratyuk]] who developed the first known lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR), a key concept for landing and return spaceflight from Earth to the Moon. The LOR was later used for the plotting of the first actual human spaceflight to the Moon. Both theoretical and practical aspects of spaceflight was also provided by the Latvian pioneer of rocketry and spaceflight [[Friedrich Zander]], including suggesting in a 1925 paper that a spacecraft traveling between two planets could be accelerated at the beginning of its trajectory and decelerated at the end of its trajectory by using the gravity of the two planets' moons — a method known as gravity assist.

==== Gas Dynamics Laboratory (GDL) ====
The first Soviet development of rockets was in 1921 when the Soviet military sanctioned the start of a small research laboratory to explore solid fuel rockets, led by [[Nikolai Tikhomirov]], a chemical engineer and supported by [[Vladimir Artemyev]] a Soviet engineer. Tikhomirov had commenced studying solid and Liquid-fueled rockets in 1894, and in 1915 he lodged a patent for "self-propelled aerial and water-surface mines." In 1928 the laboratory was renamed the [[Gas Dynamics Laboratory]] (GDL). The First test-firing of a solid fuel rocket was carried out in March 1928, which flew for about 1,300 meters. Further developments in the early 1930s were led by [[Georgy Langemak]]. and 1932 in-air test firings of [[RS-82 missile|RS-82 missiles]] from an [[Tupolev I-4 aircraft|Tupolev I-4]] armed with six launchers successfully took place.

==== Sergey Korolev ====
A key contributor to early soviet efforts came from a young Ukrainian aircraft engineer Sergey Korolev, who would later become the de facto head of the Soviet space program. In 1926 an advanced student, Korolev was mentored by the famous Soviet aircraft designer Andrey Tupolev, who was a professor at his [[Bauman Moscow State Technical University|University]]. In 1930 while working as a lead engineer on the [[Tupolev TB-3 heavy bomber]] he became interested in the possibilities of liquid-fueled rocket engines to propel airplanes. This led to contact with Zander, and sparked his interest in space exploration and rocketry.

==== Group for the Study of Reactive Motion (GIRD) ====
Practical aspects built on early experiments carried out by members of the '[[Group for the Study of Reactive Motion]]' (better known by its Russian acronym "GIRD") in the 1930s, where Zander, Korolev and other pioneers such as the Russian engineers [[Mikhail Tikhonravov]], [[Leonid Dushkin]], [[Vladimir Vetchinkin]] and [[Yuriy Pobedonostsev]] worked together. On August 18, 1933, the Leningrad branch of GIRD, led by Tikhonravov, launched the first hybrid propellant rocket, the [[GIRD-09]], and on November 25, 1933, the Soviet's first liquid-fueled rocket [[GIRD-X]].

==== Reactive Scientific Research Institute (RNII) ====
In 1933 GIRD was merged with GDL to form the [[Reactive Scientific Research Institute]] (RNII), which brought together the best of the Soviet rocket talent, including Korolev, Langemak, Ivan Kleymyonov and former GDL engine designer Valentin Glushko. Early success of RNII included the conception in 1936 and first flight in 1941 of the [[RP-318 Rocket-powered Aircraft|RP-318]] the Soviets first rocket-powered aircraft and the [[RS-82 Missile|RS-82]] and [[RS-132 Missile|RS-132]] missiles entered service by 1937, which became the basis for development in 1938 and serial production from 1940 to 1941 of the [[Katyusha Multiple Rocket Launcher|Katyusha multiple rocket launcher]], another advance in the reactive propulsion field. RNII's research and development were very important for later achievements of the Soviet rocket and space programs.

During the 1930s Soviet rocket technology was comparable to Germany's, but complications from the Great Patriotic War severely damaged its progress. In November 1937, Kleymyonov and Langemak were arrested and executed, where as Glushko and many other leading engineers were imprisoned in [[Main Administration of Camps|work camps]]. Korolev was arrested in June 1938 and sent to a work camp camp in [[Kolyma]] in June 1939. However, due to intervention by Tupolev, he was relocated to a prison for scientists and engineers in September 1940.

=== The Great Patriotic War ===
During World War II rocketry efforts were carried out by three Soviet [[design bureaus]]. RNII continued to develop and improve solid fuel rockets, including the RS-82 and RS-132 missiles and the Katyusha rocket launcher, where Pobedonostsev and Tikhonravov continued to work on rocket design. In 1944 RNII was renamed [[Scientific Research Institute No 1]] (NII-I) and combined with design bureau [[OKB-293 Design Bureau|OKB-293]], led by Soviet engineer Viktor Bolkhovitinov, whom developed, with Aleksei Isaev, Boris Chertok, Leonid Voskresensky and Nikolay Pilyugin a short-range rocket powered interceptor called [[Bereznyak-Isayev BI-1]].

