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	<updated>2026-10-24T03:28:30Z</updated>
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		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Contradiction&amp;diff=89845</id>
		<title>Contradiction</title>
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		<updated>2026-02-28T18:00:01Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: Rectified the page somewhat, might work on it more later.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;[[File:Yin and Yang symbol.svg|thumb|128px|The modern [[Yin-yang]] is a illustration of contradiction.]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The &#039;&#039;&#039;contradiction&#039;&#039;&#039; is the fundamental mechanism behind [[dialectics]]. A contradiction is a coexistent&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;existing at the same time&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; diametrical&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;at opposite ends, in direct opposition&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; link between two forces. Contradictions exist when two requirements are met:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
# Two forces must be diametrically opposed and&lt;br /&gt;
# one cannot exist without the other.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{citation|author=Mao Zedong|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|chapter=V. [[Library:On_contradiction#The_Identity_and_Struggle_of_the_Aspects_of_a_Contradiction|The Identity and Struggle of the Aspects of a Contradiction]]|year=1937|city=[[Yan&#039;an]]|quote=…the existence of each of the two aspects of a contradiction in the process of the development of a thing presupposes the existence of the other aspect, and both aspects coexist in a single entity….}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
In dialectics, a contradiction is the engine of motion, which moves itself in the process of self-transformation of the conditions in which it exists. This transformation then creates new contradictions, called [[negation of the negation]], this entails the process of intrinsic contradictions within all that exists. The science of dialectics is the science of process itself i.e. understanding how and what motion entails within material conditions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
For example, the [[bourgeoisie]] form a contradiction to the [[proletariat]]. The former wants to make their workers work greater [[Surplus-value|surplus yield]] from the latter, while the latter wants to maximize the amount paid in [[Wage|wage-labor]]. The contradiction cannot be &amp;quot;moved past&amp;quot; because the very structural compulsions of capital, the drive to maximize profit entail wage suppression; the contradiction thus produces [[Antagonistic contradictions|antagonisms]] between classes, birthing both reactionary and revolutionary moments, both co-constituting each other in their existence as opposed to each other. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Primary and secondary contradictions ==&lt;br /&gt;
Contradictions are separated into primary and secondary categories. Secondary contradictions stand on on primary ones as their ground for existence or rather, primary contradictions being causal structure secondary contradictions which operate with their own internal structure but in tandem with all other contradictions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Secondary contradictions are not &amp;quot;resolved through resolving primary contradictions&amp;quot; as [[Mechanical materialism|vulgar materialists]] suggest, rather the resolution of secondary contradictions allow for the capacity to systematically address primary contradictions. Consider the secondary contradiction of race, it is structured by class society and economic [[Relations of production|modes of production]] whilst simultaneously having its own internal logic and operational structure that doesn&#039;t reduce to &amp;quot;just class&amp;quot;. Racial supremacy and capital exist in a symbiotic relationship, where capital is the ground on which racial supremacy entrenches itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In combatting capital, we combat racial supremacy, and in combatting racialism, we combat capital itself. By resolving the primary contradiction, we unentrench racial supermacy and thus gain the capacity to combat it effectively.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Solving contradictions ==&lt;br /&gt;
A contradiction is resolved when the struggle gives form to new relations whilst the decaying relata are made irrelevant to the motion of the totality; i.e. when the conditions in which the contradiction constitutes itself stop existing, through its own very struggle to end the contradiction can we say the contradiction was resolved.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The proletariat, in being the class that encompasses most of humanity unlike past classes which were themselves gradations in a multi-hierarchical structure, is the class posed to resolve not just the contradiction of proletarian-bourgeois, but of class society itself. In annihilating the basis for private ownership and socializing the [[means of production]], the proletarian class negates the very basis of class society, i.e. surplus. With no class with privileged ownership of the means of production, class as viable existent dissolves itself leading to classless society, or [[communism]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
However, the communist stage of society is not the end of process, but the end of antagonistic contradictions. In its place [[non-antagonistic contradictions]]&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;take place as the engine of motion. These contradictions require synthesis, and not the domination or annihilation of one relata over another. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
An example can be the non-antagonistic contradiction between humans and nature. We are part of the nature, and it is in our interest to simultaneously extract from it and preserve it. The goal becoming to find a synthetic and active manner to deal with the non-antagonistic contradiction, which becomes the basis for societal development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Universality==&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that contradiction is universal necessitates two prerequisites; these being that all things posses within them, internal contradiction and secondly, the contradiction exists through the whole of the process.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Mao Zedong|year=1937|title=On Contradiction|title-url=https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Library:On_contradiction|chapter=II. The Universality of Contradiction|quote=The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; {{quote|Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end.|[[Mao Zedong]]|[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|[[Library:On_contradiction#The_Universality_of_Contradiction|The Universality of Contradiction]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Particularity===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The particularity of contradictions refer to a contradiction that forms the distinct process of a thing, within a larger totality. Mao noted that it is important to study the particular contradictions of a thing to qualitatively distinguish it from other things.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|chapter=III. [[Library:On_contradiction#The_Particularity_of_Contradiction|The Particularity of Contradiction]]|author=Mao Zedong|year=1937|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm|quote=But what is especially important and necessary, constituting as it does the foundation of our knowledge of a thing, is to observe what is particular to this form of motion of matter, namely, to observe the qualitative difference between this form of motion and other forms. Only when we have done so can we distinguish between things. Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction. This particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another. It is the internal cause or, as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world. … All these forms are interdependent, but in its essence each is different from the others. The particular essence of each form of motion is determined by its own particular contradiction. This holds true not only for nature but also for social and ideological phenomena. Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Humans study the particular contradiction of a process to distinguish it from other processes. This leads to common knowledge of a set of processes, which in turn aids in the study of particularities. Our knowledge of the cosmos for example, is a study of the particularity of the extra-earth conditions, and the particularity itself stems from other process such spectroscopy (study of wavelengths of light) or photometry (analysis of visual brightness, structures etc to determine particular phenomena within the cosmos), demonstrating interconnection.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Mao and Lenin warned against viewing only part of a contradiction (or one-sidedness), as this leads to misunderstanding the contradiction.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|title=[[Library:Once Again On The Trade Unions, The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Buhkarin|Once Again On The Trade Unions, The Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Buhkarin]]|author=[[Vladimir Lenin]]|mia=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/jan/25.htm|year=1921|quote=Firstly, if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and “mediacies”. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|author=Mao Zedong|year=1937|chapter=III. [[Library:On_contradiction#The_Particularity_of_Contradiction|The Particularity of Contradiction]]|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm|quote=In studying a problem, we must shun subjectivity, one-sidedness and superficiality. … To be one-sided means not to look at problems all-sidedly… . In a word, it means not to understand the characteristics of both aspects of a contradiction. This is what we mean by looking at a problem one-sidedly. Or it may be called seeing the part but not the whole, seeing the trees but not the forest. That way it is impossible to kind the method for resolving a contradiction, it is impossible to accomplish the tasks of the revolution, to carry out assignments well or to develop inner-Party ideological struggle correctly.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Mao also warned against superficiality, which is not viewing both the totality and the individuality of a contradiction.&amp;lt;ref name=superficial&amp;gt;{{Citation|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|chapter=III. [[Library:On_contradiction#The_Particularity_of_Contradiction|The Particularity of Contradiction]]|year=1937|author=Mao Zedong|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm|quote=To be superficial means to consider neither the characteristics of a contradiction in its totality nor the characteristics of each of its aspects; it means to deny the necessity for probing deeply into a thing and minutely studying the characteristics of its contradiction, but instead merely to look from afar and, after glimpsing the rough outline, immediately to try to resolve the contradiction (to answer a question, settle a dispute, handle work, or direct a military operation). … }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The result of applying both superficiality and one-sidedness is the loss of the holistic analysis which understands the motion of the whole.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|chapter=III. [[Library:On_contradiction#The_Particularity_of_Contradiction|The Particularity of Contradiction]]|year=1937|author=Mao Zedong|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm|quote=To be one-sided and superficial is at the same time to be subjective. For all objective things are actually interconnected and are governed by inner laws, but instead of undertaking the task of reflecting things as they really are some people only look at things one-sidedly or superficially and who know neither their interconnections nor their inner laws, and so their method is subjectivist.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Principality ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A principal contradiction is the sole contradiction in a thing that determines the existence and development of other contradictions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|author=Mao Zedong|chapter=IV. [[Library:On_contradiction#The_Principal_Contradiction_and_the_Principal_Aspect_of_a_Contradiction|The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction]]|year=1937|quote=There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A principal force (or aspect) is the dominant force in a contradiction.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|author=Mao Zedong|chapter=IV. [[Library:On_contradiction#The_Principal_Contradiction_and_the_Principal_Aspect_of_a_Contradiction|The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction]]|year=1937|quote=But, in any given contradiction, whether principal or secondary, should the two contradictory aspects be treated as equal? Again, no. In any contradiction the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven. Sometimes they seem to be in equilibrium, which is however only temporary and relative, while unevenness is basic. Of the two contradictory aspects, one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The principality of forces in a contradiction can change.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|author=Mao Zedong|chapter=IV. [[Library:On_contradiction#The_Principal_Contradiction_and_the_Principal_Aspect_of_a_Contradiction|The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction]]|year=1937|quote=…the principal and the non-principal aspects of a contradiction transform themselves into each other and the nature of the thing changes accordingly. In a given process or at a given stage in the development of a contradiction, A is the principal aspect and B is the non-principal aspect; at another stage or in another process the roles are reversed--a change determined by the extent of the increase or decrease in the force of each aspect in its struggle against the other in the course of the development of a thing.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Identity ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Identity refers to the &#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039; linked coexistence of both aspects in a contradiction and that the contradictory aspects conditionally transform into their opposites.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|quote=Identity, unity, coincidence, interpenetration, interpermeation, interdependence (or mutual dependence for existence), interconnection or mutual co-operation--all these different terms mean the same thing and refer to the following two points: first, the existence of each of the two aspects of a contradiction in the process of the development of a thing presupposes the existence of the other aspect, and both aspects coexist in a single entity; second, in given conditions, each of the two contradictory aspects transforms itself into its opposite. This is the meaning of identity.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Identity exists conditionally.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=V. I. [[Lenin]]|title=Conspectus of Hegel&#039;s The Science of Logic, Collected Works Russian Edition|city=Moscow|year=1958|volume=XXXVIII|page=97-98|quote=Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical--under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another, why the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Contradictions in the class struggle ==&lt;br /&gt;
In [[Europe]], before the bourgeoisie [[Class struggle|was opposed to the proletariat]], they were opposed to the [[nobility]]. The bourgeoisie was born out of the material conditions of the late Middle Ages: in free cities, artisans hired workers by the day and bought their labour power. This was a different relation to labour from the feudal lord and his serfs, as the serfs were not &amp;quot;free&amp;quot; to choose their employer or the nature of their work; the serf was locked to his lord&#039;s land, unable to freely travel or choose his occupation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The bourgeoisie thus wanted to have more free workers available to expand their businesses (and have people to sell their products to), while nobles and lords wanted more serfs to increase their power and personal wealth. This lead to many violent uprisings and clashes, including the [[European wars of religion|wars of religion in Europe]] (Catholic leaders were mostly feudal lords and Protestants were by and large bourgeois).&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Eventually, after several centuries, the bourgeoisie won over the feudal lords and became the dominant class in society, controlling the state and able to pass laws favouring them (e.g. putting an end to the serf system). This slowly created a proletariat, and phased out the noble class over time who either became part of the bourgeoisie or were executed. Today, the contradiction is not between feudal lords and the bourgeoisie anymore, but between the bourgeoisie and proletariat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As the proletariat will themselves become the dominant class in society, they will naturally phase out the bourgeoisie and create new contradictions out of this qualitative change and the class struggle will continue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Other examples ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Saturation and starvation form a contradiction; saturation is diametrically opposed to starvation, as one cannot be saturated and starved at the same time. Starvation also must coexist with saturation, otherwise it would be impossible to starve without the need for saturation.&lt;br /&gt;
* In warfare, attack and defence form a contradiction; defence is the diametrical opposite of the attack (rule 1) and there is no need for defence if there is no attack (rule 2).&lt;br /&gt;
* &#039;&#039;Life&#039;&#039; and &#039;&#039;death&#039;&#039;. Life is diametrically opposed to death and something is either dead or alive, but never both at once.&lt;br /&gt;
* Void versus phenomena. This plays out in several ways. Darkness and light. Heat and cold. Darkness is the absence of light. Cold is the absence of heat.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==Further Reading==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* {{Citation|author=Mao Zedong|mia=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm|title=[[Library:On contradiction|On contradiction]]|year=1937|city=[[Yan&#039;an]]}}&lt;br /&gt;
* {{Citation|author=Friedrich Engels|year=1883|title=Dialectics of nature|mia=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/index.htm}}&lt;br /&gt;
* {{Citation|author=[[Nikolai Bukharin]]|year=1925|title=Historical Materialism|mia=https://www.marxists.org/archive/bukharin/works/1921/histmat/index.htm}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
==References==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
===Notes===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=lower-alpha /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Marxist theory]][[Category:Marxist terminology]][[Category:Dialectical materialism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=89654</id>
		<title>Essay:A thousand chains we will have to break</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=89654"/>
		<updated>2026-02-17T16:22:32Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=A thousand chains we will have to break|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-15|excerpt=What is the morality of the communist? What are our ethics? On what basis? The morality adequate to our struggle is not the morality of the ruling class dressed as universal ethics but the morality born from the recognition that our liberation requires their expropriation, that our humanity requires the negation of their inhumanity, that our flourishing requires the transformation of the system that produces our immiseration.|image=Hammersicklebanner.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“Be moderate,” the trimmers cry,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Who dread the tyrants’ thunder.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“You ask too much and people fly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;From you aghast in wonder.”&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;’Tis passing strange, for I declare&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Such statements give me mirth,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;For our demands most moderate are,&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;We only want the earth.&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;- James Connolly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== I. The question of morality ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What morality do you speak of? What morality do you seek?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal extends his hand and speaks of universal human values, of dignity inherent to all, of rights transcending material conditions. He speaks as if morality descended from heaven, &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;eternal and unchanging, waiting to be discovered by enlightened minds.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is mystification. This is the morality of those who crush speaking the language of those who are crushed.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the proletariat is not detached but &#039;&#039;&#039;concrete&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not discovered but &#039;&#039;&#039;forged&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not eternal but &#039;&#039;&#039;historical&#039;&#039;&#039;. It emerges not from contemplation but from &#039;&#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;&#039;, from the realization that the struggle is not imaginary but &#039;&#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039;&#039;, not philosophical but &#039;&#039;&#039;visceral&#039;&#039;&#039;, not distant but &#039;&#039;&#039;immediate&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is born in the factory where the worker&#039;s body is ground to produce surplus value. Our morality is born in the slum where children die of preventable disease because medicine serves profit, not need. Our morality is born in the field where the farmer hangs himself because debt compounds while grain rots in warehouses.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not sentiment. This is material reality demanding response. The morality that emerges from this reality is not universal brotherhood but class war. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Not an abstract notion of humanity but concrete humanity as it exists within objective reality.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== II. The mystification of humanity ==&lt;br /&gt;
You appeal to humanity. You say: all humans are one, all deserve dignity, all are brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;which&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;humanity&#039;&#039;? The humanity of the ruling class, standing outside history, outside class, outside the brutal material relations that structure every moment of existence? &#039;&#039;&#039;This humanity does not exist&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is phantom, an enemy construct deployed precisely to obscure the reality that humanity is fractured, divided, set against itself by the mode of production that constitutes it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are you one with Ambani, whose wealth accumulates while workers starve? Are you one with Adani, whose ports and power plants displace tribals and destroy ecosystems? Are you one with Tata, whose steel mills and automobile factories extract surplus from your labor, whose mansions rise on your exploitation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;No. You. Are. Not.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To them, you are not human in the same sense they are human. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;You are resource, instrument, means to accumulation. Your suffering is &#039;&#039;&#039;externality&#039;&#039;&#039;, your death is &#039;&#039;&#039;statistic&#039;&#039;&#039;, your resistance is &#039;&#039;&#039;disruption&#039;&#039;&#039; to be managed or crushed.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gaze of the oppressor looks down. It sees not equals but lesser beings whose &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;natural position&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt; is &#039;&#039;&#039;subordination&#039;&#039;&#039;. The Brahmin looks at the Dalit and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;pollution&#039;&#039;&#039;. The capitalist looks at the worker and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;cost&#039;&#039;&#039;. The imperialist looks at the colonized and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;primitive accumulation waiting to happen&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not mere prejudice to be overcome through education. This is not individual failing to be corrected through moral improvement. &#039;&#039;&#039;This is structural necessity produced by material relations of domination.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When capital requires exploitation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;justifies&#039;&#039;&#039; exploitation. When caste requires hierarchy, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;naturalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; hierarchy. When imperialism requires subjugation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;rationalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; subjugation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;To appeal to abstract humanity while these structures persist is not moral but mystification. It hides the material base of oppression behind the veil of universal values. It substitutes the concrete demand for liberation with the abstract hope for recognition.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== III. The concrete against the detached ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Our struggle is not fictional. The social murder of our people is concrete. The death of a child because sustaining life does not serve capital is concrete. The starvation of a family because subsistence wages ensure maximum extraction is concrete. The annihilation of every livable condition while productive capacity has never been higher is concrete.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do you tell the worker whose lungs fill with silica dust in the mine? That all humanity is one? What do you tell the mother whose child dies because the hospital demands payment she cannot provide? That human dignity is universal? What do you tell the farmer drowning in debt while his harvest is purchased below cost of production? That we are all brothers?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are not answers. These are &#039;&#039;evasions&#039;&#039;. These are the comfortable ruling class notions of those whose material conditions allow them the luxury of detachment and mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The worker does not need to be told about universal humanity. The worker needs the means of subsistence guaranteed, the exploitation ended, the structures that produce his misery overthrown.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of struggle recognizes this. It refuses disembodiment because disembodiment serves those who benefit from obscuring material reality. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It refuses universalism because universalism erases the particularity of oppression and the necessity of particular struggle.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is partisan. It takes sides. It recognizes comrades and enemies not in the liberal sense of difference of opinion but in the material sense of opposing class interests. The worker and the capitalist do not have competing values requiring &#039;&#039;dialogue&#039;&#039;. They have antagonistic material interests requiring &#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IV. The task of the communist ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The task of the communist is simple in formulation, infinite in implication: to annihilate the gaze of superiority by annihilating the material base that produces it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;convince&#039;&#039; the Brahmin that Dalits are human. But to destroy the caste system that produces the Brahmin&#039;s privilege and the Dalit&#039;s oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;teach&#039;&#039; the capitalist to treat workers fairly. But to expropriate the capitalist&#039;s property and socialize the means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;appeal&#039;&#039; to the imperialist&#039;s better nature. But to break the chains of imperialist extraction and build independent development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The oppressor shows you no mercy. He crushes you and calls it development. He extracts surplus value and calls it opportunity. He displaces you from your land and calls it progress. He shatters your social structures and calls it modernization.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And you would show him kindness? You would appeal to his humanity? You would extend moral regard to a rock, to a force of nature, to a system that operates by its own logic of accumulation regardless of human cost?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not morality but masochism. This is not ethics but capitulation dressed in the language of universal love.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the communist recognizes that liberation requires not conversion but conquest. Not of individual capitalists&#039; hearts but of the capitalist mode of production itself. Not of individual oppressors&#039; minds but of the &#039;&#039;structures&#039;&#039; that produce oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== V. The morality of liberation ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of struggle. Let it be tested not in intellectual philosophical debate but in material transformation of wretched conditions. Let it be measured not by how closely it approaches eternal values but by how effectively it advances liberation.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do not resist violently&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the oppressor, who reserves violence for himself as monopoly. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;all sides have valid concerns&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the ruling class, whose concern is continued domination. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;change must be gradual&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves those who benefit from present arrangements while those who suffer are told to wait.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We reject this ruling class morality. Not because we are immoral but because we recognize morality as historically conditioned, class-determined, and materially grounded. &#039;&#039;&#039;The morality adequate to our struggle is not the morality of the ruling class dressed as universal ethics but the morality born from the recognition that our liberation requires their expropriation, that our humanity requires the negation of their inhumanity, that our flourishing requires the transformation of the system that produces our immiseration.&#039;&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is the morality of the march of history grounded by objective reality&#039;s transformation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not cruelty but clarity. This is not barbarism but recognition that the barbarism is present, operating, crushing lives daily in the name of development, progress, and natural law.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of the concrete: the concrete suffering demanding concrete response. Let it be the morality of the wretched of the earth becoming its stewards, taking what was stolen, building what was destroyed, liberating what was bound.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VI. The revolutionary stance ==&lt;br /&gt;
When the liberal asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in human rights?&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in the right of the worker to the full product of his labor. We believe in the right of the peasant to the land he works. We believe in the right of the oppressed to expropriate the oppressor. These are the rights that are fundamental, for they are the material conditions of all other rights.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the moralist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in non-violence&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in ending the violence of starvation, of preventable disease, of social murder. We believe in ending the structural violence that kills more surely than any revolutionary&#039;s gun. If you call this violence, &#039;&#039;then we are violent&#039;&#039;. If you call justice for the oppressed extremism, &#039;&#039;then we are extremist&#039;&#039;. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;We will not apologize for demanding what is ours by right of having produced it.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the humanist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in the brotherhood of man&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;we believe in the solidarity of the exploited. We believe in the unity of the working class across artificial divisions. We believe in international proletarian solidarity against international capital&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;. But we do not believe in brotherhood with those who profit from our exploitation. Oppressor and oppressed are not brothers. They are enemies in class war that the oppressor pretends does not exist.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality, then, is this: we side with life against the forces of death. We side with the producers against the parasites. We side with the oppresssed against the oppressor. We side with the future against the &#039;&#039;present arrangement that strangles it&#039;&#039;. We side with liberation against all that impedes it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; relativism. This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; nihilism. This is recognition that morality adequate to revolutionary transformation cannot be the morality that rationalizes what must be transformed. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It must be born from struggle, tested in practice, measured by its contribution to liberation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VII. Death upon struggle through struggle ==&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling class offers you this morality: love your enemy, wait for justice, trust the process, respect the law, believe in gradual reform. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Every one of these demands serves their interest. Every one asks you to wait while they accumulate. Every one asks you to be patient while children go hungry. Every one asks you to be peaceful while structural violence grinds you down.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The communists posits something else: &#039;&#039;&#039;the morality of struggle.&#039;&#039;&#039; The morality that recognizes your enemy and names him. The morality that &#039;&#039;demands&#039;&#039; what is yours and &#039;&#039;takes&#039;&#039; it. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The morality that builds in the process of fighting, that transforms in the process of destroying, that creates the new world in the shell of the old.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: organize where you are. Fight where you stand. Link your immediate material interests to the long-term interest of the working class. &#039;&#039;&#039;Recognize that your liberation and the capitalist&#039;s loss are not separate questions but one question with one answer: the overthrow of the system that produces both.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: you owe nothing to those who crush you. Your debt is to those who struggle alongside you. Your obligation is to the future we will build when we have seized what we produced and organize it for human need rather than capital accumulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our morality be this: from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our ethics be this: seize the means of production.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our politics be this: smash the bourgeois state and build the dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our practice be this: organize, agitate, educate, mobilize, revolt.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle. End the class war by winning it. Annihilate exploitation by annihilating the exploiter&#039;s economic power. Transform the wretched of the earth into its stewards not through appeal to the mercy of our oppressors but through organized collective force that makes our oppression impossible.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is communist morality. This is proletarian ethics. This is the only morality adequate to our task: the liberation of humanity from class society, from exploitation, from alienation, from all the chains that capital has forged.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The choice is simple: ruling class morality that rationalizes what is, or concrete morality that fights for what must be. The morality of the bourgeoisie, or the morality of the proletariat. The morality that asks us to wait, or the morality that demands we seize.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;We choose the morality of liberation. We choose the morality of struggle. We choose the morality of the wretched becoming the stewards of the earth they made with their labor and will remake with their victory.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Today we are nothing, tomorrow we will be everything!&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Agitprop (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Hammersicklebanner.png&amp;diff=89653</id>
