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		<id>https://prole.wiki/w/index.php?title=Recep_Tayyip_Erdo%C4%9Fan&amp;diff=88388</id>
		<title>Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</title>
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		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;159.146.8.235: Vastly developed the page and made it relevant to today.&lt;/p&gt;
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&lt;div&gt;{{Stub}}{{Infobox politician|name=Recep Tayyip Erdoğan|birth_date=26 February 1954 (age 71)|birth_place=Beyoğlu, İstanbul, [[Turkey]]|nationality=Turkish|political_orientation=[[Islamism]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;[[Neoliberalism]]&amp;lt;br&amp;gt;Right-wing [[populism]]|political_party=[[Justice and Development Party|Justice and Development]]|image=Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ukraine.jpg}}&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
&#039;&#039;&#039;Recep Tayyip Erdoğan&#039;&#039;&#039; is a [[Turkish]] [[far-right]] politician who is serving as President since 2014 and is currently holding an unconstitutional third term due to controversial legal reinterpretations&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bianet - [https://bianet.org/haber/presidential-term-limits-don-t-apply-to-erdogan-top-election-body-concludes-276802 Presidential term limits don&#039;t apply to Erdoğan, top election body concludes.]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and his dubious university diploma.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Turkish Minute - [https://turkishminute.com/2023/03/24/controversy-over-erdogan-university-degree-reignited-ahead-of-election/ Controversy over Erdoğan’s university degree reignited ahead of elections]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Previously, he was Prime Minister from 2003 to 2014. Erdoğan is the founder and leading figure of the [[Justice and Development Party|Justice and Development Party (AKP)]], an organization combining [[Islamism]], [[conservative]] [[liberalism]], and [[neoliberal]] economy. Under his leadership, [[Republic of Türkiye|Turkey]] transitioned from a parliamentary system to a centralized presidential regime characterized by executive dominance and declining institutional checks.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;Jacobin - [https://jacobin.com/2025/03/turkey-erdogan-imamoglu-imprisonment-authoritarianism &amp;quot;Turkey’s Authoritarian Turn&amp;quot;] by Barış Özkul&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Early life ==&lt;br /&gt;
Erdoğan was born in 1954 in İstanbul. He emerged politically within the [[Islamist]] National Outlook &#039;&#039;(Turkish: Milli Görüş)&#039;&#039; movement, becoming mayor of Istanbul in 1994. His brief imprisonment in 1999 elevated his status among [[conservative]] voters. In 2001, Erdoğan co-founded the [[Justice and Development Party|AKP]], framing it as a moderate split from earlier [[Islamist]] parties while maintaining continuity with their ideological outlook.&lt;br /&gt;
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== Rise to power ==&lt;br /&gt;
The [[Justice and Development Party|AKP]] came to power in 2002 amid economic crisis and political division. Erdoğan’s early period was marked by promises of democratization, [[European Union]] reforms, and economic stabilization. This phase allowed the AKP to build legitimacy among [[liberal]] segments and international institutions while simultaneously consolidating a loyal [[conservative]] base and expanding its influence within the state apparatus.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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During its ascent, the [[Justice and Development Party|AKP]] initiated a strong [[Neoliberalism|neoliberal]] program that fundamentally restructured [[Turkey]]’s political economy in favor of capital. The party accelerated [[Privatization|privatizations]] on an unprecedented scale, selling off state enterprises in energy, mining, transportation, and telecommunications to domestic conglomerates and foreign investors. This process dismantled [[public ownership]] and transferred strategic sectors into the hands of a newly empowered [[bourgeoisie]] closely tied to the [[Justice and Development Party|AKP]] leadership. [[Labor rights]] were systematically weakened: unions faced restrictive legislation, strikes were routinely banned “for [[national security]],” and precarious subcontracted work became the norm across both public and [[Private ownership|private sectors]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jacobin - [https://jacobin.com/2022/03/erdogan-turkey-akp-privatization-electricity-tenders-isparta In Erdoğan’s Turkey, Privatization Means Corruption and Collapsed Infrastructure] by Erin O’Brien&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duvar English - [https://www.duvarenglish.com/president-erdogan-the-worlds-biggest-real-estate-agent-news-57329 &#039;President Erdoğan: The world&#039;s biggest real estate agent&#039;]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;sendika.org - [https://sendika.org/2017/10/akpnin-milli-gorus-gomlegi-neoliberalizm-ile-deli-gomlegine-donustu-451222 “AKP’nin Milli Görüş gömleği, neoliberalizm ile deli gömleğine dönüştü”]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Consolidating power ==&lt;br /&gt;