[[Special Design Bureau for Special Engines|Special Design Bureau for Special Engines (OKB-SD)]] was led by Glushko and focused on developing auxiliary liquid-fueled rocket engines to assist takeoff and climbing of prop aircraft, including the [[RD-IKhZ]], [[RD-2]] and [[RD-3]]. In 1944, the [[RD-1 kHz auxiliary rocket motor]] was tested in a fast-climb [[Lavochkin La-7R]] for protection of the capital from high-altitude [[Luftwaffe]] attacks. In 1942 Korolev was transferred to OKB-SD, where he proposed development of the long range missiles [[D-1 Long Range Missile|D-1]] and [[D-2 Long Range Missile|D-2]].

The third design bureau was [[Plant Number 51|Plant No 51 (OKB-51)]], led by Soviet Ukrainian Engineer Vladimir Chelomey, where he created the first Soviet pulsating air jet engine in 1942.

=== Early German influence ===
During the Great Patriotic War, NAZI Germany developed rocket technology that was more advanced than the [[Allied Powers (World War II)|Allies]] and a race commenced between the Soviet Union and the United States to capture and exploit the technology. Soviet rocket specialist were sent to Germany in 1945 to obtain [[V-2 Missile|V-2 rockets]] and worked with German specialists in Germany, later moves to the Soviet Union, to understand and replicate the technology. The involvement of German scientists and engineers was an essential catalyst to early Soviet efforts in the field. In 1945 and 1946 the use of German expertise was invaluable in reducing the time needed to master the intricacies of the V-2 rocket, establishing production of the [[R-1 Rocket|R-1 rocket]] and enable a base for further developments. As such, after 1947 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists and their influence on the future Soviet rocket program was marginal.

== Projects and accomplishments ==

=== Completed projects ===
The Soviet space program's projects include:

* [[Almaz]] space stations
* [[Cosmos]] satellites
* [[Foton]]
* Luna Moon flybys, orbiters, impacts, landers, rovers, sample returns
* Mars probe program
* [[Meteor (Satellite)|Meteor]] meteorological satellites
* [[Molniya]] communications satellites
* Mir space station
* [[Proton (Satellite)|Proton]] satellites
* [[Phobos Program|Phobos]] Mars probes program
* Salyut space stations
* [[Soyuz]] program spacecraft
* Sputnik satellites
* [[TKS spacecraft]]
* Venera Venus probes program
* [[Vega Program|Vega program]] Venus and comet Halley probes program
* [[Vostok Program|Vostok program]] spacecraft
* [[Voskhod Program|Voskhod program]] spacecraft
* [[Zond Program|Zond program]]

=== Notable firsts ===
Two days after the United States announced its intention to launch an artificial satellite, on July 31, 1955, the Soviet Union announced its intention to do the same. Sputnik 1 was launched on October 4, 1957, beating the United States and stunning people the world over.
The Soviet space program pioneered many aspects of space exploration:

* 1957: First intercontinental ballistic missile and orbital launch vehicle, the [[R-7 Semyorka]].
* 1957: First satellite, Sputnik 1.
* 1957: First animal in Earth orbit, the dog Laika on [[Sputnik 2]].
* 1959: First rocket ignition in Earth orbit, first man-made object to escape Earth's gravity, Luna 1.
* 1959: First data communications, or telemetry, to and from outer space, Luna 1.
* 1959: First man-made object to pass near the Moon, first man-made object in Heliocentric orbit, Luna 1.
* 1959: First probe to impact the Moon, Luna 2.
* 1959: First images of the moon's far side, Luna 3.
* 1960: First animals to safely return from Earth orbit, the dogs [[Belka]] and [[Strelka]] on [[Sputnik 5]].
* 1961: First probe launched to Venus, [[Venera 1]].
* 1961: First person in space (International definition) and in Earth orbit, Yuri Gagarin on [[Vostok 1]], Vostok program.
* 1961: First person to spend over 24 hours in space [[Gherman Titov]], [[Vostok 2]] (also first person to sleep in space).
* 1962: First dual crewed spaceflight, [[Vostok 3]] and [[Vostok 4]].
* 1962: First probe launched to Mars, [[Mars 1]].
* 1963: First woman in space, Valentina Tereshkova, [[Vostok 6]].
* 1964: First multi-person crew (3), [[Voskhod 1]].
* 1965: First extra-vehicular activity (EVA), by Alexsei Leonov, [[Voskhod 2]].
* 1965: First radio telescope in space, [[Zond 3]].
* 1965: First probe to hit another planet of the Solar System (Venus), [[Venera 3]].
* 1966: First probe to make a soft landing on and transmit from the surface of the Moon, Luna 9.
* 1966: First probe in lunar orbit, [[Luna 10]].
* 1966: first image of the whole Earth disk, [[Molniya 1]].
* 1967: First uncrewed rendezvous and docking, [[Cosmos 186]]/[[Cosmos 188]].
* 1968: First living beings to reach the Moon (circumlunar flights) and return unharmed to Earth, Russian tortoises and other lifeforms on [[Zond 5]].
* 1969: First docking between two crewed craft in Earth orbit and exchange of crews, [[Soyuz 4]] and [[Soyuz 5]].
* 1970: First soil samples automatically extracted and returned to Earth from another celestial body, Luna 16.
* 1970: First robotic space rover, [[Lunokhod 1]] on the Moon.
* 1970: First full interplanetary travel with a soft landing and useful data transmission. Data received from the surface of another planet of the Solar System (Venus), [[Venera 7]]
* 1971: First space station, Salyut 1.
* 1971: First probe to impact the surface of Mars, [[Mars 2]].
* 1971: First probe to land on Mars, [[Mars 3]].
* 1971: First armed space station, Almaz.
* 1975: First probe to orbit Venus, to make a soft landing on Venus, first photos from the surface of Venus, [[Venera 9]].
* 1980: First Latin American, Cuban and person with African ancestry in space, [[Arnaldo Tamayo Méndez]] on [[Soyuz 38]].
* 1984: First woman to walk in space, [[Svetlana Savitskaya]] ([[Salyut 7]] space station).
* 1986: First crew to visit two separate space stations (Mir and Salyut 7).
* 1986: First probes to deploy robotic balloons into Venus atmosphere and to return pictures of a comet during close flyby [[Vega 1]], [[Vega 2]].
* 1986: First permanently crewed space station, Mir, 1986–2001, with a permanent presence on board (1989–1999).
* 1987: First crew to spend over one year in space, Vladimir Titov and [[Musa Manarov]] on board of [[Soyuz#TM-4|Soyuz TM-4]] – Mir.
* 1988: First fully automated flight of a spaceplane (''[[Buran]]'').

== Incidents and setbacks ==

== Canceled projects ==

=== Energia rocket ===

=== Interplanetary projects ===

==== Mars missions ====

==== Vesta ====

==== Tsiolkovsky ====
[[Category:Space Programs]]
[[Category:Socialist Space Programs]]
[[Category:Science]]
[[Category:Cold War]]

Party for Reclamation and Survival

2022-12-16T21:51:23Z

Sparkingcircuit: Added some minor information.

{{Infobox political party|name=The Party for Reclamation and Survival|logo=RAS_logo.jpg|political_orientation=[[Anti-imperialism]] [[Eco-Socialist]] [[Marxist]] [[Marxist-Leninist]] Placeholder|international=Placeholder}}{{Message box/Stub}}
The '''Party for Reclamation and Survival''' ('''RAS''') is a revolutionary Marxist political party in the [[United States of America|United States]]. It is semi-underground, Material Feminists, and pro de-colonization<ref>{{Web citation|author=The Party for Reclamation and Survival|newspaper=Twitter|title=What makes the RAS different from other Communist organizations in the United States empire?|date=2021-06-05|url=https://twitter.com/Reclaim_Survive/status/1401316373242859522?cxt=HHwWhMCi0aT0vPImAAAA}}</ref>. They are pro [[Actually Existing Socialism|actually existing socialisms]]<ref>{{Web citation|author=The Party for Reclamation and Survival|newspaper=Twitter|date=2022-08-02|url=https://twitter.com/Reclaim_Survive/status/1554478098845949956?cxt=HHwWiICzzYnmzpIrAAAA|quote=}}</ref>.

== Links ==

* [https://twitter.com/Reclaim_Survive Twitter]
* [https://linktr.ee/Reclaim_Survive Linktree]

== References ==
[[Category:Statesian communist parties]]
<references />
[[Category:Communist parties]]
[[Category:Stubs]]

Taxes

2022-12-16T00:50:22Z

Sparkingcircuit: Sparkingcircuit moved page Taxes to Tax: Plural used instead of singular.

#REDIRECT [[Tax]]

Tax

2022-12-16T00:50:22Z

Sparkingcircuit: Sparkingcircuit moved page Taxes to Tax: Plural used instead of singular.

{{Message box/Stub}}

A '''Tax''' is a compulsory financial levy on the purchase, sale, use, or ownership of a good, service, or income of an individual. It is the most common means for market economies to fund their governments. They have existed sense ancient times, and have been used in [[Slave Society|Slave Societies]], [[Feudalism|Feudal Societies]], [[Capitalism|Capitalist Societies]], and [[Market Socialism|Market Socialist Societies]].
[[Category:Stubs]]

DPG Media Group

2022-12-15T23:09:09Z

Sparkingcircuit: Applied stub template.