		<title>File:Hammersicklebanner.png</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Hammersicklebanner.png&amp;diff=89653"/>
		<updated>2026-02-17T16:21:46Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Daniel_De_Leon&amp;diff=89631</id>
		<title>Daniel De Leon</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Daniel_De_Leon&amp;diff=89631"/>
		<updated>2026-02-16T18:02:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox revolutionary|name=Daniel De Leon|birth_date=December 14, 1852|birth_place=[[Curaçao]]|death_date=May 11, 1914 (aged 61)|death_place=[[New York City]], [[State of New York|New York]], [[United States of America|United States]]|political_orientation=[[Syndicalism]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[De Leonism]]|political_party=[[Socialist Labor Party of America|Socialist Labor Party]]|image=Daniel De Leon.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Daniel De Leon&#039;&#039;&#039; (December 14, 1852 – May 11, 1914) was a Statesian [[Socialism|socialist]] who served as the leader of the [[Socialist Labor Party of America]] (SLP) from 1891 until his death. De Leon was an influential thinker in early socialist thought in the United States and was also a co-founder of the [[Industrial Workers of the World]] (IWW), although he only briefly associated with it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He supported a society administered by [[Trade union#Industrial unionism|industrial unions]] instead of the contemporary [[dictatorship of the proletariat]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|last=De Leon|first=Daniel|author=Daniel De Leon|year=1913|title=Industrial Unionism|title-url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/deleon/works/1913/130120.htm|quote=&amp;quot;Industrial Unionism is the Socialist Republic in the making; and the goal once reached, the Industrial Union is the Socialist Republic in operation.&lt;br /&gt;
	&lt;br /&gt;
Accordingly, the Industrial Union is at once the battering ram with which to pound down the fortress of Capitalism, and the successor of the capitalist social structure itself.&amp;quot;|pdf=https://www.marxists.org/archive/deleon/pdf/subject/Ind_Unionism.pdf}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He believed in a two-front approach to the socialist movement, where industrial unions organize to attack the [[bourgeoisie]] along the economic sphere, while a political party organizes to attack the bourgeoisie along the political sphere.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|last=De Leon|first=Daniel|author=Daniel De Leon|year=1896|title=Reform of Revolution?|title-url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/deleon/works/1896/960126.htm|quote=&amp;quot;Make no mistake: The organization of the working class must be both economic and political. The capitalist is organized upon both lines. You must attack him on both.&amp;quot;|pdf=https://www.marxists.org/archive/deleon/pdf/1896/RefRev.pdf}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; He viewed the socialist movement as [[Revolution|revolutionary]], disavowing [[reformism]] as purely external changes.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|last=De Leon|first=Daniel|author=Daniel De Leon|year=1986|title=Reform of Revolution?|title-url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/deleon/works/1896/960126.htm|quote=&amp;quot;And yet, essentially, a poodle he was, a poodle he is and a poodle he will remain. That is reform.&amp;quot;|pdf=https://www.marxists.org/archive/deleon/pdf/1896/RefRev.pdf}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
De Leon&#039;s two-front approach is limited in that the two pillars focus on conflicting purposes; with unions engaging in the very economist fights for immediate relief that De Leon rejected as pointless. Either the trade unions are subordinate to the political goal of state conquest or they are their own organizations seeking out [[Economism|economist]] victories.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Kristen Svanum|newspaper=International Council Correspondence|title=Daniel De Leon|date=1935|url=https://www.marxists.org/subject/left-wing/icc/1935/03/daniel-de-leon.htm}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, he did correctly criticize the [[American Federation of Labor|AFL]] for being [[Class collaborationism|class-collaborationist]] and called for creating new unions instead of radicalizing existing ones.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=[[William Z. Foster]]|year=1952|title=History of the Communist Party of the United States|title-url=http://williamzfoster.blogspot.com/|chapter=The S.L.P: De Leonism and Decline (1890-1900)|chapter-url=https://williamzfoster.blogspot.com/2013/01/chapter-six-slp-de-leonism-and-decline.html}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1852 births]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1914 deaths]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Industrial Workers of the World members]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Socialist Labor Party of America politicians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Statesian communists]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Metaphysics&amp;diff=89607</id>
		<title>Metaphysics</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Metaphysics&amp;diff=89607"/>
		<updated>2026-02-15T23:53:55Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Metaphysics&#039;&#039;&#039; is the study of the world beyond nature or first principles of existence. It is the opposite of [[dialectics]] which explain reality and its dynamicity from within it. Metaphysicists in their variety of outlooks have the fundamentally common position of articulating an external principle of existence by which reality abides and is constrained by. Dialecticians on the contrary assert that dynamicity of the totality is grounded in its very own motion rather than a logically prior principle according to which reality operates. Dialectics itself becomes a naturalized position through the development of its very conceptions and logic as explicitly derivative from material reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Etymology ==&lt;br /&gt;
The word &#039;&#039;meta&#039;&#039; means &#039;&#039;beyond&#039;&#039; in Greek, and is today usually used to mean &#039;&#039;something on something&#039;&#039;. Physics originally referred to the study of nature in Ancient Greece, which can be understood as the natural world, i.e. the physical, material world in which we live.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics, therefore, would refer to the &amp;quot;nature of nature&amp;quot; or something &amp;quot;beyond nature&amp;quot;. Metaphysics put simply is the principles of reality itself, its very operational structure. Per [[dialectical materialism]], no conceptuality can grasp this supposed &amp;quot;beyond&amp;quot; precisely because every conceptuality is structured by material existence. Conceptualities developed within material existence are structured by it. Thus what they always grasp is not some operational logical structure of reality which takes primary existence over reality as [[Plato|Platonists]] and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegelians]] would suggest but rather the logical structure is that which is constrained and developed from engagement within material reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historically, especially to [[Aristotle]], metaphysics was the study of the being which is found beyond nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Philosophy]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Metaphysics&amp;diff=89606</id>
		<title>Metaphysics</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Metaphysics&amp;diff=89606"/>
		<updated>2026-02-15T23:52:52Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: Corrected the metaphysics article&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Metaphysics&#039;&#039;&#039; is the study of the world beyond nature or first principles of existence. It is the opposite of [[dialectics]] which explain reality and its dynamicity from within it. Metaphysicists in their variety of outlooks have the fundamentally common position of articulating an external principle of existence by which reality abides and is constrained by. Dialecticians on the contrary assert that dynamicity of the totality is grounded in its own very motion rather than a logically prior principle according to which reality operates. Dialectics itself becomes a naturalized position through the development of its very conceptions and logic as explicitly derivative from material reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Etymology ==&lt;br /&gt;
The word &#039;&#039;meta&#039;&#039; means &#039;&#039;beyond&#039;&#039; in Greek, and is today usually used to mean &#039;&#039;something on something&#039;&#039;. Physics originally referred to the study of nature in Ancient Greece, which can be understood as the natural world, i.e. the physical, material world in which we live.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Metaphysics, therefore, would refer to the &amp;quot;nature of nature&amp;quot; or something &amp;quot;beyond nature&amp;quot;. Metaphysics put simply is the principles of reality itself, its very operational structure. Per [[dialectical materialism]], no conceptuality can grasp this supposed &amp;quot;beyond&amp;quot; precisely because every conceptuality is structured by material existence. Conceptualities developed within material existence are structured by it. Thus what they always grasp is not some operational logical structure of reality which takes primary existence over reality as [[Plato|Platonists]] and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegelians]] would suggest but rather the logical structure is that which is constrained and developed from engagement within material reality.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Historically, especially to [[Aristotle]], metaphysics was the study of the being which is found beyond nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Philosophy]]&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Category:Essays_by_Comrade_Kiwi&amp;diff=89497</id>
		<title>Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Category:Essays_by_Comrade_Kiwi&amp;diff=89497"/>
		<updated>2026-02-10T11:03:31Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;Okay so all my essays will be continously expanded because I can never decide on a final version.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feel free to ping me on the discord to ask for a clarification or elaboration on anything I write.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by author]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=88220</id>
		<title>Essay:A thousand chains we will have to break</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=88220"/>
		<updated>2025-11-14T18:51:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=A thousand chains we will have to break|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-15|excerpt=What is the morality of the communist? What are our ethics? On what basis? The morality adequate to our struggle is not the morality of the ruling class dressed as universal ethics but the morality born from the recognition that our liberation requires their expropriation, that our humanity requires the negation of their inhumanity, that our flourishing requires the transformation of the system that produces our immiseration.|image=Partisanexecutionb.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“Be moderate,” the trimmers cry,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Who dread the tyrants’ thunder.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“You ask too much and people fly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;From you aghast in wonder.”&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;’Tis passing strange, for I declare&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Such statements give me mirth,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;For our demands most moderate are,&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;We only want the earth.&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;- James Connolly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== I. The question of morality ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What morality do you speak of? What morality do you seek?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal extends his hand and speaks of universal human values, of dignity inherent to all, of rights transcending material conditions. He speaks as if morality descended from heaven, &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;eternal and unchanging, waiting to be discovered by enlightened minds.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is mystification. This is the morality of those who crush speaking the language of those who are crushed.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the proletariat is not detached but &#039;&#039;&#039;concrete&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not discovered but &#039;&#039;&#039;forged&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not eternal but &#039;&#039;&#039;historical&#039;&#039;&#039;. It emerges not from contemplation but from &#039;&#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;&#039;, from the realization that the struggle is not imaginary but &#039;&#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039;&#039;, not philosophical but &#039;&#039;&#039;visceral&#039;&#039;&#039;, not distant but &#039;&#039;&#039;immediate&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is born in the factory where the worker&#039;s body is ground to produce surplus value. Our morality is born in the slum where children die of preventable disease because medicine serves profit, not need. Our morality is born in the field where the farmer hangs himself because debt compounds while grain rots in warehouses.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not sentiment. This is material reality demanding response. The morality that emerges from this reality is not universal brotherhood but class war. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Not an abstract notion of humanity but concrete humanity as it exists within objective reality.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== II. The mystification of humanity ==&lt;br /&gt;
You appeal to humanity. You say: all humans are one, all deserve dignity, all are brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;which&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;humanity&#039;&#039;? The humanity of the ruling class, standing outside history, outside class, outside the brutal material relations that structure every moment of existence? &#039;&#039;&#039;This humanity does not exist&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is phantom, an enemy construct deployed precisely to obscure the reality that humanity is fractured, divided, set against itself by the mode of production that constitutes it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are you one with Ambani, whose wealth accumulates while workers starve? Are you one with Adani, whose ports and power plants displace tribals and destroy ecosystems? Are you one with Tata, whose steel mills and automobile factories extract surplus from your labor, whose mansions rise on your exploitation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;No. You. Are. Not.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To them, you are not human in the same sense they are human. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;You are resource, instrument, means to accumulation. Your suffering is &#039;&#039;&#039;externality&#039;&#039;&#039;, your death is &#039;&#039;&#039;statistic&#039;&#039;&#039;, your resistance is &#039;&#039;&#039;disruption&#039;&#039;&#039; to be managed or crushed.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gaze of the oppressor looks down. It sees not equals but lesser beings whose &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;natural position&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt; is &#039;&#039;&#039;subordination&#039;&#039;&#039;. The Brahmin looks at the Dalit and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;pollution&#039;&#039;&#039;. The capitalist looks at the worker and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;cost&#039;&#039;&#039;. The imperialist looks at the colonized and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;primitive accumulation waiting to happen&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not mere prejudice to be overcome through education. This is not individual failing to be corrected through moral improvement. &#039;&#039;&#039;This is structural necessity produced by material relations of domination.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When capital requires exploitation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;justifies&#039;&#039;&#039; exploitation. When caste requires hierarchy, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;naturalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; hierarchy. When imperialism requires subjugation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;rationalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; subjugation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;To appeal to abstract humanity while these structures persist is not moral but mystification. It hides the material base of oppression behind the veil of universal values. It substitutes the concrete demand for liberation with the abstract hope for recognition.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== III. The concrete against the detached ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Our struggle is not fictional. The social murder of our people is concrete. The death of a child because sustaining life does not serve capital is concrete. The starvation of a family because subsistence wages ensure maximum extraction is concrete. The annihilation of every livable condition while productive capacity has never been higher is concrete.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do you tell the worker whose lungs fill with silica dust in the mine? That all humanity is one? What do you tell the mother whose child dies because the hospital demands payment she cannot provide? That human dignity is universal? What do you tell the farmer drowning in debt while his harvest is purchased below cost of production? That we are all brothers?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are not answers. These are &#039;&#039;evasions&#039;&#039;. These are the comfortable ruling class notions of those whose material conditions allow them the luxury of detachment and mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The worker does not need to be told about universal humanity. The worker needs the means of subsistence guaranteed, the exploitation ended, the structures that produce his misery overthrown.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of struggle recognizes this. It refuses disembodiment because disembodiment serves those who benefit from obscuring material reality. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It refuses universalism because universalism erases the particularity of oppression and the necessity of particular struggle.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is partisan. It takes sides. It recognizes comrades and enemies not in the liberal sense of difference of opinion but in the material sense of opposing class interests. The worker and the capitalist do not have competing values requiring &#039;&#039;dialogue&#039;&#039;. They have antagonistic material interests requiring &#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IV. The task of the communist ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The task of the communist is simple in formulation, infinite in implication: to annihilate the gaze of superiority by annihilating the material base that produces it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;convince&#039;&#039; the Brahmin that Dalits are human. But to destroy the caste system that produces the Brahmin&#039;s privilege and the Dalit&#039;s oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;teach&#039;&#039; the capitalist to treat workers fairly. But to expropriate the capitalist&#039;s property and socialize the means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;appeal&#039;&#039; to the imperialist&#039;s better nature. But to break the chains of imperialist extraction and build independent development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The oppressor shows you no mercy. He crushes you and calls it development. He extracts surplus value and calls it opportunity. He displaces you from your land and calls it progress. He shatters your social structures and calls it modernization.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And you would show him kindness? You would appeal to his humanity? You would extend moral regard to a rock, to a force of nature, to a system that operates by its own logic of accumulation regardless of human cost?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not morality but masochism. This is not ethics but capitulation dressed in the language of universal love.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the communist recognizes that liberation requires not conversion but conquest. Not of individual capitalists&#039; hearts but of the capitalist mode of production itself. Not of individual oppressors&#039; minds but of the &#039;&#039;structures&#039;&#039; that produce oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== V. The morality of liberation ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of struggle. Let it be tested not in intellectual philosophical debate but in material transformation of wretched conditions. Let it be measured not by how closely it approaches eternal values but by how effectively it advances liberation.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do not resist violently&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the oppressor, who reserves violence for himself as monopoly. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;all sides have valid concerns&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the ruling class, whose concern is continued domination. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;change must be gradual&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves those who benefit from present arrangements while those who suffer are told to wait.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We reject this ruling class morality. Not because we are immoral but because we recognize morality as historically conditioned, class-determined, and materially grounded. &#039;&#039;&#039;The morality adequate to our struggle is not the morality of the ruling class dressed as universal ethics but the morality born from the recognition that our liberation requires their expropriation, that our humanity requires the negation of their inhumanity, that our flourishing requires the transformation of the system that produces our immiseration.&#039;&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is the morality of the march of history grounded by objective reality&#039;s transformation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not cruelty but clarity. This is not barbarism but recognition that the barbarism is present, operating, crushing lives daily in the name of development, progress, and natural law.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of the concrete: the concrete suffering demanding concrete response. Let it be the morality of the wretched of the earth becoming its stewards, taking what was stolen, building what was destroyed, liberating what was bound.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VI. The revolutionary stance ==&lt;br /&gt;
When the liberal asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in human rights?&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in the right of the worker to the full product of his labor. We believe in the right of the peasant to the land he works. We believe in the right of the oppressed to expropriate the oppressor. These are the rights that are fundamental, for they are the material conditions of all other rights.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the moralist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in non-violence&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in ending the violence of starvation, of preventable disease, of social murder. We believe in ending the structural violence that kills more surely than any revolutionary&#039;s gun. If you call this violence, &#039;&#039;then we are violent&#039;&#039;. If you call justice for the oppressed extremism, &#039;&#039;then we are extremist&#039;&#039;. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;We will not apologize for demanding what is ours by right of having produced it.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the humanist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in the brotherhood of man&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;we believe in the solidarity of the exploited. We believe in the unity of the working class across artificial divisions. We believe in international proletarian solidarity against international capital&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;. But we do not believe in brotherhood with those who profit from our exploitation. Oppressor and oppressed are not brothers. They are enemies in class war that the oppressor pretends does not exist.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality, then, is this: we side with life against the forces of death. We side with the producers against the parasites. We side with the oppresssed against the oppressor. We side with the future against the &#039;&#039;present arrangement that strangles it&#039;&#039;. We side with liberation against all that impedes it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; relativism. This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; nihilism. This is recognition that morality adequate to revolutionary transformation cannot be the morality that rationalizes what must be transformed. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It must be born from struggle, tested in practice, measured by its contribution to liberation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VII. Death upon struggle through struggle ==&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling class offers you this morality: love your enemy, wait for justice, trust the process, respect the law, believe in gradual reform. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Every one of these demands serves their interest. Every one asks you to wait while they accumulate. Every one asks you to be patient while children go hungry. Every one asks you to be peaceful while structural violence grinds you down.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The communists posits something else: &#039;&#039;&#039;the morality of struggle.&#039;&#039;&#039; The morality that recognizes your enemy and names him. The morality that &#039;&#039;demands&#039;&#039; what is yours and &#039;&#039;takes&#039;&#039; it. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The morality that builds in the process of fighting, that transforms in the process of destroying, that creates the new world in the shell of the old.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: organize where you are. Fight where you stand. Link your immediate material interests to the long-term interest of the working class. &#039;&#039;&#039;Recognize that your liberation and the capitalist&#039;s loss are not separate questions but one question with one answer: the overthrow of the system that produces both.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: you owe nothing to those who crush you. Your debt is to those who struggle alongside you. Your obligation is to the future we will build when we have seized what we produced and organize it for human need rather than capital accumulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our morality be this: from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our ethics be this: seize the means of production.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our politics be this: smash the bourgeois state and build the dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our practice be this: organize, agitate, educate, mobilize, revolt.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle. End the class war by winning it. Annihilate exploitation by annihilating the exploiter&#039;s economic power. Transform the wretched of the earth into its stewards not through appeal to the mercy of our oppressors but through organized collective force that makes our oppression impossible.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is communist morality. This is proletarian ethics. This is the only morality adequate to our task: the liberation of humanity from class society, from exploitation, from alienation, from all the chains that capital has forged.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The choice is simple: ruling class morality that rationalizes what is, or concrete morality that fights for what must be. The morality of the bourgeoisie, or the morality of the proletariat. The morality that asks us to wait, or the morality that demands we seize.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;We choose the morality of liberation. We choose the morality of struggle. We choose the morality of the wretched becoming the stewards of the earth they made with their labor and will remake with their victory.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Today we are nothing, tomorrow we will be everything!&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Agitprop (Essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=88219</id>
		<title>Essay:A thousand chains we will have to break</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=88219"/>
		<updated>2025-11-14T18:41:16Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=A thousand chains we will have to break|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-15|excerpt=What is the morality of the communist? What are our ethics? On what basis?|image=Partisanexecutionb.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“Be moderate,” the trimmers cry,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Who dread the tyrants’ thunder.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“You ask too much and people fly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;From you aghast in wonder.”&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;’Tis passing strange, for I declare&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Such statements give me mirth,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;For our demands most moderate are,&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;We only want the earth.&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;- James Connolly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== I. The question of morality ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What morality do you speak of? What morality do you seek?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal extends his hand and speaks of universal human values, of dignity inherent to all, of rights transcending material conditions. He speaks as if morality descended from heaven, &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;eternal and unchanging, waiting to be discovered by enlightened minds.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is mystification. This is the morality of those who crush speaking the language of those who are crushed.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the proletariat is not detached but &#039;&#039;&#039;concrete&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not discovered but &#039;&#039;&#039;forged&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not eternal but &#039;&#039;&#039;historical&#039;&#039;&#039;. It emerges not from contemplation but from &#039;&#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;&#039;, from the realization that the struggle is not imaginary but &#039;&#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039;&#039;, not philosophical but &#039;&#039;&#039;visceral&#039;&#039;&#039;, not distant but &#039;&#039;&#039;immediate&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is born in the factory where the worker&#039;s body is ground to produce surplus value. Our morality is born in the slum where children die of preventable disease because medicine serves profit, not need. Our morality is born in the field where the farmer hangs himself because debt compounds while grain rots in warehouses.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not sentiment. This is material reality demanding response. The morality that emerges from this reality is not universal brotherhood but class war. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Not an abstract notion of humanity but concrete humanity as it exists within objective reality.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== II. The mystification of humanity ==&lt;br /&gt;