Erdoğan was largely perceived as a reformist and relatively [[liberal]]-leaning figure during his early period. The 2013 [[Gezi Park protests]] began in response to the Taksim Pedestrianization Project and its destructive impact on the natural environment of Gezi Park. When demonstrators opposed the project, the [[Justice and Development Party|AKP]] refused dialogue and rapidly deployed police forces against peaceful protestors, which escalated the situation into nationwide protests across [[Turkey]]. Erdoğan claimed that the uprising was a [[Soros]]-backed [[color revolution]],&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Gazete Duvar - [https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/erdogandan-kavala-aciklamasi-bu-adam-gezi-olaylarinin-perde-arkasindaydi-haber-1562573 Erdoğan&#039;dan Kavala açıklaması: Bu adam Gezi olaylarının perde arkasındaydı]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; while independent reports and on-the-ground observations showed that the protests were an organic, spontaneous reaction of the population against the increasing authoritarian tendencies of Erdoğan’s government.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Pen International - [https://www.pen-international.org/research/the-gezi-park-protests Turkey: The Gezi Park Protests]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;soL haber - [https://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/boyun-egmeyenlerin-buyuk-direnisi-iste-gun-gun-gezi-parki-direnisi-74230 &amp;quot;Boyun eğmeyenlerin büyük direnişi: İşte gün gün Gezi Parkı direnişi&amp;quot;]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;openDemocracy - [https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/gezi-park-occupation-confronting-authoritarian-neoliberalism/ The Gezi Park occupation: confronting authoritarian neoliberalism] by Cemal Burak Tansel&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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After the Gezi Park protests, Erdoğan accelerated a decade-long shift toward authoritarian rule. The collapse of the [[Kurdish]] peace process in 2015, intensified police operations in the southeast, and the government’s growing control over courts and media marked a decisive end to the [[Justice and Development Party|AKP]]’s reformist image. The [[2016 coup attempt]] provided the pretext for a sweeping [[state of emergency]], enabling mass purges, the closure of critical media outlets, and the restructuring of state institutions under executive authority. In 2017, a tightly controlled [[referendum]] replaced the parliamentary system with a centralized, unchecked, unbalanced presidential regime, granting Erdoğan expansive decree powers and direct influence over the judiciary. Throughout the late 2010s and early 2020s, opposition leaders were imprisoned, elected [[Kurdish]] mayors were removed and replaced with state-appointed trustees, and electoral conditions deteriorated as pro-government media monopolized the public sphere. By 2023, [[Turkey]] had effectively transformed into a consolidated hybrid authoritarian system centered on Erdoğan’s presidency, with sharply reduced civil liberties, politicized courts, and limited space for [[democratic]] opposition.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;HRW - [https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/turkey-authoritarian-drift-undermines-rights Turkey: Authoritarian Drift Undermines Rights]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duvar English - [https://www.duvarenglish.com/politics/2020/04/30/turkey-a-de-facto-dictatorship-bertelsmann-stiftung-transformation-index Turkey a &#039;de facto dictatorship&#039;: Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;soL Haber - [https://haber.sol.org.tr/haber/diktator-erdogan-ve-boyun-egme-pankartlari-suc-sayildi-esila-ayik-dahil-uc-ogrencinin-hapsi &#039;Diktatör Erdoğan&#039; ve &#039;Boyun Eğme&#039; pankartları suç sayıldı: Esila Ayık dahil üç öğrencinin hapsi istendi]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== Ongoing opposition crackdowns ==&lt;br /&gt;
In the aftermath of the 2024 local elections, the [[Justice and Development Party|AKP]] experienced a historic electoral setback, falling to second place for the first time since its rise to power. The main opposition party, the [[Republican People&#039;s Party|CHP]], secured a sweeping victory in major metropolitan areas through a successful [[Left-wing politics|left-wing]] [[Populism|populist]] campaign that reclaimed significant urban cities from the ruling bloc. Faced with the loss of political and economic control in key municipalities, Erdoğan began a new phase of intensified persecution targeting opposition-held local governments.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;BBC - [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68704375 Turkish local elections: Opposition stuns Erdogan with historic victory] &amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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While the appointment of state trustees to municipalities governed by [[Kurds|Kurdish]] parties had long been a standard instrument of [[Justice and Development Party|AKP]] rule, the extension of this practice to the country’s founding opposition party marked an escalation in authoritarian consolidation. In March 2025, İstanbul Mayor [[Ekrem İmamoğlu]]—who had recently announced his presidential campaign—was detained and later imprisoned under the pretext of a [[corruption]] investigation. Although the government framed these actions as anti-corruption measures, no comparable inquiries were launched into the AKP’s own long-standing corruption scandals.