{{Message box/Stub}}

'''DPG Media Group''' or '''MediaDPG''' is a [[Belgian]] [[imperialist]] [[Mass media|media]] conglomerate which operates in [[Belgium]], [[Nethelands]] and [[Denmark]].

[[Category:Stubs]]

George Washington

2022-12-15T23:08:26Z

Sparkingcircuit: Linked to other pages.

{{Adapted article}}{{Infobox politician|name=George Washington|birth_date=February 22, 1732|death_date=December 14, 1799|death_place=Mount Vernon, Virginia, United States|birth_place=Popes Creek, Virginia, British America|political_line=Classical liberalism}}
'''George Washington''' (February 22, 1732 – December 14, 1799), [[commander-in-chief]] of the [[United States of America|Statesian]] troops in the struggle of the colonies with [[Kingdom of Great Britain (1707–1801)|England]] for independence and then the first [[President of the United States|president of the North American United States]]. At time of his death, he was the richest man in [[United States of America|America]].<ref>{{News citation|author=[[Eugene Puryear]]|newspaper=[[Liberation School]]|title=The U.S. state and the U.S. revolution|date=2022-07-10|url=https://www.liberationschool.org/the-u-s-state-and-the-u-s-revolution/|retrieved=2022-07-17}}</ref> The son of a wealthy colonist planter in [[Virginia]], Washington received a very inadequate schooling, which he subsequently supplemented to a certain extent with reading; knowledge in mathematics he acquired, mainly self-taught. From 1748 Washington for three years served as a government surveyor, b. h., in border areas. Early assessing the future of the western lands, Washington since then engaged in land speculation.

From the spring of 1754 to the end of 1758, Britain took part with honors in military operations against the [[Kingdom of France (987–1792)|French]] and Native Americans. Participated in the British expedition against the French in [[New France (1534–1763)|Canada]]. After the war ended, he lived as a private man on the Mount Vernon estate. Washington's personal qualities brought him great popularity, and in 1774 he was elected to the National Convention, and in 1775, when the inevitability of war with England became clear, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the [[United States Military|North American army]].

In this position, Washington showed great administrative and organizational skills; he created an army, managed to reconcile the conflicting interests of the colonies, organized the supply of the army and, thus, greatly contributed to the final success of the war. At the end of it (in 1783) Washington transferred his powers to [[United States Congress|Congress]] and retired to Mount Vernon. With the entry into force of the Constitution of the North-American United States, Washington was unanimously elected president of the republic (1789). Washington tried to rely equally on [[Federalist Party|federalists]] (later [[Republican Party (United States)|Republicans]]) and anti-federalists (future [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democrats]]). In 1792, Washington was elected president for the second time, but did not agree to be elected for the third time. In 1798, in view of the threatening war with [[French First Republic (1792–1804)|France]], Washington again assumed the post of commander-in-chief of the troops and organized the army and the country's defense.

In foreign policy, Britain invariably strove to preserve the peace necessary for the new republic. Several cities are named after Washington. States, including the capital (see Washington, city); until now, the time Washington remains in the eyes of the Americans as a model of a statesman, although the "true" Washington did not correspond to the idealized image created by the historical legend.<ref>Lit.: Washington Papers (official and private), - Washington's Writings, ed. Sparks, 12 vis, Boston, 1837; the biography of Washington, attached to them, was revised by Guizot and translated into Russian (Essay on the Life of Washington, St. Petersburg, 1863).</ref>

== References ==
<references />

[[Category:Presidents of the United States]] [[Category:Founding Fathers of the United States]] [[Category:Statesians of English descent]]

Caucasus

2022-12-14T04:18:01Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created basic "Caucasus" page.

{{Message box/Stub}}

The '''Caucasus''' or '''Caucasia''', is a region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, mainly comprising [[Republic of Armenia|Armenia]], [[Republic of Azerbaijan|Azerbaijan]], [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]], and parts of [[Russia (disambiguation)|Southern Russia]]. The Caucasus Mountains, including the Greater Caucasus range, have historically been considered as a natural barrier between [[Eastern Europe]] and [[Western Asia]].
[[Category:Stubs]]

Joe Biden

2022-12-14T04:09:22Z

Sparkingcircuit: Linked to "President of the United States" page.