You appeal to humanity. You say: all humans are one, all deserve dignity, all are brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;which&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;humanity&#039;&#039;? The humanity of the ruling class, standing outside history, outside class, outside the brutal material relations that structure every moment of existence? &#039;&#039;&#039;This humanity does not exist&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is phantom, an enemy construct deployed precisely to obscure the reality that humanity is fractured, divided, set against itself by the mode of production that constitutes it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are you one with Ambani, whose wealth accumulates while workers starve? Are you one with Adani, whose ports and power plants displace tribals and destroy ecosystems? Are you one with Tata, whose steel mills and automobile factories extract surplus from your labor, whose mansions rise on your exploitation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;No. You. Are. Not.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To them, you are not human in the same sense they are human. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;You are resource, instrument, means to accumulation. Your suffering is &#039;&#039;&#039;externality&#039;&#039;&#039;, your death is &#039;&#039;&#039;statistic&#039;&#039;&#039;, your resistance is &#039;&#039;&#039;disruption&#039;&#039;&#039; to be managed or crushed.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gaze of the oppressor looks down. It sees not equals but lesser beings whose &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;natural position&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt; is &#039;&#039;&#039;subordination&#039;&#039;&#039;. The Brahmin looks at the Dalit and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;pollution&#039;&#039;&#039;. The capitalist looks at the worker and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;cost&#039;&#039;&#039;. The imperialist looks at the colonized and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;primitive accumulation waiting to happen&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not mere prejudice to be overcome through education. This is not individual failing to be corrected through moral improvement. &#039;&#039;&#039;This is structural necessity produced by material relations of domination.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When capital requires exploitation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;justifies&#039;&#039;&#039; exploitation. When caste requires hierarchy, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;naturalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; hierarchy. When imperialism requires subjugation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;rationalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; subjugation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;To appeal to abstract humanity while these structures persist is not moral but mystification. It hides the material base of oppression behind the veil of universal values. It substitutes the concrete demand for liberation with the abstract hope for recognition.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== III. The concrete against the detached ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Our struggle is not fictional. The social murder of our people is concrete. The death of a child because sustaining life does not serve capital is concrete. The starvation of a family because subsistence wages ensure maximum extraction is concrete. The annihilation of every livable condition while productive capacity has never been higher is concrete.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do you tell the worker whose lungs fill with silica dust in the mine? That all humanity is one? What do you tell the mother whose child dies because the hospital demands payment she cannot provide? That human dignity is universal? What do you tell the farmer drowning in debt while his harvest is purchased below cost of production? That we are all brothers?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are not answers. These are &#039;&#039;evasions&#039;&#039;. These are the comfortable ruling class notions of those whose material conditions allow them the luxury of detachment and mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The worker does not need to be told about universal humanity. The worker needs the means of subsistence guaranteed, the exploitation ended, the structures that produce his misery overthrown.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of struggle recognizes this. It refuses disembodiment because disembodiment serves those who benefit from obscuring material reality. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It refuses universalism because universalism erases the particularity of oppression and the necessity of particular struggle.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is partisan. It takes sides. It recognizes comrades and enemies not in the liberal sense of difference of opinion but in the material sense of opposing class interests. The worker and the capitalist do not have competing values requiring &#039;&#039;dialogue&#039;&#039;. They have antagonistic material interests requiring &#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IV. The task of the communist ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The task of the communist is simple in formulation, infinite in implication: to annihilate the gaze of superiority by annihilating the material base that produces it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;convince&#039;&#039; the Brahmin that Dalits are human. But to destroy the caste system that produces the Brahmin&#039;s privilege and the Dalit&#039;s oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;teach&#039;&#039; the capitalist to treat workers fairly. But to expropriate the capitalist&#039;s property and socialize the means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;appeal&#039;&#039; to the imperialist&#039;s better nature. But to break the chains of imperialist extraction and build independent development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The oppressor shows you no mercy. He crushes you and calls it development. He extracts surplus value and calls it opportunity. He displaces you from your land and calls it progress. He shatters your social structures and calls it modernization.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And you would show him kindness? You would appeal to his humanity? You would extend moral regard to a rock, to a force of nature, to a system that operates by its own logic of accumulation regardless of human cost?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not morality but masochism. This is not ethics but capitulation dressed in the language of universal love.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the communist recognizes that liberation requires not conversion but conquest. Not of individual capitalists&#039; hearts but of the capitalist mode of production itself. Not of individual oppressors&#039; minds but of the &#039;&#039;structures&#039;&#039; that produce oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== V. The morality of liberation ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of struggle. Let it be tested not in intellectual philosophical debate but in material transformation of wretched conditions. Let it be measured not by how closely it approaches eternal values but by how effectively it advances liberation.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do not resist violently&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the oppressor, who reserves violence for himself as monopoly. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;all sides have valid concerns&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the ruling class, whose concern is continued domination. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;change must be gradual&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves those who benefit from present arrangements while those who suffer are told to wait.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We reject this ruling class morality. Not because we are immoral but because we recognize morality as historically conditioned, class-determined, and materially grounded. &#039;&#039;&#039;The morality adequate to our struggle is not the morality of the ruling class dressed as universal ethics but the morality born from the recognition that our liberation requires their expropriation, that our humanity requires the negation of their inhumanity, that our flourishing requires the transformation of the system that produces our immiseration.&#039;&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is the morality of the march of history grounded by objective reality&#039;s transformation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not cruelty but clarity. This is not barbarism but recognition that the barbarism is present, operating, crushing lives daily in the name of development, progress, and natural law.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of the concrete: the concrete suffering demanding concrete response. Let it be the morality of the wretched of the earth becoming its stewards, taking what was stolen, building what was destroyed, liberating what was bound.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VI. The revolutionary stance ==&lt;br /&gt;
When the liberal asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in human rights?&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in the right of the worker to the full product of his labor. We believe in the right of the peasant to the land he works. We believe in the right of the oppressed to expropriate the oppressor. These are the rights that are fundamental, for they are the material conditions of all other rights.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the moralist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in non-violence&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in ending the violence of starvation, of preventable disease, of social murder. We believe in ending the structural violence that kills more surely than any revolutionary&#039;s gun. If you call this violence, &#039;&#039;then we are violent&#039;&#039;. If you call justice for the oppressed extremism, &#039;&#039;then we are extremist&#039;&#039;. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;We will not apologize for demanding what is ours by right of having produced it.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the humanist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in the brotherhood of man&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;we believe in the solidarity of the exploited. We believe in the unity of the working class across artificial divisions. We believe in international proletarian solidarity against international capital&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;. But we do not believe in brotherhood with those who profit from our exploitation. Oppressor and oppressed are not brothers. They are enemies in class war that the oppressor pretends does not exist.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality, then, is this: we side with life against the forces of death. We side with the producers against the parasites. We side with the oppresssed against the oppressor. We side with the future against the &#039;&#039;present arrangement that strangles it&#039;&#039;. We side with liberation against all that impedes it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; relativism. This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; nihilism. This is recognition that morality adequate to revolutionary transformation cannot be the morality that rationalizes what must be transformed. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It must be born from struggle, tested in practice, measured by its contribution to liberation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VII. Death upon struggle through struggle ==&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling class offers you this morality: love your enemy, wait for justice, trust the process, respect the law, believe in gradual reform. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Every one of these demands serves their interest. Every one asks you to wait while they accumulate. Every one asks you to be patient while children go hungry. Every one asks you to be peaceful while structural violence grinds you down.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The communists posits something else: &#039;&#039;&#039;the morality of struggle.&#039;&#039;&#039; The morality that recognizes your enemy and names him. The morality that &#039;&#039;demands&#039;&#039; what is yours and &#039;&#039;takes&#039;&#039; it. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The morality that builds in the process of fighting, that transforms in the process of destroying, that creates the new world in the shell of the old.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: organize where you are. Fight where you stand. Link your immediate material interests to the long-term interest of the working class. &#039;&#039;&#039;Recognize that your liberation and the capitalist&#039;s loss are not separate questions but one question with one answer: the overthrow of the system that produces both.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: you owe nothing to those who crush you. Your debt is to those who struggle alongside you. Your obligation is to the future we will build when we have seized what we produced and organize it for human need rather than capital accumulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our morality be this: from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our ethics be this: seize the means of production.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our politics be this: smash the bourgeois state and build the dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our practice be this: organize, agitate, educate, mobilize, revolt.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle. End the class war by winning it. Annihilate exploitation by annihilating the exploiter&#039;s economic power. Transform the wretched of the earth into its stewards not through appeal to the mercy of our oppressors but through organized collective force that makes our oppression impossible.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is communist morality. This is proletarian ethics. This is the only morality adequate to our task: the liberation of humanity from class society, from exploitation, from alienation, from all the chains that capital has forged.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The choice is simple: ruling class morality that rationalizes what is, or concrete morality that fights for what must be. The morality of the bourgeoisie, or the morality of the proletariat. The morality that asks us to wait, or the morality that demands we seize.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;We choose the morality of liberation. We choose the morality of struggle. We choose the morality of the wretched becoming the stewards of the earth they made with their labor and will remake with their victory.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Today we are nothing, tomorrow we will be everything!&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Agitprop (Essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=88218</id>
		<title>Essay:A thousand chains we will have to break</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=88218"/>
		<updated>2025-11-14T18:39:08Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=A thousand chains we will have to break|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-15|excerpt=What is the morality of the communist? What are our ethics? On what basis?|image=Partisanexecutionb.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“Be moderate,” the trimmers cry,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Who dread the tyrants’ thunder.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“You ask too much and people fly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;From you aghast in wonder.”&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;’Tis passing strange, for I declare&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Such statements give me mirth,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;For our demands most moderate are,&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;We only want the earth.&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;- James Connolly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== I. The question of morality ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What morality do you speak of? What morality do you seek?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal extends his hand and speaks of universal human values, of dignity inherent to all, of rights transcending material conditions. He speaks as if morality descended from heaven, &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;eternal and unchanging, waiting to be discovered by enlightened minds.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is mystification. This is the morality of those who crush speaking the language of those who are crushed.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the proletariat is not detached but &#039;&#039;&#039;concrete&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not discovered but &#039;&#039;&#039;forged&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not eternal but &#039;&#039;&#039;historical&#039;&#039;&#039;. It emerges not from contemplation but from &#039;&#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;&#039;, from the realization that the struggle is not imaginary but &#039;&#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039;&#039;, not philosophical but &#039;&#039;&#039;visceral&#039;&#039;&#039;, not distant but &#039;&#039;&#039;immediate&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is born in the factory where the worker&#039;s body is ground to produce surplus value. Our morality is born in the slum where children die of preventable disease because medicine serves profit, not need. Our morality is born in the field where the farmer hangs himself because debt compounds while grain rots in warehouses.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not sentiment. This is material reality demanding response. The morality that emerges from this reality is not universal brotherhood but class war. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Not an abstract notion of humanity but concrete humanity as it exists within objective reality.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== II. The mystification of humanity ==&lt;br /&gt;
You appeal to humanity. You say: all humans are one, all deserve dignity, all are brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;which&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;humanity&#039;&#039;? The humanity of the ruling class, standing outside history, outside class, outside the brutal material relations that structure every moment of existence? &#039;&#039;&#039;This humanity does not exist&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is phantom, an enemy construct deployed precisely to obscure the reality that humanity is fractured, divided, set against itself by the mode of production that constitutes it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are you one with Ambani, whose wealth accumulates while workers starve? Are you one with Adani, whose ports and power plants displace tribals and destroy ecosystems? Are you one with Tata, whose steel mills and automobile factories extract surplus from your labor, whose mansions rise on your exploitation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;No. You. Are. Not.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To them, you are not human in the same sense they are human. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;You are resource, instrument, means to accumulation. Your suffering is &#039;&#039;&#039;externality&#039;&#039;&#039;, your death is &#039;&#039;&#039;statistic&#039;&#039;&#039;, your resistance is &#039;&#039;&#039;disruption&#039;&#039;&#039; to be managed or crushed.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gaze of the oppressor looks down. It sees not equals but lesser beings whose &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;natural position&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt; is &#039;&#039;&#039;subordination&#039;&#039;&#039;. The Brahmin looks at the Dalit and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;pollution&#039;&#039;&#039;. The capitalist looks at the worker and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;cost&#039;&#039;&#039;. The imperialist looks at the colonized and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;primitive accumulation waiting to happen&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not mere prejudice to be overcome through education. This is not individual failing to be corrected through moral improvement. &#039;&#039;&#039;This is structural necessity produced by material relations of domination.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When capital requires exploitation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;justifies&#039;&#039;&#039; exploitation. When caste requires hierarchy, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;naturalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; hierarchy. When imperialism requires subjugation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;rationalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; subjugation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;To appeal to abstract humanity while these structures persist is not moral but mystification. It hides the material base of oppression behind the veil of universal values. It substitutes the concrete demand for liberation with the abstract hope for recognition.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== III. The concrete against the detached ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Our struggle is not fictional. The social murder of our people is concrete. The death of a child because sustaining life does not serve capital is concrete. The starvation of a family because subsistence wages ensure maximum extraction is concrete. The annihilation of every livable condition while productive capacity has never been higher is concrete.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do you tell the worker whose lungs fill with silica dust in the mine? That all humanity is one? What do you tell the mother whose child dies because the hospital demands payment she cannot provide? That human dignity is universal? What do you tell the farmer drowning in debt while his harvest is purchased below cost of production? That we are all brothers?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are not answers. These are &#039;&#039;evasions&#039;&#039;. These are the comfortable ruling class notions of those whose material conditions allow them the luxury of detachment and mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The worker does not need to be told about universal humanity. The worker needs the means of subsistence guaranteed, the exploitation ended, the structures that produce his misery overthrown.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of struggle recognizes this. It refuses disembodiment because disembodiment serves those who benefit from obscuring material reality. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It refuses universalism because universalism erases the particularity of oppression and the necessity of particular struggle.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is partisan. It takes sides. It recognizes comrades and enemies not in the liberal sense of difference of opinion but in the material sense of opposing class interests. The worker and the capitalist do not have competing values requiring &#039;&#039;dialogue&#039;&#039;. They have antagonistic material interests requiring &#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IV. The task of the communist ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The task of the communist is simple in formulation, infinite in implication: to annihilate the gaze of superiority by annihilating the material base that produces it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;convince&#039;&#039; the Brahmin that Dalits are human. But to destroy the caste system that produces the Brahmin&#039;s privilege and the Dalit&#039;s oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;teach&#039;&#039; the capitalist to treat workers fairly. But to expropriate the capitalist&#039;s property and socialize the means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;appeal&#039;&#039; to the imperialist&#039;s better nature. But to break the chains of imperialist extraction and build independent development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The oppressor shows you no mercy. He crushes you and calls it development. He extracts surplus value and calls it opportunity. He displaces you from your land and calls it progress. He shatters your social structures and calls it modernization.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And you would show him kindness? You would appeal to his humanity? You would extend moral regard to a rock, to a force of nature, to a system that operates by its own logic of accumulation regardless of human cost?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not morality but masochism. This is not ethics but capitulation dressed in the language of universal love.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the communist recognizes that liberation requires not conversion but conquest. Not of individual capitalists&#039; hearts but of the capitalist mode of production itself. Not of individual oppressors&#039; minds but of the &#039;&#039;structures&#039;&#039; that produce oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== V. The morality of liberation ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of struggle. Let it be tested not in intellectual philosophical debate but in material transformation of wretched conditions. Let it be measured not by how closely it approaches eternal values but by how effectively it advances liberation.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do not resist violently&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the oppressor, who reserves violence for himself as monopoly. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;all sides have valid concerns&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the ruling class, whose concern is continued domination. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;change must be gradual&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves those who benefit from present arrangements while those who suffer are told to wait.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We reject this ruling class morality. Not because we are immoral but because we recognize morality as historically conditioned, class-determined, and materially grounded. &#039;&#039;&#039;The morality adequate to our struggle is not the morality of the ruling class dressed as universal ethics but the morality born from the recognition that our liberation requires their expropriation, that our humanity requires the negation of their inhumanity, that our flourishing requires the transformation of the system that produces our immiseration.&#039;&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is the morality of the march of history grounded by objective reality&#039;s transformation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not cruelty but clarity. This is not barbarism but recognition that the barbarism is present, operating, crushing lives daily in the name of development, progress, and natural law.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of the concrete: the concrete suffering demanding concrete response. Let it be the morality of the wretched of the earth becoming its stewards, taking what was stolen, building what was destroyed, liberating what was bound.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VI. The revolutionary stance ==&lt;br /&gt;
When the liberal asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in human rights?&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in the right of the worker to the full product of his labor. We believe in the right of the peasant to the land he works. We believe in the right of the oppressed to expropriate the oppressor. These are the rights that are fundamental, for they are the material conditions of all other rights.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the moralist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in non-violence&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in ending the violence of starvation, of preventable disease, of social murder. We believe in ending the structural violence that kills more surely than any revolutionary&#039;s gun. If you call this violence, &#039;&#039;then we are violent&#039;&#039;. If you call justice for the oppressed extremism, &#039;&#039;then we are extremist&#039;&#039;. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;We will not apologize for demanding what is ours by right of having produced it.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the humanist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in the brotherhood of man&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;we believe in the solidarity of the exploited. We believe in the unity of the working class across artificial divisions. We believe in international proletarian solidarity against international capital&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;. But we do not believe in brotherhood with those who profit from our exploitation. Oppressor and oppressed are not brothers. They are enemies in class war that the oppressor pretends does not exist.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality, then, is this: we side with life against the forces of death. We side with the producers against the parasites. We side with the oppresssed against the oppressor. We side with the future against the &#039;&#039;present arrangement that strangles it&#039;&#039;. We side with liberation against all that impedes it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; relativism. This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; nihilism. This is recognition that morality adequate to revolutionary transformation cannot be the morality that rationalizes what must be transformed. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It must be born from struggle, tested in practice, measured by its contribution to liberation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VII. Death upon struggle through struggle ==&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling class offers you this morality: love your enemy, wait for justice, trust the process, respect the law, believe in gradual reform. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Every one of these demands serves their interest. Every one asks you to wait while they accumulate. Every one asks you to be patient while children go hungry. Every one asks you to be peaceful while structural violence grinds you down.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The communists posits something else: &#039;&#039;&#039;the morality of struggle.&#039;&#039;&#039; The morality that recognizes your enemy and names him. The morality that &#039;&#039;demands&#039;&#039; what is yours and &#039;&#039;takes&#039;&#039; it. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The morality that builds in the process of fighting, that transforms in the process of destroying, that creates the new world in the shell of the old.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: organize where you are. Fight where you stand. Link your immediate material interests to the long-term interest of the working class. &#039;&#039;&#039;Recognize that your liberation and the capitalist&#039;s loss are not separate questions but one question with one answer: the overthrow of the system that produces both.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: you owe nothing to those who crush you. Your debt is to those who struggle alongside you. Your obligation is to the future we will build when we have seized what we produced and organize it for human need rather than capital accumulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our morality be this: from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our ethics be this: seize the means of production.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our politics be this: smash the bourgeois state and build the dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our practice be this: organize, agitate, educate, mobilize, revolt.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle. End the class war by winning it. Annihilate exploitation by annihilating the exploiter&#039;s economic power. Transform the wretched of the earth into its stewards not through appeal to the mercy of our oppressors but through organized collective force that makes our oppression impossible.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is communist morality. This is proletarian ethics. This is the only morality adequate to our task: the liberation of humanity from class society, from exploitation, from alienation, from all the chains that capital has forged.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The choice is simple: ruling class morality that rationalizes what is, or concrete morality that fights for what must be. The morality of the bourgeoisie, or the morality of the proletariat. The morality that asks us to wait, or the morality that demands we seize.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;We choose the morality of liberation. We choose the morality of struggle. We choose the morality of the wretched becoming the stewards of the earth they made with their labor and will remake with their victory.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Today we are nothing, tomorrow we will be everything!&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Partisanexecutionb.png&amp;diff=88217</id>
		<title>File:Partisanexecutionb.png</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Partisanexecutionb.png&amp;diff=88217"/>
		<updated>2025-11-14T18:38:14Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
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		<title>File:Partisanexecution.png</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Partisanexecution.png&amp;diff=88216"/>
		<updated>2025-11-14T18:36:04Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=88215</id>
		<title>Essay:A thousand chains we will have to break</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:A_thousand_chains_we_will_have_to_break&amp;diff=88215"/>
		<updated>2025-11-14T18:35:19Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: Created page with &amp;quot;{{Infobox essay|title=A thousand chains we will have to break|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-15|excerpt=What is the morality of the communist? What are our ethics? On what basis?|image=Partisanexecution.png}}   &amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“Be moderate,” the trimmers cry,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;  &amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Who dread the tyrants’ thunder.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;  &amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“You ask too much and people fly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;  &amp;lt;big&amp;gt;From you aghast in wonder.”&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;  &amp;lt;big&amp;gt;’Tis passing strange, for I declare&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;  &amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Such statem...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=A thousand chains we will have to break|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-15|excerpt=What is the morality of the communist? What are our ethics? On what basis?|image=Partisanexecution.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“Be moderate,” the trimmers cry,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Who dread the tyrants’ thunder.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;“You ask too much and people fly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;From you aghast in wonder.”&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;’Tis passing strange, for I declare&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Such statements give me mirth,&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;For our demands most moderate are,&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;We only want the earth.&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;- James Connolly&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; =&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== I. The question of morality ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What morality do you speak of? What morality do you seek?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The liberal extends his hand and speaks of universal human values, of dignity inherent to all, of rights transcending material conditions. He speaks as if morality descended from heaven, &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;eternal and unchanging, waiting to be discovered by enlightened minds.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is mystification. This is the morality of those who crush speaking the language of those who are crushed.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the proletariat is not detached but &#039;&#039;&#039;concrete&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not discovered but &#039;&#039;&#039;forged&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is not eternal but &#039;&#039;&#039;historical&#039;&#039;&#039;. It emerges not from contemplation but from &#039;&#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;&#039;, from the realization that the struggle is not imaginary but &#039;&#039;&#039;material&#039;&#039;&#039;, not philosophical but &#039;&#039;&#039;visceral&#039;&#039;&#039;, not distant but &#039;&#039;&#039;immediate&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is born in the factory where the worker&#039;s body is ground to produce surplus value. Our morality is born in the slum where children die of preventable disease because medicine serves profit, not need. Our morality is born in the field where the farmer hangs himself because debt compounds while grain rots in warehouses.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not sentiment. This is material reality demanding response. The morality that emerges from this reality is not universal brotherhood but class war. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Not an abstract notion of humanity but concrete humanity as it exists within objective reality.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== II. The mystification of humanity ==&lt;br /&gt;