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;wsws.org - [https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2024/11/01/cwqk-n01.html Erdogan government arrests Kurdish CHP mayor in Istanbul] by Barış Demir&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;wsws.org - [https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/02/11/nnev-f11.html Turkish government escalates crackdown against CHP and DEM Party]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;wsws.org - [https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/03/19/mmjs-m19.html Erdogan’s main rival, İstanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu detained by police]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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The crackdown triggered protests centered in İstanbul’s Saraçhane—where İstanbul Municipality&#039;s HQ is—which briefly revived opposition mobilization but failed to achieve the scale or momentum of the 2013 [[Gezi Park protests|Gezi Park uprising]]. By early 2025, the pattern of arrests, trustee appointments, and legal harassment against opposition leaders signaled a new stage of political repression, reinforcing assessments that [[Turkey]] had entered a deeply [[authoritarian]], if not openly [[fascist]], phase under Erdoğan’s rule.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Jacobin - [https://jacobin.com/2025/03/turkey-erdogan-imamoglu-chp-protests The Unlikely Resistance in Turkey] by Cihan Tuğal&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
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== &amp;quot;Family Year&amp;quot; ==&lt;br /&gt;
In 2025, Erdoğan expanded crackdown beyond the political sphere and into everyday social life by declaring a so-called “Family Year,” signaling a transition toward a more overtly reactionary moral governance resembling the cultural authoritarianism seen in [[Putin|Putin&#039;s]] [[Russia]].&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot;&amp;gt;KaosGL - [https://kaosgl.org/en/single-news/erdogan-targeted-lgbti-individuals-at-the-international-family-forum-and-declared-the-2026-2035-period-as-the-decade-of-family-and-population Erdoğan targeted LGBTI+ individuals at the International Family Forum and declared the 2026-2035 period as the “Decade of Family and Population”]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Although Erdoğan once claimed in 2002 that the rights of [[LGBTQ+]] individuals should be protected,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bianet - [https://bianet.org/haber/erdogan-escinsel-haklari-guvenceye-alinmali-demisti-226570 Erdoğan “Eşcinsel hakları güvenceye alınmalı” demişti]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; his administration has since undergone a dramatic ideological regression. By 2025, state discourse centered on openly antagonizing [[LGBTQ+]] communities, criminalizing their public existence, and framing them as threats to the nation and family.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Duvar English - [https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkeys-year-of-family-becomes-year-against-lgbti-news-65764 Turkey’s year of family becomes ‘year against LGBTI+]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The government introduced new restrictions on [[Transgender|trans]] healthcare,&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Bianet - [https://bianet.org/haber/bakanlik-translarin-hormona-erisimine-21-yas-siniri-getirdi-308905 Bakanlık, transların hormona erişimine 21 yaş sınırı getirdi]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; moved to enforce rigid gender norms with near-[[Theocracy|theocratic]] severity, and prepared a judicial package aimed at policing social behavior along conservative religious lines.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;HRW - [https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/29/turkiye-draft-law-threatens-lgbt-people-with-prison Türkiye:  Draft Law Threatens LGBT People with Prison]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Women’s bodily autonomy faced further erosion as the state intensified control over reproductive rights, including a ban on elective Caesarean deliveries.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;Rudaw - [https://www.rudaw.net/turkish/middleeast/turkey/200420254 Sağlık Bakanlığından karar: Planlı sezaryen yasaklandı]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;DW - [https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-womens-rights-activists-criticize-year-of-the-family/a-71482348 Turkey: Women&#039;s rights activists slam &#039;Year of the family&#039;]&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Through these policies, the Erdoğan regime sought to reverse decades of [[civil rights]] gains and entrench a [[Social conservatism|socially conservative]] order that restricts personal freedoms and imposes its ideological vision on the entire population.&lt;br /&gt;
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== References ==&lt;br /&gt;
&amp;lt;references /&amp;gt;&lt;br /&gt;
[[Category:Current heads of state]]&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
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