{{Infobox person|name=Joe Biden|image=Joe Biden.png|image_size=200|birth_date=November 20, 1942|birth_place=Scranton, [[Pennsylvania]], [[United States of America|United States]]|nationality=Statesian}}

'''Joe Biden''' is the 46th and current [[President of the United States|President]] of the [[United States of America|United States]] and has been president since January 20, 2021. Previously, he was vice president under [[Barack Obama]], and he was also a senator in the [[tax haven]] state of Delaware for 36 years.<ref>{{News citation|newspaper=Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy|title=Delaware: An Onshore Tax Haven|date=2015-12-10|url=https://itep.org/delaware-an-onshore-tax-haven/|archive-date=2022-05-09}}</ref><ref>{{News citation|author=Joseph N. DiStefano|newspaper=The Philadelphia Inquirer|title=Joe Biden’s politics can be explained by Delaware’s shadowy past|date=2019-07-04|url=https://www.inquirer.com/business/joe-biden-delaware-roots-segregation-moderate-democrats-20190704.html|archive-url=https://archive.ph/Z3t5I|archive-date=2022-05-09}}</ref> As a senator, he claimed that desegregation would create a "racial jungle."<ref>{{Citation|year=1977|title=Busing of Schoolchildren|page=251|quote=Unless we do something about this, my children are going to grow up in a jungle, the jungle being a racial jungle with tensions having built so high that it is going to explode at some point.|title-url=https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112104078842&view=1up&seq=255}}</ref> His anti-terrorism initiative classifies people who oppose [[capitalism]] as "[[Anarchism|anarchist]] violent extremists."<ref>{{News citation|date=2021-03-01|title=Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021|url=https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0301_odni_unclass-summary-of-dve-assessment-17_march-final_508.pdf|newspaper=Office of the Director of National Intelligence}}</ref>

== Presidency ==
Hardly the popular favorite, Biden's victory was secured by backroom deals of ex-president Obama.<ref>{{News citation|author=Glenn Thrush|title=‘Accelerate the endgame’: How Barack Obama nudged Bernie Sanders out of the race|date=2020-04-14|url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-nw-nyt-barack-obama-bernie-sanders-democrats-20200414-tdpw52c46vgqjjevu54attf4yu-story.html}}</ref><ref>From @eshaLegal Thread: [https://twitter.com/eshaLegal/status/1369386575176556559?s=20&t=4mb43w-AHpOedR8LyujW2g 1. Obama helps barely coherent Biden clinch the nomination.]</ref>

Biden promised to increase the national [[minimum wage]] to $15 per hour, although he admitted it would not actually happen.<ref>{{News citation|author=Natasha Korecki, Christopher Caledago|newspaper=Politico|title=Biden privately tells governors: Minimum wage hike likely isn’t happening|date=2021-02-18|url=https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/18/biden-governors-minimum-wage-469898|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220324114238/https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/18/biden-governors-minimum-wage-469898|archive-date=2022-03-24|retrieved=2022-05-01}}</ref><ref>From @eshaLegal Thread: [https://twitter.com/eshaLegal/status/1369391701509480456?s=20&t=4mb43w-AHpOedR8LyujW2g 7. Fails to raise the minimum wage]</ref> He additionally promised to cancel "a minimum of $10,000" in [[student debt]] per borrower, however this has yet to come to fruition over two years later.<ref>https://twitter.com/JoeBiden/status/1241869418981920769</ref>

Despite Biden claiming to support the [[Amazon.com, Inc.|Amazon]] union movement and unions in general<ref>{{Web citation|date=2019-10-27|author=Joe Biden|title=The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective Bargaining, and Unions|url=https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/}}</ref> the [[National Security Agency]] (under the Biden Administration) secretly re-granted Amazon a $10 billion dollar contract<ref>{{News citation|date=2022-5-5|title=Amazon Gets Huge Contract Despite Biden’s Union Pledge|author=Matthew Cunningham-Cook & David Sirota|newspaper=The Lever|url=https://www.levernews.com/amazon-gets-huge-contract-despite-bidens-union-pledge/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/https://www.levernews.com/amazon-gets-huge-contract-despite-bidens-union-pledge/}}</ref> that was granted to Amazon in August 2021.<ref>{{Web citation|title=NSA Awards Secret $10 Billion Contract to Amazon|url=https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2021/08/nsa-awards-secret-10-billion-contract-amazon/184390/|date=2021-08-10|author=Frank Konkel|newspaper=Nextgov|archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2021/08/nsa-awards-secret-10-billion-contract-amazon/184390/}}</ref>

In June of 2022, Biden appointed to Social Security Advisory board an ''opponent'' to Social Security, Andrew Briggs.<ref>{{News citation|author=[[Jimmy Dore]]|newspaper=[[The Jimmy Dore Show]]|title=http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/149180.htm|date=2022-06-24|url=https://youtu.be/STxQgCfDeT4}}</ref>

== War crimes ==
Biden strongly supported the [[Iraq War|U.S. invasion of Iraq]] in 2003.