You appeal to humanity. You say: all humans are one, all deserve dignity, all are brothers.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But &#039;&#039;which&#039;&#039; &#039;&#039;humanity&#039;&#039;? The humanity of the ruling class, standing outside history, outside class, outside the brutal material relations that structure every moment of existence? &#039;&#039;&#039;This humanity does not exist&#039;&#039;&#039;. It is phantom, an enemy construct deployed precisely to obscure the reality that humanity is fractured, divided, set against itself by the mode of production that constitutes it.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Are you one with Ambani, whose wealth accumulates while workers starve? Are you one with Adani, whose ports and power plants displace tribals and destroy ecosystems? Are you one with Tata, whose steel mills and automobile factories extract surplus from your labor, whose mansions rise on your exploitation?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;No. You. Are. Not.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To them, you are not human in the same sense they are human. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;You are resource, instrument, means to accumulation. Your suffering is &#039;&#039;&#039;externality&#039;&#039;&#039;, your death is &#039;&#039;&#039;statistic&#039;&#039;&#039;, your resistance is &#039;&#039;&#039;disruption&#039;&#039;&#039; to be managed or crushed.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The gaze of the oppressor looks down. It sees not equals but lesser beings whose &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;natural position&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt; is &#039;&#039;&#039;subordination&#039;&#039;&#039;. The Brahmin looks at the Dalit and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;pollution&#039;&#039;&#039;. The capitalist looks at the worker and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;cost&#039;&#039;&#039;. The imperialist looks at the colonized and sees &#039;&#039;&#039;primitive accumulation waiting to happen&#039;&#039;&#039;.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is not mere prejudice to be overcome through education. This is not individual failing to be corrected through moral improvement. &#039;&#039;&#039;This is structural necessity produced by material relations of domination.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When capital requires exploitation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;justifies&#039;&#039;&#039; exploitation. When caste requires hierarchy, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;naturalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; hierarchy. When imperialism requires subjugation, it &#039;&#039;produces&#039;&#039; ideology that &#039;&#039;&#039;rationalizes&#039;&#039;&#039; subjugation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;To appeal to abstract humanity while these structures persist is not moral but mystification. It hides the material base of oppression behind the veil of universal values. It substitutes the concrete demand for liberation with the abstract hope for recognition.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== III. The concrete against the detached ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Our struggle is not fictional. The social murder of our people is concrete. The death of a child because sustaining life does not serve capital is concrete. The starvation of a family because subsistence wages ensure maximum extraction is concrete. The annihilation of every livable condition while productive capacity has never been higher is concrete.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
What do you tell the worker whose lungs fill with silica dust in the mine? That all humanity is one? What do you tell the mother whose child dies because the hospital demands payment she cannot provide? That human dignity is universal? What do you tell the farmer drowning in debt while his harvest is purchased below cost of production? That we are all brothers?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
These are not answers. These are &#039;&#039;evasions&#039;&#039;. These are the comfortable ruling class notions of those whose material conditions allow them the luxury of detachment and mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The worker does not need to be told about universal humanity. The worker needs the means of subsistence guaranteed, the exploitation ended, the structures that produce his misery overthrown.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of struggle recognizes this. It refuses disembodiment because disembodiment serves those who benefit from obscuring material reality. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It refuses universalism because universalism erases the particularity of oppression and the necessity of particular struggle.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality is partisan. It takes sides. It recognizes comrades and enemies not in the liberal sense of difference of opinion but in the material sense of opposing class interests. The worker and the capitalist do not have competing values requiring &#039;&#039;dialogue&#039;&#039;. They have antagonistic material interests requiring &#039;&#039;struggle&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== IV. The task of the communist ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;The task of the communist is simple in formulation, infinite in implication: to annihilate the gaze of superiority by annihilating the material base that produces it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;convince&#039;&#039; the Brahmin that Dalits are human. But to destroy the caste system that produces the Brahmin&#039;s privilege and the Dalit&#039;s oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;teach&#039;&#039; the capitalist to treat workers fairly. But to expropriate the capitalist&#039;s property and socialize the means of production.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Not to &#039;&#039;appeal&#039;&#039; to the imperialist&#039;s better nature. But to break the chains of imperialist extraction and build independent development.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The oppressor shows you no mercy. He crushes you and calls it development. He extracts surplus value and calls it opportunity. He displaces you from your land and calls it progress. He shatters your social structures and calls it modernization.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
And you would show him kindness? You would appeal to his humanity? You would extend moral regard to a rock, to a force of nature, to a system that operates by its own logic of accumulation regardless of human cost?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not morality but masochism. This is not ethics but capitulation dressed in the language of universal love.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality of the communist recognizes that liberation requires not conversion but conquest. Not of individual capitalists&#039; hearts but of the capitalist mode of production itself. Not of individual oppressors&#039; minds but of the &#039;&#039;structures&#039;&#039; that produce oppression.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== V. The morality of liberation ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of struggle. Let it be tested not in intellectual philosophical debate but in material transformation of wretched conditions. Let it be measured not by how closely it approaches eternal values but by how effectively it advances liberation.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do not resist violently&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the oppressor, who reserves violence for himself as monopoly. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;all sides have valid concerns&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves the ruling class, whose concern is continued domination. The morality that says &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;change must be gradual&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; serves those who benefit from present arrangements while those who suffer are told to wait.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
We reject this ruling class morality. Not because we are immoral but because we recognize morality as historically conditioned, class-determined, and materially grounded. &#039;&#039;&#039;The morality adequate to our struggle is not the morality of the ruling class dressed as universal ethics but the morality born from the recognition that our liberation requires their expropriation, that our humanity requires the negation of their inhumanity, that our flourishing requires the transformation of the system that produces our immiseration.&#039;&#039;&#039; &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is the morality of the march of history grounded by objective reality&#039;s transformation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;This is not cruelty but clarity. This is not barbarism but recognition that the barbarism is present, operating, crushing lives daily in the name of development, progress, and natural law.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Let our morality be the morality of the concrete: the concrete suffering demanding concrete response. Let it be the morality of the wretched of the earth becoming its stewards, taking what was stolen, building what was destroyed, liberating what was bound.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VI. The revolutionary stance ==&lt;br /&gt;
When the liberal asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in human rights?&#039;&#039;&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in the right of the worker to the full product of his labor. We believe in the right of the peasant to the land he works. We believe in the right of the oppressed to expropriate the oppressor. These are the rights that are fundamental, for they are the material conditions of all other rights.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the moralist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in non-violence&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;we believe in ending the violence of starvation, of preventable disease, of social murder. We believe in ending the structural violence that kills more surely than any revolutionary&#039;s gun. If you call this violence, &#039;&#039;then we are violent&#039;&#039;. If you call justice for the oppressed extremism, &#039;&#039;then we are extremist&#039;&#039;. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;We will not apologize for demanding what is ours by right of having produced it.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When the humanist asks &amp;quot;&#039;&#039;do you not believe in the brotherhood of man&#039;&#039;?&amp;quot; we answer: &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;we believe in the solidarity of the exploited. We believe in the unity of the working class across artificial divisions. We believe in international proletarian solidarity against international capital&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;. But we do not believe in brotherhood with those who profit from our exploitation. Oppressor and oppressed are not brothers. They are enemies in class war that the oppressor pretends does not exist.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Our morality, then, is this: we side with life against the forces of death. We side with the producers against the parasites. We side with the oppresssed against the oppressor. We side with the future against the &#039;&#039;present arrangement that strangles it&#039;&#039;. We side with liberation against all that impedes it.&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; relativism. This is &#039;&#039;&#039;not&#039;&#039;&#039; nihilism. This is recognition that morality adequate to revolutionary transformation cannot be the morality that rationalizes what must be transformed. &amp;lt;u&amp;gt;It must be born from struggle, tested in practice, measured by its contribution to liberation.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== VII. Death upon struggle through struggle ==&lt;br /&gt;
The ruling class offers you this morality: love your enemy, wait for justice, trust the process, respect the law, believe in gradual reform. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Every one of these demands serves their interest. Every one asks you to wait while they accumulate. Every one asks you to be patient while children go hungry. Every one asks you to be peaceful while structural violence grinds you down.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The communists posits something else: &#039;&#039;&#039;the morality of struggle.&#039;&#039;&#039; The morality that recognizes your enemy and names him. The morality that &#039;&#039;demands&#039;&#039; what is yours and &#039;&#039;takes&#039;&#039; it. &#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The morality that builds in the process of fighting, that transforms in the process of destroying, that creates the new world in the shell of the old.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: organize where you are. Fight where you stand. Link your immediate material interests to the long-term interest of the working class. &#039;&#039;&#039;Recognize that your liberation and the capitalist&#039;s loss are not separate questions but one question with one answer: the overthrow of the system that produces both.&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This morality says: you owe nothing to those who crush you. Your debt is to those who struggle alongside you. Your obligation is to the future we will build when we have seized what we produced and organize it for human need rather than capital accumulation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our morality be this: from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our ethics be this: seize the means of production.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our politics be this: smash the bourgeois state and build the dictatorship of the proletariat.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Let our practice be this: organize, agitate, educate, mobilize, revolt.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Death upon struggle through struggle. End the class war by winning it. Annihilate exploitation by annihilating the exploiter&#039;s economic power. Transform the wretched of the earth into its stewards not through appeal to the mercy of our oppressors but through organized collective force that makes our oppression impossible.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;This is communist morality. This is proletarian ethics. This is the only morality adequate to our task: the liberation of humanity from class society, from exploitation, from alienation, from all the chains that capital has forged.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;The choice is simple: ruling class morality that rationalizes what is, or concrete morality that fights for what must be. The morality of the bourgeoisie, or the morality of the proletariat. The morality that asks us to wait, or the morality that demands we seize.&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;We choose the morality of liberation. We choose the morality of struggle. We choose the morality of the wretched becoming the stewards of the earth they made with their labor and will remake with their victory.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Today we are nothing, tomorrow we will be everything!&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Prostitution&amp;diff=87960</id>
		<title>Prostitution</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Prostitution&amp;diff=87960"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T18:03:51Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Prostitution&#039;&#039;&#039; is the coerced exchange of sexual access for monetary compensation or material goods under conditions of economic compulsion. Within [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]] analysis, prostitution is examined as a material relation produced by the intersection of [[Capitalism|capitalist]] immiseration and [[Patriarchy|patriarchal]] social structures. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Definition and scope ==&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution involves the provision of sexual services in exchange for payment. The transaction is characterized by economic compulsion rather than mutual desire, distinguishing it from consensual sexual activity. The Marxist-Leninist framework analyzes prostitution not as a moral question but as a social relation shaped by [[class society]] and patriarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Material basis ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Structural coercion ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fundamental character of prostitution is economic coercion and commodification of sexual activity. This coercion is structural rather than reducible to individual circumstances. The coercion exists at the level of social relations. The prostitute &amp;quot;consents&amp;quot; to sell sexual access in the structural sense that the [[Proletariat|worker]] &amp;quot;consents&amp;quot; to [[Wage slavery|wage labor]], under threat of destitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Commodification ===&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution reduces the prostitute to an object of only sexual utility. Unlike wage labor there is no abstract [[Labor-power|labor power]] sold here, but direct and intimate bodily access. Sexual access through monetary exchange under conditions making refusal materially impossible. Removing the economic coercion by guaranteeing housing, food, healthcare, and employment, and prostitution does not exist as a social category as the monetary relation (and thus coercion) would cease to exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution represents the explicit marketization of patriarchal reduction of women to sexual utility.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Classification within socialist political economy ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Labor withdrawal ===&lt;br /&gt;
Within [[Socialism|socialist]] political economy, prostitution is classified as a form of labor withdrawal from socially necessary labor while depending on the productive work of others for necessary survival. In order to survive, the prostitute must live off the wage of productive workers without contributing to production or social reproduction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Alexandra Kollontai]] stated:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We do not condemn prostitution and fight against it as a special category but as an aspect of labour desertion. To us in the workers&#039; republic it is not important whether a woman sells herself to one man or to many... All women who avoid work and do not take part in production or in caring for children are liable, on the same basis as prostitutes, to be forced to work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Alexandra Kollontai|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Speech by Alexandra Kollontai to the third all-Russian conference of heads of the Regional Women’s Departments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution and ways of fighting it|date=1921|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/kollonta/1921/prostitution.htm|quote=We do not, therefore, condemn prostitution and fight against it as a special category but as an aspect of labour desertion. To us in the workers’ republic it is not important whether a woman sells herself to one man or to many, whether she is classed as a professional prostitute selling her favours to a succession of clients or as a wife selling herself to her husband. All women who avoid work and do not take part in production or in caring for children are liable, on the same basis as prostitutes, to be forced to work. We cannot make a difference between a prostitute and a lawful wife kept by her husband, whoever her husband is – even if he is a “commissar”. It is failure to take part in productive work that is the common thread connecting all labour deserters. The workers’ collective condemns the prostitute not because she gives her body to many men but because, like the legal wife who stays at home, she does no useful work for the society.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This classification is materially distinct from [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] speculation. The prostitute owns no capital and participates in no [[Augmentation|valorization]] process. The speculator, while parasitic, functions as a mystified capitalist participating in surplus value extraction through the M-C-M&#039; circuit, the capital injected into stock purchases becomes productive capital (purchasing machinery, raw materials, labor power) that yields surplus value, which returns as stock dividends. The speculator thus remains within the circuit of capital accumulation, however mystified.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prostitute, by contrast, has does not have an input within the process of augmenting value. She possesses nothing to sell but access to her body for sexual utility. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Distinction from socially necessary unproductive labor ===&lt;br /&gt;
Socialist society distinguishes between [[productive labor]] (which valorizes value itself) and [[unproductive labor]]. Within unproductive labor exists a critical distinction: labor that maintains conditions for productive labor (transportation, logistics, education, healthcare) and labor that neither produces value nor maintains the productive apparatus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cultural and artistic labor, while unproductive in the strict sense, serves a necessary social function when it advances socialist consciousness. The educator reproduces labor power with expanded capacities. The healthcare worker maintains the health of the productive population. The artist producing [[Socialist realism|socialist realist]] work combats bourgeois ideology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution performs none of these functions. Sexual satisfaction through prostitution is not analogous to medical care or education. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Consent ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Historical materialism]] does not abstract a moment from the continous whole, and recognizes that consent cannot be abstracted from the social totality it exists within. Consent for sexual activities under coercive material conditions is not consent but coercion. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within socialism where coercive material conditions are combatted, prostitution ceases to exist as a social category because the prostitute need not engage in sexual activity for survival. Prostitution&#039;s material base itself is combatted through eliminating the conditions which create a stratum of working class women who must sell intimate sexual access in order to avoid homelessness, starvation and death.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Support for prostitutes ==&lt;br /&gt;
The prostitute operates under coercive conditions not of her making. Criminalization drives prostitution underground, increases vulnerability to violence, and fails to address material conditions producing prostitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitutes&#039; immediate material needs require addressing through: supporting decriminalization protecting prostitutes from state violence; supporting sex worker organizing improving immediate conditions; providing exit pathways for those wanting to leave prostitution. Socialist construction creates alternative employment, housing, healthcare, and social support making prostitution unnecessary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Further reading ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Essay:On Prostitution|&#039;&#039;On prostitution&#039;&#039;]] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;[[Library:Prostitution and ways of fighting it|Prostitution and ways of fighting it]]&#039;&#039;  (Alexandra Kollontai)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Prostitution&amp;diff=87959</id>
		<title>Prostitution</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Prostitution&amp;diff=87959"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T17:58:49Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: Needs a LOT - LOT more work, I have laid down the basis but it needs a lot of data cited, more sections devoted to understanding prostitution in the global south, empirical data and what have you related to prostitution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Prostitution&#039;&#039;&#039; is the coerced exchange of sexual access for monetary compensation or material goods under conditions of economic compulsion. Within [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]] analysis, prostitution is examined as a material relation produced by the intersection of [[Capitalism|capitalist]] immiseration and [[Patriarchy|patriarchal]] social structures. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Definition and scope ==&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution involves the provision of sexual services in exchange for payment. The transaction is characterized by economic compulsion rather than mutual desire, distinguishing it from consensual sexual activity. The Marxist-Leninist framework analyzes prostitution not as a moral question but as a social relation shaped by [[class society]] and patriarchy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Material basis ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Structural coercion ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fundamental character of prostitution is economic coercion and commodification of sexual activity. This coercion is structural rather than reducible to individual circumstances. The coercion exists at the level of social relations. The prostitute &amp;quot;consents&amp;quot; to sell sexual access in the structural sense that the [[Proletariat|worker]] &amp;quot;consents&amp;quot; to [[Wage slavery|wage labor]], under threat of destitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Commodification ===&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution reduces the prostitute to an object for only sexual utility. Unlike wage labor there is no abstract [[Labor-power|labor power]] sold here, but direct and intimate bodily access. Sexual access through monetary exchange under conditions making refusal materially impossible. Removing the economic coercion by guaranteeing housing, food, healthcare, and employment, and prostitution does not exist as a social category as the monetary relation (and thus coercion) would cease to exist.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution represents the explicit marketization of patriarchal reduction of women to sexual utility.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Classification within socialist political economy ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Labor withdrawal ===&lt;br /&gt;
Within [[Socialism|socialist]] political economy, prostitution is classified as a form of labor withdrawal from socially necessary labor while depending on the productive work of others for necessary survival. In order to survive, the prostitute must live off the wage of productive workers without contributing to production or social reproduction.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
[[Alexandra Kollontai]] stated:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;We do not condemn prostitution and fight against it as a special category but as an aspect of labour desertion. To us in the workers&#039; republic it is not important whether a woman sells herself to one man or to many... All women who avoid work and do not take part in production or in caring for children are liable, on the same basis as prostitutes, to be forced to work.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Alexandra Kollontai|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Speech by Alexandra Kollontai to the third all-Russian conference of heads of the Regional Women’s Departments.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution and ways of fighting it|date=1921|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/kollonta/1921/prostitution.htm|quote=We do not, therefore, condemn prostitution and fight against it as a special category but as an aspect of labour desertion. To us in the workers’ republic it is not important whether a woman sells herself to one man or to many, whether she is classed as a professional prostitute selling her favours to a succession of clients or as a wife selling herself to her husband. All women who avoid work and do not take part in production or in caring for children are liable, on the same basis as prostitutes, to be forced to work. We cannot make a difference between a prostitute and a lawful wife kept by her husband, whoever her husband is – even if he is a “commissar”. It is failure to take part in productive work that is the common thread connecting all labour deserters. The workers’ collective condemns the prostitute not because she gives her body to many men but because, like the legal wife who stays at home, she does no useful work for the society.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;This classification is materially distinct from [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] speculation. The prostitute owns no capital and participates in no [[Augmentation|valorization]] process. The speculator, while parasitic, functions as a mystified capitalist participating in surplus value extraction through the M-C-M&#039; circuit, the capital injected into stock purchases becomes productive capital (purchasing machinery, raw materials, labor power) that yields surplus value, which returns as stock dividends. The speculator thus remains within the circuit of capital accumulation, however mystified.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The prostitute, by contrast, has does not have an input within the process of augmenting value. She possesses nothing to sell but access to her body for sexual utility. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Distinction from socially necessary unproductive labor ===&lt;br /&gt;
Socialist society distinguishes between [[productive labor]] (which valorizes value itself) and [[unproductive labor]]. Within unproductive labor exists a critical distinction: labor that maintains conditions for productive labor (transportation, logistics, education, healthcare) and labor that neither produces value nor maintains the productive apparatus.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Cultural and artistic labor, while unproductive in the strict sense, serves a necessary social function when it advances socialist consciousness. The educator reproduces labor power with expanded capacities. The healthcare worker maintains the health of the productive population. The artist producing [[Socialist realism|socialist realist]] work combats bourgeois ideology.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitution performs none of these functions. Sexual satisfaction through prostitution is not analogous to medical care or education. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Consent ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Historical materialism]] does not abstract a moment from the continous whole, and recognizes that consent cannot be abstracted from the social totality it exists within. Consent for sexual activities under coercive material conditions is not consent but coercion. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Within socialism where coercive material conditions are combatted, prostitution ceases to exist as a social category because the prostitute need not engage in sexual activity for survival. Prostitution&#039;s material base itself is combatted through eliminating the conditions which create a stratum of working class women who must sell intimate sexual access in order to avoid homelessness, starvation and existence.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Support for prostitutes ==&lt;br /&gt;
The prostitute operates under coercive conditions not of her making. Criminalization drives prostitution underground, increases vulnerability to violence, and fails to address material conditions producing prostitution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Prostitutes&#039; immediate material needs require addressing through: supporting decriminalization protecting prostitutes from state violence; supporting sex worker organizing improving immediate conditions; providing exit pathways for those wanting to leave prostitution. Socialist construction creates alternative employment, housing, healthcare, and social support making prostitution unnecessary.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Further reading ==&lt;br /&gt;