As vice president, Biden oversaw the U.S. invasions of [[Afghanistan]], [[Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1977–2011)|Libya]], [[Syrian Arab Republic|Syria]], and [[Republic of Yemen|Yemen]] and the bombing of [[Islamic Republic of Pakistan|Pakistan]] and [[Federal Republic of Somalia|Somalia]].<ref>{{Web citation|author=[[Benjamin Norton]]|newspaper=[[Multipolarista]]|title=In mind-blowingly hypocritical UN speech, Biden tries to rewrite history|date=2022-09-22|url=https://multipolarista.com/2022/09/22/un-speech-biden-war/|retrieved=2022-02-24}}</ref>

On February 25, 2021, Biden ordered airstrikes in [[Syrian Arab Republic|Syria]], a country that the United States of America is not at war with, killing 22 people.<ref>{{News citation|journalist=Dan De Luce, et al.|date=2021-02-25|title=Biden orders airstrikes in Syria, retaliating against Iran-backed militias|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-bombs-facilities-syria-used-iran-backed-militia-n1258912|newspaper=NBC News|retrieved=2022-02-07}}</ref>

== References ==
[[Category:Politicians in the United States]]
<references />
[[Category:Current heads of state]]
[[Category:Statesians of Irish descent]]
[[Category:Statesians of English descent]]
[[Category:Statesians of French descent]]

Bourgeois democracy

2022-12-14T04:06:22Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created basic "Bourgeois Democracy" page.

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'''Bourgeois Democracy''', is a means of setting up a [[Capitalism|Capitalist Economy]] in such a way as to settle disputes between the bourgeois without disrupting the overall power structure of the government. These governments tend to call themself [[Democracy|democratic]] despite the fact that the control a citizen of these nations has over their government is minimal unless they are of the owning class.
[[Category:Stubs]]

Government of the United States of America

2022-12-14T04:04:59Z

Sparkingcircuit: /* Governmental Structure */ Grammar correction

{{Infobox government|name=United States federal government|type=Federal Corporatocratic Republic|image=[[File:Coat of Arms of the USA.webp|120px]]|caption=Coat of Arms|constitution=[[Constitution of the United States]]|formation=1789|leader_cs=|rulilng_class=[[Bourgeoisie]]}}The system of government in the [[United States of America]] operates on the basis of a [[plutocracy]], a government entirely controlled by the wealthy. The richest three Statesians have more money than the poorest 160 million combined. Public support for the U.S. government is very low, with only 2% of Statesians believing the government almost always does what is right and only 19% believing it mostly does the right thing. 7% of Statesians have confidence in Congress, 23% have confidence in the presidency, and 25% have confidence in the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]].<ref>{{Web citation|author=Tom Mckay|newspaper=MIC|title=Princeton Concludes What Kind of Government America Really Has, and It's Not a Democracy|date=2016-4-16|url=https://www.mic.com/articles/87719/princeton-concludes-what-kind-of-government-america-really-has-and-it-s-not-a-democracy|retrieved=2022-8-30}}</ref>

The US is effectively a [[one-party state]], with aesthetical differences between its two main parties, the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republicans]] and the [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democrats]], but both parties follow common policies, especially abroad. The ruling capitalist oligarchy has two factions: the Democratic Party which is center-right and is controlled by the monopolistic managerial [[bourgeoisie]] who seeks to maintain the stability of the imperialist system by being less reactionary on inconsequential social issues, and the Republican Party, which is more reactionary and backwards when it comes to social issues and tends to pander to the [[Petty bourgeoisie|petit bourgeoisie]] in their effort to deepen the exploitation of labor.

The election system further solidifies this duopoly with its "First Past the Post" system, resulting in citizens having to choose "the lesser of two evils." The two political parties stir up public debate around their small disagreements to create a facade of democracy, but bipartisan agreement reigns on questions of foreign policy (imperialism, war, attacking socialist countries) as well as domestic policies such as prioritizing funding for police repression over social programs such as free housing, higher education, healthcare, etc.

== Governmental Structure ==
The government of the United States of America is, in essence, a standard [[Bourgeois Democracy|bourgeois democracy]]. It has been copied the world over due to its effectiveness in the maintenance of capitalism within a nation, and the ease of trade thereof. It consists of three governmental branches, legislative, executive, and judicial. These branches are defined by acts of Congress, including the creation of executive departments and courts inferior to that of the Supreme Court.

=== Legislative ===
The [[United States Congress]], under Article I of the [[Constitution of the United States|Constitution]], is the legislative branch of the federal government. It is split into two distinct assemblies, the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] and the [[United States Senate|Senate]].

==== Makeup of Congress ====

===== House of Representatives =====
The House represents a [[Congressional Districts of the United States|congressional district]]. The number of representatives each state has in the House is based on each state's population as determined in the most recent [[Census of the United States|United States Census]].

===== Senate =====
The Senate is made up of two [[United States Senators|senators]] from each state, regardless of population. There are currently 100 senators (2 from each of the 50 states), each of whom serve six-year terms.