[[Essay:On Prostitution|&#039;&#039;On prostitution&#039;&#039;]] &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;[[Library:Prostitution and ways of fighting it|Prostitution and ways of fighting it]]&#039;&#039;  (Alexandra Kollontai)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87953</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87953"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T13:25:16Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked and what questions can simply be discarded. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what can even be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that him declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: If knowledge is historical and from practice, as you posit, then doesn’t it become relative? How can anything be objectively true if the basis keeps changing?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; To call knowledge historical does not mean it lacks objectivity; it means objectivity itself develops. Every historic stage produces forms of knowledge adequate to its mode of production; adequacy is not eternal diktat but living dialogue with objective conditions that contain within them those objective conditions. Objectivity arises when social practice reproduces the world consciously; the more conscious the practice, the more objective the knowledge. Knowledge is not eternal truth nor born out of subjective nothingness but successful participation in society&#039;s own unfolding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87952</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87952"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T13:20:37Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked and what questions can simply be discarded. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what can even be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that him declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: If knowledge is historical and from practice, as you posit, then doesn’t it become relative? How can anything be objectively true if the basis keeps changing?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; To call knowledge historical does not mean it lacks objectivity; it means objectivity itself develops. Every historic stage produces forms of knowledge adequate to its mode of production; adequacy is not eternal diktat but living dialogue with objective conditions that contain within them those objective conditions. Objectivity arises when social practice reproduces the world consciously; the more conscious the practice, the more objective the knowledge. Knowledge is not eternal truth nor born out of subjective nothingness but successful participation in society&#039;s own unfolding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87951</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87951"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T13:19:24Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked and what questions can simply be discarded. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what can even be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that him declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: If knowledge is historical and from practice, as you posit, then doesn’t it become relative? How can anything be objectively true if the basis keeps changing?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; To call knowledge historical does not mean it lacks objectivity; it means objectivity itself develops. Every historic stage produces, forms of knowledge adequate to its mode of production; adequacy is not eternal diktat but living dialogue with objective conditions that contain within them those objective conditions. Objectivity arises when social practice reproduces the world consciously; the more conscious the practice, the more objective the knowledge. Knowledge is not eternal truth nor born out of subjective nothingness but successful participation in societies own unfolding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87950</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87950"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T13:19:11Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked and what questions can simply be discarded. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what can even be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that him declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: If truth is historical and from practice, as you posit, then doesn’t it become relative? How can anything be objectively true if the basis keeps changing?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; To call knowledge historical does not mean it lacks objectivity; it means objectivity itself develops. Every historic stage produces, forms of knowledge adequate to its mode of production; adequacy is not eternal diktat but living dialogue with objective conditions that contain within them those objective conditions. Objectivity arises when social practice reproduces the world consciously; the more conscious the practice, the more objective the knowledge. Knowledge is not eternal truth nor born out of subjective nothingness but successful participation in societies own unfolding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87949</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87949"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T13:18:40Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked and what questions can simply be discarded. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
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The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what can even be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that him declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: If truth is historical and practical, as you say, then doesn’t it become relative? How can anything be objectively true if the basis keeps changing?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; To call knowledge historical does not mean it lacks objectivity; it means objectivity itself develops. Every historic stage produces, forms of knowledge adequate to its mode of production; adequacy is not eternal diktat but living dialogue with objective conditions that contain within them those objective conditions. Objectivity arises when social practice reproduces the world consciously; the more conscious the practice, the more objective the knowledge. Knowledge is not eternal truth nor born out of subjective nothingness but successful participation in societies own unfolding.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
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&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87947</id>
		<title>Ludwig Feuerbach</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87947"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T10:48:55Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox philosopher|name=Ludwig Feuerbach|birth_name=Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach|birth_date=28 July 1804|birth_place=Landshut, [[Electorate of Bavaria]]|death_date=13 September 1872 (aged 68)|death_place=Rechenberg, [[German Empire]]|nationality=German|school_tradition=[[Materialism]]|image=File:Feuerbach.jpg}}&#039;&#039;&#039;Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (28 July 1804 – 13 September 1872) was a German philosopher who played a crucial role in the development of [[materialism]]. His most significant contributions are his materialist critique of  [[Objective idealism|Hegelian idealism]] and his anthropological critique of [[religion]]. He represents the pinnacle of pre-[[Marxism|Marxist]] materialism and greatly influenced the [[Young Hegelians]].&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach played a crucial role in the development of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels|Engels&#039;]] philosophical thought, even as they ultimately moved beyond his limitations. By synthesizing Feuerbach&#039;s materialism and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel&#039;s]] [[dialectics]] with their own ideas the pair were able to create [[dialectical materialism]] and [[historical materialism]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
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Part 4: Marx|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm|quote=The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)&lt;br /&gt;
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In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Biography ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Early life and education ===&lt;br /&gt;
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born on 28 July 1804 in Landshut, [[Free State of Bavaria|Bavaria]], to noted jurist Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach. Ludwig was the fourth of five sons, in age order: Joseph the eldest became a archaeologist, Karl Wilhelm was a mathetician, Eduard August was a jurist and Friedrich was a philosgist and follower of Ludwig&#039;s philosophy. Feuerbach&#039;s upbringing was privileged and [[Liberalism|liberal]], and he received a government stipend as son of a civil servant.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xvii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xviii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach began his studies in [[theology]] at the University of Heidelberg in 1823, where he attended lectures by [[Heinrich Paulus]] and [[Karl Daub]]. Feuerbach was quickly repelled by the rationalized theology of Paulus, later describing it as a &amp;quot;web of sophisms&amp;quot;, and stopped attending the lectures. However, the Hegel influenced lectures of Daub inspired in him an interest in philosophy and the desire to head to [[State of Berlin|Berlin]], the centre of the Hegelians. In 1824, after problems with his fathers objections and police surveillance,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Following the [[Carlsbad Decrees]] of 1819 aimed at supressing the rising sentiment for [[German unification]], pressure on students increased.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he traveled to Berlin to attend the lectures of Hegel, as well as the theologians [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Philip Marheinekehe]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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In 1825 he enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin but a year later he had to leave Berlin due to financial problems caused by his government stipend being cut off upon the death of Bavarian King [[Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria|Max Joseph]]. Returning to the University of Erlangen, Feuerbach planned to study the natural sciences, attending lectures on physiology and anatomy to continue this goal, but his financial problems made continuing impossible. In 1828 he earned his doctoral degree with his dissertation &#039;&#039;[[De ratione una, universali, infinita]]&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;English:&#039;&#039;The One, Universal, and Infinite Reason&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an early work of Hegelianism that explored the concept of a single, universal, and infinite reason&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Philosopher ===&lt;br /&gt;
From 1829 to 1835, Feuerbach lectured on the history of modern philosophy at the University of Erlangen. In 1830 Feuerbach anonymously published his first book, &#039;&#039;Thoughts on Death and Immortality&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;German: &#039;&#039;Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; which was essentially an attack on theology being used in service of the state. The [[clergy]] considered it a revolutionary document that was a threat to [[reactionary]] rule and when Feuerbach was recognized as the author he was barred from his university post and any future chance of working in academia.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach continued his philosophical work despite these difficulties, producing a three volume work on the history of philosophy with volumes appearing in 1833, 1836 and 1838 respectively which examined philosophers such as [[Francis Bacon]], [[Baruch Spinoza]], [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]] and [[Pierre Bayle]]. In 1837 Feuerbach met and married Bertha Löw, who was part-owner of a family porcelain factory in Bruckberg, where they moved allowing Feuerbach to continue his work in rustic isolation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1839, he published &#039;&#039;[[Critique of Hegelian Philosophy]]&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;German: &#039;&#039;Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; marking his open break with Hegelian idealism which was was followed up by his most  fundamental work,&#039;&#039;[[The Essence of Christianity]]&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;German: &#039;&#039;Das Wesen des Christenthums&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in 1841. In the early 1840s, Feuerbach became the theoretical leader of the Young Hegelians and he had a profound influence on Marx and Engels in particular. Engels would later write of this period: &amp;quot;We were all Feuerbachians,&amp;quot; but he and Marx soon moved beyond Feuerbach&#039;s limitations and in 1845 Marx wrote his &#039;&#039;[[Theses on Feuerbach]]&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xix|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Later life ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach maintained a skeptical attitude toward the [[Revolution of 1848]], though he would later despair at the subsequent reactionary period that resulted from the failure of the revolution and considered moving to the [[United States of America|United States]]. At the invitation of the revolutionary student body, he gave a series of public lectures at the City Hall in Heidelberg from December 1848 to March 1849 on the essence of religion. His next major work was the&#039;&#039;[[Theogonie]]&#039;&#039; in 1857, which extended the program of &#039;&#039;The Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039; with respect to other relgions and Greek and Roman mythology.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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In 1860, his wife&#039;s porcelain factory went bankrupt, and Feuerbach found himself  without a source of income forcing him to move to Rechenberg, near Nuremberg, where he lived until his death. His final major work was &#039;&#039;[[Spiritualism and Materialism]]&#039;&#039;, which appeared as part of the tenth and final volume of his collected works in 1866. In 1868, Feuerbach read Marx&#039;s first volume of &#039;&#039;[[Capital, vol. I (1867)|Capital]]&#039;&#039; enthusiastically, and in 1870, he joined the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany]] (SPD). On 13 September 1872, Feuerbach died at the age of 68 and was buried at the Johannisfriedhof in Nuremberg.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:04&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xx|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Philosophy ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Critique of Hegelian idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s objective idealism, which posited that the [[Geist|Absolute Idea (Geist)]] was the foundation of reality. Instead, Feuerbach insisted that material, natural existence was primary, and that consciousness was derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
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His famous aphorism, &amp;quot;Der Mensch ist, was er isst&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;Man is what he eats&amp;quot;), is a succinct expression of this principle, emphasizing the literal, bodily basis of human life against the abstractions of idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|title=Die Naturwissenschaft und die Revolution|date=1850|url=https://www.ludwig-feuerbach.de/natur_rev.htm|quote=Der Mensch ist was er isst.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Critique of religion ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach&#039;s most influential work, &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;The Essence of Christianity&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (1841), argued that religion is a human creation, a projection of humanity&#039;s own nature onto an imaginary divine being. God is not the creator of man; rather, man creates God by externalizing and alienating his own human essence.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Essence of Christianity: PART I, The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter II. God as a Being of the Understanding|date=1841|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec02.htm|quote=RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Feuerbach, theology is merely anthropology in disguise. When humans worship God&#039;s love, wisdom, or justice, they are actually worshiping idealized human qualities projected outward.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Critique ==&lt;br /&gt;
While Feuerbach broke with [[idealism]], his materialism remained contemplative rather than practical, and [[Mechanical materialism|mechanical]] rather than [[Dialectics|dialectical]].&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Contemplative, not practical materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach understood reality as an object of contemplation and perception, not as the product of human [[Subjectivity|practical activity]].&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the &#039;&#039;object or of contemplation&#039;&#039;, but not as &#039;&#039;sensuous human activity, practice&#039;&#039;, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the &#039;&#039;active&#039;&#039; side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach&#039;s materialism was passive, humans observe and contemplate nature but do not transform it through labor and practice. This meant Feuerbach could not understand that human consciousness and human nature itself are products of historical practice, not eternal givens.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Ahistorical and abstract conception of human nature ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach posited an eternal, unchanging human essence or &amp;quot;[[species-being]]&amp;quot; that exists outside of history and social relations. In contrast, Marx contended that &amp;quot;the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
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To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Feuerbach viewed human nature as a fixed essence rather than as historically produced through [[Relations of production|social relations]] and labor, he could not understand how different social structures, particularly [[Mode of production|modes of production]], shape human consciousness, create [[alienation]], and are subject to revolutionary transformation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Inability to grasp revolutionary practice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s contemplative materialism left him unable to understand the transformation of the world through revolutionary practice. Marx&#039;s eleventh and most famous thesis on Feuerbach emphasizes this:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach could critique religion intellectually, but he could not understand that religion would only be abolished through the revolutionary transformation of the material conditions that produce religious alienation, i.e., [[class society]] and [[exploitation]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Rejection of dialectics&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s dialectics along with his idealism, throwing out the rational kernel with the mystical shell. He failed to develop a materialist dialectics. Without dialectics, Feuerbach could not grasp development, contradiction, and qualitative transformation, the tools necessary for understanding historical change and revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Legacy ==&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach occupies a unique and indispensable position in the history of philosophy: he represents both the culmination of pre-Marxist materialism and the necessary bridge to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. His influence on the development of Marxism is vast, even as Marx and Engels ultimately transcended his philosophical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Impact on Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s work had an immediate and profound impact on the Young Hegelians, providing the philosophical foundations for their break with Hegelian idealism. His &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;  (1841) arrived as a philosophical weapon that shattered the dominance of idealist philosophy in German thought. As Engels recalls in &#039;[[Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy|&#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&#039;&#039;]]&#039; (1886):&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Then came Feuerbach’s &#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[D]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[E]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 1: Hegel|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm|quote=Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the The Holy Family[E].}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Advancements ===&lt;br /&gt;
As Marx himself laid down, that the advancements of Feuerbach were of immense importance:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Feuerbach&#039;&#039; is the only one who has a &#039;&#039;serious, critical&#039;&#039; attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(1)&#039;&#039;&#039; The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(2)&#039;&#039;&#039; The establishment of &#039;&#039;true materialism&#039;&#039; and of &#039;&#039;real science,&#039;&#039; by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(3)&#039;&#039;&#039; His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts &lt;br /&gt;
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General|date=1844|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm|quote=Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Feuerbach&#039;s limitations as legacy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential legacy may be the clarity with which Marx and Engels identified his limitations. The &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Theses on Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (1845) represent not a rejection of Feuerbach but a dialectical &#039;&#039;[[Aufhebung]],&#039;&#039; a simultaneous preservation, negation, and transcendence. Marx preserved Feuerbach&#039;s materialism, negated his contemplative passivity, and transcended both through the concept of revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach thus stands as both:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- An end point: The culmination of one philosophical tradition (contemplative, ahistorical materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- A beginning: The necessary stepping stone to another (dialectical, historical, revolutionary materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, Feuerbach&#039;s greatest contribution was not what he built, but what he made possible to build beyond him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1804 births]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1872 deaths]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:German philosophers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theologians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Young Hegelians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Mechanical materialism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87946</id>
		<title>Ludwig Feuerbach</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87946"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T10:44:10Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox philosopher|name=Ludwig Feuerbach|birth_name=Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach|birth_date=28 July 1804|birth_place=Landshut, [[Electorate of Bavaria]]|death_date=13 September 1872 (aged 68)|death_place=Rechenberg, [[German Empire]]|nationality=German|school_tradition=[[Materialism]]|image=File:Feuerbach.jpg}}&#039;&#039;&#039;Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (28 July 1804 – 13 September 1872) was a German philosopher who played a crucial role in the development of [[materialism]]. His most significant contributions are his materialist critique of  [[Objective idealism|Hegelian idealism]] and his anthropological critique of [[religion]]. He represents the pinnacle of pre-[[Marxism|Marxist]] materialism and greatly influenced the [[Young Hegelians]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach played a crucial role in the development of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels|Engels&#039;]] philosophical thought, even as they ultimately moved beyond his limitations. By synthesizing Feuerbach&#039;s materialism and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel&#039;s]] [[dialectics]] with their own ideas the pair were able to create [[dialectical materialism]] and [[historical materialism]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 4: Marx|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm|quote=The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Biography ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Early life and education ===&lt;br /&gt;
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born on 28 July 1804 in Landshut, [[Free State of Bavaria|Bavaria]], to noted jurist Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach. Ludwig was the fourth of five sons, in age order: Joseph the eldest became a archaeologist, Karl Wilhelm was a mathetician, Eduard August was a jurist and Friedrich was a philosgist and follower of Ludwig&#039;s philosophy. Feuerbach&#039;s upbringing was privileged and [[Liberalism|liberal]], and he received a government stipend as son of a civil servant.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xvii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xviii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach began his studies in [[theology]] at the University of Heidelberg in 1823, where he attended lectures by [[Heinrich Paulus]] and [[Karl Daub]]. Feuerbach was quickly repelled by the rationalized theology of Paulus, later describing it as a &amp;quot;web of sophisms&amp;quot;, and stopped attending the lectures. However, the Hegel influenced lectures of Daub inspired in him an interest in philosophy and the desire to head to [[State of Berlin|Berlin]], the centre of the Hegelians. In 1824, after problems with his fathers objections and police surveillance,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Following the [[Carlsbad Decrees]] of 1819 aimed at supressing the rising sentiment for [[German unification]], pressure on students increased.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he traveled to Berlin to attend the lectures of Hegel, as well as the theologians [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Philip Marheinekehe]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1825 he enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin but a year later he had to leave Berlin due to financial problems caused by his government stipend being cut off upon the death of Bavarian King [[Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria|Max Joseph]]. Returning to the University of Erlangen, Feurebach planned to study the natural sciences, attending lectures on physiology and anatomy to continue this goal, but his financial problems made continuing impossible. In 1828 he earned his doctoral degree with his dissertation &#039;&#039;De ratione una, universali, infinita&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;English:&#039;&#039;The One, Universal, and Infinite Reason&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an early work of Hegelianism that explored the concept of a single, universal, and infinite reason&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Philosopher ===&lt;br /&gt;
From 1829 to 1835, Feuerbach lectured on the history of modern philosophy at the University of Erlangen. In 1830 Feurerbach anonymously published his first book, &#039;&#039;Thoughts on Death and Immortality&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;German: &#039;&#039;Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; which was essentially an attack on theology being used in service of the state. The [[clergy]] considered it a revolutionary document that was a threat to [[reactionary]] rule and when Feurebach was recognized as the author he was barred from his university post and any future chance of working in academia.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach continued his philosophical work despite these difficulties, producing a three volume work on the history of philosophy with volumes appearing in 1833, 1836 and 1838 respectively which examined philosophers such as [[Francis Bacon]], [[Baruch Spinoza]], [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]] and [[Pierre Bayle]]. In 1837 Feuerbach met and married Bertha Löw, who was part-owner of a family porcelain factory in Bruckberg, where they moved allowing Feuerbach to continue his work in rustic isolation.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1839, he published &#039;&#039;Critique of Hegelian Philosophy&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;German: &#039;&#039;Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Philosophie&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; marking his open break with Hegelian idealism which was was followed up by his most  fundamental work,&#039;&#039;The Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;German: &#039;&#039;Das Wesen des Christenthums&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; in 1841. In the early 1840s, Feuerbach became the theoretical leader of the Young Hegelians and he had a profound influence on Marx and Engels in particular. Engels would later write of this period: &amp;quot;We were all Feuerbachians,&amp;quot; but he and Marx soon moved beyond Feuerbach&#039;s limitations and in 1845 Marx wrote his &#039;&#039;Theses on Feuerbach&#039;&#039;.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:02&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xix|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Later life ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach maintained a skeptical attitude toward the [[Revolution of 1848]], though he would later despair at the subsequent reactionary period that resulted from the failure of the revolution and considering moving to the [[United States of America|United States]]. At the invitation of the revolutionary student body, he gave a series of public lectures at the City Hall in Heidelberg from December 1848 to March 1849 on the essence of religion. His next major work was the&#039;&#039;Theogonie&#039;&#039; in 1857, which extended the program of &#039;&#039;The Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039; with respect to other relgions and Greek and Roman mythology.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1860, his wife&#039;s porcelain factory went bankrupt, and Feuerbach found himself  without a source of income forcing him to move to Rechenberg, near Nuremberg, where he lived until his death. His final major work was &#039;&#039;Spiritualism and Materialism&#039;&#039;, which appeared as part of the tenth and final volume of his collected works in 1866. In 1868, Feuerbach read Marx&#039;s first volume of &#039;&#039;[[Capital, vol. I (1867)|Capital]]&#039;&#039; enthusiastically, and in 1870, he joined the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany]] (SPD). On 13 September 1872, Feuerbach died at the age of 68 and was buried at the Johannisfriedhof in Nuremberg.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:03&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:04&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xx|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Philosophy ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of Hegelian idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s objective idealism, which posited that the [[Geist|Absolute Idea (Geist)]] was the foundation of reality. Instead, Feuerbach insisted that material, natural existence was primary, and that consciousness was derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His famous aphorism, &amp;quot;Der Mensch ist, was er isst&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;Man is what he eats&amp;quot;), is a succinct expression of this principle, emphasizing the literal, bodily basis of human life against the abstractions of idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|title=Die Naturwissenschaft und die Revolution|date=1850|url=https://www.ludwig-feuerbach.de/natur_rev.htm|quote=Der Mensch ist was er isst.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of religion ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential work, &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[The Essence of Christianity]]&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (1841), argued that religion is a human creation, a projection of humanity&#039;s own nature onto an imaginary divine being. God is not the creator of man; rather, man creates God by externalizing and alienating his own human essence.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Essence of Christianity: PART I, The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chapter II. God as a Being of the Understanding|date=1841|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec02.htm|quote=RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Feuerbach, theology is merely anthropology in disguise. When humans worship God&#039;s love, wisdom, or justice, they are actually worshiping idealized human qualities projected outward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Critique ==&lt;br /&gt;
While Feuerbach broke with [[idealism]], his materialism remained contemplative rather than practical, and [[Mechanical materialism|mechanical]] rather than [[Dialectics|dialectical]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contemplative, not practical materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach understood reality as an object of contemplation and perception, not as the product of human [[Subjectivity|practical activity]].&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the &#039;&#039;object or of contemplation&#039;&#039;, but not as &#039;&#039;sensuous human activity, practice&#039;&#039;, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the &#039;&#039;active&#039;&#039; side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach&#039;s materialism was passive, humans observe and contemplate nature but do not transform it through labor and practice. This meant Feuerbach could not understand that human consciousness and human nature itself are products of historical practice, not eternal givens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ahistorical and abstract conception of human nature ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach posited an eternal, unchanging human essence or &amp;quot;[[species-being]]&amp;quot; that exists outside of history and social relations. In contrast, Marx contended that &amp;quot;the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Feuerbach viewed human nature as a fixed essence rather than as historically produced through [[Relations of production|social relations]] and labor, he could not understand how different social structures, particularly [[Mode of production|modes of production]], shape human consciousness, create [[alienation]], and are subject to revolutionary transformation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Inability to grasp revolutionary practice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s contemplative materialism left him unable to understand the transformation of the world through revolutionary practice. Marx&#039;s eleventh and most famous thesis on Feuerbach emphasizes this:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach could critique religion intellectually, but he could not understand that religion would only be abolished through the revolutionary transformation of the material conditions that produce religious alienation, i.e., [[class society]] and [[exploitation]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Rejection of dialectics&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s dialectics along with his idealism, throwing out the rational kernel with the mystical shell. He failed to develop a materialist dialectics. Without dialectics, Feuerbach could not grasp development, contradiction, and qualitative transformation, the tools necessary for understanding historical change and revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Legacy ==&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach occupies a unique and indispensable position in the history of philosophy: he represents both the culmination of pre-Marxist materialism and the necessary bridge to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. His influence on the development of Marxism is vast, even as Marx and Engels ultimately transcended his philosophical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Impact on Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s work had an immediate and profound impact on the Young Hegelians, providing the philosophical foundations for their break with Hegelian idealism. His &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;  (1841) arrived as a philosophical weapon that shattered the dominance of idealist philosophy in German thought. As Engels recalls in &#039;[[Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy|&#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&#039;&#039;]]&#039; (1886):&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Then came Feuerbach’s &#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[D]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[E]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 1: Hegel|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm|quote=Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the The Holy Family[E].}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Advancements ===&lt;br /&gt;