==== Powers of Congress ====
The [[Congress of the Unites States|Congress of the Unites States of America]] has the power to the powers to levy and collect [[taxes]]; to coin money and regulate its value; provide for punishment for counterfeiting; establish post offices and roads, issue [[patents]], create federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court, combat piracy and felonies, declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a [[United States Navy|navy]], make rules for the regulation of land and naval forces, provide for, arm and discipline the militia, exercise exclusive legislation in the [[District of Columbia]], regulate interstate commerce, and to make laws necessary to properly execute powers.

=== Executive ===
The executive branch is established in Article Two of the United States Constitution, which vests executive power in the [[President of the United States]],

==== President ====
The president of the United States is the lead executive power in the United States of America being both the [[Head of state|Head of State]] (performing ceremonial functions) and the head of government (the chief executive). The Constitution requires the president to swear or affirm to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."<ref>{{Citation|author=Philadelphia Convention|year=1787|title=Constitution of the United States of America|title-url=https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/|chapter=Article 2, Clause 8|section=Section 1|quote=...I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.|trans-lang=English}}</ref>

===== Executive Powers =====
The president is the [[commander-in-chief]] of the [[United States Military|armed forces]], empowered to conduct foreign relations (generally being considered to have sole diplomatic recognition), and may also negotiate and sign treaties. The president may also "... appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States" as well as grant presidential pardons.

===== Election, succession, and term limits =====
The president and [[Vice President of the United States|vice president]] are normally elected by the [[Electoral College]], but an individual may also be granted presidency via [[succession]] in the case of the death or impeachment of the previous president. The length of a term is four years, though a US president may only run for two.

==== Cabinet, executive departments, and agencies ====
The daily enforcement and administration of federal laws is managed by the [[Federal Executive Departments of the United States|federal executive departments]]. These departments are created by Congress to manage specific international and internal affairs, the heads of which are appointed by the United States president with further approval being granted by Congress.

=== Judicial ===
The [[Judiciary of the United States|Judiciary]], under Article III of the Constitution, explains, interprets, and applies the laws. It does this by hearing and eventually making decisions on various legal cases.

== See also ==

* [[Corporate duopoly]]
* [[Corporatocracy]]
* [[Dictatorship of the bourgeoisie]]

==References==
<references />
[[Category:Politics of the United States of America]]
[[Category:Government of the United States of America]]
[[Category:Bourgeois governments]]

Government of the United States of America

2022-12-14T03:57:39Z

Sparkingcircuit: /* Governmental Structure */ Corrected spelling.

{{Infobox government|name=United States federal government|type=Federal Corporatocratic Republic|image=[[File:Coat of Arms of the USA.webp|120px]]|caption=Coat of Arms|constitution=[[Constitution of the United States]]|formation=1789|leader_cs=|rulilng_class=[[Bourgeoisie]]}}The system of government in the [[United States of America]] operates on the basis of a [[plutocracy]], a government entirely controlled by the wealthy. The richest three Statesians have more money than the poorest 160 million combined. Public support for the U.S. government is very low, with only 2% of Statesians believing the government almost always does what is right and only 19% believing it mostly does the right thing. 7% of Statesians have confidence in Congress, 23% have confidence in the presidency, and 25% have confidence in the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]].<ref>{{Web citation|author=Tom Mckay|newspaper=MIC|title=Princeton Concludes What Kind of Government America Really Has, and It's Not a Democracy|date=2016-4-16|url=https://www.mic.com/articles/87719/princeton-concludes-what-kind-of-government-america-really-has-and-it-s-not-a-democracy|retrieved=2022-8-30}}</ref>

The US is effectively a [[one-party state]], with aesthetical differences between its two main parties, the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republicans]] and the [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democrats]], but both parties follow common policies, especially abroad. The ruling capitalist oligarchy has two factions: the Democratic Party which is center-right and is controlled by the monopolistic managerial [[bourgeoisie]] who seeks to maintain the stability of the imperialist system by being less reactionary on inconsequential social issues, and the Republican Party, which is more reactionary and backwards when it comes to social issues and tends to pander to the [[Petty bourgeoisie|petit bourgeoisie]] in their effort to deepen the exploitation of labor.

The election system further solidifies this duopoly with its "First Past the Post" system, resulting in citizens having to choose "the lesser of two evils." The two political parties stir up public debate around their small disagreements to create a facade of democracy, but bipartisan agreement reigns on questions of foreign policy (imperialism, war, attacking socialist countries) as well as domestic policies such as prioritizing funding for police repression over social programs such as free housing, higher education, healthcare, etc.

== Governmental Structure ==
The government of the United States of America is, in essence, a standard [[Bourgeoisie Democracy|bourgeoisie democracy]]. It has been copied the world over due to its effectiveness in the maintenance of capitalism within a nation, and the ease of trade thereof. It consists of three governmental branches, legislative, executive, and judicial. These branches are defined by acts of Congress, including the creation of executive departments and courts inferior to that of the Supreme Court.