As Marx himself laid down, that the advancements of Feuerbach were of immense importance:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Feuerbach&#039;&#039; is the only one who has a &#039;&#039;serious, critical&#039;&#039; attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(1)&#039;&#039;&#039; The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(2)&#039;&#039;&#039; The establishment of &#039;&#039;true materialism&#039;&#039; and of &#039;&#039;real science,&#039;&#039; by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(3)&#039;&#039;&#039; His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts &lt;br /&gt;
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General|date=1844|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm|quote=Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Feuerbach&#039;s limitations as legacy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential legacy may be the clarity with which Marx and Engels identified his limitations. The &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[Theses on Feuerbach]]&#039;&#039;&#039; (1845) represent not a rejection of Feuerbach but a dialectical &#039;&#039;[[Aufhebung]],&#039;&#039; a simultaneous preservation, negation, and transcendence. Marx preserved Feuerbach&#039;s materialism, negated his contemplative passivity, and transcended both through the concept of revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach thus stands as both:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- An end point: The culmination of one philosophical tradition (contemplative, ahistorical materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- A beginning: The necessary stepping stone to another (dialectical, historical, revolutionary materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, Feuerbach&#039;s greatest contribution was not what he built, but what he made possible to build beyond him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1804 births]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1872 deaths]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:German philosophers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theologians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Young Hegelians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Mechanical materialism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87945</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87945"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T08:35:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked and what questions can simply be discarded. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what can even be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that him declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87944</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87944"/>
		<updated>2025-11-03T08:34:52Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked and what questions can simply be discarded. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what even can be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that him declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87934</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87934"/>
		<updated>2025-11-02T19:22:43Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what even can be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that him declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87933</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87933"/>
		<updated>2025-11-02T18:41:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: Added 2 more questions to my theses on positivism, answering the relevance of the text and the necessity of admitted epistemology and practiced ontology in positivism.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: What relevance do the theses hold to our Marxist-Leninist movement?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer:&#039;&#039;&#039; As the very first statement of my text declares, epistemology determines the validity of a question, what questions can even be asked. When we ask, what of exploitation? The enemy class responds:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;quot;But bourgeois economics don&#039;t show that, look at the data, look at our paradigm!&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The framework of how knowledge can be known and what questions are valid, that is epistemology, thus they seek to invalidate the revolutionary question by maintaining hegemony over what even can be questioned. We must combat their hegemony over what knowledge is, and how it is acquired, as Lenin declared, a struggle on all fronts must be waged.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;Question: Why the positivist must collapse epistemology to ontology? What is the structural necessity even?&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Answer: The positivist must practice not in description but prescription, not epistemology but ontology, in that he declaring axioms and observation to be what reality is rather than the most advanced description, precisely because if he doesn&#039;t then positivism collapses because it is based on only upholding what is empirically true as the truth and nothing else, so since its axioms, i.e. the external world exists, causality is stable and what have you, cannot be justified empirically, he must posit that - that is how it is, rather than mere description.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position solipsism, of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity. You cannot justify empiricism through empiricism when the very framework is what is being brought into question. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;u&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Question: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/u&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87929</id>
		<title>Essay:THESES ON POSITIVISM</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Essay:THESES_ON_POSITIVISM&amp;diff=87929"/>
		<updated>2025-11-01T19:11:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: Created page with &amp;quot;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}  The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.  = THESES ON POSITIVISM = &amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;&amp;#039;  === I. ===...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox essay|title=THESES ON POSITIVISM|author=Comrade Kiwi|date=2025-11-02|excerpt=The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.|image=Ilyenkovyoung.png}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The fight over epistemology is always the fight over what questions we permit ourselves to ask.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
= THESES ON POSITIVISM =&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Critique of the empiricist metaphysics&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== I. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist treats scientific laws as descriptions of nature yet operates as if they were nature itself. He admits epistemology but practices ontology. This collapse is not accidental error but structural necessity: empiricism cannot justify its own presuppositions and therefore must naturalize them as self-evident. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
When philosophy challenges these foundations, the positivist demands empirical evidence for philosophical argument. The demand itself proves the critique.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== II. ===&lt;br /&gt;
All positivism rests on axioms it cannot prove. When pressed to defend these axioms against solipsism or subjective idealism, the positivist retreats: &amp;quot;I take them as given.&amp;quot; But what is given is not thereby justified. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The unexamined foundation remains unexamined, not sound. Philosophy interrogates precisely what empiricism must take as given, and the positivist who declares this interrogation irrelevant has merely announced his incapacity to think at the level of presupposition.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== III. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist demands concrete examples of how philosophical critique manifests in scientific practice, mistaking framework-level analysis for content-level disagreement. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This is to ask: show me which room has cracks when told the foundation is unstable. The critique is not that individual measurements fail but that the entire structure of positivist epistemology fragments reality, isolates phenomena from totality, and reproduces bourgeois ideology&#039;s incapacity to think relation and motion.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IV. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When cornered on axioms, the positivist shifts from &amp;quot;we know only what we can prove empirically&amp;quot; to &amp;quot;we disregard what is not useful.&amp;quot; This is not answer but evasion, switching from positivism to utilitarianism when the former fails. That he must switch frameworks when challenged reveals not empiricism&#039;s strength but its bankruptcy. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
A framework that cannot defend its own presuppositions and must appeal to utility has already conceded the philosophical argument.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== V. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist claims presuppositions are both relevant and irrelevant within the same argument. He admits theories are formed and broken on presuppositions, then declares philosophical examination of presuppositions useless to his practice. This is not dialectical contradiction but simple incoherence. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He wants foundations to matter without having to examine them, wants to operate within a framework without being responsible for its logic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The fragmentation of totality into discrete measurable units is not neutral method but ideological operation. The positivist studies batteries without grasping the social relations that necessitate batteries, measures particles without recognizing that measurement categories are historically produced through human practice, calculates motion without theory of what motion is. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
This fragmentation reproduces capital&#039;s logic: treat all phenomena as isolated, analyzable independent of the whole, understandable without reference to the totality producing them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Empiricism cannot account for qualitative development, only quantitative measurement. It has no theory of motion, only of states. When science advances from Newton to Einstein, the positivist records the transition but cannot think the logic of transition itself. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
He measures before and after but the movement between, the negation and sublation, the dialectical transformation, this remains opaque to him. His framework contains only being and non-being, not becoming.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== VIII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who says &amp;quot;philosophy does not matter to my work&amp;quot; has made a philosophical claim he cannot defend without doing philosophy. His refusal to examine foundations is not escape from philosophy but submission to unexamined philosophy, which is always the philosophy of the ruling class. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The claim that one can do science without philosophy is itself philosophy, and bad philosophy at that.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== IX. ===&lt;br /&gt;
Scientific practice is social practice embedded in material relations. The questions asked, the research funded, the applications pursued, all reflect the mode of production within which science operates. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist who claims neutrality, who insists he merely describes nature without philosophical commitment, reproduces ideology precisely through this claimed neutrality. To refuse examination of how your framework is socially constituted is not objectivity but mystification.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== X. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The standpoint of positivism is fragmented civil society treating knowledge as individual acquisition and science as collection of isolated facts. The standpoint of dialectical materialism is social humanity grasping knowledge as collective product emerging from human practice in its totality. The positivist measures; the dialectician comprehends. The positivist prescribes; the dialectician transforms. The positivist fragments; the dialectician grasps the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XI. ===&lt;br /&gt;
When the positivist finally admits he cannot defend his axioms empirically, that he takes them as given, that philosophy of foundations does not interest him, he has conceded everything. A framework that rests on assumptions it declares unjustifiable and irrelevant is not science but faith.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The positivist is not materialist but mystic, worshipping at the altar of measurement while refusing to ask what measurement means, what it presupposes, what it cannot grasp. His demand for empirical proof of philosophical critique is category error so fundamental that every conclusion derived from it is worthless.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== XII. ===&lt;br /&gt;
The positivists have thus far only interpreted nature as data; the task, however, is to dissolve the observer into the process, to make science itself a moment of praxis.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;big&amp;gt;Positivism is bourgeois ideology in epistemological form: fragmenting, reifying, naturalizing what is historical, treating description as prescription, collapsing knowing into being, and declaring its own presuppositions beyond interrogation. The positivist cannot answer philosophy and therefore declares philosophy irrelevant. This is not refutation but retreat.&amp;lt;/big&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Addendum: ==&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Question&#039;&#039;&#039;: For thesis II, these axioms are taken as such because there are no known counter-example, what do you say to that?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I argue, that the empirical nature of this argument falls apart when not based on rigorous philosophical basis, for example: What of the empirically unfalsifiable position of positing that only the mind is, what is? The presuppositions themselves demand stabilization which cannot come empirically, lest we declare circularity.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Question&#039;&#039;&#039;: For thesis VI, quantum mechanics has pretty much ensured that studying systems in isolation is useless although other sciences may not have caught onto it, what then?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: I am moreso making a general paradigm and foundation critique, it is not that science is unable to think in categories and inter-relation, it obviously can, the point is that, it is not structural paradigm which which dictates this, dialectical materialism enables not only allows for stabilization of axioms but also making relational and systemic thinking embedded in the very logic of science.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Question:&#039;&#039;&#039; Quine&#039;s naturalism accepts circularity but denies foundationalism. Doesn&#039;t this sidestep your critique by refusing the game of grounding rather than playing it badly?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: Quine still presupposes nature as pregiven object for cognition rather than recognizing thought as moment of nature&#039;s self-development. His &amp;quot;no first philosophy&amp;quot; retains subject-object dualism, consciousness studies nature from outside. Dialectical logic grasps thought as material practice through which reality comes to know itself. The circle isn&#039;t vicious because thinking is real activity transforming its object. Quine&#039;s naturalism remains contemplative; ours is practical.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Question&#039;&#039;&#039;: Your own categories, totality, contradiction, negation etc require grounding. How does dialectical materialism escape the axiom problem it diagnoses in positivism?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: We don&#039;t &amp;quot;escape&amp;quot; it; we recognize axioms as historically produced through collective practice, not timeless prerequisites. Thought-forms develop from human activity transforming nature. Contradiction isn&#039;t imposed as external law but discovered as actual movement of things, capital is self-contradictory motion, not logical inconsistency projected onto it. Our categories are stabilized practically, not deductively. Positivism mystifies its axioms as natural; we grasp ours as social-historical achievements requiring ongoing reproduction. The difference: we think our presuppositions as presuppositions.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Question&#039;&#039;&#039;: If positivist science &amp;quot;works&amp;quot; instrumentally despite philosophical incoherence, haven&#039;t you just shown scientists have bad philosophy, not bad science?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: False separation. Scientific practice embeds theoretical commitments that fragment phenomena, naturalize contingent social forms, and block comprehension of development. That batteries &amp;quot;work&amp;quot; doesn&#039;t vindicate treating electrochemistry as isolated domain, it means instrumental success coincides with theoretical mystification. The critique isn&#039;t that measurements fail but that positivist frameworks render invisible the social totality producing both battery and physicist. Limited-fragmented theoretical basis produce limited and fragmented results in isolation from the whole.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Question&#039;&#039;&#039;: Doesn&#039;t studying isolated systems remain methodologically necessary even granting your critique? How does one grasp totality without abstract reduction first?&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Answer&#039;&#039;&#039;: The error is treating methodological abstraction as ontological truth, forgetting that isolated system is produced by abstracting activity and must be sublated back into concrete totality. Positivism mistakes moment for whole, reifies the abstraction. We begin with chaotic whole, reduce to abstract determinations, then reconstruct the concrete as thought-totality. The positivist stops at step two and calls it nature.&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Essays by Comrade Kiwi]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theory (essays)]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Ilyenkovyoung.png&amp;diff=87928</id>
		<title>File:Ilyenkovyoung.png</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Ilyenkovyoung.png&amp;diff=87928"/>
		<updated>2025-11-01T19:10:15Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Ilyenkov.png&amp;diff=87926</id>
		<title>File:Ilyenkov.png</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=File:Ilyenkov.png&amp;diff=87926"/>
		<updated>2025-11-01T19:02:31Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87897</id>
		<title>Ludwig Feuerbach</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87897"/>
		<updated>2025-10-29T15:20:47Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox philosopher|name=Ludwig Feuerbach|birth_name=Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach|birth_date=28 July 1804|birth_place=Landshut, [[Electorate of Bavaria]]|death_date=13 September 1872 (aged 68)|death_place=Rechenberg, [[German Empire]]|nationality=German|school_tradition=[[Materialism]]|image=File:Feuerbach.jpg}}&#039;&#039;&#039;Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (28 July 1804 – 13 September 1872) was a German philosopher who played a crucial role in the development of [[materialism]]. His most significant contributions are his materialist critique of  [[Objective idealism|Hegelian idealism]] and his anthropological critique of [[religion]]. He represents the pinnacle of pre-[[Marxism|Marxist]] materialism and greatly influenced the [[Young Hegelians]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach played a crucial role in the development of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels|Engels&#039;]] philosophical thought, even as they ultimately moved beyond his limitations. By synthesizing Feuerbach&#039;s materialism and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel&#039;s]] [[dialectics]] with their own ideas the pair were able to create [[dialectical materialism]] and [[historical materialism]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 4: Marx|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm|quote=The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Biography ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Early life and education ===&lt;br /&gt;
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born on 28 July 1804 in Landshut, [[Free State of Bavaria|Bavaria]], to noted jurist Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach. Ludwig was the fourth of five sons, in age order: Joseph the eldest became a archaeologist, Karl Wilhelm was a mathetician, Eduard August was a jurist and Friedrich was a philosgist and follower of Ludwig&#039;s philosophy. Feuerbach&#039;s upringing was priviliged and [[Liberalism|liberal]], and he received a government stipend as son of a civil servant.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xvii-xviii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach began his studies in theology at the University of Heidelberg in 1823, where he attended lectures by [[Heinrich Paulus]] and [[Karl Daub]]. Feuerbach was quickly repelled by the rationalized theology of Paulus, later describing it as a &amp;quot;web of sophisms&amp;quot;, and stopped attending the lectures. However, the Hegel influenced lectures of Daub inspired in him an interest in philosophy and the desire to head to [[State of Berlin|Berlin]], the centre of the Hegelians. In 1824, after problems with his fathers objections and police surveillance,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Following the [[Carlsbad Decrees]] of 1819 aimed at supressing the rising sentiment for [[German unification]], pressure on students increased.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he traveled to Berlin to attend the lectures of Hegel, as well as the theologians [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Philip Marheinekehe]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1825 he enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin but a year later he had to leave Berlin due to financial problems caused by his government stipend being cut off upon the death of Bavarian King [[Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria|Max Joseph]]. Returning to the University of Erlangen, Feurebach planned to study the natural natural sciences, attending lectures on physiology and anatomy to continue this goal, but his financial problems made continuing impossible. In 1828 he earned his doctural degree, &#039;&#039;De ratione una, universali, infinita&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;English:&#039;&#039;The One, Universal, and Infinite Reason&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an early work of Hegelianism that explored the concept of a single, universal, and infinite reason&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Philosophy ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of Hegelian idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s objective idealism, which posited that the [[Geist|Absolute Idea (Geist)]] was the foundation of reality. Instead, Feuerbach insisted that material, natural existence was primary, and that consciousness was derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His famous aphorism, &amp;quot;Der Mensch ist, was er isst&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;Man is what he eats&amp;quot;), is a succinct expression of this principle, emphasizing the literal, bodily basis of human life against the abstractions of idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|title=Die Naturwissenschaft und die Revolution|date=1850|url=https://www.ludwig-feuerbach.de/natur_rev.htm|quote=Der Mensch ist was er isst.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of religion ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential work, &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[The Essence of Christianity]]&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (1841), argued that religion is a human creation, a projection of humanity&#039;s own nature onto an imaginary divine being. God is not the creator of man; rather, man creates God by externalizing and alienating his own human essence.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Essence of Christianity: PART I, The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chapter II. God as a Being of the Understanding|date=1841|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec02.htm|quote=RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Feuerbach, theology is merely anthropology in disguise. When humans worship God&#039;s love, wisdom, or justice, they are actually worshiping idealized human qualities projected outward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Critique ==&lt;br /&gt;
While Feuerbach broke with [[idealism]], his materialism remained contemplative rather than practical, and [[Mechanical materialism|mechanical]] rather than [[Dialectics|dialectical]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contemplative, not practical materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach understood reality as an object of contemplation and perception, not as the product of human [[Subjectivity|practical activity]].&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the &#039;&#039;object or of contemplation&#039;&#039;, but not as &#039;&#039;sensuous human activity, practice&#039;&#039;, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the &#039;&#039;active&#039;&#039; side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach&#039;s materialism was passive, humans observe and contemplate nature but do not transform it through labor and practice. This meant Feuerbach could not understand that human consciousness and human nature itself are products of historical practice, not eternal givens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ahistorical and abstract conception of human nature ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach posited an eternal, unchanging human essence or &amp;quot;[[species-being]]&amp;quot; that exists outside of history and social relations. In contrast, Marx contended that &amp;quot;the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Feuerbach viewed human nature as a fixed essence rather than as historically produced through [[Relations of production|social relations]] and labor, he could not understand how different social structures, particularly [[Mode of production|modes of production]], shape human consciousness, create [[alienation]], and are subject to revolutionary transformation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Inability to grasp revolutionary practice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s contemplative materialism left him unable to understand the transformation of the world through revolutionary practice. Marx&#039;s eleventh and most famous thesis on Feuerbach emphasizes this:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach could critique religion intellectually, but he could not understand that religion would only be abolished through the revolutionary transformation of the material conditions that produce religious alienation, i.e., [[class society]] and [[exploitation]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Rejection of dialectics&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s dialectics along with his idealism, throwing out the rational kernel with the mystical shell. He failed to develop a materialist dialectics. Without dialectics, Feuerbach could not grasp development, contradiction, and qualitative transformation, the tools necessary for understanding historical change and revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Legacy ==&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach occupies a unique and indispensable position in the history of philosophy: he represents both the culmination of pre-Marxist materialism and the necessary bridge to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. His influence on the development of Marxism is vast, even as Marx and Engels ultimately transcended his philosophical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Impact on Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s work had an immediate and profound impact on the Young Hegelians, providing the philosophical foundations for their break with Hegelian idealism. His &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;  (1841) arrived as a philosophical weapon that shattered the dominance of idealist philosophy in German thought. As Engels recalls in &#039;[[Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy|&#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&#039;&#039;]]&#039; (1886):&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Then came Feuerbach’s &#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[D]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[E]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 1: Hegel|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm|quote=Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the The Holy Family[E].}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Advancements ===&lt;br /&gt;
As Marx himself laid down, that the advancements of Feuerbach were of immense importance:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Feuerbach&#039;&#039; is the only one who has a &#039;&#039;serious, critical&#039;&#039; attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(1)&#039;&#039;&#039; The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(2)&#039;&#039;&#039; The establishment of &#039;&#039;true materialism&#039;&#039; and of &#039;&#039;real science,&#039;&#039; by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(3)&#039;&#039;&#039; His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts &lt;br /&gt;
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General|date=1844|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm|quote=Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Feuerbach&#039;s limitations as legacy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential legacy may be the clarity with which Marx and Engels identified his limitations. The &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[Theses on Feuerbach]]&#039;&#039;&#039; (1845) represent not a rejection of Feuerbach but a dialectical &#039;&#039;[[Aufhebung]],&#039;&#039; a simultaneous preservation, negation, and transcendence. Marx preserved Feuerbach&#039;s materialism, negated his contemplative passivity, and transcended both through the concept of revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach thus stands as both:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- An end point: The culmination of one philosophical tradition (contemplative, ahistorical materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- A beginning: The necessary stepping stone to another (dialectical, historical, revolutionary materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, Feuerbach&#039;s greatest contribution was not what he built, but what he made possible to build beyond him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1804 births]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1872 deaths]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:German philosophers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theologians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Young Hegelians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Mechanical materialism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Absolute_Knowing&amp;diff=87893</id>
		<title>Absolute Knowing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Absolute_Knowing&amp;diff=87893"/>
		<updated>2025-10-29T10:36:50Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;In [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel’s]] &#039;&#039;[[Phenomenology of Spirit]]&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;&#039;Absolute Knowing&#039;&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;das absolute Wissen&#039;&#039;) is the final stage of the [[Geist|Geist’s]] (Spirit’s) self-development. According to Hegel it is the point at which consciousness has grasped that all of reality, i.e. nature, history, thought etc. is a [[Dialectics|dialectical]] process, and that thought itself is part of that process. In Absolute Knowing, Geist recognizes itself in the world: subject and object, thought and being, are reconciled. So it’s “absolute” not because knowledge is finished once and for all, but because knowledge has become fully self-conscious of its method i.e&#039;&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039; dialectics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=G.W.F. Hegel|year=1807|title=Phänomenologie des Geistes or The Phenomenology of Spirit|title-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm|chapter=Introduction|quote=The experience which consciousness has concerning itself can, by its essential principle, embrace nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, the whole realm of the truth of mind, and in such wise that the moments of truth are set forth in the specific and peculiar character they here possess — i.e. not as abstract pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them, and in virtue of which they are moments of the whole, are embodiments or modes of consciousness. In pressing forward to its true form of existence, consciousness will come to a point at which it lays aside its semblance of being hampered with what is foreign to it, with what is only for it and exists as an other; it will reach a position where appearance becomes identified with essence, where, in consequence, its exposition coincides with just this very point, this very stage of the science proper of mind. And, finally, when it grasps this its own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute knowledge itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== The materialist conception ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Dialectical materialism|materialist]] conception of Absolute Knowing is recognition that the world is a process of contradictions and transformations, and that human thought must grasp and participate in that process; absolute knowledge doesn’t mean omniscience, but the recognition that truth is concrete, historically conditioned, and verified in practice&#039;&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039; While simultaneously rejecting the final [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] closure, [[Vladimir Lenin|Lenin]] writes:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Alias:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Man’s consciousness&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
not only reflects the ob-&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
jective world, but cre-&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ates it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=V.I. Lenin|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s book, The Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or&lt;br /&gt;
the Doctrine of the Notion).|date=1914-09 to 1914-12|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm|quote=Alias:&lt;br /&gt;
     Man’s consciousness&lt;br /&gt;
not only reflects the ob-&lt;br /&gt;