=== Legislative ===
The [[United States Congress]], under Article I of the [[Constitution of the United States|Constitution]], is the legislative branch of the federal government. It is split into two distinct assemblies, the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] and the [[United States Senate|Senate]].

==== Makeup of Congress ====

===== House of Representatives =====
The House represents a [[Congressional Districts of the United States|congressional district]]. The number of representatives each state has in the House is based on each state's population as determined in the most recent [[Census of the United States|United States Census]].

===== Senate =====
The Senate is made up of two [[United States Senators|senators]] from each state, regardless of population. There are currently 100 senators (2 from each of the 50 states), each of whom serve six-year terms.

==== Powers of Congress ====
The [[Congress of the Unites States|Congress of the Unites States of America]] has the power to the powers to levy and collect [[taxes]]; to coin money and regulate its value; provide for punishment for counterfeiting; establish post offices and roads, issue [[patents]], create federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court, combat piracy and felonies, declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a [[United States Navy|navy]], make rules for the regulation of land and naval forces, provide for, arm and discipline the militia, exercise exclusive legislation in the [[District of Columbia]], regulate interstate commerce, and to make laws necessary to properly execute powers.

=== Executive ===
The executive branch is established in Article Two of the United States Constitution, which vests executive power in the [[President of the United States]],

==== President ====
The president of the United States is the lead executive power in the United States of America being both the [[Head of state|Head of State]] (performing ceremonial functions) and the head of government (the chief executive). The Constitution requires the president to swear or affirm to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."<ref>{{Citation|author=Philadelphia Convention|year=1787|title=Constitution of the United States of America|title-url=https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/|chapter=Article 2, Clause 8|section=Section 1|quote=...I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.|trans-lang=English}}</ref>

===== Executive Powers =====
The president is the [[commander-in-chief]] of the [[United States Military|armed forces]], empowered to conduct foreign relations (generally being considered to have sole diplomatic recognition), and may also negotiate and sign treaties. The president may also "... appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States" as well as grant presidential pardons.

===== Election, succession, and term limits =====
The president and [[Vice President of the United States|vice president]] are normally elected by the [[Electoral College]], but an individual may also be granted presidency via [[succession]] in the case of the death or impeachment of the previous president. The length of a term is four years, though a US president may only run for two.

==== Cabinet, executive departments, and agencies ====
The daily enforcement and administration of federal laws is managed by the [[Federal Executive Departments of the United States|federal executive departments]]. These departments are created by Congress to manage specific international and internal affairs, the heads of which are appointed by the United States president with further approval being granted by Congress.

=== Judicial ===
The [[Judiciary of the United States|Judiciary]], under Article III of the Constitution, explains, interprets, and applies the laws. It does this by hearing and eventually making decisions on various legal cases.

== See also ==

* [[Corporate duopoly]]
* [[Corporatocracy]]
* [[Dictatorship of the bourgeoisie]]

==References==
<references />
[[Category:Politics of the United States of America]]
[[Category:Government of the United States of America]]
[[Category:Bourgeois governments]]

President of the United States

2022-12-14T03:53:13Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created basic "President of the United States" page.

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The '''President of the United States''' ('''POTUS''') is the head of state and head of [[government of the United States of America]]. The president directs the executive branch of the federal government and is the [[commander-in-chief]] of the [[United States Military|United States Armed Forces]]. The current president of the United States is [[Joe Biden]].
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Vice President of the United States

2022-12-14T03:50:04Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created basic "Vice President of the United States" page.

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The '''Vice President of the United States''' ('''VPOTUS''') is the second-highest officer in the executive branch of the [[Government of the United States of America|U.S. federal government]], after the [[president of the United States]], and ranks first in the presidential line of succession.
[[Category:Stubs]]

United States Department of Commerce

2022-12-14T03:45:17Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created basic "USDC" page.

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The '''United States Department of Commerce''' is an executive department of the [[Government of the United States of America|U.S. federal government]] concerned with creating the conditions for economic growth.
[[Category:Stubs]]

United States Census Bureau

2022-12-14T03:43:16Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created basic "USCB" page.

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The '''United States Census Bureau''' ('''USCB'''), officially the '''Bureau of the Census''', is an agency of the [[United States Federal Statistical System]], responsible for producing data about the American people and economy. The Census Bureau is a part of the [[United States Department of Commerce|U.S. Department of Commerce]].
[[Category:Stubs]]

Census of the United States

2022-12-14T03:38:09Z

Sparkingcircuit: Created basic "Census of the United States" page.

{{Message box/Stub}}

The '''Census of the United States''' is a constitutionally mandated census conducted by [[United States Census Bureau|Bureau of the Census]]. It is conducted every ten years to keep track of the demographics of the United States.
[[Category:Stubs]]