jective world, but cre-&lt;br /&gt;
ates it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Lenin clarifies that &amp;quot;creates&amp;quot; here does not mean creation ex nihilo from pure thought. It means that through human labor and revolutionary practice, we actively reshape the material world according to our purposes (material necessities which themselves are not determinate but create potential tendencies which our material conditioned will tends to but not definitely as an absolute bend to), and in doing so, we test and validate our ideas. This is the materialist conception of practice that collapses Hegel&#039;s transcendental Geist back into the activity of material human beings.&lt;br /&gt;
== Further reading ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/index.htm Lenin&#039;s Conspectus of Hegel’s book &#039;&#039;The Science of Logic&#039;&#039;]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[:en:Essay:Ecological_crisis_and_the_Marxist_understanding_and_resolution_from_a_dialectical_materialist_lens#Section_(2)_-_Unconscious_development_of_class_society_vs_Conscious_development_of_classless_society._What_ends_and_what_begins?|On the materialist conception on conscious and unconscious development]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Hegelianism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Objective idealism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Absolute_Knowing&amp;diff=87892</id>
		<title>Absolute Knowing</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Absolute_Knowing&amp;diff=87892"/>
		<updated>2025-10-29T10:36:18Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;In [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel’s]] &#039;&#039;[[Phenomenology of Spirit]]&#039;&#039;, &#039;&#039;&#039;Absolute Knowing&#039;&#039;&#039; (&#039;&#039;das absolute Wissen&#039;&#039;) is the final stage of the [[Geist|Geist’s]] (Spirit’s) self-development. According to Hegel it is the point at which consciousness has grasped that all of reality, i.e. nature, history, thought etc. is a [[Dialectics|dialectical]] process, and that thought itself is part of that process. In Absolute Knowing, Geist recognizes itself in the world: subject and object, thought and being, are reconciled. So it’s “absolute” not because knowledge is finished once and for all, but because knowledge has become fully self-conscious of its method i.e&#039;&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039; dialectics.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=G.W.F. Hegel|year=1807|title=Phänomenologie des Geistes or The Phenomenology of Spirit|title-url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phintro.htm|chapter=Introduction|quote=The experience which consciousness has concerning itself can, by its essential principle, embrace nothing less than the entire system of consciousness, the whole realm of the truth of mind, and in such wise that the moments of truth are set forth in the specific and peculiar character they here possess — i.e. not as abstract pure moments, but as they are for consciousness, or as consciousness itself appears in its relation to them, and in virtue of which they are moments of the whole, are embodiments or modes of consciousness. In pressing forward to its true form of existence, consciousness will come to a point at which it lays aside its semblance of being hampered with what is foreign to it, with what is only for it and exists as an other; it will reach a position where appearance becomes identified with essence, where, in consequence, its exposition coincides with just this very point, this very stage of the science proper of mind. And, finally, when it grasps this its own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute knowledge itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== The materialist conception ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Dialectical materialism|materialist]] conception of Absolute Knowing is recognition that the world is a process of contradictions and transformations, and that human thought must grasp and participate in that process; absolute knowledge doesn’t mean omniscience, but the recognition that truth is concrete, historically conditioned, and verified in practice&#039;&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&#039; While simultaneously rejecting the final [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] closure, [[Vladimir Lenin|Lenin]] writes:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Alias:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
    Man’s consciousness&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
not only reflects the ob-&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
jective world, but cre-&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
ates it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=V.I. Lenin|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s book, The Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or&lt;br /&gt;
the Doctrine of the Notion).|date=1914-09 to 1914-12|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm|quote=Alias:&lt;br /&gt;
     Man’s consciousness&lt;br /&gt;
not only reflects the ob-&lt;br /&gt;
jective world, but cre-&lt;br /&gt;
ates it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Lenin clarifies that &amp;quot;creates&amp;quot; here does not mean creation ex nihilo from pure thought. It means that through human labor and revolutionary practice, we actively reshape the material world according to our purposes (material necessities which themselves are not determinate but create potential tendencies which our material conditioned will tends to but not definitely as an absolute bend to), and in doing so, we test and validate our ideas. This is the materialist conception of practice that collapses Hegel&#039;s transcendental Geist back into the activity of material human beings.&lt;br /&gt;
== Further reading ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* [https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/index.htm Lenin&#039;s Conspectus of Hegel’s book &#039;&#039;The Science of Logic&#039;&#039;]&lt;br /&gt;
* [[:en:Essay:Ecological_crisis_and_the_Marxist_understanding_and_resolution_from_a_dialectical_materialist_lens#Section_(2)_-_Unconscious_development_of_class_society_vs_Conscious_development_of_classless_society._What_ends_and_what_begins?|On the materialist conception on conscious and unconscious development]]&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Hegelianism]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Objective idealism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87891</id>
		<title>Ludwig Feuerbach</title>
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		<updated>2025-10-29T09:19:16Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox philosopher|name=Ludwig Feuerbach|birth_name=Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach|birth_date=28 July 1804|birth_place=Landshut, [[Electorate of Bavaria]]|death_date=13 September 1872 (aged 68)|death_place=Rechenberg, [[German Empire]]|nationality=German|school_tradition=[[Materialism]]|image=File:Feuerbach.jpg}}&#039;&#039;&#039;Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (28 July 1804 – 13 September 1872) was a German philosopher who played a crucial role in the development of [[materialism]]. His most significant contributions are his materialist critique of  [[Objective idealism|Hegelian idealism]] and his anthropological critique of [[religion]]. He represents the pinnacle of pre-[[Marxism|Marxist]] materialism and greatly influenced the [[Young Hegelians]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach played a crucial role in the development of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels|Engels&#039;]] philosophical thought, even as they ultimately moved beyond his limitations. By synthesizing Feuerbach&#039;s materialism and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]]&#039;s [[dialectics]] with their own ideas the pair were able to create [[dialectical materialism]] and [[historical materialism]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 4: Marx|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm|quote=The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Biography ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Early life and education ===&lt;br /&gt;
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born on 28 July 1804 in Landshut, [[Free State of Bavaria|Bavaria]], to noted jurist Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach. Ludwig was the fourth of five sons, in age order: Joseph the eldest became a archaeologist, Karl Wilhelm was a mathetician, Eduard August was a jurist and Friedrich was a philosgist and follower of Ludwig&#039;s philosophy. Feuerbach&#039;s upringing was priviliged and [[Liberalism|liberal]], and he received a government stipend as son of a civil servant.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xvii-xviii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach began his studies in theology at the University of Heidelberg in 1823, where he attended lectures by [[Heinrich Paulus]] and [[Karl Daub]]. Feuerbach was quickly repelled by the rationalized theology of Paulus, later describing it as a &amp;quot;web of sophisms&amp;quot;, and stopped attending the lectures. However, the Hegel influenced lectures of Daub inspired in him an interest in philosophy and the desire to head to [[State of Berlin|Berlin]], the centre of the Hegelians. In 1824, after problems with his fathers objections and police surveillance,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Following the [[Carlsbad Decrees]] of 1819 aimed at supressing the rising sentiment for [[German unification]], pressure on students increased.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he traveled to Berlin to attend the lectures of Hegel, as well as the theologians [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Philip Marheinekehe]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1825 he enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin but a year later he had to leave Berlin due to financial problems caused by his government stipend being cut off upon the death of Bavarian King [[Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria|Max Joseph]]. Returning to the University of Erlangen, Feurebach planned to study the natural natural sciences, attending lectures on physiology and anatomy to continue this goal, but his financial problems made continuing impossible. In 1828 he earned his doctural degree, &#039;&#039;De ratione una, universali, infinita&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;English:&#039;&#039;The One, Universal, and Infinite Reason&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an early work of Hegelianism that explored the concept of a single, universal, and infinite reason&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Philosophy ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of Hegelian Idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel&#039;s]] objective idealism, which posited that the [[Geist|Absolute Idea (Geist)]] was the foundation of reality. Instead, Feuerbach insisted that material, natural existence was primary, and that consciousness was derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His famous aphorism, &amp;quot;Der Mensch ist, was er isst&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;Man is what he eats&amp;quot;), is a succinct expression of this principle, emphasizing the literal, bodily basis of human life against the abstractions of idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|title=Die Naturwissenschaft und die Revolution|date=1850|url=https://www.ludwig-feuerbach.de/natur_rev.htm|quote=Der Mensch ist was er isst.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of Religion ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential work, &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[The Essence of Christianity]]&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (1841), argued that religion is a human creation, a projection of humanity&#039;s own nature onto an imaginary divine being. God is not the creator of man; rather, man creates God by externalizing and alienating his own human essence.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Essence of Christianity: PART I, The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chapter II. God as a Being of the Understanding|date=1841|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec02.htm|quote=RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Feuerbach, theology is merely anthropology in disguise. When humans worship God&#039;s love, wisdom, or justice, they are actually worshiping idealized human qualities projected outward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Critique ==&lt;br /&gt;
While Feuerbach broke with idealism, his materialism remained contemplative rather than practical, and [[Mechanical materialism|mechanical]] rather than [[Dialectics|dialectical]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contemplative, not practical materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach understood reality as an object of contemplation and perception, not as the product of human [[Subjectivity|practical activity]].&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the &#039;&#039;object or of contemplation&#039;&#039;, but not as &#039;&#039;sensuous human activity, practice&#039;&#039;, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the &#039;&#039;active&#039;&#039; side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach&#039;s materialism was passive, humans observe and contemplate nature but do not transform it through labor and practice. This meant Feuerbach could not understand that human consciousness and human nature itself are products of historical practice, not eternal givens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ahistorical and abstract conception of human nature ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach posited an eternal, unchanging human essence or &amp;quot;species-being&amp;quot; that exists outside of history and social relations. In contrast, Marx contended that &amp;quot;the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Feuerbach viewed human nature as a fixed essence rather than as historically produced through [[Relations of production|social relations]] and labor, he could not understand how different social structures, particularly [[Mode of production|modes of production]], shape human consciousness, create [[alienation]], and are subject to revolutionary transformation.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Inability to grasp revolutionary practice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s contemplative materialism left him unable to understand the transformation of the world through revolutionary practice. Marx&#039;s eleventh and most famous thesis on Feuerbach emphasizes this:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach could critique religion intellectually, but he could not understand that religion would only be abolished through the revolutionary transformation of the material conditions that produce religious alienation, i.e., [[class society]] and [[exploitation]].&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Rejection of dialectics&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s dialectics along with his idealism, throwing out the rational kernel with the mystical shell. He failed to develop a materialist dialectics. Without dialectics, Feuerbach could not grasp development, contradiction, and qualitative transformation, the tools necessary for understanding historical change and revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Legacy ==&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach occupies a unique and indispensable position in the history of philosophy: he represents both the culmination of pre-Marxist materialism and the necessary bridge to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. His influence on the development of Marxism is vast, even as Marx and Engels ultimately transcended his philosophical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Impact on Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s work had an immediate and profound impact on the Young Hegelians, providing the philosophical foundations for their break with Hegelian idealism. His &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;  (1841) arrived as a philosophical weapon that shattered the dominance of idealist philosophy in German thought. As Engels recalls in &#039;[[Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy|&#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&#039;&#039;]]&#039; (1886):&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Then came Feuerbach’s &#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[D]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[E]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 1: Hegel|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm|quote=Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the The Holy Family[E].}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Advancements ===&lt;br /&gt;
As Marx himself laid down, that the advancements of Feuerbach were of immense importance:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Feuerbach&#039;&#039; is the only one who has a &#039;&#039;serious, critical&#039;&#039; attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(1)&#039;&#039;&#039; The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(2)&#039;&#039;&#039; The establishment of &#039;&#039;true materialism&#039;&#039; and of &#039;&#039;real science,&#039;&#039; by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(3)&#039;&#039;&#039; His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts &lt;br /&gt;
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General|date=1844|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm|quote=Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Feuerbach&#039;s limitations as legacy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential legacy may be the clarity with which Marx and Engels identified his limitations. The &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[Theses on Feuerbach]]&#039;&#039;&#039; (1845) represent not a rejection of Feuerbach but a dialectical &#039;&#039;[[Aufhebung]],&#039;&#039; a simultaneous preservation, negation, and transcendence. Marx preserved Feuerbach&#039;s materialism, negated his contemplative passivity, and transcended both through the concept of revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach thus stands as both:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- An end point: The culmination of one philosophical tradition (contemplative, ahistorical materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- A beginning: The necessary stepping stone to another (dialectical, historical, revolutionary materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, Feuerbach&#039;s greatest contribution was not what he built, but what he made possible to build beyond him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1804 births]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1872 deaths]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:German philosophers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theologians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Young Hegelians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Mechanical materialism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87890</id>
		<title>Ludwig Feuerbach</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87890"/>
		<updated>2025-10-29T09:18:03Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox philosopher|name=Ludwig Feuerbach|birth_name=Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach|birth_date=28 July 1804|birth_place=Landshut, [[Electorate of Bavaria]]|death_date=13 September 1872 (aged 68)|death_place=Rechenberg, [[German Empire]]|nationality=German|school_tradition=[[Materialism]]|image=File:Feuerbach.jpg}}&#039;&#039;&#039;Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (28 July 1804 – 13 September 1872) was a German philosopher who played a crucial role in the development of [[materialism]]. His most significant contributions are his materialist critique of  [[Objective idealism|Hegelian idealism]] and his anthropological critique of [[religion]]. He represents the pinnacle of pre-[[Marxism|Marxist]] materialism and greatly influenced the [[Young Hegelians]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach played a crucial role in the development of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels|Engels&#039;]] philosophical thought, even as they ultimately moved beyond his limitations. By synthesizing Feuerbach&#039;s materialism and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]]&#039;s [[dialectics]] with their own ideas the pair were able to create [[dialectical materialism]] and [[historical materialism]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 4: Marx|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm|quote=The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Biography ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Early life and education ===&lt;br /&gt;
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born on 28 July 1804 in Landshut, [[Free State of Bavaria|Bavaria]], to noted jurist Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach. Ludwig was the fourth of five sons, in age order: Joseph the eldest became a archaeologist, Karl Wilhelm was a mathetician, Eduard August was a jurist and Friedrich was a philosgist and follower of Ludwig&#039;s philosophy. Feuerbach&#039;s upringing was priviliged and [[Liberalism|liberal]], and he received a government stipend as son of a civil servant.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xvii-xviii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach began his studies in theology at the University of Heidelberg in 1823, where he attended lectures by [[Heinrich Paulus]] and [[Karl Daub]]. Feuerbach was quickly repelled by the rationalized theology of Paulus, later describing it as a &amp;quot;web of sophisms&amp;quot;, and stopped attending the lectures. However, the Hegel influenced lectures of Daub inspired in him an interest in philosophy and the desire to head to [[State of Berlin|Berlin]], the centre of the Hegelians. In 1824, after problems with his fathers objections and police surveillance,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Following the [[Carlsbad Decrees]] of 1819 aimed at supressing the rising sentiment for [[German unification]], pressure on students increased.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he traveled to Berlin to attend the lectures of Hegel, as well as the theologians [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Philip Marheinekehe]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1825 he enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin but a year later he had to leave Berlin due to financial problems caused by his government stipend being cut off upon the death of Bavarian King [[Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria|Max Joseph]]. Returning to the University of Erlangen, Feurebach planned to study the natural natural sciences, attending lectures on physiology and anatomy to continue this goal, but his financial problems made continuing impossible. In 1828 he earned his doctural degree, &#039;&#039;De ratione una, universali, infinita&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;English:&#039;&#039;The One, Universal, and Infinite Reason&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an early work of Hegelianism that explored the concept of a single, universal, and infinite reason&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Philosophy ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of Hegelian Idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel&#039;s]] objective idealism, which posited that the [[Geist|Absolute Idea (Geist)]] was the foundation of reality. Instead, Feuerbach insisted that material, natural existence was primary, and that consciousness was derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His famous aphorism, &amp;quot;Der Mensch ist, was er isst&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;Man is what he eats&amp;quot;), is a succinct expression of this principle, emphasizing the literal, bodily basis of human life against the abstractions of idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|title=Die Naturwissenschaft und die Revolution|date=1850|url=https://www.ludwig-feuerbach.de/natur_rev.htm|quote=Der Mensch ist was er isst.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of Religion ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential work, &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[The Essence of Christianity]]&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (1841), argued that religion is a human creation, a projection of humanity&#039;s own nature onto an imaginary divine being. God is not the creator of man; rather, man creates God by externalizing and alienating his own human essence.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Essence of Christianity: PART I, The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chapter II. God as a Being of the Understanding|date=1841|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec02.htm|quote=RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Feuerbach, theology is merely anthropology in disguise. When humans worship God&#039;s love, wisdom, or justice, they are actually worshiping idealized human qualities projected outward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Critique ==&lt;br /&gt;
While Feuerbach broke with idealism, his materialism remained contemplative rather than practical, and [[Mechanical materialism|mechanical]] rather than [[Dialectics|dialectical]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contemplative, not practical materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach understood reality as an object of contemplation and perception, not as the product of human [[Subjectivity|practical activity]].&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the &#039;&#039;object or of contemplation&#039;&#039;, but not as &#039;&#039;sensuous human activity, practice&#039;&#039;, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the &#039;&#039;active&#039;&#039; side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach&#039;s materialism was passive, humans observe and contemplate nature but do not transform it through labor and practice. This meant Feuerbach could not understand that human consciousness and human nature itself are products of historical practice, not eternal givens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ahistorical and abstract conception of human nature ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach posited an eternal, unchanging human essence or &amp;quot;species-being&amp;quot; that exists outside of history and social relations. In contrast, Marx contended that &amp;quot;the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Feuerbach viewed human nature as a fixed essence rather than as historically produced through [[Relations of production|social relations]] and labor, he could not understand how different social structures, particularly [[Mode of production|modes of production]], shape human consciousness, create [[alienation]], and are subject to revolutionary transformation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Inability to grasp revolutionary practice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s contemplative materialism left him unable to understand the transformation of the world through revolutionary practice. Marx&#039;s eleventh and most famous thesis on Feuerbach emphasizes this:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach could critique religion intellectually, but he could not understand that religion would only be abolished through the revolutionary transformation of the material conditions that produce religious alienation, i.e., [[class society]] and [[exploitation]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Rejection of Dialectics&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s dialectics along with his idealism, throwing out the rational kernel with the mystical shell. He failed to develop a materialist dialectics. Without dialectics, Feuerbach could not grasp development, contradiction, and qualitative transformation, the tools necessary for understanding historical change and revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Legacy ==&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach occupies a unique and indispensable position in the history of philosophy: he represents both the culmination of pre-Marxist materialism and the necessary bridge to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. His influence on the development of Marxism is vast, even as Marx and Engels ultimately transcended his philosophical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Impact on Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s work had an immediate and profound impact on the Young Hegelians, providing the philosophical foundations for their break with Hegelian idealism. His &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;  (1841) arrived as a philosophical weapon that shattered the dominance of idealist philosophy in German thought. As Engels recalls in &#039;[[Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy|&#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&#039;&#039;]]&#039; (1886):&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Then came Feuerbach’s &#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[D]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[E]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 1: Hegel|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm|quote=Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the The Holy Family[E].}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Advancements ===&lt;br /&gt;
As Marx himself laid down, that the advancements of Feuerbach were of immense importance:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Feuerbach&#039;&#039; is the only one who has a &#039;&#039;serious, critical&#039;&#039; attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(1)&#039;&#039;&#039; The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(2)&#039;&#039;&#039; The establishment of &#039;&#039;true materialism&#039;&#039; and of &#039;&#039;real science,&#039;&#039; by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(3)&#039;&#039;&#039; His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts &lt;br /&gt;
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General|date=1844|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm|quote=Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Feuerbach&#039;s limitations as legacy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential legacy may be the clarity with which Marx and Engels identified his limitations. The &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[Theses on Feuerbach]]&#039;&#039;&#039; (1845) represent not a rejection of Feuerbach but a dialectical &#039;&#039;[[Aufhebung]],&#039;&#039; a simultaneous preservation, negation, and transcendence. Marx preserved Feuerbach&#039;s materialism, negated his contemplative passivity, and transcended both through the concept of revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach thus stands as both:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- An end point: The culmination of one philosophical tradition (contemplative, ahistorical materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- A beginning: The necessary stepping stone to another (dialectical, historical, revolutionary materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, Feuerbach&#039;s greatest contribution was not what he built, but what he made possible to build beyond him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1804 births]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1872 deaths]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:German philosophers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theologians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Young Hegelians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Mechanical materialism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87889</id>
		<title>Ludwig Feuerbach</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87889"/>
		<updated>2025-10-29T09:11:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox philosopher|name=Ludwig Feuerbach|birth_name=Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach|birth_date=28 July 1804|birth_place=Landshut, [[Electorate of Bavaria]]|death_date=13 September 1872 (aged 68)|death_place=Rechenberg, [[German Empire]]|nationality=German|school_tradition=[[Materialism]]|image=File:Feuerbach.jpg}}&#039;&#039;&#039;Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (28 July 1804 – 13 September 1872) was a German philosopher who played a crucial role in the development of [[materialism]]. His most significant contributions are his materialist critique of  [[Objective idealism|Hegelian idealism]] and his anthropological critique of [[religion]]. He represents the pinnacle of pre-[[Marxism|Marxist]] materialism and greatly influenced the [[Young Hegelians]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach played a crucial role in the development of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels|Engels&#039;]] philosophical thought, even as they ultimately moved beyond his limitations. By synthesizing Feuerbach&#039;s materialism and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]]&#039;s [[dialectics]] with their own ideas the pair were able to create [[dialectical materialism]] and [[historical materialism]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
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Part 4: Marx|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm|quote=The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
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Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)&lt;br /&gt;
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In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Biography ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Early life and education ===&lt;br /&gt;
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born on 28 July 1804 in Landshut, [[Free State of Bavaria|Bavaria]], to noted jurist Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach. Ludwig was the fourth of five sons, in age order: Joseph the eldest became a archaeologist, Karl Wilhelm was a mathetician, Eduard August was a jurist and Friedrich was a philosgist and follower of Ludwig&#039;s philosophy. Feuerbach&#039;s upringing was privaleged and [[Liberalism|liberal]], and he received a government stipend as son of a civil servant.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xvii-xviii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach began his studies in theology at the University of Heidelberg in 1823, where he attended lectures by [[Heinrich Paulus]] and [[Karl Daub]]. Feuerbach was quickly repelled by the rationalized theology of Paulus, later describing it as a &amp;quot;web of sophisms&amp;quot;, and stopped attending the lectures. However, the Hegel influenced lectures of Daub inspired in him an interest in philosophy and the desire to head to [[State of Berlin|Berlin]], the centre of the Hegelians. In 1824, after problems with his fathers objections and police surveillance,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Following the [[Carlsbad Decrees]] of 1819 aimed at supressing the rising sentiment for [[German unification]], pressure on students increased.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he traveled to Berlin to attend the lectures of Hegel, as well as the theologians [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Philip Marheinekehe]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
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In 1825 he enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin but a year later he had to leave Berlin due to financial problems caused by his government stipend being cut off upon the death of Bavarian King [[Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria|Max Joseph]]. Returning to the University of Erlangen, Feurebach planned to study the natural natural sciences, attending lectures on physiology and anatomy to continue this goal, but his financial problems made continuing impossible. In 1828 he earned his doctural degree, &#039;&#039;De ratione una, universali, infinita&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;English:&#039;&#039;The One, Universal, and Infinite Reason&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an early work of Hegelianism that explored the concept of a single, universal, and infinite reason&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Philosophy ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Critique of Hegelian Idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel&#039;s]] objective idealism, which posited that the [[Geist|Absolute Idea (Geist)]] was the foundation of reality. Instead, Feuerbach insisted that material, natural existence was primary, and that consciousness was derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
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His famous aphorism, &amp;quot;Der Mensch ist, was er isst&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;Man is what he eats&amp;quot;), is a succinct expression of this principle, emphasizing the literal, bodily basis of human life against the abstractions of idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|title=Die Naturwissenschaft und die Revolution|date=1850|url=https://www.ludwig-feuerbach.de/natur_rev.htm|quote=Der Mensch ist was er isst.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Critique of Religion ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach&#039;s most influential work, &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[The Essence of Christianity]]&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (1841), argued that religion is a human creation, a projection of humanity&#039;s own nature onto an imaginary divine being. God is not the creator of man; rather, man creates God by externalizing and alienating his own human essence.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Essence of Christianity: PART I, The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion&lt;br /&gt;
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Chapter II. God as a Being of the Understanding|date=1841|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec02.htm|quote=RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
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But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Feuerbach, theology is merely anthropology in disguise. When humans worship God&#039;s love, wisdom, or justice, they are actually worshiping idealized human qualities projected outward.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Critique ==&lt;br /&gt;
While Feuerbach broke with idealism, his materialism remained contemplative rather than practical, and [[Mechanical materialism|mechanical]] rather than [[Dialectics|dialectical]].&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Contemplative, not practical materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach understood reality as an object of contemplation and perception, not as the product of human [[Subjectivity|practical activity]].&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the &#039;&#039;object or of contemplation&#039;&#039;, but not as &#039;&#039;sensuous human activity, practice&#039;&#039;, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the &#039;&#039;active&#039;&#039; side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach&#039;s materialism was passive, humans observe and contemplate nature but do not transform it through labor and practice. This meant Feuerbach could not understand that human consciousness and human nature itself are products of historical practice, not eternal givens.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Ahistorical and abstract conception of human nature ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach posited an eternal, unchanging human essence or &amp;quot;species-being&amp;quot; that exists outside of history and social relations. In contrast, Marx contended that &amp;quot;the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
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To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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Because Feuerbach viewed human nature as a fixed essence rather than as historically produced through [[Relations of production|social relations]] and labor, he could not understand how different social structures, particularly [[Mode of production|modes of production]], shape human consciousness, create [[alienation]], and are subject to revolutionary transformation.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Inability to grasp revolutionary practice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s contemplative materialism left him unable to understand the transformation of the world through revolutionary practice. Marx&#039;s eleventh and most famous thesis on Feuerbach emphasizes this:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach could critique religion intellectually, but he could not understand that religion would only be abolished through the revolutionary transformation of the material conditions that produce religious alienation, i.e., [[class society]] and [[exploitation]].&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Rejection of Dialectics&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s dialectics along with his idealism, throwing out the rational kernel with the mystical shell. He failed to develop a materialist dialectics. Without dialectics, Feuerbach could not grasp development, contradiction, and qualitative transformation, the tools necessary for understanding historical change and revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Legacy ==&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach occupies a unique and indispensable position in the history of philosophy: he represents both the culmination of pre-Marxist materialism and the necessary bridge to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. His influence on the development of Marxism is vast, even as Marx and Engels ultimately transcended his philosophical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Impact on Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s work had an immediate and profound impact on the Young Hegelians, providing the philosophical foundations for their break with Hegelian idealism. His &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;  (1841) arrived as a philosophical weapon that shattered the dominance of idealist philosophy in German thought. As Engels recalls in &#039;[[Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy|&#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&#039;&#039;]]&#039; (1886):&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Then came Feuerbach’s &#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[D]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[E]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
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Part 1: Hegel|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm|quote=Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the The Holy Family[E].}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Advancements ===&lt;br /&gt;
As Marx himself laid down, that the advancements of Feuerbach were of immense importance:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Feuerbach&#039;&#039; is the only one who has a &#039;&#039;serious, critical&#039;&#039; attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;(1)&#039;&#039;&#039; The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;(2)&#039;&#039;&#039; The establishment of &#039;&#039;true materialism&#039;&#039; and of &#039;&#039;real science,&#039;&#039; by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
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&#039;&#039;&#039;(3)&#039;&#039;&#039; His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts &lt;br /&gt;
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General|date=1844|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm|quote=Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
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(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
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(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
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(3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Feuerbach&#039;s limitations as legacy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential legacy may be the clarity with which Marx and Engels identified his limitations. The &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[Theses on Feuerbach]]&#039;&#039;&#039; (1845) represent not a rejection of Feuerbach but a dialectical &#039;&#039;[[Aufhebung]],&#039;&#039; a simultaneous preservation, negation, and transcendence. Marx preserved Feuerbach&#039;s materialism, negated his contemplative passivity, and transcended both through the concept of revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach thus stands as both:&lt;br /&gt;
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- An end point: The culmination of one philosophical tradition (contemplative, ahistorical materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
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- A beginning: The necessary stepping stone to another (dialectical, historical, revolutionary materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
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In this sense, Feuerbach&#039;s greatest contribution was not what he built, but what he made possible to build beyond him.&lt;br /&gt;
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== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1804 births]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1872 deaths]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:German philosophers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theologians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Young Hegelians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Mechanical materialism]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87888</id>
		<title>Ludwig Feuerbach</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87888"/>
		<updated>2025-10-29T09:06:03Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: Completed the legacy section&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox philosopher|name=Ludwig Feuerbach|birth_name=Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach|birth_date=28 July 1804|birth_place=Landshut, [[Electorate of Bavaria]]|death_date=13 September 1872 (aged 68)|death_place=Rechenberg, [[German Empire]]|nationality=German|school_tradition=[[Materialism]]|image=File:Feuerbach.jpg}}&#039;&#039;&#039;Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (28 July 1804 – 13 September 1872) was a German philosopher who played a crucial role in the development of [[materialism]]. His most significant contributions are his materialist critique of  [[Objective idealism|Hegelian idealism]] and his anthropological critique of [[religion]]. He represents the pinnacle of pre-[[Marxism|Marxist]] materialism and greatly influenced the [[Young Hegelians]].&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach played a crucial role in the development of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels|Engels&#039;]] philosophical thought, even as they ultimately moved beyond his limitations. By synthesizing Feuerbach&#039;s materialism and [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]]&#039;s [[dialectics]] with their own ideas the pair were able to create [[dialectical materialism]] and [[historical materialism]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
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Part 4: Marx|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm|quote=The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Biography ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Early life and education ===&lt;br /&gt;
Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born on 28 July 1804 in Landshut, [[Free State of Bavaria|Bavaria]], to noted jurist Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach. Ludwig was the fourth of five sons, in age order: Joseph the eldest became a archaeologist, Karl Wilhelm was a mathetician, Eduard August was a jurist and Friedrich was a philosgist and follower of Ludwig&#039;s philosophy. Feuerbach&#039;s upringing was privaleged and [[Liberalism|liberal]], and he received a government stipend as son of a civil servant.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Citation|author=Wartofsky, Marx W|year=1977|title=Feuerbach|title-url=https://annas-archive.org/md5/1dd6a86129982cd6a288cd709df3f368|chapter=Feurbach&#039;s Life: A Brief Sketch|page=xvii-xviii|city=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach began his studies in theology at the University of Heidelberg in 1823, where he attended lectures by [[Heinrich Paulus]] and [[Karl Daub]]. Feuerbach was quickly repelled by the rationalized theology of Paulus, later describing it as a &amp;quot;web of sophisms&amp;quot;, and stopped attending the lectures. However, the Hegel influenced lectures of Daub inspired in him an interest in philosophy and the desire to head to [[State of Berlin|Berlin]], the centre of the Hegelians. In 1824, after problems with his fathers objections and police surveillance,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Following the [[Carlsbad Decrees]] of 1819 aimed at supressing the rising sentiment for [[German unification]], pressure on students increased.&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; he traveled to Berlin to attend the lectures of Hegel, as well as the theologians [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Philip Marheinekehe]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In 1825 he enrolled in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Berlin but a year later he had to leave Berlin due to financial problems caused by his government stipend being cut off upon the death of Bavarian King [[Maximilian I Joseph of Bavaria|Max Joseph]]. Returning to the University of Erlangen, Feurebach planned to study the natural natural sciences, attending lectures on physiology and anatomy to continue this goal, but his financial problems made continuing impossible. In 1828 he earned his doctural degree, &#039;&#039;De ratione una, universali, infinita&#039;&#039;,&amp;lt;ref group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot;&amp;gt;English:&#039;&#039;The One, Universal, and Infinite Reason&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; an early work of Hegelianism that explored the concept of a single, universal, and infinite reason&#039;&#039;.&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Philosophy ==&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of Hegelian Idealism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel&#039;s]] objective idealism, which posited that the [[Geist|Absolute Idea (Geist)]] was the foundation of reality. Instead, Feuerbach insisted that material, natural existence was primary, and that consciousness was derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
His famous aphorism, &amp;quot;Der Mensch ist, was er isst&amp;quot; (&amp;quot;Man is what he eats&amp;quot;), is a succinct expression of this principle, emphasizing the literal, bodily basis of human life against the abstractions of idealist philosophy.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|title=Die Naturwissenschaft und die Revolution|date=1850|url=https://www.ludwig-feuerbach.de/natur_rev.htm|quote=Der Mensch ist was er isst.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Critique of Religion ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential work, &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[The Essence of Christianity]]&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (1841), argued that religion is a human creation, a projection of humanity&#039;s own nature onto an imaginary divine being. God is not the creator of man; rather, man creates God by externalizing and alienating his own human essence.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Essence of Christianity: PART I, The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chapter II. God as a Being of the Understanding|date=1841|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec02.htm|quote=RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Feuerbach, theology is merely anthropology in disguise. When humans worship God&#039;s love, wisdom, or justice, they are actually worshiping idealized human qualities projected outward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Critique ==&lt;br /&gt;
While Feuerbach broke with idealism, his materialism remained contemplative rather than practical, and [[Mechanical materialism|mechanical]] rather than [[Dialectics|dialectical]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Contemplative, not practical materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach understood reality as an object of contemplation and perception, not as the product of human [[Subjectivity|practical activity]].&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the &#039;&#039;object or of contemplation&#039;&#039;, but not as &#039;&#039;sensuous human activity, practice&#039;&#039;, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the &#039;&#039;active&#039;&#039; side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach&#039;s materialism was passive, humans observe and contemplate nature but do not transform it through labor and practice. This meant Feuerbach could not understand that human consciousness and human nature itself are products of historical practice, not eternal givens.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Ahistorical and abstract conception of human nature ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach posited an eternal, unchanging human essence or &amp;quot;species-being&amp;quot; that exists outside of history and social relations. In contrast, Marx contended that &amp;quot;the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.&amp;quot;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Because Feuerbach viewed human nature as a fixed essence rather than as historically produced through [[Relations of production|social relations]] and labor, he could not understand how different social structures, particularly [[Mode of production|modes of production]], shape human consciousness, create [[alienation]], and are subject to revolutionary transformation.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Inability to grasp revolutionary practice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s contemplative materialism left him unable to understand the transformation of the world through revolutionary practice. Marx&#039;s eleventh and most famous thesis on Feuerbach emphasizes this:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach could critique religion intellectually, but he could not understand that religion would only be abolished through the revolutionary transformation of the material conditions that produce religious alienation, i.e., [[class society]] and [[exploitation]].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Rejection of Dialectics&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s dialectics along with his idealism, throwing out the rational kernel with the mystical shell. He failed to develop a materialist dialectics. Without dialectics, Feuerbach could not grasp development, contradiction, and qualitative transformation, the tools necessary for understanding historical change and revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Legacy ==&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach occupies a unique and indispensable position in the history of philosophy: he represents both the culmination of pre-Marxist materialism and the necessary bridge to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. His influence on the development of Marxism is vast, even as Marx and Engels ultimately transcended his philosophical limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== &#039;&#039;&#039;Impact on Marx and Engels&#039;&#039;&#039; ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s work had an immediate and profound impact on the Young Hegelians, providing the philosophical foundations for their break with Hegelian idealism. His &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;  (1841) arrived as a philosophical weapon that shattered the dominance of idealist philosophy in German thought. As Engels recalls in &#039;[[Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy|&#039;&#039;Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&#039;&#039;]]&#039; (1886):&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Then came Feuerbach’s &#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[D]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[E]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 1: Hegel|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm|quote=Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the The Holy Family[E].}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Advancements ===&lt;br /&gt;
As Marx himself laid down, that the advancements of Feuerbach were of immense importance:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;Feuerbach&#039;&#039; is the only one who has a &#039;&#039;serious, critical&#039;&#039; attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(1)&#039;&#039;&#039; The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(2)&#039;&#039;&#039; The establishment of &#039;&#039;true materialism&#039;&#039; and of &#039;&#039;real science,&#039;&#039; by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;(3)&#039;&#039;&#039; His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts &lt;br /&gt;
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General|date=1844|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm|quote=Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical attitude to the Hegelian dialectic and who has made genuine discoveries in this field. He is in fact the true conqueror of the old philosophy. The extent of his achievement, and the unpretentious simplicity with which he, Feuerbach, gives it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the opposite attitude [of the others].&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach’s great achievement is:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form and manner of existence of the estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(2) The establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of “man to man” the basic principle of the theory;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
(3) His opposing to the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Feuerbach&#039;s limitations as legacy ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s most influential legacy may be the clarity with which Marx and Engels identified his limitations. The &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[Theses on Feuerbach]]&#039;&#039;&#039; (1845) represent not a rejection of Feuerbach but a dialectical &#039;&#039;[[Aufhebung]],&#039;&#039; a simultaneous preservation, negation, and transcendence. Marx preserved Feuerbach&#039;s materialism, negated his contemplative passivity, and transcended both through the concept of revolutionary practice.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach thus stands as both:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- An end point: The culmination of one philosophical tradition (contemplative, ahistorical materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- A beginning: The necessary stepping stone to another (dialectical, historical, revolutionary materialism)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this sense, Feuerbach&#039;s greatest contribution was not what he built, but what he made possible to build beyond him.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
=== Notes ===&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references group=&amp;quot;lower-alpha&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1804 births]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:1872 deaths]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:German philosophers]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Theologians]]&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Young Hegelians]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
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		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Ludwig_Feuerbach&amp;diff=87882</id>
		<title>Ludwig Feuerbach</title>
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		<updated>2025-10-27T12:42:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Comrade Kiwi: Done with the entire Feuerbach article, reworked it thoroughly.&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;&#039;&#039;&#039;Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach&#039;&#039;&#039; (1804–1872) was a German philosopher who developed a [[Materialism|materialist]] critique of [[religion]] and [[Objective idealism|Hegelian idealism]]. Feuerbach represents the pinnacle of pre-[[Marxism|Marxist]] materialism and played a crucial role in the development of [[Karl Marx|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels|Engels&#039;]] philosophical thought, even as they ultimately moved beyond his limitations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Feuerbach&#039;s philosophy ==&lt;br /&gt;
Materialism against Hegelian idealism: Feuerbach rejected [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel&#039;s]] objective idealism, which posited that the [[Geist|Absolute Idea (Geist)]] was the foundation of reality. Instead, Feuerbach insisted that material, natural existence was primary, and that consciousness was derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
As Feuerbach famously declared, &amp;quot;Man is what he eats&amp;quot; (Der Mensch ist was er isst), emphasizing, literally, the material, bodily basis of human existence against [[Idealism|idealist]] abstractions.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|title=Die Naturwissenschaft und die Revolution|date=1850|url=https://www.ludwig-feuerbach.de/natur_rev.htm|quote=Der Mensch ist was er isst.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Critique of religion: Feuerbach&#039;s most influential work, &#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039;[[The Essence of Christianity]]&#039;&amp;lt;nowiki/&amp;gt;&#039;&#039; (1841), argued that religion is a human creation, a projection of humanity&#039;s own nature onto an imaginary divine being. God is not the creator of man; rather, man creates God by externalizing and alienating his own human essence.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Ludwig Feuerbach|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Essence of Christianity: PART I, The True or Anthropological Essence of Religion&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Chapter II. God as a Being of the Understanding|date=1841|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec02.htm|quote=RELIGION is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself God is not what man is – man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature. Hence it must be shown that this antithesis, this differencing of God and man, with which religion begins, is a differencing of man with his own nature.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;For Feuerbach, theology is merely anthropology in disguise. When humans worship God&#039;s love, wisdom, or justice, they are actually worshiping idealized human qualities projected outward.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Marx and Engels&#039; engagement with Feuerbach ==&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach greatly influenced the [[Young Hegelians]], including Marx and Engels. His materialism provided the philosophical weapon to overthrow Hegelian idealism. As Engels recalled:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Then came Feuerbach’s &#039;&#039;Essence of Christianity&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[D]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the &#039;&#039;The Holy Family&#039;&#039;&amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;[E]&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 1: Hegel|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm|quote=Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity[D]. With one blow, it pulverized the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. The spell was broken; the “system” was exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians. How enthusiastically Marx greeted the new conception and how much — in spite of all critical reservations — he was influenced by it, one may read in the The Holy Family[E].}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;However, Marx and Engels quickly moved beyond Feuerbach, recognizing the limitations of his materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Limitations of Feuerbach&#039;s materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
While Feuerbach broke with idealism, his materialism remained contemplative rather than practical, and [[Mechanical materialism|mechanical]] rather than [[Dialectics|dialectical]].&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Contemplative, not practical materialism ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach understood reality as an object of contemplation and perception, not as the product of human [[Subjectivity|practical activity]].&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the &#039;&#039;object or of contemplation&#039;&#039;, but not as &#039;&#039;sensuous human activity, practice&#039;&#039;, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the &#039;&#039;active&#039;&#039; side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach&#039;s materialism was passive, humans observe and contemplate nature but do not transform it through labor and practice. This meant Feuerbach could not understand that human consciousness and human nature itself are products of historical practice, not eternal givens.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Ahistorical and abstract conception of human nature ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach posited an eternal, unchanging human essence or &amp;quot;species-being&amp;quot; that exists outside of history and social relations.&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
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* Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual.&lt;br /&gt;
Essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as “genus”, as an internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Because Feuerbach viewed human nature as a fixed essence rather than as historically produced through [[Relations of production|social relations]] and labor, he could not understand:&lt;br /&gt;
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- How different [[Mode of production|modes of production]] create different forms of consciousness.&lt;br /&gt;
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- How class society produces [[alienation]].&lt;br /&gt;
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- How revolutionary transformation of society transforms human nature itself.&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Inability to grasp revolutionary practice ===&lt;br /&gt;
Feuerbach&#039;s contemplative materialism left him unable to understand the transformation of the world through revolutionary practice. Marx&#039;s eleventh and most famous thesis on Feuerbach emphasizes this:&amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Karl Marx|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Theses On Feuerbach|date=1845|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htm|quote=The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;Feuerbach could critique religion intellectually, but he could not understand that religion would only be abolished through the revolutionary transformation of the material conditions that produce religious alienation, i.e., [[class society]] and [[exploitation]].&lt;br /&gt;
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=== Mechanical, not dialectical ===&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach rejected Hegel&#039;s dialectics along with his idealism, throwing out the rational kernel with the mystical shell. He failed to develop a materialist dialectics. Without dialectics, Feuerbach could not grasp development, contradiction, and qualitative transformation, the tools necessary for understanding historical change and revolution.&lt;br /&gt;
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== From Feuerbach to historical materialism ==&lt;br /&gt;
Marx and Engels synthesized Feuerbach&#039;s materialism with Hegel&#039;s dialectics to create [[dialectical materialism]] and [[historical materialism]].&lt;br /&gt;
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From Feuerbach, they took:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The materialist critique of idealism.&lt;br /&gt;
* The understanding that consciousness is derived from material being.&lt;br /&gt;
* The critique of religion as human self-alienation.&lt;br /&gt;
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From Hegel, they took:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* The dialectical method (development through contradiction).&lt;br /&gt;
* The historical approach.&lt;br /&gt;
* The understanding that consciousness is active, not passive.&lt;br /&gt;
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What they added:&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
* Practice as the basis of cognition and the criterion of truth.&lt;br /&gt;
* Labor and production as the foundation of human existence and history.&lt;br /&gt;
* [[Class struggle]] as the motor of historical development.&lt;br /&gt;
* Revolutionary transformation as the goal of philosophy. &amp;lt;blockquote&amp;gt;The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned. Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the &#039;&#039;Logic&#039;&#039; and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. &amp;lt;sup&amp;gt;(2)&amp;lt;/sup&amp;gt;  In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade &#039;&#039;things&#039;&#039;, but as a complex of &#039;&#039;processes&#039;&#039;, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. &amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Web citation|author=Frederick Engels|newspaper=Marxists.org|title=Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Part 4: Marx|date=1886|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch04.htm|quote=The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world — nature and history — just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist fancy which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently — at least in its basic features — in all domains of knowledge concerned.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist — unknown where — from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it “alienates” itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man’s consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/blockquote&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== Historical significance ==&lt;br /&gt;
Despite his limitations, Feuerbach played a crucial transitional role:&lt;br /&gt;
- He demolished Hegelian idealism and restored materialism to philosophy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
- He provided Marx and Engels with the initial materialist framework they would develop into historical materialism.&lt;br /&gt;
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- His critique of religion as alienation influenced Marx&#039;s theory of alienation under capitalism.&lt;br /&gt;
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- He represents the highest point pre-Marxist materialism could reach before it required dialectics and revolutionary practice to advance further.&lt;br /&gt;
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Feuerbach thus stands as both the culmination of one philosophical tradition (contemplative materialism) and the necessary stepping stone to another (dialectical and historical materialism). To understand Marx, one must understand both what Marx learned from Feuerbach and what Marx added that Feuerbach could not conceive.&lt;br /&gt;
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== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Comrade Kiwi</name></author>
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